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The WTO dispute settlement system has significantly improved the 
position of developing countries in the international trade arena 
over that which applied under its predecessor, the GATT dispute 
mechanism. However, while developing countries do not hesitate to 
evaluate the system positively, they are still facing certain 
difficulties, so that they cannot participate in it with full effect. The 
participation of developing countries in the WTO dispute settlement 
system is of great importance, since international trade regulations 
are developed there, and it is essential to safeguard their interests 
in the long run. In this respect, the procedural concerns of 
developing countries accompanied with the effect of the WTO 
decision making and jurisprudence on the development objectives 
of developing countries will be analysed. 
The position of developing countries in system is certainly in need of 
review so that solutions can be identified and adopted. Solutions for 
reform are presented here in order to help developing countries to 
use the system effectively. One of the evolving issues that have 
stimulated a real debate among WTO members is the reform of third 
party rights. The aim of this research is to analyse the importance of 
such rights for developing counties, showing how exercising them 
more widely could give developing counties a real insight into the 
functioning of the DSM and allow them to familiarise themselves 
with the system. However, third party rights are often unclear and 
sometimes confusing; hence, proposals for reform of third party 
rights in both the consultation stage and the panel/AB processes will 
be evaluated with particular reference to developing countries. 
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1.1 Background to the Study 
On taking up his post in 1999, Mike Moore, the former Director- 
General of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) stated that "No other 
issue is as important as addressing the plight of the poor nations"'. 
The basis of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is framed in 
Articles XXII and XXIII. These are the two provisions on which the 
GATT dispute settlement mechanism was developed, although there 
was no explicit reference to the term "dispute settlement'. The General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was intended as a provisional 
agreement for tariff negotiations in anticipation of the Havana 
Chartere, which was to govern detailed dispute settlement 
proceedings. Despite the fact that developing countries accounted for 
about half of the twenty-three members of GATT, there were no 
specific rules concerning them3. These countries, therefore, had no 
confidence in the reliability of the dispute settlement system during 
the GATT period. Thus, developing countries rarely used the GATT 
dispute settlement process4. 
1 Hansel T. Pham, 'Developing Countries and the WTO: The Need for More Mediation 
in the DSU, (2004), 9 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 331, p. 333. 
2 The International Trade Organization (ITO) did not come into existence due to the 
refusal of the United States Congress to approve it. 
3 Hansel T. Pham, note 1, p. 333. 
4 TRADE Working Paper: 'Issues Regarding the Review of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism', (1999), available online at 
http: //www south centre. org/publications/trade/dispute. pdf, last seen on 01-07-07 at 
10am, p. ii. 
In contrast, the WTO dispute settlement system has achieved a certain 
level of trust among developing countries. However, it has not 
obscured the fact that certain of these countries are the main 
participants in the dispute settlement system. This issue requires a 
reform of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) to guarantee 
that developing countries benefit more from the dispute mechanisms 
and that it does not work against their interests5. Various developing 
countries still have faith that the current system can be enhanced in 
order to utilize the system more efficiently to protect their rights under 
the covered agreements. 
The review of the DSU started in 1999 and all deadlines have been 
missed so far. Surprisingly, developing countries have participated 
effectively in the review process and several proposals have been 
introduced. Third party rights have proved to be a source of 
controversy among WTO members. This research will contribute to the 
current debate concerning the reform of the DSU, by analyzing the 
reform of third party rights with special reference to developing 
countries. 
1.2 Objectives and Scope of the Study 
A key concern regarding development vis-a-vis trade agreements in 
general is the disparity in benefits derived from the international 
trading system between developing and developed countries. 6 Despite 
the objective of the WTO being the enhancement of development 
5 Developing countries have submitted significant proposals and suggestions during 
official sessions on the DSM expressing concerns and putting forward ideas for 
reform. 
6 M. Bulajic, Principles of International Law, (Martin Nijhoff, Second Edition, 1993), 
pp. 3-4. 
through trade, 7 the continued lack of equal distribution of benefits 
arising from the international trading system has become a major 
obstacle to developing countries. 8 The main advantage the WTO has 
over other international trade forums is its dispute settlement 
mechanism, which makes commitments undertaken by members 
binding. 9 However, there has been growing concern that a certain bias 
concerning the application of the WTO dispute settlement has 
influenced poorer members' decisions not to participate in the 
process. 1° Such a situation would eventually create circumspection 
regarding the regulation of new areas of international trade, leading to 
an overall welfare loss. The credibility of the DSU is, therefore, a 
crucial element in achieving the developmental objectives of the WTO. 
Developing countries have been highly critical of several issues. These 
include special and differential treatment, third party participation and 
the enforcement process. It is also the case that developing countries 
do not have enough legal experts in the matter of WTO law, and that 
they cannot bear the financial costs of bringing a dispute. Indeed, 
developing countries are not economically strong enough to be the 
main party in a dispute. Third party participation is vital for developing 
countries in order for them to become familiar with the dispute 
settlement system, and to have an opportunity to present their 
arguments and points of view. This would strengthen their position 
' Paragraphs 1-3 of the preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organisation 1994. 
8 B. Balassa and C. Michalopoulosin, 'Liberalising Trade Between Developed and 
Developing Countries', (1986), 20(1) Journal of World Trade 3. 
' J. Jackson, The World Trade Organisation: Constitution and Jurisprudence, (The 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998), pp. 11-12. 
10 C. Bown, 'Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants, Interested 
Parties and Free Riders', Brandies University, USA, (September 2003), available at 
http: //people brandies. edu/Ncbown/papers/free-ride. pdf, last seen on 19-11-2008 
at 2: 50 pm. 
until a real improvement takes place in their economic and legal 
power. 
This study seeks to examine the nexus between these two central 
developments in the current international trading system: the position 
of developing countries in the WTO dispute mechanism and third party 
rights. This study analyzes the difficulties facing developing countries 
in the DSM and links with third party rights in the DSU, to demonstrate 
that developing countries' participation as third parties is an important 
tool that ought to be used on a regular basis. It then addresses third 
party rights in the consultative process, arguing that greater rights for 
developing countries as third parties are needed at this stage. Specific 
reform proposals that could be adopted in the DSU are also dealt with. 
Third party rights at the panel/appeal stage are then examined. It is 
argued that such rights are unclear, confusing and in need of 
strengthening. This argument is accompanied by detailed proposals for 
reform of the DSU. 
1.3 Importance and Justification of the Study 
Since the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) is the distinguishing 
feature of the WTO, there is a growing debate as to whether it 
provides the required environment for members to participate 
effectively in the system. The present study will conduct a critical 
review of the DSM and explore the current debate on how third party 
participation could be enhanced in order to strengthen the 
participation of developing countries. This is accompanied by an 
analytical emphasis on the fundamental issue of development and the 
need for a fairer distribution of international trade to improve the 
credibility and effectiveness of the multilateral trading system. In the 
meantime, developing countries ought to be creative and seize any 
4 
opportunity to participate as third parties. However, they will not 
become main players in the conduct of international trade unless 
development targets are realised. Therefore, the original contribution 
of this research will be accomplished by analysing and explaining the 
application and reform of third party rules in the WTO dispute 
settlement system. 
In sum, there is a call for reform of the DSM in favour of developing 
countries. Meanwhile, practice and the formal review process of the 
WTO dispute settlement system have revealed the need for the reform 
of third party rights. However, there is a research gap in this regard, 
as third party rights have not been looked at in connection with 
developing countries. The aim of this research is to fill this gap by 
conducting a politically independent analysis of the reform of third 
party rights with special reference to developing countries. Now is an 
appropriate time to judge its width and depth. 
1.4 Research Questions 
The reliability of the DSU is consequently an essential element in 
achieving the developmental aims of the WTO. There are a number of 
concerns relating to the DSU in this regard. 
Question 1: What are the uncertainties concerning special and 
differential treatment provisions? 
Developing countries have introduced criticisms during the review of 
the DSU, concerning their efficient engagement in the proceedings of 
the dispute system and uncertainty about the way in which the special 
and differential treatment rules are applied. They have complained 
that specific articles concerning special and differential treatment are 
5 
not expressed explicitly, and so need to be reconsidered. While the 
terms 'shall' and "should' are used, it is argued that it is by no means 
guaranteed that these provisions can be applied to developing 
countries in reality". It is regarded as uncertain that these special 
provisions will actually be applied, since they are merely hortatory, not 
compulsory 12. 
Question 2: Do developing countries lack the financial means and 
expertise to address their rights and high costs? 
The disparity in the ability that the various WTO members have to 
bring disputes or to act as respondents, means that the WTO dispute 
mechanism is far from providing a "level playing field i13. The current 
dispute settlement system is regarded as too costly, since significant 
human and monetary resources are required to arrange and pursue a 
dispute from consultation to the appeal process, over a period of time 
which may be as long as three years. Developing countries, because 
they lack the proficiencies required to participate in such complicated 
and extended legal procedures, have no alternative to employing 
skilled legal specialists from developed countries14 
11 Note by the Secretariat, Concerns Regarding Special and Differential Treatment 
Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions, WT/COMTD/W/66 (16 February 2000), 
p. 31. 
12 For instance, Article 8.10 states that "When a dispute is between a developing 
country Member and a developed country Member the panel shall, if the developing 
country Member so requests, include at least one panellist from a developing country 
Member". 
13 Beatrice Chaytor, 'Dispute Settlement under the GATT/WTO: The experience of 
Developing Nations', in James Cameron & Karen Campbell(eds), Dispute Resolution 
in the World Trade Organization, (Cameron May Ltd, London, 1998), p. 267. 
14 TRADE, note 4, p. 23. 
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Question 3: Do developing countries need the implementation of a 
new WTO dispute settlement system? 
A key criticism made by developing countries is the impediment to the 
implementation of the rulings of a panel or the Appellate Body (AB) 
against a developed country member. Even where the AB rules that a 
particular trade measure taken by the respondent is in breach of the 
complainant's WTO rights, the WTO has no power to oblige the 
violating member to abolish the measure in question, or even to 
deliver an obligation to bring the inconsistent measure to an end. 
Instead, the DSU implements its rulings mainly by authorizing the 
winning member to set up retaliatory trade barriers against the 
violating member until the latter chooses to meet the terms of the 
decision. Since retaliation worsens the matter by diminishing the 
benefits of trade for the disputing members, and can indeed have a 
negative consequence on the successful party, this mechanism has 
been severely criticized. Thus, the enforcement system neither repairs 
the injury which has occurred nor promotes conformity; instead, it 
imposes greater damage on the disputing members by implementing 
i1s the simple economic notion of "an eye for an eye 
Question 4: The effect of the decisions and decision-making process 
of the WTO and its dispute settlement system on the 
development objectives of developing countries. 
Resolving disagreements through decision-making in the WTO is not 
an easy task, which has left highly political matters lying on the 
negotiating table. On the other hand, the WTO dispute settlement 
system, especially the AB, has been active and does not hesitate to 
15 Hansel T. Pham, note 1, pp. 352-353. 
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deal with any disagreements, even highly political ones. But has the 
WTO dispute settlement been successful in restoring equality among 
all members? This question needs to be weighed against an outcome 
such as the Shrimp case, 16 where the broader security and 
predictability goals of the WTO are compromised. '7 
Question 5: Are third party rights vital for developing countries, and 
is reforming such rights important? 
The study, then, will consider why third party rights are important for 
developing countries, and how they can be interrelated with problems 
facing developing countries in the DSM. Next, there will be an 
examination of the provisions dealing with third parties' rights at the 
consultation stage. Here, the problems will be analysed and the 
proposals made for the reform of third party rights during the 
consultative process will be assessed. Finally, the study will consider 
third party rights during the panel and AB processes from a critical 
perspective, illustrating the failure of the WTO panel and AB to 
establish a clear and practicable precedent for third party rights. 
These, in particular, have negatively affected developing countries as 
third parties. This part of the study will also examine the reform 
proposals related to third party rights during the panel and AB 
processes. 
16 United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, panel 
report, WT/DS58/R, adopted on 15 May 1998, appellate body report, 
WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted on 12 October 1998. [hereinafter US Shrimp] 
17 J. Jackson, 'International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: 
Obligation to Comply or Option to Buy Out', (2004), 98 American Journal of 
International Law, 109. 
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1.5 Methodology 
Despite the growing debate on the position of developing countries in 
the WTO dispute settlement system, the area of third parties' 
participation has not been well developed. Thus, there is a paucity of 
information and academic writing on this topic, indicating the need for 
a strong focus on primary methods of data collection. 
The study will examine the academic literature for evidence of 
perceptions of the WTO dispute settlement system (some conflicting, 
since there are two sides to this matter). The literature will also be 
analyzed in parallel with the WTO members' submissions made during 
the formal review process with regard to the reform of the current 
dispute settlement system, in order to identify the agreed difficulties 
and proposed solutions. The submissions of WTO members (both from 
developed and developing countries) provide an invaluable source to 
identify the positions of WTO members in general and developing 
countries in particular, thus compensating for the lack of academic 
publications, especially with respect to third-party rights18. However, it 
is unfortunate that secrecy has, to a certain extent, also affected the 
negotiations on the DSU review process. This has led to a distinction 
between the TN/DS/ series of documents, which have been made 
public, and the Job/ series, which is unpublished and is restricted to 
WTO members. This study will draw on primary sources (original 
papers presented by institutions which deal with the WTO dispute 
settlement system, such as Oxfam, South Centre and the Third World 
Network) to cover the lack of information on the contents of these 
documents. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that the WTO 
18 Members' submissions on the review of the WTO dispute settlement system are 
available on the WTO website, using a simple document search, starting with 
TN/DS/. 
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website is rich in original sources such as members' proposals, cases 
which have been dealt with under the DSM, and papers and books 
which explain the foundation of the DSM. In order to test the feasibility 
of the proposed reforms, whenever appropriate, a comparison will be 
drawn with other international judicial institutions, such as the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Law of the Sea Tribunal to 
draw parallels between international law and WTO law for a better 
understanding of the matters under discussion. 
With regard to the existing literature, an issue that is worth 
mentioning is that although third parties have not been extensively 
dealt with, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism itself has attracted 
significant attention. This requires careful examination of the available 
sources in order to identify the most authoritative literature. 
In addition to these written sources, the case study approach was 
considered useful in gathering data for this research, for a number of 
reasons. To start with, this approach is widely used in social science 
research, of which legal research is a part. The case study is a 
particularly useful tool, since it provides the researcher with a rich 
source of data, as well as facilitating the study of specific areas which 
have not been well understood or researched. It is useful in terms of 
comparing and contrasting organisations, and in testing theory against 
practice by examining the actual events taking place at a particular 
time. Thus, case studies have the benefit of linking the research with 
what is happening in reality'9. 
19 John Gerring, Case study research: principles and practices, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). Also, Robert K. Yin (ed), The case study 
anthology, (London: SAGE, 2004); Roger Gomm, Martyn Hammersley and Peter 
Foster, Study Methods: Key Issues, Key Texts, (SAGE, London, 2000); Colin Robson, 
Real world research: a resource for social scientists and practitioner-researchers, 
(Blackwell, Oxford, 2002). 
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It should be acknowledged that case studies have the drawback of 
tending to lead researchers into drawing early and misleading 
conclusions. This needs to be carefully thought about. Despite this 
weakness, the case study is a useful tool in the present research, 
particularly in the form of a pro-post case study. This would support 
my research by identifying the effects of the WTO law on a specific 
country. This would be achieved by examining the effect of the WTO 
law before and after it had been established; for instance how 
developing countries fared before (in the era of the GATT adjudication 
mechanism) and after the establishment of the WTO dispute 
mechanism. This would have the advantage of building the picture as 
the research is developing, and providing rich data which might help in 
understanding what is actually happening in the real world. This is 
especially important in testing the research questions, not only 
theoretically but also practically, and is a vital factor in discovering the 
relationship between theory and practice. 
While case studies are considered to be in the field of longitudinal 
research, there is no specific or particular design to be followed in 
using case studies20. It is be an approach to an issue and a useful tool 
which can take many forms; thus, it may be qualitative or 
quantitative, comparative or contrasting, and it can be a pro-post case 
study. In addition, the different designs which can be used in 
conducting case studies include surveys, focus groups, archival and 
theoretical data. There is thus great flexibility in designing a case 
20 "Unlike other research strategies, a comprehensive 'catalogue' of research designs 
for case studies has yet to be developed. There are no text books like those in the 
biological and psychological sciences, covering such design considerations as the 
assignment of subjects to different 'groups'. " Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research, 
(second edition, SAGE Publications, London, 1994), p. 18. 
study. It was initially intended to use a group of countries from sub- 
Saharan Africa as a case study to collect data about developing 
countries in the WTO dispute settlement system and third party 
participation. However, early research indicated that countries from 
this region hardly ever participated in the WTO dispute settlement 
system21. Therefore, the subject of the case study has been modified 
from developing country members to major disputes and disputes in 
which developing countries have participated as parties or third 
parties. An analysis has been made of the implications of these 
disputes for the position of developing countries in the WTO dispute 
settlement system and the reform of third-party rights. 
Analyses of a wide range of disputes will be at the heart of this thesis, 
examining facts, legal reasoning and jurisprudence established by the 
panel or the AB regarding the participation of developing countries in 
the DSM and the function and reform of third-party rights. The World 
Wide Web provides a useful device for gathering additional information 
about a particular dispute. For the sake of originality, whenever 
appropriate original documents concerning these disputes have been 
downloaded directly from reliable websites such as that of the WTO. 
In the case study design, the geographical distribution of developing 
and less developed country (LDC) members has been considered to 
obtain the most comprehensive view of the status of developing 
countries and LDCs in the WTO dispute settlement system. Examples 
have therefore been selected from three continents: Asia, Africa and 
South America. 
21 Victor Mosoti, `Does Africa Need The WTO Dispute Settlement System? ', in 
Gregory Shaffer, Victor Mosoti and Asif Qureshi, Towards A Development-Supportive 
Dispute Settlement System in the WTO, (ICTSD, 2003), p. 72. 
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1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The body of the thesis is divided into nine different chapters. The first 
is an introductory one which serves as a road map of the rest of the 
research. The second chapter analyses the evolution of the GATT/WTO 
dispute settlement system and developing countries. Chapter three 
examines the obstacles facing developing countries in the DSM, 
Chapter four considers the effects of WTO decision-making as well as 
AB and panel decisions on the development objectives of developing 
countries, with special reference to trade-related issues such as 
intellectual property rights, the environment and human rights. 
Chapter five explores the justifications for the participation of 
developing countries as third parties. This is followed by Chapter six, 
which scrutinizes the role of informal third parties in the consultative 
process. Chapter seven evaluates the rights of third parties in the 
Panel and AB processes, leading to Chapter eight, which investigates 
proposals for reform of these rights. Chapter nine then draws together 
the research and offers concluding remarks. 
Before embarking on a critical analysis of the significance, competence 
and reform of third party rights, it is essential to look at how 
developing countries have been treated under the GATT/WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism so far. Thus, Chapter two critically reviews the 




The Evolution of the GATT/WTO Dispute 
Settlement System and Developing 
Countries 
2.1 Introduction 
Ironically, the present time represents the past for developing 
countries; as the current global financial crisis dominates the world, it 
has become clear that developing countries, especially the poorer 
ones, are subject to the most devastating consequences. 22 Even when 
GATT was created to boost the world economy and improve the 
welfare of its members, developing countries' problems and concerns 
were not at the heart of the international trade talks. This 
disadvantaged status will be explored here, with special reference to 
the evolution of the GATT/WTO dispute mechanism and the 
participation of developing countries. 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. Firstly, the treatment of 
developing countries during the GATT adjudication system from 1947 
to the 1990s will be analyzed; then the main deficiencies of the GATT 
22 Robert Zoellick warned in a speech that the impact of the financial crisis would be 
most significant for the poorer countries by stating that "The events of September 
could be a tipping point for many developing countries. A drop in exports, as well as 
capital inflow, will trigger a falloff in investments. Deceleration of growth and 
deteriorating financing conditions, combined with monetary tightening, will trigger 
business failures and possibly banking emergencies. Some countries will slip toward 
balance of payments crises. As is always the case, the most poor are the most 
defenseless. " Cited online at 
http: //web. worldbank. org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0contentMDK: 21927606Npaq 
ePK: 64257043NpiPK: 437376NtheSitePK: 4607,00. 
html, last seen on 15-10-08 at 
6: 16 pm. 
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adjudication system will be critically reflected upon. The next section 
evaluates the use of the GATT dispute mechanism by developing 
countries. Secondly, there will be an examination of the procedural 
aspects of the WTO dispute settlement system and how it might result 
in unsatisfactory outcomes for all members. 
2.2 Developing Countries and the GATT 
Dispute Settlement System 
2.2.1 GATT is a provisional treaty, not a permanent 
institution 
"Whoever speaks of dispute settlement in GATT must start from nearly 
nothing. i23 While for decades talks on how to regulate international 
trade have been conducted between states, the international trade 
arena did not recognize third-party adjudication until the GATT system 
was established in 1947.24 The process started during the Second 
World War, when the Allied leaders began to plan the post-war world 
economic order. The intention then was to reduce the risk of 
isolationism and economic depression which had characterised earlier 
post-war periods. In 1944, a conference was held at Bretton Woods, 
New Hampshire, as a result of which the Bretton Woods institutions 
were established. These are the International Bank for Reconstruction 
23 Pescatore, Pierre, 'The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Its Present Situation 
and its Prospects', (1993), 10 Journal of International Arbitration 27, p. 27., cited in 
Eric Reinhardt, 'Aggressive Multilateralism: The Determinants of GATT/WTO Dispute 
Initiation', 1948-1998, (1999), available at 
http: //www. isr. umich. edu/cps/pewpa/archive/archive 99/19990004. pdf, last seen 
on 04-01-08 at lam, p. 1. 
24 Robert E. Hudec, "The Role of the GATT Secretariat in the Evolution of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Procedure', in Jagdish Bhagwati and Mathias Hirsch (eds), The 
Uruguay Round and Beyond: Essays in Honour of Arthur Dunkel, (Springer-Verlag, 
London, 1998), p. 102. 
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and Development, which is known as the World Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, at Bretton Woods there 
was no agreement regarding international trade issues; indeed, these 
were not considered, since the conference was attended by delegates 
from the finance ministries only. 25 
After the Second World War, there was a plan to establish an 
international institution to be known as the International Trade 
Organisation (ITO). The ITO was supposed to have a section to 
address trade in goods, as well as others dealing with various issues 
such as employment, economic growth, protective measures and inter- 
governmental commodity agreements. The ITO Charter was planned 
to create a set of legal rules governing the settlement of disputes and 
third party adjudication. Any conflict occurring among the ITO parties 
could be presented for a legal verdict by the Executive Board, drawn 
from eighteen Contracting members. This verdict could then be 
referred to an appeal process before the full membership at the ITO 
Plenary Conference. The ITO adjudication system also provided that 
members could obtain an advisory opinion from the International 
Court of Justice. 26 
The ITO thus had a well-constructed dispute settlement system. In 
spite of this, when its Charter was completed in 1948 and submitted 
for endorsement it had lost its national political popularity in some of 
25 David Palmeter and Petros C. Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade 
Organization: Practice and Procedure, (Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2004), p. 1. Also, John H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing 
Fundamentals of International Law, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006), 
pp. 91-103. 
26 Robert E. Hudec, note 24, p. 102., and G. L. Lanjouw, International Trade 
Institutions, (Longman Publishing, New York, 1995), pp. 6-8. 
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the major member states. Consequently, the ITO Charter27 was not 
approved by the US Congress. This rejection took place mainly as a 
result of the growing dissatisfaction with international legal 
organisations in the atmosphere of tension and suspicion at the 
beginning of the Cold War era. 28 
However, in 1947, during the discussions on the ITO, GATT was 
established in order to accomplish an urgent tariff reduction among 
the twenty-three contracting parties negotiating the ITO Charter. 
While GATT was considered an independent agreement which had 
been implemented directly, it was in fact established as a provisional 
agreement intended to serve only until the ITO came into force in 
1948 or 1949. Therefore, GATT was actually created in 1947 by the 
negotiating parties on the understanding that it would ultimately be 
replaced by the more robust dispute settlement mechanism of the 
ITO. 29 When the ITO was stillborn, this left the impermanent GATT 
agreement without a genuine organisational structure and a dispute 
settlement system governed by only two rules: Articles XXII and XXIII 
of GATT. 30 
Thus, GATT was intended as a provisional agreement for tariff 
negotiations in anticipation of the Havana Charter, 31 which would 
provide for detailed dispute settlement procedures. 32 As a result of the 
27 It is also known as the Havana Charter. 
28 Robert E. Hudec, note 24, p. 102. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Kim Van der Borght, "Critical Essay: The Review of the WTO Understanding on 
Dispute Settlement: Some Reflections on the Current Debate', (1999), 14(4) 
American University International Law Review 1223, p. 1224. 
31 The International Trade Organization (ITO) did not come to existence due to the 
refusal of the United States Congress to approve it. 
32 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, (Kluwer Law 
International, London, 1997), p. 70. 
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temporary status of the GATT dispute settlement mechanism, it was 
conceived with very limited provisions governing trade disputes. Its 
two procedural rules, taken from the anticipated ITO Charter (Article 
XXII and Article XXIII) addressed the issues of the consultation stage 
and of "nullification and impairment". These procedural rules were 
fundamental to GATT adjudication, and remain fundamental to the 
WTO dispute settlement system. 33 
The procedural rules for resolving a dispute under GATT adjudication 
are simple. The first stage is consultation, the only obligation at this 
stage being for the defendant to show "sympathetic consideration" to 
the case brought by the complainant. Then, if the disputing parties do 
not reach an agreed solution within a fixed time, the establishment of 
an ad hoc panel can be requested by the complaining party in order to 
consider the disputed issue and render its verdict. 34 
As far as developing countries were concerned, GATT 1947 did not 
officially acknowledge such a category, although when GATT was 
signed nearly half of the contracting parties (11 out of 23) were 
developing countries; nor did it acknowledge that any special 
treatment was required to respond to their particular needs in order to 
safeguard their trade interests. 35 
33 David Palmeter and Petros C. Mavroidis, note 25, p. 7. 
34 Marc L. Bush, Democracy, 'Consultation and the Paneling of Disputes under GATT', 
(2000), 44(4) Journal of Conflict Resolution 425, p. 428. 
35 Constantine Michalopoulos, 'The Role of Special and Differential Treatment for 
Developing Countries in GATT and the World Trade Organization', (2000), available 
at, http: //wbInOO18. worldbank. org/research/workpapers. nsf/ 
bd04ac9da150d30385256815005076ce/f427de05fa0079388525691300652b9f/$FILE 
/WPS2388. pdf, last seen on 11-02-08 at 11am, p. 2. 
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Moreover, in GATT's early years the panel process was fairly informal, 
most cases being sent to a Plenary Meeting of GATT contracting 
parties for a verdict. In response to increased criticisms, the tradition 
of bringing a case to a working party was extended to encompass the 
disputing parties as well as interested third parties. 36 The practice of 
referring a complainant to the contracting parties was not considered a 
process of 
negotiation. 37 
adjudication, but rather one of conciliation and 
From the perspective of developing countries, the conciliatory and 
negotiating nature of the GATT dispute settlement system would 
disadvantage them, since industrial competitors would be able to use 
their superior political and economic leverage against poorer countries. 
A rule-based dispute settlement system, on the other hand, would 
provide equal treatment for all members. 38 Therefore, developing 
countries under GATT were always in favour of a more legalised 
dispute settlement system, because they believed that a rule-based 
system would be better for them. 39 
After a while, the practice of working parties began to be criticized by 
GATT members for its lack of neutrality and independence, and there 
was a demand for a more legalised adjudication system. This 
36 Christina R. Sevilla, "Explaining Patterns of GATT/WTO Trade Complaints', 
Weatherhead Centre for International Affairs, Working Paper Series 98-01, (1998), 
available at htttp: //www. wcfia. harvard. edu/papers/98-01. pdf, last seen on 03-03-08 
at gam, p. 3. 
37 S. Narayanan, "Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO: need for 
improvement and clarification', Indian Council for Research on International 
Economic Relations, Working Paper no. 117, (2003), available online at 
http: //www. icrier. org/pdf/wp117. pdf, last seen on 3-6-2008 at 1 pm., p. 91. 
38 Pretty Elizabeth Kuruvila, 'Developing Countries and the GATT/WTO Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism', (1997), 37(6) Journal of World Trade 171, p. 178. 
39 Maria Marta, Maria Marta, "Evaluating the Effectiveness of the GATT Dispute 
Settlement System', (1992), 16(2) World Competition 81, p. 91. 
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atmosphere among the GATT contracting parties led to the 
establishment of the panel process. The parties had developed this in 
1955, establishing ad hoc panels composed of three to five panellists 
selected from members not participating in the dispute. Unfortunately, 
as with the rulings on working parties, the decisions rendered by these 
panels were regarded as purely advisory. 40 This development was 
considered to be a move from diplomacy towards the rule of the law, 
and the panel process was applied to nearly all the disputes arising in 
the GATT area. 41 Nonetheless, it was argued that even with the 
foundation of the ad hoc panel procedure, 42 the GATT dispute 
settlement system maintained its conciliatory and diplomatic nature, 
and it was not considered to be a judicial system. 43 In addition, the 
1950s procedures for ad hoc GATT panels were undermined by the 
practice of consensus, which led to the blocking of nearly all reports 
rendered by these panels. 44 
40 S. Narayanan, note 37, p. 7., Frank Stone, Canada, the GATT and the International 
Trade System: Essays in International Economic, (The Institute for Research on 
public Policy, Third printing, 1987), p. 39. 
41 John Jackson, 'The Role and Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism', (2000), Brookings Trade Forum 179, p. 181. 
42 In this regard it has been stated that "in 1955 the procedure was formalized, on 
the basis of a Secretariat report, which distinguished between Panels and Working 
Parties, stressing in particular that Panel members were appointed as individual 
experts, since their role should be 'to prepare an objective analysis for consideration 
by the contracting parties, in which the special interests of individual governments 
are subordinated to the basic objective of applying the Agreement impartially and for 
the benefit of the contracting parties in general'. " Sol Picciotto, 'The WTO's Appellate 
Body: Legal Formalism as a Legitimation of Global Governance', School of Public 
Policy Working Paper Series: ISSN 1479-9472,2005, Working Paper 14, (2005), 
available online at http: //eprints. lancs. ac. uk/29/1/wto-ab. pdf, last seen on 11-6- 
2008 at 8am, p. 7. 
43 "This procedure differs from the judicial approach in certain important respects. 
The disputants are permitted to see and comment on the report while in process. 
There is also considerable informal consultation with the disputants to find common 
ground which may be acceptable to both parties. But the responsibility for the final 
report which goes to the Contracting Parties rests with panel" K. P. Gupta, A Study of 
Genera/ Agreement on Trade and Tariff, (S. Chand & Co, New Delhi, 1967), p. 195. 
44 Asoke Mukerji, "Developing Countries and the WTO: Issues of Implementation', 
(2000), 34(6) Journal of World Trade 33, p. 64. 
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At this early stage of the GATT adjudication system, developing 
countries felt that it was inadequate for them and that it did not give 
due consideration to their special requirements, so they rarely invoked 
it. 45 Kufuor reports that from 1948 to 1966 developing countries 
invoked the GATT system on only ten occasions, amounting to 12 
percent of total disputes in that period. 46 
2.2.2 Developing countries lose confidence in the 
GATT dispute settlement system (Uruguay 
Dispute) 
In the 1950s, a number of developing countries, including Pakistan, 
Cuba, Chile, Haiti and India, started to utilise enthusiastically the 
emerging GATT adjudication system to safeguard their trade interests. 
Conversely, the enthusiasm of developing countries regarding GATT 
soon began to diminish, since the agreement (especially the outcome 
of the Uruguay dispute) did not match their ambitions in this respect. 47 
Uruguay initiated a significant dispute in 1962, arguing that several 
trade measures in a number of developed countries were inconsistent 
with GATT obligations. This case is of major significance, because on 
the one hand the panel established a prima facie position, whereby 
according to article XXIII nullification or impairment is the foundation 
45 Maria Marta, note 39, p. 93. 
46 Kofi Kufuor, 'From the GATT to the WTO: The Developing Countries and the 
Reform of the procedures for the settlement of international Trade Disputes, (1997), 
31(5) Journal of World Trade 117, p. 128. 
47 TRADE Working Paper: 'Issues Regarding the Review of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism', (1999), available online at 
http: //www. southcentre-orq/publications/trade/dispute. pdf, last seen on 01-07-07 at 
10am, p. 2.; Sara Dillon, International Trade and Economic Law and the European 
Union, (Hart Publishing, 2002), p. 49. 
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of any dispute. The panel developed this rule further and decided that 
any breach of GATT obligations would be regarded as prima facie 
nullification or impairment. In this respect, the panel decided that the 
defendants must prove that no nullification or impairment of the GATT 
obligations had taken place. 48 On the other hand, because of the 
political pressure on developing countries challenging the measures of 
various industrial members, Uruguay merely alleged the nullification of 
benefits and did not challenge the legality of the 576 trade barriers 
applied by the developed country defendants. Because Uruguay did 
not explicitly dispute most of the inconsistent measures, "the panel 
issued what was essentially a default finding in favor of the developed 
countries in all but the most patently illegal measures". 49 
Hudec presents the reason behind this case as being that "the 
Uruguayan complaint was showpiece litigation - an effort to dramatize 
a larger problem by framing it as a lawsuit". 50 Hence, the dispute 
would appear to demonstrate two facts: the first that the imposition of 
trade barriers impedes developing countries' exports, and that, 
regardless of the legality of these trade measures, the GATT system 
was ineffective, as this was its best outcome. Secondly, although 
Uruguay avoided questioning the legitimacy of these measures, it is 
quite clear that these trade barriers demonstrate the weakness of the 
GATT system in safeguarding the trade interests of developing 
countries. 51 It was reported that developing countries had to overcome 
a total of 576 inconsistent trade restrictions in order to penetrate the 
48 Uruguayan recourse to Article XXIII, BISD 11S/95, also, John Jackson, note 41, 
pp. 182-183. 
49 Hansel T. Pharr, "Developing Countries and the WTO: The Need for More Mediation 
in the DSU, (2004), 9 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 331, pp. 343-344. 
50 Robert Hudec, Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System, (Cower Publishing, 
Brookfield-USA, 1987), p. 47. 
51 TRADE, note 47, p. 2. 
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markets of industrial countries. There was a demand from the panel 
that demonstrably inconsistent restrictions be eliminated. The 
Uruguayans then argued that although they were indeed eliminated, 
they were replaced by other trade restrictions. 52 
The complaint brought by Uruguay also indicates the political 
pressures on developing countries when they engage in disputes with 
their developed counterparts. This deterred Uruguay from explicitly 
questioning the validity of these measures, so that they would not 
gravely upset the industrial countries. Therefore, developing countries 
would support the idea of introducing 'public prosecutors' in trade 
conflicts, to address their concerns regarding any aggressive response 
from developed countries against whom a case had been brought. 53 
It has also been argued that as a consequence of publicity given to the 
Uruguay complaint, there was a shift against legalising the GATT 
system towards an "anti-legalistic' or pragmatic approach to dispute 
resolution". 54 Legal procedures were attacked and described as 
unfriendly. The GATT dispute settlement mechanism had fallen into 
neglect by 1963 and the methods of diplomacy and negotiation were 
s considered ideal. s 
The Uruguay case was indeed significant in terms of identifying the 
role of international trade restrictions in impeding exports from 
developing countries in the international trade arena. On the other 
hand, the Uruguay case failed altogether to remove or even reduce 
52 Hansel T. Pharr, note 49, pp. 343-344. 




these restrictions. 56 By this time, the majority of developing countries 
did not consider GATT as an appropriate institution to address their 
issues. 57 In addition, the conciliation process provided by Article XXIII 
of GATT would function effectively only between parties with the same 
economic leverage; in this respect, developing countries simply do not 
have enough power to influence the positions of developed countries in 
trade disputes brought under GATT. There is also a perception of the 
failure of the implementation system provided under Article XXIII, 
which is grounded on the assumption that reciprocity governs the 
relationships between developed and less developed parties. As a 
result, efforts were made to establish special rules to be used in 
disputes involving developed and developing countries as conflicting 
parties. 58 
2.2.3 The introduction of preferential treatment for 
developing countries in the GATT DSM 
While the participation of developing countries in the GATT dispute 
settlement mechanism was declining subsequent to the Uruguay 
complaint, they nevertheless made an attempt to reform the GATT 
adjudication process in their interest by making formal reform 
proposals. 59 Significant events took place in 1964. In response to 
increased criticism by developing countries of GATT (they argued that 
it did not consider their special requirements) in 1964 the contracting 
parties decided to add a fourth part to the GATT agreement in order to 
56 TRADE, note 47, p. 2. 
57 Nigel Grimwade, 'The GATT, the Doha Round and Developing Countries', in Homi 
Katrak and Roger Strange (eds), The WTO and Developing Countries, (Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York, 2004), p. 13. 
58 Abdulqawi Yusuf, Legal Aspects of Trade Preferences for Developing States: A 
study of the influence of development needs on the evolution of international law, 
(Martinus Nijhoff, London, 1982), pp. 73-74. 
59 TRADE, note 47, pp. 2-3. 
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give preferential treatment to developing countries. This innovative 
provision led to developed countries beginning to give significant 
consideration to the trade interests of developing countries. 60 
The developing countries made an attempt to develop Part IV further 
in their interests. As far as the GATT dispute settlement was 
concerned, a significant proposal was put forward by two developing 
countries who were party to GATT: Brazil and Uruguay. The aim of the 
proposal was to enhance GATT rules for the settlement of disputes and 
to alleviate all the obstacles established before the date of the 
proposal, in particular what happened in the Uruguay complaint. 61 
The proposal by Brazil and Uruguay required several amendments to 
Article XXIII of GATT in favour of developing countries. Firstly, Part 2 
of the Article was to be expanded in order to give developing countries 
the right to exploit additional measures once they decided to take legal 
action. Secondly, if it was ruled that the trade measures applied by a 
developed country had undesirable consequences for the economy of a 
developing country, and it was unfeasible to remove such trade 
measures, the victimised developing countries ought to be granted 
financial compensation. Thirdly, if a trade measure applied by a 
developed country had a negative effect on a developing country's 
import capacity, the latter should be consequentially freed from its 
GATT obligations towards the developed country in violation. Finally, if 
a developed member country failed to comply with the ruling of a 
panel within the time limit provided, the GATT Contracting Parties 
were to have the right of joint action against that member. 
62 
60 Nigel Grimwade, note 57, p. 13. 
61 Robert Hudec, note 50, p. 58. 
62 TRADE, note 47, pp. 2-3. 
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Unfortunately, the attempt by Brazil and Uruguay to add these 
proposed reforms to the new Part IV faced opposition from developed 
countries, and it was unsuccessful. 63 In spite of this failure, these 
proposals gave rise to the establishment of the 1966 Procedures, 
which provide special rules for developing countries in the GATT 
dispute settlement system. 64 
However, the first instance of special treatment for developing 
countries was the inclusion of the consultation mechanism in Article 37 
Para 2 of Part IV, to ensure that developed countries fulfilled their 
commitments in Article 37 Para 1. This gave developing countries the 
right to conduct consultations with contracting parties in order to find 
a satisfactory resolution among the parties involved in the 
disagreement, if their rights under Article 37 Para 1 were violated. This 
would have the benefit of guaranteeing developed countries' 
compliance with their commitment. It also introduced the idea of 'joint 
action' between the contracting parties. Unfortunately, this provision 
was never used by developing countries, since developed countries 
always favoured bilateral consultations. 65 
2.2.4 The inclusion of the 1966 Conciliation 
Procedures for developing countries 
For developing countries, the inclusion of the 1966 Procedures in GATT 
is considered a major event in the evolution of the dispute settlement 
system. These procedures dealt specifically with disputes involving 
63 Robert Hudec, note 50, p. 58. 
64 TRADE, note 47, p. 3. 
65 Abdulgawi Yusuf, note 58, pp. 74-75. 
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developed and developing countries as disputing parties, and were 
added to Article XXIII of GATT. 66 
First, with regard to the consultation stage, the 1966 Procedures give 
the right to a developing country, as a disputing party on its own, to 
seek the good offices of the Director General in order to settle the 
dispute once the consultation has been requested. In addition, the 
disputing parties are required to provide the Director General with all 
the data related to the dispute. 67 
In relation to the panel stage, the Procedures helped to speed up the 
establishment of the panel. They stated that the Director General 
shall notify the contracting parties or the GATT Council of the process 
and present a report, if it is required by one of the disputants, and that 
a panel should be established immediately. 68 This was significant in 
helping developing countries to avoid the delaying tactics employed by 
more powerful developed countries in establishing the panel. 69 The 
1966 Procedures require that the panel ruling be submitted within 
sixty days of its appointment, 70 and that once a report is issued the 
offending party must enact its stipulations within 90 days. 71 
In addition to speeding up the submission and enforcement of panel 
rulings, the 1966 Procedures required a panel of experts to investigate 
the case in such a way as to provide the required resolutions. They 
also added new dimensions to the panel rulings by assessing the trade 
66 Jeff Waincymer, WTO Litigation: Procedural Aspects of Formal Dispute Settlement, 
(Cameron May, London, 2002), p. 746. 
67 Ibid., p. 748. 
68 Ibid., p. 749. 
69 Robert Hudec, note 50, p. 66. 
70 Jeff Waincymer, note 66, p. 749. 
71 Abdulgawi Yusuf, note 58, p. 75. 
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and economic development consequences for the complainant party of 
the measures complained about. 72 
However, Kuruvila argues that the outcome of the 1966 Procedures for 
developing countries was "modest". 73 Although they established 
preferential treatment for developing countries, and enhanced the 
function of the GATT dispute settlement system in general, developing 
countries rarely invoked their preferential treatment provisions. 74 The 
mediation of the Director General, for example, was requested in only 
three cases during the GATT period; furthermore, in none of these 
cases was a satisfactory outcome achieved, either with regard to 
implementing the resolution or to realising the incentive behind the 
initiation of these cases. Therefore, it could be claimed that the 1966 
Procedures were merely "a symbolic achievement for developing 
countries". 75 
A number of attempts were made between 1967 and 1971 to modify 
the GATT 1947 rules for the settlement of disputes in favour of 
developing countries. The contracting parties decided in 1967 to 
establish a "self standing" panel to review the effect of "'quantities 
restrictions" in the developed countries' industrial systems on the 
developing countries' trading systems. 76 Nevertheless, the inclusion of 
the words "may be established" in the terms of the self-standing panel 
left it to the contracting parties to decide whether to apply such 
procedures. It was also weakened by the developed countries' 
72 Jeff Waincymer, note 66, p. 749. 
73 TRADE, note 47, p. 3. 
74 S. Narayanan, note 37, pp. 7-8. 
75 Pretty Elizabeth Kuruvila, note 38, pp. 172-173. 
76 Maria Marta, note 39, p. 107. 
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practice, since in reality they preferred bilateral talks and as a result 
avoided the establishment of the panel. " 
Moreover, in relation to the developed countries' duties under Part IV, 
the creation of an automatic panel was introduced in 1970. It was 
suggested that there ought to be panels to evaluate the conformity of 
the developed countries with their obligations. The proposal was 
approved by the contracting parties. However, whereas it was 
suggested that the panel should be automatically appointed, the 
contracting parties' approval required the consent of the party in 
question. This considerably weakened the significance of the proposed 
modification. 78 
The year 1971 witnessed another suggestion put forward by the 
developing countries with regard to the GATT adjudication system: the 
introduction of the Group of Three, consisting of the contracting 
parties, the Council, and the Trade and Development Committee. Its 
purpose was to identify inconsistent trade measures and to provide 
technical assistance in bringing these inconsistent measures into 
conformity with GATT, in order to safeguard developing countries' 
trade interests. This proposal was adopted and functioned for three 
years, during which the Group of Three contributed to the removal of a 
number of trade barriers against access for developing countries. But 
the group was discontinued in 1974, so as not to clash with the Tokyo 
79 Round talks. 
" Kofi Kufuor, note 46, p. 126. 
78 Alain Freneau, 'WTO Dispute Settlement System and Implementation of Decision: 
A Developing Country Perspective', (2001), available online at 
http: //lafrique. free. fr/memoires/pdf/200107AF. pdf, last seen on 5-08-07 at 7pm, 
pp. 13-14. 
79 Abdulgawi Yusuf, note 58, p. 76. 
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2.2.5 Preferential treatment for developing countries 
from the Tokyo Round onwards 
2.2.5.1 The 1979 Understanding Regarding Notification, 
Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance 
One of the major outcomes of international trade talks in the Tokyo 
Round was the approval in 1979 of the Understanding Regarding 
Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, and its 
annex, the Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of GATT in 
the Field of Dispute Settlement (Article XXIII: 2). The main purpose of 
the Understanding was to regulate the customary procedures that 
evolved under the GATT ; 80 however, from the developing countries' 
perspective, it contained few fundamental provisions which considered 
their special conditions. 81 
The GATT contracting parties decided to give special consideration to 
the development of the trading systems of developing countries by 
carrying out regular reviews to identify difficulties in their progress. In 
addition, Para (iii) of the 1979 Understanding acknowledged the idea 
of selecting a panellist from a developing country in disputes involving 
developed and developing countries as complaining members. 82 
Furthermore, the consultation stage required that special consideration 
be given to developing countries and restated the provisions made for 
developing countries in the 1966 Procedures. Another preference, 
although it was not clearly stated, was that a developing country with 
80 S. Narayanan, note 37, p. 8. 
81 Pretty Elizabeth Kuruvila, note 38, p. 173; Jeffery S. Thomas and Michael A. Meyer, 
the New Rules of Global Trade: A Guide to the World Trade Organization, (Carswell, 
1997), p. 310. 
82 Ibid. 
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substantial interests in a case could present its interests to the panel. 
The panel could obtain professional assistance from any individual or 
organization, if it believed it necessary to do so. While this was 
conditional on the wishes of the panel, it was also considered a 
movement towards the third party83 participation that developing 
countries desired to be included in GATT 1947.84 
Moreover, developing countries' concerns regarding the aggressive 
response of developed countries when a complaint was filed against 
them were addressed in the 1979 understanding. A major concession 
granted to developing countries, which is still in place in the WTO 
dispute settlement system, 85 was that they would be provided with 
technical advice by the GATT Secretariat once they had decided to 
initiate a complaint. In parallel with this, the Secretariat witnessed the 
creation of a more comprehensive new legal office, in order to provide 
such technical support for developing countries. 86 The 1979 
Understanding87 was reformed after three years by the 1982 
Ministerial Declaration, which by adding new rules reinforced and 
clarified it. 88 Although the 1982 Declaration was not particularly 
83 The WTO officially recognizes third parties' participation in Article 10 of the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding 
84 Kofi Kufuor, note 46, pp. 128-129. 
85 Developing countries' lack of legal resources with regard to the WTO dispute 
settlement system is further analyzed in Chapter Three. 
86 Kofi Kufuor, note 46, p. 129. 
87 One of the major criticisms of the 1979 improvement was "Neither the General 
Agreement on Tariffs on Trade (GATT) nor the various side-agreements signed in the 
Tokyo Round (the Tokyo Round «Codes») contained any specific provisions dealing 
with remedies in cases of violations. This is not an anomaly. It is often the case that 
drafters of a treaty leave to the discretion of the adjudicating body to recommend 
the appropriate remedy" in Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis, 'Remedies in the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System and Developing Country Interests', (1999), available 
online at, http: //www1. worldbank. org/wbiep/trade/papers 2000/BPdisput. PDF, last 
seen on 1-08-07 at 8pm, p. 7. 
88 S. Narayanan, note 37, p. 8. 
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related to the status of developing countries, it did strengthen the 
GATT adjudication system taken as a whole. 89 
2.2.5.2 The Decision on Improvements to the GATT Dispute 
Settlement Rules and Procedures 1989 
During the Uruguay Round and after the mid-term review meeting, the 
contracting parties agreed to reform the GATT dispute settlement 
system in areas approved during the negotiation process of the 
Uruguay talks. This was in anticipation of the final result of the Round. 
Therefore, the decision on improvements to the GATT Dispute 
Settlement Rules and Procedures was implemented from 12 April 1989 
to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. A significant result of the 
1989 improvements was that the panel was automatically adopted in 
the second assembly of the Council. In spite of this, the consensus for 
the approval of the panel ruling was retained. However, a vague 
provision especially intended for developed countries was added, 
stating that `"the delaying of the process of dispute settlement shall be 
avoided". 90 As far as developing countries are concerned, the 1989 
improvements provided technical assistance for developing countries 
in order to bring their cases to the GATT dispute settlement system. I 
It also required the GATT Secretariat to appoint skilled legal specialists 
from the Technical Co-operation Division to provide the appropriate 
technical support for developing countries. 91 
In addition, the disputing parties were required to inform the Council 
of any mutually agreed resolutions resulting from the GATT dispute 
settlement process or rendered by an arbitral tribunal, to be reviewed 
89 Alain Freneau, note 78, p. 16. 
90 S. Narayanan, note 37, pp. 9-10. 
91 Terence P. Stewart, the GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), 
(Vol. III, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Denvnter, 1993), p. 53. 
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by the contracting parties. 92 The reason for this provision was to 
ensure that any agreed solutions would be in conformity with GATT. 
This was significant for developing countries, since it would minimise 
the effect of superior leverage enjoyed by developed countries in 
disputes with their developing counterparts. 93 
The 1989 decision also established a time limit of ten days for entering 
into consultation once it had been requested, and of thirty days for the 
formation of the panel for consultation. If the offending party failed to 
enter the consultation process with 10 days, or if the consultation 
phase exceeded 30 days, the panel would automatically be adopted. 94 
This addressed developing countries' concerns with regard to time 
limits in the dispute settlement procedure. The 1989 decision is 
considered to represent significant progress over the 1979 
understanding in shortening the dispute process before the adoption of 
the panel. 95 On the other hand, the 1989 improvements did not deal 
with the blocking of the adoption of the panel rulings, or with how 
these rulings should be implemented once they were approved. The 
contracting parties kept the 'negative consensus' condition, and were 
satisfied with merely making it more difficult to use a blocking order. 96 
92 "Mutually agreed solutions to matters formally raised under the GATT Articles XXII 
and XXIII, as well as arbitration awards with GATT, must be notified to the 
Council 
where any Contracting Parties may raise any point relating thereto. 
" 1989 
improvement, cited in Terence P. Stewart, note 91, p. 48. 
93 Kofi Kufuor, note 46, p. 131. 
94 Terence P. Stewart, note 91, p. 48. 
95 Kofi Kufuor, note 46, p. 131. 
96 Maria Marta, note 39, p. 91. 
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2.3 Critical Reflections on the GATT System 
2.3.1 Testing the GATT panel procedures 
One of the aspects of GATT which received criticism is that the 
defendant could block or delay the establishment of the panel, so that 
GATT was compared "to a court that could not deliberate (let alone 
rule) without the permission of the accused". 97 Notwithstanding that 
blocking of the establishment of the panel was not frequently practised 
by defendants during the GATT era, the hazards of doing so and the 
common utilisation of delaying strategies were enough to dissuade 
some complainants from bringing a dispute before a panel. 98 
The blocking of the establishment of the panel was valid even up to 
the 1989 Montreal Conference. For instance, the Argentina v. EU99 
dispute illustrates the difficulties facing developing countries (in this 
instance Argentina) in presenting a case before a panel, because the 
panel was not automatically formed, even with the support of the 
GATT Council. 100 
Not only could the formation of the panel be blocked, but so could the 
adoption of its decision. Under the GATT adjudication system, any of 
the contracting parties as well as the offender had the right to veto the 
approval of the panel report, besides the power to block the panel 
from actually being held. 101 In practice, the contracting parties did not 
commonly block the formation of the panel. Instead, what commonly 
happened was the blocking of the adoption of its ruling. For instance, 
the European Community (EC) in its two Bananas cases under the 
97 Marc L. Busch, Democracy, note 34, p. 428. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Argentina v. EU, GATT L/6201,8 July 1987. [hereinafter Argentina v. EU] 
goo Pretty Elizabeth Kuruvila, note 38, p. 176. 
101 Christina R. Sevilla, note 57, p. 3. 
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GATT system, blocked the adoption of panel decisions, thus illustrating 
the difficulties of adopting successful verdicts against reluctant 
offenders. Providing the disputing parties with the opportunity to block 
the formation of a panel, as well as the ability to stop the 
implementation of its decisions, was described as one of the main 
reasons for the scant use of the GATT adjudication systemlo2, 
especially when compared to the WTO dispute settlement system. 
2.3.2 Lack of rules and integration of the GATT 
adjudication system 
The second criticism arises from the fact that GATT was intended as a 
provisional agreement for tariff negotiations, in anticipation of the 
entry into force of the Havana Charter103 for detailed dispute 
settlement proceedings. 104 Despite the fact that they accounted for 
eleven of the twenty-three original members of GATT, there were no 
specific rules concerning developing countries. 105 Therefore, they did 
not have confidence in the reliability of the GATT dispute settlement 
system and rarely used it. 106 
Many commentators have wondered whether the GATT adjudication 
system ever functioned. One reason for this is that the system began 
with very few rules, being based on customary practice, augmented by 
the 1979 Understanding on Dispute Settlement and developed through 
102 Bananas cases, GATT document C/M/264. (hereinafter Banana GATT dispute], also 
see Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, 'The Evolution of GATT/WTO Dispute 
Settlement', (2003), available at 
http: //www. qeorqetown. edu/users/mlb66/TPR2003 Busch Reinhardt. pdf, last seen 
on 22/01/06 at 10am, p. 150. 
103 More detail on the provisional nature of GATT adjudication system in section 
2.2.1. 
104 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, note 32, p. 70. 
105 Hansel T. Pham, note 49, p. 333. 
106 TRADE, note 47, p. ii. 
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various negotiation rounds, especially the Tokyo Round `Codes'. Thus, 
one commentator notes, the "GATT dispute settlement lacked not only 
teeth, but a consistent set of rules more generally". 107 The issue of the 
enforcement of the GATT adjudication system will be discussed in the 
coming sections. 
Hudec argues that "to the extent that the imperfections of the GATT 
legal system do in fact discourage smaller countries from using the 
GATT dispute settlement procedure, the legal system is obviously less 
successful than one would want it to be". 108 In this respect, Jackson 
suggests that the fact that the GATT adjudication system was a 
provisional system (pending a more sophisticated dispute settlement 
procedure under the ITO) encompassing agreed arbitration and a 
system of appeal to the ICJ in some situations, was one of the main 
reasons for the 'birth defects' of the GATT adjudication system. 109 
The Tokyo Round Codes were intended to regulate non-tariff 
restrictions, such as dumping, state procurement and subsidies, and 
customs valuation; these regulations were to be brought under the 
dispute settlement rules of individual codes, and GATT contracting 
parties could not dispute them unless they had ratified the exact code 
that had been violated. In addition, since GATT excluded several issues 
including trade services and intellectual property rights, "there was 
simply no adjudicatory recourse for states victimized in these 
107 Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, 'Transatlantic Trade Conflicts and GATT/WTO 
Dispute Settlement', (2002), available at 
http: //www. law. berkeley. edu/students/curricularprograms/ils/papers/Busch%20and 
%20Reinhardt%20--%2OPetersmann%2OProject pdf#search='Transatlantic 
%20Trade%2OConflicts%20and%20GATT%2FWTO%2ODispute%2OSettlement, last 
seen on 06-03-06 at 11: 20am, pp. 2-3. 
108 Robert E. Hudec, 'A Statistical Profile of GATT Dispute Settlement Cases: 1948- 
1989', (1993), 2 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 1, p. 32. 
109Jackson, John, note 41, pp. 180-181. 
36 
areas". 110 Furthermore, the GATT adjudication system was accused of 
suffering from lack of integration. This is because of the way the 
system evolved, from its origin in Articles XXII and XXIII in 1947, via 
the 1966 Procedures which were later codified in a number of Tokyo 
Round Codes. "' 
2.3.3 Compliance problems 
With regard to GATT 1947, there were a number of states with a 
reputation for non-compliance with the dispute settlement mechanism, 
particularly the EU with reference to its Common Agricultural Policy. As 
a result, there were repeated uses of the dispute mechanism under 
GATT for identical import measures. In theory, this can be prevented 
through a timescale being fixed for execution under the WTO process. 
Conversely, the current practice in some high-status cases (for 
instance, in a dispute which was brought against the EU regarding its 
banana import policy) suggests that a parallel difficulty can take place 
in the WTO. 112 The WTO implementation process will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter three, Section 3.3. 
The main objective of the GATT enforcement system was to put the 
disputing parties back on the negotiation trail, rather than to impose a 
penalty on the offending party. In cases where GATT ruled for 
retaliation, provided that the offending party apologized, it was 
subsequently supposed by GATT that the winning party would end its 
110 Alexander Thompson, 'Power and Legalization: Explaining U. S. Support of WTO 
Dispute Settlement', (2001), available at http: //www. dehollanders. nl/ 
ThompsonWTO. pdf, last seen on 15/01/06 at 6pm, p. 6. 
111 Pretty Elizabeth Kuruvila, note 38, p. 177; and Surendra Bhandari, World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and Developing Countries: Diplomatic to Rule Based System, 
(Deep & Deep Publications, New Delhi, 2002), pp. 132-133. 
112 Thomas L. Brewer & Stephen Young, 'WTO Disputes and Developing countries', 
(1999), 33(5) Journal of World Trade 169, p. 172. 
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retaliatory action, even if it had not started yet. The lack of other 
implementation methods under GATT meant that the most 
advantageous approach was to cheat until retaliation was approved, 
and once it was approved to apologize. This has led some to argue 
that the GATT was not even a self-enforcing treaty. 113 
Interestingly, in the practice of the GATT dispute settlement system, 
retaliation was not often used. Among all the cases brought under 
Article XXIII, retaliation was endorsed on only one occasion. In 
response to the inconsistent trade barriers applied against its dairy 
exports, from 1952 to 1959 The Netherlands was authorised to restrict 
imports of wheat flour from the US. Considering the United States' 
national power during the GATT period, the Netherlands, inevitably, 
did not retaliate against the import restrictions. What is more, given 
the GATT shortcoming that allowed the conflicting parties to block the 
panel decision (and accordingly avoiding retaliation), retaliation was an 
extremely unrealistic option. 114 
It is argued that developed countries' reputation for non-compliance 
with preferential trade measures designed to meet the needs of 
developing and least developed countries was in fact a manifestation 
of their wider non-compliance with the decisions of the GATT panel, 
which the panel clearly highlighted in these decisions. For instance, in 
the case of EC - Refunds on Exports of Sugar - Complaint 
by Brazil, 115 
it was claimed by European Community officials that the principles and 
aims of Article XXXVI clearly did not impose any legal requirements. 
113 Shannon K. Mitchell, 'GATT, Dispute Settlement and Cooperation: A Note', 
(1997), 9(1) Economics and Politics 87, p. 87. 
114 Ibid., p. 88. 
115 EC - Refunds on Exports of 
Sugar - Complaint by Brazil, panel report, L/5011- 
27S/69, adopted on 10 November 1980. [hereinafter EC Refunds] 
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Hence, it was unfeasible to determine whether any violation of a 
particular trade measure had occurred regarding the terms of Article 
XXXVI. Equally, in the EEC - Restrictions on Imports of Apples - 
Complaint by Chile'16 dispute, in relation to the principles and aims set 
out in Articles XXXVI and XXXVII of GATT (especially Article XXXVII: 
1(b)) it was claimed that it was unfeasible for the panel to decide that 
the attempts of the European Economic Community (EEC) to prevent 
the imposition of these trade barriers against Chile were insufficient. 
Thus, the panel could not rule that the EEC was in violation of Part IV 
of the former provisions. 117 
As a result of the inability of the GATT adjudication system to enforce 
its rules, the final years of the GATT period witnessed aggressive 
unilateral actions by the United States and the creation of Section 301, 
or Super 301. There had been a growing fear among countries that 
they could be subject to unilateral US sanctions, which could take the 
form of retaliation, or even a total ban from the US market. 118 In the 
early days of Section 301, the EC strongly criticised the US for its 
counterproductive unilateral actions, which were harmful to 
multilateral trade negotiations. In 1989, the US imposed Super 301 
against Brazil and India in order to encompass trade services, 
investment and intellectual property rights in the GATT agreements. 
This forced the former GATT Director-General, Arthur Dunkel, to 
criticize publicly the unilateral US sanctions as illegitimate. As a 
116 EEC - Restrictions on Imports of Apples - Complaint by Chile, panel report, 
L/5047-27S/98, adopted on 10 November 1980. [hereinafter EEC Restrictions] 
117 Gustavo Olivares, 'The Case for Giving Effectiveness to GATT/WTO Rules on 
Developing Countries and LDCs', (2001), 35(1) Journal of World Trade 545 , p. 547. 118 Terence P. Stewart & Amy Ann Karpel, 'Review of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding: Operation of Panels', (2000), available at 
http: //www law. georgetown. edu/iournals/lpib/symp00/documents/stewart. pdf, last 
seen on 12-11-07, at 11am, pp. 1-2. 
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corollary to the excessive use of unilateral sanctions by the US, in 
March 1989 an exceptional summit was held to warn that these 
actions would destroy the multilateral trade negotiations in the 
Uruguay Round, and might result in joint cross-retaliation against the 
US. 119 
2.3.4 Lack of trust and support for developing 
countries 
It is argued that the GATT dispute settlement system was prejudiced 
against developing countries. 120 Hudec, one of the leading academic 
critics of GATT, argues that 
"The quantitative analysis of individual country 
performance makes it quite clear that the GATT dispute 
settlement system is somewhat more responsive to the 
interests of the strong than to the interests of the weak. 
The evidence for this hypothesis occurs in all phases of 
performance - in the rates of success as complainants, in 
the rates of non-compliance as defendants, in the quality 
of outcomes achieved, and in the extent to which 
complainants are able to carry complaints forward to a 
decision. "121 
It is worth mentioning that instead of GATT, developing countries 
considered the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) to be the major trading organization, where they could 
safeguard and advance their trade interests more beneficially, 
especially in the 1960s and 1970s. This could be seen in their 
preference for sending official delegates to that body. Many developing 
countries did not sign the GATT agreement, and of those which did, 
119 Alexander Thompson, note 110, p. 12. 
120 David Palmeter and Petros C. Mavroidis, note 25, p. 7., Sheila Page and Michael 
Davenport, World Trade Reform: Do Developing Countries Gain or Lose?, 
(Chameleon Press Ltd, London, 1994), pp. 92-93. 
121 Robert E. Hudec, note 108, p. 97. 
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many did not have their delegates based in Geneva, preferring to use 
their official delegates in other European cities to deal with GATT 
issues. For instance, Brussels was the EU city where the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries sent their delegations. 122 
In addition, developing countries were always given 'breakable' 
promises under GATT. Article XXXVII is usually cited by GATT 
observers as an illustration of this: 123 "The developed contracting 
parties shall to the fullest extent possible ... accord high priority to ... ". 
The language used in the legal texts relating to developing countries 
and LDCs is generally the same: "shall be facilitated through 
negotiated specific commitments"; "shall take account of the special 
needs"; "agree to facilitate"; "agree to ensure"; "shall consider"; and 
"sympathetic consideration shall be given". 124 
Under the GATT dispute settlement system, developing countries 
suffered from a lack of legal experts who could analyze the GATT 
Agreement and present strong arguments once a dispute was initiated. 
The lack of qualified experts increased the financial cost of bringing 
their cases to the GATT adjudication system. 125 
122Constantine Michalopoulos, 'The Developing Countries in the WTO', (1999), 22(1) 
World Economy, 117, p. 117. 
123Gustavo Olivares, note 117, p. 547. 
124 Article XXXVII of the GATT. Full text available at 
http: //pacific commerce ubc. ca/trade/GATT. htmI#XXXVII, last seen on 06-03-06 at 
11: 35 am. 
125 Kofi Kufuor, note 46, p. 199. 
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2.4 Evaluating Developing Countries' Use of the 
GATT Adjudication System 
The literature offers many negative assessments of the GATT 
adjudication system, of which the following are broadly representative: 
"One could be forgiven for wondering why any country 
ever used GATT dispute settlement, let alone that 
developing countries seldom used it. 11126 
And 
"Dispute settlement under the GATT is generally noted 
more for its shortcomings than its strengths. "12' 
A small number of larger developed countries were the predominant 
participants in the GATT dispute settlement mechanism. Hudec argues 
in his statistical review of the cases brought under GATT that the 
United States, Canada, Australia, the EC and EC members initiated 
73% of the disputes in the GATT period. Indeed, with regard to the 
complainant position, the predominance of the major developed 
countries was even greater: the EC, Canada and Japan acted as 
complainant in 83% of disputes brought under GATT. By contrast, 
developing countries made very little use of the system, being involved 
in 19% of cases (44 out of a total of 229). As complainants, 
developing countries acted in only 29 cases (13%). 128 What is more, it 
is argued that this very low participation in the GATT adjudication 
system did not involve all developing countries. It was mainly used by 
126 Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, "Developing Countries and General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute 
Settlement', (2003), 37(4) 
Journal of World Trade 719, pp. 720-721. 
127 Christina R. Sevilla, note 57, p. 3. 
128 Robert E. Hudec, note 108, pp. 29-31. 
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larger or richer states such as, Brazil, India, Chile, Hong Kong and 
Argentina. 129 
This disproportionate use of the system is illustrated by the 
involvement of Africa, which has a great number of developing 
countries. Mosoti observes that there was only one instance in which 
an African country participated in the GATT adjudication system as a 
main disputing party (defendant or respondent); this was South Africa. 
In the Canada - Measures Affecting the Sale of Gold Coins130 dispute 
in 1985, South Africa successfully disputed the percentage of the tax 
imposed by Canada on its exports of gold coins. 131 
The disappointment of developing countries regarding the 
effectiveness of the GATT adjudication system continued; this 
frustration is reflected in Brazil's submission at the beginning of the 
Uruguay Round talks on the dispute settlement system. Brazil 
complained that insufficient special and differential treatments were 
provided for developing countries, highlighting their difficulties in 
retaliating against their developed counterparts. It was contended 
that this was because of the difference in power and the failure of Part 
IV to provide the required balance between developed and developing 
contracting parties. However, like the 1965 proposal, the Brazilian 
submission was rejected. 132 
129 Pretty Elizabeth Kuruvila, note 38, p. 182. 
130 Canada - Measures Affecting the Sale of Gold Coins, Report of the Panel, GATT 
Doc. L/5863. [hereinafter Canada Measures] 
131 Victor Mosoti. 'Africa in the First Decade of WTO dispute settlement', (2005), 
available at http: //www. worldtradelaw. net/articles/mosotiafrica. pdf, last seen on 03- 
03-06 at 5pm, p. 12. 
132 TRADE, note 47, p. 3. 
4J 
In fact, up to the 1980s developing countries were involved very little 
in the GATT trade negotiation rounds, where they wished to gain 
preferential treatment to address their special status in the 
international trade arena. One reason for this is that until the 1980s 
developing countries, especially the larger ones such as India, China 
and Brazil, did not view the multilateral trade system as an 
appropriate method to achieve their development goals. Instead, they 
preferred to focus on internal elements to strengthen their 
economies. 133 
In addition, the multilateral trading system was mainly under the 
control of developed countries. The Kennedy negotiation round was 
initiated because the US wanted to gain better market access to the 
newly-founded European Common Market, while the Tokyo Rounds 
were initiated as a result of the broadening of EEC membership and 
the inclusion of the United Kingdom. Hence, trade negotiations under 
GATT were mainly between developed countries, and the global 
trading system worked in their favour. It was only during the Uruguay 
Round that developing countries started to participate effectively in 
international trade talks, marking what is considered a major shift in 
the multilateral trading system. 134 
Many GATT scholars also consider the role of the special and 
preferential treatments for developing countries to be insignificant, 
especially those introduced in the 1950s, in 1966 and in 1979. 
However, the 1989 improvements, provided some progress. The 
formation of an entirely new system for dispute settlement, which 
133 Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton, Fair Trade For All, (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2005), pp. 42-44. 
134 Ibid, pp. 44-49. 
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could be considered a significant achievement of GATT and the 
Uruguay trade negotiations, was the WTO's Dispute Settlement 
Understanding. 135 
2.5 The Establishment of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System and Developing 
Countries 
2.5.1 Procedural victory of the WTO Understanding on 
Dispute Settlement 
The WTO Understanding on Dispute Settlement (DSU) was discussed 
in the Uruguay Round. This was considered by many to be the most 
significant set of negotiations in the international trade arena since 
1947, and the new system came into force in 1995.136 It was designed 
to guarantee a level playing field for all members, so that poorer 
countries could safeguard their trade interests regardless of their 
economic power. This new system replaced the political process of the 
GATT system with a more rule-oriented system, applying public 
international law. 137 The WTO dispute settlement system is considered 
an improvement on the old GATT system, and has been called the 
"backbone of the multilateral trading system". 138 While the 
shortcomings of the GATT adjudication system were frequently 
criticised, the WTO dispute settlement system is widely acknowledged 
135 Eric Reinhardt, 'Aggressive Multilateralism: The Determinants of GATT/WTO 
Dispute Initiation, 1948-1998', (1999), available at 
http: //www. isr. umich. edu/cps/pewpa/archive/archive 99/19990004. pdf, pp. 4-5. 
136 Andrew Mitchell, Challenges and Prospects for the WTO, (Cameron May, London, 
2004), p. 4. 
137 David Palmeter and Petros C. Mavroidis, note 25, p. 3; Yasuhei Taniguchi, "The 
WTO's tenth Anniversary', in Yasuhei Taniguchi, Alan Yanovich and Jan Bohanes 
(eds), The WTO in the Twenty-first Century: Dispute Settlement, Negotiations, and 
Regionalism in Asia, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007), pp. 8-9. 
138 Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, note 102, p. 143. 
45 
as enhancing confidence in a more legalized multilateral trading 
system. 
139 It is important to note that the role of the WTO is not 
limited to formulating sophisticated procedural rules for dispute 
settlement; it also seeks to ensure that these rules function properly, 
in order to provide certainty and predictability in the multilateral 
trading system. 
140 
The establishment of a single dispute settlement system141 for tackling 
disputes occurring under the numerous multilateral trade agreements 
is one of the achievements of the Uruguay Round and the founding of 
the World Trade Organization. 142 Some of its most important aspects 
are considered below. 
2.5.1.1 An automatic system 
Under the GATT dispute mechanism, the approval of all of the 
contracting parties, including the respondent and the complainant, was 
required for setting up the GATT panel. This body could operate only 
by achieving what could be described as a positive consensus, making 
it easy for the respondent to block either the establishment of the 
panel or the adoption of its ruling. In contrast, under the WTO/DSU 
system the right to have a panel is automatic and guaranteed, and 
panel reports are adopted unless there is a consensus not to approve. 
In other words, a negative consensus, which means that all WTO 
members including the complainant have to agree not to set a panel or 
139 Ibid. 
140 Maria Marta, note 39, p. 92. 
141 Details of the phases of the WTO dispute settlement system in the figure in 
Appendix one. 
142 The World Trade Organization Agreement was signed in Marrakech 1994. 
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adopt its ruling, makes it virtually impossible to block the 
establishment of a WTO panel or the ratification of its rulings. 143 
This was expected to benefit developing countries144 in particular, as 
under the new rules they could take a case to the panel/AB process 
and obtain a favourable decision without fear of obstruction or the use 
of unilateral sanctions against them. Safadi and Laird predict that "the 
new provisions should increase pressure on parties to resolve disputes, 
leaving them less room for manoeuvre and intensifying pressure on 
countries to comply with rulings". 145 This is believed vital for 
establishing a more stable global trading regime. 
146 
2.5.1.2 A better enforcement system 
Other features of the DSU are enhanced measures for enforcement, 
the permitting of retaliation under particular conditions, and final 
compensation being regulated in the DSU. 147 The replacement of the 
positive consensus requirement under GATT with the new dispute 
143 Keisuke lida, `Is WTO Dispute Settlement Effective? ', (2004), 10 Global 
Governance 207, p. 210; also Keisuke Iida, The Politics of WTO Dispute Settlement: 
The Japanese Experience, (Cameron May, London, 2006), pp. 47-49. 
144 A similar view is adopted by Hecht: "One of the central achievements proclaimed 
by proponents of the Uruguay Round was the new dispute settlement system. 
Whereas the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) previously allowed a 
single Party to block the adoption of a dispute settlement report, the new Round 
adopted a "negative consensus' rule - providing that a panel report would be adopted 
unless all Members of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) voted to block it. At least 
superficially, this change would appear to provide far greater power and authority to 
panels to meaningfully review and judge national laws and policies". James C. Hecht, 
'Operation of WTO Dispute Settlement Panels: Assessing Proposals for Reform', 
(2000), Presented at The First Five Years of the WTO American Bar Association 
Section of International Law and Practice, available online at 
http"//www. law. georgetown. edu/iournals/giil/symp00/documents/hecht. pdf, last 
seen on 23-03-09 at 8: 15 pm. 
145 Raed Safadi and Sam Laird, 'The Uruguay Round Agreements: Impact on 
Developing Countries', (1996), 24(7) World Development 1223, p. 1238. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Mary E. Footer, 'Developing Country Practice in the Matter of WTO Dispute 
Settlement', (2001), 35(1) Journal of World Trade 55, p. 55. 
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settlement system resulted in automatic retaliation, which enhanced 
the potentiality of the enforcement mechanism against a hesitant 
offending member. Consequently, a defendant could no longer block 
an unfavourable report or the demand for retaliation. Hence, if a 
defendant was found inconsistent, it would be subject to potential 
retaliatory measures authorized by the WTO. 148 The position of LDCs is 
also considered in the new enforcement system in Article 24.1 of the 
DSU. This states149 that "if the defendant is a least developed member, 
the complaining country should 'exercise due restraint in asking for 
compensation'". 150 
2.5.1.3 The right to appeal 
With the creation of the Appellate Body, the DSU introduced a judicial 
review system in order to guarantee greater reliability and consistency 
of panel decisions. The innovative AB, which consists of seven experts 
appointed for a four-year period, has the authority to assess and 
evaluate legal issues raised by the disputing parties concerning a panel 
decision. 151 
While the panellists are appointed ad hoc by the disputing parties, or 
by the Director General if the parties disagree, the AB is a standing 
body of well known figures with established reputations in international 
law and trade. Picciotto emphasises that they are 
"unaffiliated with any government', appointed by the DSB 
to ensure that it is 'broadly representative' of the WTO 
membership. Each appeal is heard by a Division of three 
members, assigned by rote, so that a judge may be a 
148 Keisuke Iida, note 143, p. 210. 
149 Chad P. Bown, "Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/WTO 
dispute trade', (2004), 27(1) The World Economy 59, p. 64. 
150 Article 24.1 of the DSU 
15 ß Gustavo Olivares, note 117, p. 545. 
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national of a disputing party; indeed this often occurs, 
since the AB has always included nationals both of the US 
and the EU, which have been parties to the majority of 
cases. Thus, a great deal of weight is given to the 
independence and judicial nature of the AB: members of 
the Appellate Body do not act as advocates for the national 
interests of their home countries. i152 
Picciotto further asserts that the AB provides the highest level of 
integrity and impartiality, equal to the best practices applied in 
national courts. 
153 
2.5.1.4 Strict timelines 
The WTO has improved the timeframe of the dispute settlement 
system. Whereas under GATT delaying manoeuvres could be used and 
would result in an almost endless dispute settlement process, the WTO 
provides a rigorous schedule resulting in more timely procedures. This 
is one of the most widely appreciated advantages of the WTO dispute 
settlement system, under which delaying tactics are less successful. 154 
152 Sol Picciotto , 'The WTO's Appellate Body: Legal Formalism as a Legitimation of Global Governance', School of Public Policy Working Paper Series: ISSN 1479-9472, 
Working Paper 14, (2005), available online at http: //eprints. lancs. ac. uk/29/1/wto- 
ab. pdf, last seen on 11-6-2008 at 8am, p. 11-12. 
153 Ibid. In the same vein it has been argued that "The Appellate Body is also one of 
the outstanding innovations of the new procedure since each party can blame the 
conclusions of the panel by thus appealing of its decisions. " Fabien Besson, 'Is WTO 
Dispute Settlement System Biased Against Developing Countries? An Empirical 
Analysis', (2004), available at http: //www. univ- 
nancy2. fr/RECHERCHE/EcoDroit/DOWNLOAD/DROITSETDEVELOP/Besson-Mehdi05- 
04. pdf , 
last seen on 09-05-06 at 9: 30am, p. 5. See also an interesting analysis of 
WTO law and national law in Sharif Bhuiyan, National Law in WTO Law: Effective and 
Good Governance in the World Trading System, (Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
154 Keisuke Iida, note 143, p. 210. Safadi and Laird have also argued that "The 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes brings 
the dispute settlement system of the GATT up to date by building on existing GATT 
practices, and extending them in significant ways. This has been achieved through 
the introduction of greater speed and automaticity into the dispute settlement 
procedures that eliminate competing fora or forum-shopping within the system. The 
integrated system seeks to ensure procedural and interpretive consistency in dispute 
settlement practices across all issues. It provides for greater automaticity in: (i) the 
establishment of a dispute settlement panel if bilateral consultations fail; (ii) the 
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It is claimed that, unlike GATT, the establishment of a strict time 
frame for the settlement of disputes under the WTO is vital. This would 
motivate complainants (both from developed and developing 
countries) to bring cases to the WTO dispute settlement system. On 
the other hand, it would motivate reluctant respondents to settle cases 
without delay. '55 
2.5.1.5 Rule of law 
The WTO rule-oriented DSM has many advantages for developing 
countries. Legalizing the dispute settlement system fosters the 
reliability and certainty of the system and the panel rulings. It limits 
the extent to which the domestic enterprises of a state member can 
apply pressure to maintain an inconsistent measure once there is a 
WTO ruling against it. State members would think carefully about such 
a demand in order to maintain their reputation in the international 
trade arena and to avoid the worry of facing retaliation. 
156 
Bown notes that some have argued that, as a result of the legalization 
of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, the disadvantaged position 
of developing countries in the era of GATT diplomacy no longer 
applies. Now "right perseveres over might' and developing countries 
adoption of reports by dispute settlement panels; and (iii) the right of retaliation in 
the event of noncompliance with adopted panel recommendations. " Raed Safadi and 
Sam Laird, note 145, p-1238- 
155 Ibid. 
156 caglar Özden, `Strengths and Weaknesses of the Present Trade System for 
developing countries', (2003), available at 
http: //www ycsa. yale. edu/documents/papers/Ozden. doc, last seen on 04-03-06 at 
9: 15am, p. 12., Nuno Pires de Carvalho, The TRIPS Regime of Trademarks and 
Designs, (Kluwer Law International, 2006), p. 430. 
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can invoke the WTO dispute settlement system as much as their 
developed counterparts. 157 
2.5.1.6 Developing countries have the ACWL 
Between 1995 and 2001, developing countries were reliant upon 
Article 27.2 of the DSU, which requires the WTO Secretariat to provide 
legal assistance for a developing country wishing to bring a case to the 
DSM. In response to growing demands for tactical support for 
developing countries, the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) was 
created in 2001 in order to fulfil developing countries' technical need 
to participate effectively in the WTO dispute settlement system. This 
independent international institution offers developing countries the 
required legal training, and operates as a legal consultant on WTO law 
and its application to the settlement of disputes at affordable cost158 
However, its function has received severe criticism from developing 
countries. 159 The competence of both Article 27.2 of the DSU and the 
ACWL will be analysed in detail in section two of Chapter three. 
The dispute settlement system was expected to benefit developing 
countries in particular. It was broadly anticipated that the new system 
would be a victory for developing countries, considering the 
conventional wisdom that creating a binding third party adjudication 
system in international law would tend to support smaller countries, 
ls' Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, note 126, p. 719. More detail of the legalism of 
the DSM in Thomas Cottier(ed), The Challenge of WTO Law: Collected Essays, 
(Cameron May, London, 2006), pp. 19-32. 
158 Thomas A. Zimmermann, 'WTO Dispute Settlement at Ten: Evolution, 
Experiences, and Evaluation', (2005), 60(1) The Swiss Review of International 
Economic Relations 27, p. 51. 
159 See Chapter Three. 
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since their bargaining power would be improved by the open support 
of impartial judges. 160 
2.5.2 Are all WTO Members happy? 
It has been argued that the WTO dispute settlement system has 
functioned more successfully than the GATT adjudication system in 
settling trade disputes, especially from the 1980s onwards. 161 The 
WTO has considerably enhanced developing countries' status in 
international business, while the present rule-based mechanism of the 
WTO reflects the sovereign parity of international law. The likelihood of 
implementing rights relies on the strength of the legal arguments, 
instead of the economic power of the members. 
162 However, it has 
been argued that "as with sovereig n equality in international law, the 
equality of members in the WTO is more akin to myth than reality" . 
163 
Although the WTO system under the DSU has been considerably 
enhanced in comparison with the former GATT dispute settlement 
mechanism, it is evident that within the DSU developing countries still 
experience certain difficulties. 
164 
Many developing countries have been amongst those criticising the 
new dispute settlement (DS) system since its creation. If one 
considers the DS review process in the Doha Round, it is clear that a 
160 Gustavo Olivares, note 117, p. 543. 
161 Nicholas Perdikis & Robert Read, 'The Operation of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding in the Light of Recent Trade Disputes between the European Union 
and North America', SMBA Research Papers 2004-7, (2004), p. 5. 
162 Kim Van der Borght, 'The Advisory Center on WTO Law: Advance Fairness and 
Equality', (1999), 2(4) Journal of International Economic Law 723, p. 723. 
163 Ibid. 
164 TRADE, note 47, p . ii., and 
Haider Khan and Yibei Liu, "Globalization and the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Making a Rules-Based Trading Regime Work', 
Munich Personal REPEC Archive, No. 7631, (2008), available online at 
httr): //mpra. ub. uni-muenchen. de/7613/l/MPRA paper 7613. pdf, last seen on 01- 
12-2008 at 10 am. 
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great many proposals concerning special and differential treatment 
were introduced, mainly by developing and the least developed 
countries. In a formal review of the DSU by member governments, 
delegates from both Indonesia and Malaysia noted that they would not 
rule out advocating its termination. 165 
In this respect, Schaffer argues that "whatever one's perspective on 
trade liberalization and its enforcement, developing countries and 
developing country constituents clearly are at a disadvantage before 
the WTO's current dispute settlement system. Developing countries' 
use of the WTO dispute settlement against developed countries is 
considerably less than their share of developed country trade. " 166 
Table 1 lists the most frequent complainants and defendants. 
According to the statistics, the number of cases of developing 
countries participating in the dispute settlement system has increased. 
Nevertheless, only a small number of developing countries are 'repeat 
players' in the dispute settlement system, and none in this category is 
from sub-Saharan Africa. 167 It is the larger developing countries with 
larger revenues, such as Brazi1168, India, Korea and Mexico, that are 
the major participants. 169 It is also the case that the growing number 
of developing countries participating do so mainly as respondents 
165 Gustavo Olivares, note 117, p. 547. 
166 Schaffer, Gregory, Defending Interests: Public-Private Partnerships in W. T. O. 
Litigation, (Washington, DC, USA: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p. 161. 
167 Victor Mosoti, 'Does Africa Need The WTO Dispute Settlement System? ' in 
Gregory Shaffer, Victor Mosoti and Asif Qureshi, Towards A Development-Supportive 
Dispute Settlement System in the WTO, (ICTSD, 2003), p. 72. 
168 The most successful model among developing countries with respect to WTO 
dispute settlement system is Brazil, an interesting empirical study on how Brazil 
have accomplished such success through public-private sector cooperation in, 
Gergory Shaffert, Michelle Ratton Sanchez and Barbara Rosenberg, 'The Trials of 
Winning at the WTO: What Lies Behind Brazil's Success', (2008), 41 Cornell 
International Law Journal 384. 
169 Mary E. Footer, note 147, p. 58. 
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rather than as complainants, 170 while at the appellate stage, 
developing countries are more often involved as third parties than as 
main complainants or respondents. 171 
Table 1172: Most frequent GATT and WTO complainants and 
defendants 
GATT WTO 
Complainant Defendant Complainant Defendant 
Argentina 13 3 10 14 
Australia 24 4 7 9 
Brazil 19 9 21 13 
Canada 33 23 25 12 
Chile 18 3 9 10 
EC 105 197 63 74 
India 6 3 13 18 
Japan 8 35 11 13 
Korea, Rep. of 1 4 11 12 
Mexico 5 3 13 11 
New Zealand 9 2 6 0 
Norway 4 12 12 0 
US 116 116 81 92 
170 Thaddeus McBride, 'Rejuvenating the WTO: Why the U. S. Must Assist Developing 
Countries in Trade Disputes, (1999), 11 International Legal Perspectives 
65, pp. 88- 
89. 
171 Hansel T. Pham, note 49, p. 837. 
172 World Trade Report 2007: Six Decades of Multilateral Trade 
Cooperation: What 
have we Learnt?, (World Trade Organization, 
2007), p. 271. 
54 
What is more, Hudec argues that growing participation in the dispute 
settlement system is not due to growing confidence in the importance 
of the system as a tool to implement their rights to market access, but 
mainly because of the growth in legal duties in the WTO. The situation 
is one of "Lawyers, Lawyers, Everywhere". The legal costs that result 
from the growing use of the dispute settlement process are excessively 
difficult for developing countries and there is no participation by the 
least developed countries. 173 
Unless the developing countries fully participate in the dispute 
settlement system, there cannot be a flourishing and comprehensive 
dispute settlement mechanism, which ought to be the objective of an 
international organization like the WTO. Real and effective 
incorporation of developing countries within the WTO depends on a 
guarantee that these nations can confidently bring disputes and take 
legal action, regardless of differences in political power. It must 
include a determined attempt to consider the observations of these 
nations in a review of the dispute settlement system and not to 
disregard their suggestions. 174 
It is argued that the WTO dispute settlement system is crucial for 
developing countries on a number of issues. It is able to promote their 
rights under the covered agreements and to restrain the superior 
173 Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, 'Enforcing Multilateral Commitments: 
Dispute Settlement and Developing Countries', (1999), available on line at, 
http: //www2. cid. harvard. edu/cidtrade/Issues/hoekman. pdf, last seen on 20-07-04 
at 9 am, p. 2; Amrita Narlikar, The World Trade Organisation: A Very Short 
Introduction, (Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 96., Only Bangladesh and India 
have requested consultation in which the disputes have been settled without 
resourcing to the panel and appeal process. 
174 Victor Mosoti, note 167, p. 74; Chad P. Bown and Bernard M. Hoekman, 
'Developing Counties and Enforcement of Trade Agreements: Why Dispute 
Settlement is not Enough', (2008), 42(1) Journal of World Trade 177, pp. 198-200. 
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economic power of developed nations. The DSM is also vital in 
guaranteeing that developing countries' interests and priorities are 
properly addressed by the "systemic changes brought about through 
the WTO jurisprudence". 175 
To sum up, the WTO dispute settlement system is much more widely 
used than was the GATT adjudication system; this, like the use of 
domestic courts, is considered a sign of legitimacy. However, it is 
neither an indicator of whether the system is actually being exploited 
by developing or developed countries, nor of who brings these cases, 
who wins them, with what consequences or how this has changed over 
time. These are surprisingly difficult questions to answer. 176 
More recently, South Centre has urged developing countries to put 
forward reform proposals in the DS negotiations so as to enhance their 
position in the WTO dispute settlement system, by arguing that: 
"Developing countries should strive to ensure that they 
participate fully when the negotiations get back on track 
and should make every effort to have their concerns 
discussed and addressed in the negotiations. They should 
refine and revise some of their proposals and should 
strongly push for acceptance of their proposals on 
remedies. 11177 
175 Asif H. Qureshi, "Participation of Developing Countries in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System', (2003), 47(2) Journal of African Law 174, p. 175. 
176 Rob Jenkins, 'Accountability and the WTO Dispute-Settlement System', (2004), 
available at http: //www. bbk. ac. uk/polsoc/download/rob ienkins/Accountability- 
WTO-Dispute-2004. doc, last seen on 01-02-06 at 7pm, p. 7. 
177 Working Paper of South Centre, "Analysis Series, South Centre Analysis of the 
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration', Working Paper No, SC/TADP/TA/CC/1,2006 
p. 1121. In this regard, the representative of Japan in the WTO has stated that "his 
delegation would continue to be active and constructive in the negotiations [and] 
that it was important for members to redefine their priorities in the negotiations and 
make as rapid progress as possible. He urged members to take into account the 
interests of developing countries in the negotiations. ", Minutes of Meeting, 
TN/DS/M/16, (7 June 2004), p. 2. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
The GATT adjudication system retained its diplomatic character, 
despite the fact that as it evolved it acquired some legal elements such 
as the GATT panel. The GATT dispute settlement mechanism suffered 
major problems such as the "negative consensus' rules, which made it 
almost impossible to initiate a GATT panel. Its temporary character 
also meant that the GATT mechanism lacked clear integrated rules and 
was governed by only two articles. Compliance problems arose from 
its bias in favour of the more powerful and developed GATT members, 
which led the US to use its power outside GATT to retaliate against 
other members, imposing their own agendas in what is referred to as 
'unilateral aggression'. Developing countries had very limited roles to 
play in the GATT adjudication system, and very little, if any, trust in it. 
After over fifty years of negotiation, the WTO and its dispute 
settlement system were established. It was claimed that unlike the 
power-based GATT mechanism, the more legalized WTO system would 
treat all members equally, no matter how powerful or weak. In fact, it 
has since been recognized that the WTO agreement has not been a 
success for developing countries, yet it has been claimed that the WTO 
dispute settlement system is a most important victory for developing 
countries. It appears that what some have believed to be the single 
most important victory for developing countries is not without 
qualification. This observation leads on to the next chapter, where the 
aim is to analyze the obstacles facing developing countries in the WTO 
dispute settlement system. 
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Obstacles Facing Developing Countries in 
the DSM 
3.1 Introduction 
The establishment of a single settlement system for tackling disputes 
occurring under the numerous multilateral trade agreements is one of 
the achievements of the Uruguay Round and the founding of the World 
Trade Organization. 178 Some of the most notable aspects are the 
specification of time frames for the dispute settlement process and the 
avoidance of obstacles, since panel reports are automatically adopted. 
Other important features are the creation of an appellate body, to 
enhance measures for enforcement, consideration of retaliation and 
compensation in particular conditions. 179 The DSU also encompasses 
numerous provisions for special and differential treatment that 
recognize the asymmetries among WTO members. However, despite 
all the improvements that were incorporated into the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism, developing countries are still facing practical 
difficulties that handicap them from participating in the system 
effectively. 
The discussion begins by analyzing the lack of monetary and human 
resources faced by developing countries in pursuing a dispute. This is 
one of the weaknesses of the implementation procedures under the 
DSU. Other problems that will be dealt with are the enforcement of the 
178 The World Trade Organization Agreement was signed in Marrakech 1994. 
179 Mary E. Footer, 'Developing Country Practice in the Matter of WTO Dispute 
Settlement', (2001), 35(1) Journal of World Trade 55, p. 55. 
;g 
decisions of the panel or appellate body and the weaknesses of the 
special and differential treatment provisions. In examining these 
issues, a critical discussion will be presented with regard to the WTO 
dispute settlement system, together with suggestions and proposals 
for reform of the system. This, it is hoped, will create a better 
environment for developing countries to participate effectively and 
safeguard their interests. 
3.2 Lack of Financial and Legal Resources 
3.2.1 Critical reflections 
The current dispute settlement system is regarded as too costly; 180 it 
requires significant human and monetary resources to arrange and 
pursue the dispute from the consultation to the appeal process and it 
takes a long period of time - nearly three years on average. 
Developing countries, because of the shortage of skilled personnel 
needed to participate in such a complicated and extended legal 
procedure, have no alternative but to employ legal specialists from 
developed countries. 181 Financially, they must pay their legal experts 
to plan and present their case in front of a panel, and also pay their 
diplomats to work the political channels with their opponent so as not 
to endanger their relationship. While countries pay the same amount 
for the services of legal officials and diplomats whether a dispute is 
Aso Joseph A. Conti, "The Good Case: Decisions to Litigate at the World Trade 
Organization', (2008), 42(1) Law & Society Review 145, pp. 165-169; Moonhawk 
Kim, 'Costly Procedures: Divergent Effects of Legalization in the GATT/WTO Dispute 
Settlement Procedures', (2008), 52 International Studies Quarterly 657.; Diana 
Tussle and Valentina Delich, 'Dispute Settlement between Developing Countries: 
Argentina and Chilean Price Band', in Peter Gallagher, Patrick Low and Andrew L. 
Stoler(eds), Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation: 45 Case Studies, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 34-36. 
181 TRADE Working Paper: "Issues Regarding the Review of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism', (1999), available online at 
http: //www. southcentre. orq/publications/trade/dispute. pdf, last seen on 01-07-07 at 
10am, p. 23. 
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pursued or not, there is a cost involved in dedicating such officials to a 
dispute. Politically, a disputing member could damage its relationship 
with its disputing counterpart, which would negatively affect the 
benefits of forthcoming trade negotiations. 182 
From the point of view of developing countries, the new WTO dispute 
settlement system is very expensive, especially for smaller and less 
developed members. It is difficult for developing countries to identify 
their rights under the complicated WTO rules. Additionally, they 
cannot properly defend themselves once they are in a dispute, as this 
requires expensive legal resources. A dispute settlement mechanism 
that is more readily available to the richer nations will undermine the 
confidence of developing countries in the system. 183 
The dispute settlement system has been criticized as leaving 
developing countries in a weak position, since they do not possess the 
legal expertise and financial means accessible to developed countries, 
although the WTO offers skilled legal professionals to help developing 
countries in their disputes (as will be discussed later). Developing 
countries would consequently rather end panel actions subsequent to a 
182 Andrew Guzman and Beth A. Simmons, 'To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical 
Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the WTO', (2002), 31(1) part 2 Journal of 
Legal of Studies, p. 208.; Rorden Wilkinson, The WTO Crisis and the Governance of 
Global Trade, (Routledge, 2006), p. 97. 
183 T. N. Srinivasan, 'Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trading System after 
Doha', Yale University Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 842, (2002), 
Available at http: //www. publicpolicies. orq/Research/TN%C2%AOSrinivasan-pres. pdf, 
last seen on 14-06-06 at 10am, p. 14.; Bhagirath Lai Das, The Current Negotiations 
in the WTO: Options, Opportunities and Risks for Developing Countries, (Zed Books, 
London, 2005), pp. 68-69. 
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bilateral resolution, which might sometimes be unfair, 184 so as not to 
go through the dispute settlement process of the WTO. '85 
In addition, if developing countries cannot afford to make their case to 
the WTO panel and appellate body, they will be unlikely to exercise 
their WTO rights even in cases of more explicit contraventions, as has 
been argued by India. In this case, an alternative would be bilateral 
negotiations. However the process of settling in this way will be 
undermined once the respondent recognized that its opponent cannot 
meet the expense of taking the case to the DSM. 186 
Also, the appellate body and panels adopt a highly contextualized way 
of deciding a dispute founded on jurisprudence, so that their reports 
are extremely long and complex. Such complexity would demand ever 
more intensive and time-consuming efforts by private attorneys or 
official trade experts so as to effectively deal with the matter. 187 For 
example, defining the terminology of the dispute can cause difficulties 
and can be time consuming. In the Sugar dispute188, the disputing 
parties - Australia, Brazil and Thailand - took a considerable time to 
decide the definition of the amount of imported sugar from ACP/India 
which would be subject to export subsidies. This was a crucial point 
184 The issue of unfair settlement will be dealt with in more detail in chapter five. 
iss Thomas L. Brewer & Stephen Young, 'WTO Disputes and Developing Countries', 
(1999), 33(5) Journal of World Tradel69, p. 173. 
186 Keisuke Iida, 'Is WTO Dispute Settlement Effective? ', (2004), 10 Global 
Governance 207, p. 216. 
187 Gregory Shaffer, 'How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for 
Developing Countries', in Gregory Shaffer, Victor Mosoti, and Asif Qureshi, Towards a 
Development-Supportive Dispute Settlement System in the WTO, (ICTSD, 2003), 
available online at http: //www. ictsd. orq/dloque/2003-02-07/Shaffer. pdf, last seen on 
1-6-2008 at 9 pm., p. 16. 
188 EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar, panel report 
(complaint by Thailand, Brazil and 
Australia), WT/DS/283/R, WT/DS266/R, WT/DS265/R, 15 October 2004, appellate 
body report, WT/DS/283/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS265/AB/R, adopted on 28 
April 2005. [hereinafter EC Sugar] 
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which had to be resolved so that the EC could understand all the 
associations provided by the complainants. Finally, the disputing 
parties called it the "ACP/India equivalent of sugar". 189 
Developing countries must therefore think carefully about the costs 
and benefits of pursuing a dispute, even if they are persuaded that 
their rights under the covered agreements have been violated or that 
other members have neglected their duties. Smaller developing 
countries must also take into account the potential political expense19o 
(in addition to the fiscal costs) when their rights have been violated by 
a developed country. This has a negative impact on the balance of 
rights and duties in the dispute settlement mechanism, since there is 
no equivalent pressure on developed countries from either financial or 
political costs. 191 
In addition, it has been argued that when a country does not have 
adequate technical skills192 this reduces its ability to litigate and 
influences its bargaining power in disputes: a rich country will not take 
189 Pornchai Danvivathana, 'Case Study of Thailand's Experience in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System', Working Paper of ICTSD Asia Dialogue on WTO Dispute 
Settlement and Sustainable Development Jakarta, (25 and 26 January 2006), 
Available at http: //www. ictsd. or /q dloque/2006-01-25/Pornchai. pdf, last seen on 22- 
07-06 at lam, p. 12. 
190 The political influence of the DSM on developing countries will be scrutinized in 
Section 3.3.3, when dealing with deficiencies in the implementation system. 
191 TRADE, note 181, p. 24- 
192 This is a general problem facing DCs in all WTO issues: "A key question that 
arises at present is whether developing countries' representation at the WTO is 
adequate for the pursuit of their effective participation in the activities of the 
Organization and, through it, the promotion of their interests in the expanding range 
of issues being addressed. This issue is of special importance because the WTO, like 
the GATT before it, is a member driven organization, meaning that the bulk of the 
analytical work, the development of proposals as well as the negotiation of 
agreements falls on the member countries and their representatives. " Constantine 
Michalopoulos, 'The Participation of the Developing Countries in the WTO', (1998), 
available online at 
http: //www worldbank. org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/WPS1900series/wps19 
06/wps1906. pdf, last seen on 22-07-06 at 3am, p. 23. 
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seriously threats to litigate over its trade practices when it knows that 
a poorer one is not able to bring a case. Thus, developing countries 
are failing to pursue disputes because they lack the technical ability to 
do so. In addition, having no adequate legal experts leads to an 
incapacity to recognize breaches in their WTO rights and to bring 
disputes. 193 
Let us consider the position of developing countries as plaintiffs; the 
lack of legal and financial resources will hinder their use of the system. 
On the other hand, their appearances as respondents are becoming 
more frequent, and in this respect it is argued that even reputational 
considerations will not effectively prevent developed countries from 
increasing their legal actions against developing ones. 194 
With regard to technical assistance, there has been strong criticism of 
the role of the WTO as well as of the developed countries, which are 
said to have done nothing in this regard, although there is much that 
they could do, and such attempts as have been made have been 
considered "very poor and unorganized". 195 Thus, there is a need for 
pressure on developed countries to play a greater part in providing 
technical assistance. Their ineffectiveness, it has been claimed, is due 
to the concern that the dispute settlement mechanism will be used 
against them by developing countries. 196 Therefore, they have no 
incentive to encourage the participation of developing countries in the 
system. 
193 Douglas Ierley, 'Defining the factors that influence developing country compliance 
with and participation in the WTO dispute settlement system: Another look at the 
dispute over bananas', (2002), 33(4) Law and Policy in International Business 615, 
p. 642. 
194 Keisuke Iida, note 186, p-218- 
195 Douglas Ierley, note 193, pp. 643-644. 
196 Ibid. 
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Additionally, as a result of the establishment of the WTO dispute 
settlement system in the Uruguay Round, the appellate body was 
introduced under Article 17. Its function was that of examining the 
legal findings of the panel after a request from the disputing members 
engaged in a case. The WTO takes the initiative in creating such a 
binding appeal process. 197 The formation of the appellate body has 
been criticized for having a number of undesirable consequences. 
There has been a significant increase in the cost of bringing a dispute 
and in the length of time needed for settling a dispute. It is obvious 
that the first issue is not in the interests of developing countries and 
the second might affect either party. However, because dispute 
resolution usually takes place among members with asymmetrical 
strength, developing countries will generally realize that they can gain 
little from the lengthened period in which they must meet their WTO 
obligations; indeed, the longer it lasts, the higher the cost. 198 
Besson has further developed the capacity argument by suggesting 
that a member with superior legal power would obtain positive rulings, 
since it could effectively deal with the complexity of WTO law and its 
dispute settlement procedures. In this respect, he argues, there is a 
wide capacity gap between developed and developing countries, 
allowing the former superior performance before the panel and the 
appellate body, thus reducing the likelihood of the latter winning their 
cases. Legal capacity includes a number of factors. First, developed 
197 Jeff Wanicymer, WTO Litigation Procedural Aspects of Formal Disputes 
Settlement, (Cameron May Ltd, London, 2002), p. 693. 
198 Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, 'Enforcing Multilateral Commitments: 
Dispute Settlement and Developing Countries', (1999), available on line at, 
http"//www2 cid harvard edu/cidtrade/Issues/hoekman. pd, last seen on 20-07-04 
at 9 am, p. 28. 
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countries are more able to bear the expenses of a case brought to the 
DSM than developing ones. Also, there is disparity in the number of 
WTO officials representing developed and developing countries. 199 
This problem is not limited to the least developed countries; even 
Thailand, an advanced developing country which is more familiar with 
the dispute settlement process, can be shown to face difficulties 
arising from a lack of resources. Firstly, although it has trade officials 
who could evaluate and prepare economic cases, it lacks the 
international and trade lawyers required to present them before a 
panel or the appellate body. This deprives their rulings of protection 
from the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 200 Secondly, 
Thailand has found it challenging to recruit enough staff with 
experience of the multilateral trading system to work on a case, since 
there must be staff not only in Geneva but also in Bangkok, to 
communicate the progress of the case. This is made more difficult by 
the time difference between the two cities. 201 Lack of legal and 
financial resources has left many developing countries and LDCs not 
even knowing if the DSM could work. 202 
3.2.2 Law firms 
First, it is worth mentioning that, according to the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, only government officials were originally allowed to 
present a case before a panel or the appellate body. This put 
199 Fabien Besson, 'Is WTO Dispute Settlement System Biased Against Developing 
Countries? An Empirical Analysis', (2004), available at http: //www. univ- 
nancy2 fr/RECHERCHE/EcoDroit/DOWNLOAD/DROITS ETDEVELOP/Besson-Mehdi05- 
04Tpdf , 
last seen on 09-05-06 at 9: 30am, p. 14. 
200 Ibid., p. 12. 
201 Pornchai Danvivathana, note 189, p. 5. 
202 Augustine Mandigora, 'Govern-Business Interface in the Dispute Settlement: 
Lessons for SACU', Tralac Working Paper No. 2, Stellenbosch: US Printers, (2007), 
p. 12. 
65 
additional strain on the developing countries with a restricted number 
of official legal specialists, since private law firms were not allowed to 
be involved in a WTO dispute. It was only after a number of ruling S203 
issued by a panel and the appellate body that private law firms were 
allowed to participate. This is described by Michalopoulos as "a rule 
that inadvertently may prejudice developing country participation in 
the WTO". 204 
With regard to law firms, the lack of in-house legal capacity means 
that developing countries may have to resort to private law firms for 
the support required to present cases to the WTO. These are usually 
based in developed countries. 205 It has been argued that due to 
growth in the number of disputes brought under the WTO, private law 
firms play an important part in assisting developing countries to 
participate in the system. On the other hand, the role of such firms 
has been severely criticized by the developing countries that have 
used them. It has been described as a catastrophe, in that private law 
firms deliberately extend disputes to earn more money. What is more, 
law firms that represent developing counties in a dispute do not play 
any role in training domestic equivalents, but instead develop their 
own legal experts. 206 Therefore, it has been suggested that law firms 
203 This important precedent has been first set by the AB in the Banana III dispute at 
the request of St Lucia who has participate as third party, more detail also in chapter 
four. 
204 Constantine Michalopoulos, note 129, p. 27. 
205 Working Paper of South Centre, 'The WTO Multilateral Trade Agenda and the 
South', No: ISBN 92-9162-008-4,1998, p. 44.; Simonetta Zarrilli, 'International 
Trade in Genetically Modified Organisms: A New Dilemma for developing countries', 
in Francesco Francioni (ed), Environment, Human Rights and International Trade, 
(Hart Publishing, 2001), p. 86. 
206 Douglas Ierley, note 193, pp. 644-645. 
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ought to support the developing countries that they represent by 
training local experts and using them to participate in disputes. 207 
There is no denying that law firms are extremely costly, 208 and 
although private ones deal with developing country disputes, there is 
still the problem of lack of monetary means in developing countries. 209 
Hiring private legal experts would cost them $200-$600 or more per 
hour for counsel and representation in their disputes. In the Japan - 
Photographic Film dispute, 210 Kodak's and Fuji's private legal 
representatives cost them about 10 million US dollars. Such financial 
costs are unimaginable for the majority of developing countries. Even 
in a fairly small dispute, a law firm would charge about $200,000 to 
represent a developing country, just during the panel process. 211 
3.2.3 Developing countries' position in comparison to 
developed countries 
To develop in-house legal experts is not cheap. The position of 
developed countries in this respect differs from their developing 
counterparts. The former are "well equipped with legal talent, are well 
briefed by export interests, and have a worldwide network of 
commercial and diplomatic representation that feeds their systems 
with relevant data". 212 Furthermore, there has been significant growth 
207 Ibid. 
208 IPRs-online document, WTO dispute settlement, (1 December 2004), 
http: //www. iprsonline. orq/unctadictsd/docs/-RB5.3 Dispute Settlement update. pdf, 
last seen on 11-06-06 at 9: 00am, p. 688. 
209 Hansel T. Pham, 'Developing Countries and the WTO: The Need for More 
Mediation in the DSU', (2004), 9 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 331, p. 355. 
210 Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic 
Film, panel report, 
WT/DS44/R, adopted 22 April 1998. [hereinafter Japan Photographic Film] 
211 Gregory Shaffer, note 187, p. 16. 
212 Chris Nixon, 'WTO dispute settlement procedure: Implications for a small 
country', NZTC working paper no 22, (2002), available at 
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in education with regard to WTO law in the United States, where every 
year there are more than one hundred lectures on different aspects of 
the WTO rules and more than two thousand candidates studying WTO 
law. Unlike the US and Europe, developing countries do not have 
domestic private lawyers who can give advice on WTO law and its 
functions to local firms and trade associations, enabling these 
countries to protect their interests in the WTO dispute settlement 
system. The small number of lawyers with expertise in WTO law 
greatly increases the cost for law firms and governments in developing 
countries of identifying WTO breaches, in addition to hiring and 
educating legal experts to dispute any violating trade measures. 213 
Regrettably, this does not make developing countries eligible for 
financial support, which leads to other difficulties about who ought to 
provide such support and whether developed countries are prepared to 
do so, especially when these capacities are developed to be used 
against them in the WTO dispute settlement system. 214 
It appears that developed countries benefit both from their own 
expertise and from that of students sponsored by developing countries 
to study WTO law in the institutions of developed countries, who, 
instead of returning home as intended, remain in the developed 
countries to gain further expertise in international law and trade. 
http: //www. nzier. co. nz/SITE Default/SITE Publications/x-files/1325. pdf, last seen 
on 3-04-06 at lam, pp. 15-16.; Also an interesting comparison between the number 
of trade representatives of developing and developed countries, in Constantine 
Michalopoulous, Developing Countries in the WTO, (Paigrave Macmillan, 2001), 
pp. 158-160. 
213 Chris Nixon, note 212, p. 17. 
214 Ibid., p. 15-16. 
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3.2.4 Article 27.2215 
In order to help developing countries tackle this matter, the DSU 
contains a rule specifically established to meet their requirements. 
Legal support is provided under Article 27.2 of the DSU, which states 
that the secretariat may give legal assistance to developing countries 
on issues related to the dispute settlement system. Thus, the 
secretariat makes skilled legal experts from the WTO technical 
cooperation services available to developing countries upon request. In 
order to accomplish this duty, two legal affairs officers have been 
assigned by the secretariat to support developing countries. However, 
their role is confined to giving advice and clarification regarding WTO 
law and processes. 216 Article 27.2 proscribes the legal advisor from 
acting as counsel or helping in writing submissions, because to do so 
could be a breach of the impartiality requirement of the secretariat. 
While the legal assistants are not held back in their work by this 
limitation, they are nevertheless constrained by the fact that they 
work only one day per week on these duties. 217 
In the main, developing countries have not considered the legal 
assistance provided by the WTO in Article 27.2 particularly helpful to 
them, and it has been criticized for the quality and quantity of help 
provided. In terms of quantity, the WTO secretariat has assigned two 
legal experts from the GATT/WTO Legal Affairs Division to assist 
215 Article 27.2 of the DSU states that "While the Secretariat assists Members in 
respect of dispute settlement at their request, there may also be a need to provide 
additional legal advice and assistance in respect of dispute settlement to 
developing 
country members. To this end, the Secretariat shall make available a qualified 
legal 
expert from the WTO technical cooperation services to any 
developing country 
member which so requests. This expert shall assist the 
developing country member 
in a manner ensuring the continued impartiality of the 
Secretariat. " 
216 Kim Van der Borght, 'The Advisory Center on WTO Law: Advance Fairness and 
Equality', (1999), Journal of International Economic Law 723 , p. 723-723. 
217 Ibid. 
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developing countries part-time with the support of two subordinate 
personnel. Additionally, a number of developing countries have 
claimed that in spite of the importance of legal advice offered, it is 
actually restricted in its scope, often merely evaluating potential claims 
and giving simple guidance regarding the WTO dispute settlement 
process. 218 
Oxfam argues further that the WTO Technical Co-operation and 
Training Division (TCTD) cannot meet developing countries' 
considerable need for human and technical support, because, beside 
the impartiality barrier, they have a restricted number of staff: two 
full-time, two part-time and an additional one on a part-time basis as 
required. 219 The quality of the counsel is not in question and it is 
suitable within the limited extent of technical support. What is more, 
at issue is the variety of assistance provided. In addition, the legal 
assistance is provided to the developing country only after the 
submission of their case to the WTO. 22° 
The language of the article itself is very broad and does not specify 
how such assistance could be executed in an acceptable manner. 
There is no article apart from this single provision which provides 
technical support from the DSU. Due to the restricted number of staff 
in the secretariat, it can devote only one legal consultant to a country 
in a dispute, which means that it would be extremely difficult to deal 
with the dispute settlement system with such limited support. 221 
218 Mary E. Footer, note 179, p. 74. 
219 Oxfam GB Discussion Paper, Institutional Reform of the WTO, 2000, available at 
http: //www. oxfam. orq. uk, last seen on 21-06-06 at gam, 
220 Ibid. 
221 Working Paper of South Centre, Review of the Existing Special and Differential 
Treatment Provisions: Implementing the Doha Mandate, Doc No: sc/tadp/sdt/1, 
(2002), p. 14. 
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3.2.5 The ACWL 
The criticism of the lack of legal and financial resources available to 
developing countries was so serious that it resulted in the creation of 
the Advisory Centre on WTO Law, 222 an innovative, non-governmental 
trans-national organization whose purpose is to provide developing 
countries with inexpensive legal assistance on the WTO rules and the 
dispute settlement system. 223 The intention was to offer developing 
countries and LDCs equal access to the system. According to a 
representative from Colombia, the ACWL has so far been fairly 
successful. A number of developed and developing countries224 have 
given it their monetary and moral support. 225 Frieder Roessler, the 
current Director of the ACWL, has a very good reputation with regard 
to the dispute settlement system. He developed his skill with the GATT 
dispute settlement mechanism, as a Director of the GATT Legal Affairs 
Division. 226 
The Advisory Centre on WTO Law functions separately from the 
secretariat. Hence, it can act in a broader and more tactical manner 
with developing countries, while preserving the impartiality of the WTO 
secretariat. In a way, the ACWL performs the role of `public defender' 
222 Dukgeun Ahn, 'WTO Dispute Settlements in East Asia', Nber Working Paper, No: 
10178, (2003), available at http: //www. nber. org//papers/w10178, last seen on 23- 
04-06 at 12: 30am, p. 33. 
223 Amelia Porges, "Settling WTO Disputes: What do Litigation Models Tell Us? ', 
(2003), Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 141, p. 177. 
224 Detail on the staff and member state of the ACWL, available online in, 
www. acwl. org, last seen on 23-6-08 at 6: 50 pm 
225 Andrea Greisberger, note 202, pp. 828-829. 
226 William J. Davey, 'The WTO Dispute Settlement System: How Have Developing 
Countries Fared? ', Illinois Public Law and Legal Theory Research Papers Series, 
Research Paper No. 05-17, (2005), available online at 
http: //papers. ssrn. com/sol3/papers. cfm? abstract id=862804, last seen on 4-2-2008 
at 11: 30am, p. 36. 
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for the developing countries. The costs for developing countries are 
also generally lower and exist mainly to deter the bringing of cases on 
frivolous grounds, because the ACWL is mainly financed by a number 
of developed countries. In fact, the fees imposed by the ACWL are only 
a small part of the real cost of representing a developing country from 
the beginning to the end of the appeals process. 227 
The ACWL has played an active role both in advising developing 
countries on the process of a dispute and in training them to deal with 
the system. 228 As an example of its positive role, it offered advice to 
the Thai government regarding anti-dumping matters in the Shrimp 
dispute229. In spite of the private sector's desire to involve private 
lawyers, the government chose to work extensively with the ACWL. In 
this case the ACWL worked closely with private lawyers. The Thai 
government was thus able, by undertaking such collaboration with the 
ACWL, to reduce the cost of litigation to around half what it would 
have paid if the work had all been done by private law firm s. 230 
With regard to the ACWL advice on WTO law, developing country 
members of the WTO ought also to be members of the Advisory 
Centre, in order to receive this advice free of charge. This is because 
non-members pay a higher rate and do not enjoy the benefits of 
membership. In terms of the WTO dispute settlement system, its 
members must pay fees in order to be represented. These fees differ 
according to members' trade volume and GDP, with the less developed 
227 Hansel T. Pham, note 209, pp. 356-357. 
228 William J. Davey, note 226, p. 37. 
229 United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, panel 
report, WT/DS58/R, adopted on 15 May 
1998, appellate body report, 
WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted on 12 October 1998. [hereinafter US Shrimp] 
230 Pornchai Danvivathana, note 189, p. 7. 
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countries paying only 40 Swiss francs per hour. LDCs do not have to 
be ACWL members to receive assistance at the lower rate, but 
developing countries which do not have ACWL membership could 
theoretically receive such advice, but would pay higher charges than 
members. However, so far, only ACWL members and one LDC have 
benefited from such support in the WTO dispute settlement system. 231 
As a result, the ACWL has been criticized, because even though 
developing countries have admired its performance and targets, they 
also consider that it "should not be considered a panacea for all 
institutional and human capacity constraints of developing 
countries". 232 It has been argued by developing countries that the 
charges made by the ACWL for membership, which confers the right to 
use its facilities, are rather high for a number of less-developed 
countries that might have more urgent uses for its scarce resources. 
Furthermore, despite the fact that the ACWL's legal representatives 
have been admired for their knowledge and skills, there are too few 
lawyers available to deal with all of the disputes involving developing 
countries. 233 
In disputes where two developing countries are against each other, 
conflicts of interest may also arise. 234 An interesting example of this 
took place in the Sugar case235, in which Australia had its own legal 
experts, Brazil relied on a private law firm with monetary support from 
its sugar business and Thailand worked with the ACWL. In this 
231 William J. Davey, note 226, p. 36. 
232 Proposal by the African Group, Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, TN/DS/W/15 (25 September 2002), p. 2. 
233 Hansel T. Pham, note 209, p. 357. 
234 Ibid. 
235 EC Sugar, note 188. 
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instance, despite the obvious beneficial factors (such as reasonable 
litigation costs for the Thai government, the quality of services 
provided and the expertise of its director) the Thai government had to 
take the initiative in order to be presented by the ACWL in the Sugar 
case, especially as the other disputing parties (Australia and Brazil) 
were also keen to be represented by the ACWL. In actual fact, the 
ACWL declined the demand of the other parties, because Thailand was 
the first to seek its involvement. 236 The ACWL also lacks the support of 
the major developed members: the US, Japan, France and Germany 
are absent, while few EU countries are members of the ACWL. 23' 
Indeed, the majority of developing countries are not members 
either238; thus, of 153 WTO member states, only 20 developing and 9 
developed countries are members of the ACWL. All of these countries 
are listed in Table 2. 
Table 2: 239 Members of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law 
Members entitled to the services of the 
Centre 
Developed Country Members 
1- Bolivia 1- Canada 
2- Colombia 2- Denmark 
3- Dominican Republic 3- Finland 
4- Ecuador 4- Ireland 
5- Egypt 5- Italy 
6- Guatemala 6- Netherlands 
7- Honduras 7- Norway 
8- Hong Kong, China 8- Sweden 
9- India 9- United Kingdom 
10- Kenya 
236 Pornchai Danvivathana, note 189, p. 7. 
237 Trish Kelly, The Impact of the WTO: The Environment, Public Health and 
Sovereignty, (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2007), p. 191. 
238 Kim Van der Borght, 'The Reform of the Dispute Settlement System of the World 
Trade Organization: Improving Fairness and Inducting Fear', (2007), 4(2) 
Manchester Journal of International Economic Law 2, p. 22. 
239 Source: ACWL website at http: //www. acwl. ch/e/members/members e. aspx, last 
seen on 11-11-2008 at 3.50 pm. 
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3.2.6 Options for Reform 
3.2.6.1 Improvements to Article 27.2 
Even after the creation of the Advisory Centre on WTO law, developing 
countries still suffer from the excessive costs of bringing a dispute to 
the WTO dispute settlement system. 240 Thus, there is a strong call for 
a review of the role of Article 27.2 of the DSU, in order to make it 
conducive to the participation of developing countries in dispute 
settlement concerns. 241 
The most straightforward demand is for an increase in the size of the 
team referred to in Article 27.2, which at present comprises two part- 
time legal advisers. In this regard, the strongest suggestion was made 
by Venezuela, which called for five advisors in an autonomous legal 
division. Such a structure would ensure that developing countries 
received autonomous legal assistance regarding the process of the 
DSM, and this would not affect the impartiality of the secretariat. 242 
240 Hansel T. Pham, note 209, p. 364. 
241 Note by the Secretariat, Concerns Regarding Special and Differential Treatment 
Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions, WT/COMTD/W/66 (16 February 2000), 
p. 33. 
242 Kim Van der Borght, 'Critical Essay: The Review of the WTO Understanding on 
Dispute Settlement: Some Reflections on the Current Debate', (1999), 14 American 
University International Law Review 1223, pp. 1231-1232. 
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Additionally, there is a proposal for the creation of a Permanent 
Defence Council to provide legal and technical support to developing 
countries at any time they are involved in a dispute, and for such a 
council to be funded from the WTO budget surpluses. 243 The function 
of this council could be improved if it were to play a more effective role 
in training the representatives of developing countries to deal with 
WTO issues, for 
internships. 244 
example by holding seminars and hosting 
With respect to the WTO secretariat impartiality requirement, it is 
worth mentioning that there needs to be a more explicit (and possibly 
less restricted) execution of the principle of impartiality, because a 
narrow application of this rule restricts the range and character of the 
legal assistance provided to developing countries. It also restrains 
advisors from supporting developing countries in their disputes. 245 In 
addition, a reform that could be considered is to remove the obligation 
of neutrality imposed upon consultants by Article 27.2, and to allow 
legal experts to fulfil their function as counsel. This has been 
suggested by the Less-Developed Country Group. 246 
It has also been suggested that the theory of separation of powers 
ought to be applied to the WTO, thus making the panel and the 
appellate body autonomous within the WTO. Thus, their operation 
243 Ibid. 
244 Thaddeus McBride, 'Rejuvenating the WTO: Why the U. S. Must Assist Developing 
Countries in Trade Disputes', (1999), 11 International Legal Perspectives 65, p. 92. 
245 Note by the Secretariat, note 241, p. 33. 
246 Proposal by the LDC Group, Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, TN/DS/W/17 (9 October 2002), p. 5. 
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would not be affected by any sort of political or administrative power, 
in the same way as applies in domestic legal systems. 247 
Moreover, to assist developing countries to address the issue of cost, it 
is proposed that a WTO Trust Fund be set up to provide monetary 
support to retain external specialists like attorneys and advisors in 
private law firms. This would enable a wide range of consultancy and 
advisory services to be provided. 248 If this took place, the WTO Council 
could take the UN as a model; the United Nations secretariat-General 
requests monetary support through voluntary donations from several 
countries for the UN Trust Fund, which helps developing countries 
financially to bring cases before the ICJ. 249 
In a parallel suggestion, Turkey proposed that the budget of the 
secretariat ought to be increased to improve its ability to support the 
positions of the legal experts and to employ full-time advisors. To fund 
the augmented technical support for developing countries, Turkey 
advocated, a budget of at least 250,000 Swiss francs should be drawn 
from the reserve fund. The Budget Committee accepted this allocation 
of budget surpluses and the General Council authorized it. 250 In 
January 2000, UNCTAD introduced an idea for an international training 
scheme to help people in developing countries to improve their 
expertise in international business law. Unfortunately, this was 
unsuccessful due to the lack of political and financial support from 
developed countries. 251 
247 Martin Khor, 'WTO Dispute System Tilting Balance against South', (2000), 
available online at http: //www. twnside. org. sg/title/tilt. htm, last seen on 29-07-06 at 
4pm, p. 5. 
248 Note by the Secretariat, note 241, p. 33. 
249 Kim Van der Borght, note 242, pp. 1231-1232. 
250 Kim Van der Borght, note 216, p. 724. 
251 Thaddeus McBride, note 244, pp. 69-70. 
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It has also been recognised that there is a clear need for extra training 
and financial support for developing counties to tackle the issue of 
imbalanced legal and monetary capacity. To realize this objective, the 
creation of a dispute settlement fund, receiving monetary support from 
the WTO budget, would result in the effective participation of 
developing countries in the WTO dispute settlement system. The 
African Group requested assistance in the form of "a pool of experts 
and lawyers in the preparation and conduct of cases, the payment of 
fees and expenses entailed, [and a detailed] compilation by the WTO 
secretariat of all applicable [panel and Appellate Body case] law". 252 
In response to the increase in the cost of bringing disputes in the 
WTO, India suggested that where a developing and a developed 
country are the disputing parties and the ruling of the panel or 
appellate body is that the developed country is the offending member 
and that the developing country is thus successful, or where a dispute 
established between a developed country and a developing country 
member has been later declined, it ought to be ruled that the 
developed country should pay the legal costs incurred as a result of 
the litigation. 253 In addition, it has been suggested that the number of 
disputes that can be brought by a developed country against a 
developing country ought to be restricted to two cases per year. 254 
252 African Group Proposal, note 232, p. 4. 
253 Website, available online at http: //www. freedominfo. orq/ifti/wto. htm#2, last seen 
on 1-08-04 at 9pm 
254 Communication from China, Specific Amendments to the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding - Drafting Inputs from China, revision, TN/DS/W/51/Rev. 
1 (13 March 
2003), p. 2. 
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Such a scheme, if it were implemented, would improve the capability 
of developing countries to be involved in the dispute settlement 
system. It would encourage members to pursue settlement as opposed 
to formal disputes, and this payment as a result of the failure to 
comply would not be problematic for larger developed countries, which 
could easily afford it. 255 
3.2.6.2 Small claims procedures 
It has been argued that one of the main reasons for developing and 
less developed countries not bringing disputes is the length of the 
process under the DSU, which can take up to thirty months. 
Introducing a simpler and faster dispute settlement process could help 
to resolve this matter. 256 
Many of the cases brought to the WTO dispute settlement system 
involve quite small trade volumes. Therefore, the system could be 
enhanced for developing countries by launching a 'light' dispute 
process involving, for instance, disputes in which the value of exports 
is under $1 million. In such disputes, the panel could be established 
with a sole panellist and the entire litigation accomplished in three 
months. This would particularly help developing countries, since the 
greater number of cases engaging developing countries are such 
'small' disputes. It would also significantly reduce the cost of bringing 
disputes, as attorneys might not be considered necessary. At the same 
255 Gregory Shaffer, note 187, p. 44. 
256 Peter Lichtenbaum, 'Reflections on the WTO Doha Ministerial: 'Special Treatment' 
Vs. 'Equal Participation': Striking a Balance in the Doha Negotiations', (2002), 
American University International Law Review 1003, p. 1041; Nordstrom, H. and 
Shaffer, G, 'Access to Justice in the WTO: The Case for a Small Claims Procedure: a 
Preliminary Analysis', International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 
Geneva, Switzerland, Issue Paper No. 2, (2007), available online at www. ictsd. org, 
last seen on 20-6-2008 at 2: 14 pm. 
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time, this would be considered advantageous to the dispute 
mechanism, as it would diminish the burden that is placed on 
panel S. 257 
Thus, it could produce a system for the quick review of disputes, which 
could be of enormous significance for the country initiating the 
dispute. As far as developing countries are concerned, what might be 
considered very little in dollars might represent a significant proportion 
of their overall exports. 258 The suggestion of launching a de minimis 
kind of litigation in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has also 
been put forward by India, as a developing country member: 259 
"'In cases where a developed country is the complainant 
and a developing country is the respondent, the developed 
country should acquire the right to initiate dispute 
settlement action against the developing country, only if it 
is able to demonstrate that the alleged violation of a 
provision of a covered agreement by a developing country 
causes, to the developed country, trade impairment or 
trade loss above a threshold or de minimis level. "260 
India covered in its proposal the manner in which a such fast track 
method might be decided. For instance, it could be through a specific 
fixed percentage of the value of imports of the specific commodities in 
a case where a developing country is involved, or by the complete 
market volume of the specific commodities in the developing country 
involved. 261 In this regard, the WTO can learn useful lessons from a 
comparable practice in resolving economic disputes under different 
257 Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, note 198, pp. 26-27. 
258 Ibid. 
259 Mary E. Footer, note 179, pp. 97-98. 
260 India Communication, Concerns Regarding Implementation of Provisions Relating 
to Differential and More Favourable Treatment of Developing Countries and Least- 
developed Countries in Various WTO Agreements, WT/GC/W/108 (13 November 
1998), p. 11. 
261 Ibid. 
so 
mechanisms (for example, the Court of First Instance of the European 
Communities) in evaluating the application and related advantages 
that the creation of small claims procedures would bring for the 
settlement of trade disputes in the WTO. 262 
3.3 Questioning the Enforcement Procedures 
3.3.1 Retaliation is not an option for developing 
countries 
It is claimed that as a trade sanction is not a prerequisite of a better 
compliance record in the WTO, there are other factors that put 
pressure on WTO members to respect their obligations under the 
covered agreements, such as domestic pressure, reputational penalties 
and unilateral sanctions, even without imposing trade sanctions. 
Moreover, the role of the dispute settlement system in clarifying and 
interpreting the rules and provisions of the WTO agreements is more 
important than imposing penalties on the offending member. Because 
of this, if the offending party withdrew the inconsistent measures 
according to the panel or appellate body rulings, they would pay no 
penalty. 263 
In addition, several provisions indicate that its goals are obvious and 
that the preferred means of settling a dispute between two conflicting 
members in the DSM is to reach a mutually acceptable resolution that 
is compatible with the WTO rules. It is important to note that the main 
objective of the DSU is to ensure that all violations cease and that 
262 Mary E. Footer, note 179, p. 98. 
263 Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, 'The Economic Structure of Renegotiation 
and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization', 
(2002), 31 Journal of Legal 
Studies 179, p. 204. 
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measures are made consistent with WTO agreements. 264 Retaliation is 
considered "'the last resort", 
265 but one may wonder for whom. It is 
relevant here to recall a recent answer by the WTO Director General, 
Paschal Lamy, when asked about the effectiveness of the WTO 
sanctions for developing countries: 
"Strictly speaking, the WTO system has no sanctions. 
Members are supposed to comply with rulings from WTO 
panels or the appellate body. If they don't comply in a 
reasonable period of time, the complaining country may 
receive a temporal compensation or, lacking that, be 
temporarily authorized to suspend equivalent concessions. 
This is the closest we get to sanctions in the WTO system. 
This matter is being currently examined by Members under 
the Doha negotiations. One of the concerns is that small 
countries do not have the same capacity as large ones to 
impose countermeasures that induce compliance. "266 
The Director General's words provide clear support to those who 
believe that the WTO remedies need to be reviewed and reformed. 267 
Nevertheless, the dispute settlement system itself seems to function 
fairly well, and it surely deserves to be preserved. 268 In addition, 
Srinivasan rightly argues that any WTO member who suspends 
264 Article 3.7 of the DSU states that, "The first objective of the dispute settlement 
mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these 
are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements" 
265 William 1. Davey, note 226, p. 4. 
266 Transcript of Internet chat with WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, (21 February 
2006), Available on www. wto. org, p. 17. 
267 Alan Wm. Wolff, 'Colloquium on Preserving American Sovereignty: How Should 
International Trade Rules Be Formulated? Problems with WTO Dispute Settlement', 
(2001), available at 
www. dbtrade. com/publications/problems with WTO dispute settlement. pdf, last 
seen on 2-07-06 at 12am, p. 6; also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 'Why Rational Choice 
Theory Requires a Multilevel Constitutional Approach to International Economic Law', 
(2008), 1 University of Illinois Law Review 359, pp. 376-382. 
268 Faryar Shirzad, 'The WTO Dispute Settlement System: Prospects for Reform', 
(2000), Law and Policy in International Business 769, p. 769. 
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concessions to an offending member will also tend to harm its own 
national trade interests. 269 Jackson argues in this respect that 
"asking the winning country to impose so-called 'retaliatory 
measures' amounts to asking it to shoot itself in the foot, 
because the measures inflict an economic harm on the 
imposing country, and often affect third parties that usually 
have nothing to do with the case-in effect, innocent 
bystanders. These problems show clearly how the views of 
sovereign nations constrain the authority of the WTO. i270 
With respect to developing countries, it has been strongly argued that 
one of the main reasons for the absence of developing and less- 
developed country members from the dispute settlement system is the 
structural inflexibility of the remedies presented to the poor nations to 
enforce a favourable decision. 271The anticipated gain for a developing 
country that has obtained a positive ruling from a panel or the 
appellate body in a dispute against a developed country is restricted to 
the withdrawal of concessions under consideration by the developed 
country member. If the inconsistent measure is not removed, it may 
be awarded compensation for the damage suffered by the developing 
country because of the existence of the inconsistent measure, and the 
developing country has the right to retaliate. This is considered to be 
an improvement on the GATT 1947 dispute settlement mechanism. 
Nevertheless, with regard to the implementation of decisions under the 
DSU, because of the imbalance between them developing countries 
269 T. N. Srinivasan, 'The Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the WTO: A Brief History 
and an Evaluation from Economic, Contractarian and Legal Perspectives', (2007), 
30(7) The World Economy 1033, pp. 1054-1055 
270 Johan Jackson, 'The Case of the World Trade Organization', (2008), 84(3) 
International Affairs 437, p. 452. 
271 Proposal by the LDC Group, note 246, p. 3. 
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still experience certain difficulties, 272 especially in disputes where 
developing and developed countries are the disputing parties. 273 
As regards, GATT 1947, there were a number of states with a 
reputation for non-compliance with the dispute settlement mechanism. 
This particularly applied to the EU and its Common Agricultural Policy. 
As a result, there were repeated uses of the dispute mechanism under 
GATT for identical import measures. In theory, this can be prevented 
in the WTO process through a timescale being fixed for the execution 
procedure. Conversely, the current practice in some high-profile cases 
(such as the one which was brought against the EU regarding its 
banana import policy) suggests that a parallel difficulty can arise in the 
WTO. 274 
Developing countries do not have the privilege of deciding whether to 
meet the terms of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) decision or not. 
Their relatively weak economies place these countries in a poor 
position to withstand the retaliation they would face if they did not 
comply. An expert for a developing country articulated this briefly by 
saying that "developing countries 'do not have the luxury of choosing 
whether to comply ". 275 
Secondly, the panels and the appellate body usually deliver verdicts by 
proposing remedies as broad "recommendations". The ambiguity of 
272 TRADE, note 181, p. 24., Matsushita, Thomas J. Schoenbaum and 
Petros C 
Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy, (Oxford 
University Press, second Edition, 2006), p. 196. 
273 Andrew G. Brown and Robert M. Stern, 'Concepts of Fairness in the Global 
Trading System', (2007), 12(3) Pacific Economic Review 293, p. 113. 
274 Thomas L. Brewer & Stephen Young, note 185, p. 172; a similar position was 
adopted by Lal Das, in Bhagirath Lal Das, 
The World Trade Organisation: A Guide to 
the Framework for International Trade, (Third World Network, 
1999), p. 397. 
275 Douglas Ierley, note 193, pp. 625-626. 
84 
these legal rulings by the panels and appellate body do not affect all 
parties equally. They allow developed countries with greater economic 
power to escape conformity with a ruling if they lose the case, while 
doing nothing to prevent them when they are successful from using 
their great market power to push developing countries into meeting 
the terms of the ruling. 276 
Thirdly, the present enforcement mechanism under the DSU generates 
an inducement, particularly for the United States and the EC, to 
extend the duration of the dispute for many years. Consequently, by 
the time a panel decides that they have breached their duties under 
the covered agreement, they will have blocked their markets with no 
effects on their industry. The side effects of this inducement have been 
apparent in the textile industry. Despite the fact that the United States 
has lost a number of disputes regarding textile safeguard measures 
(for instance in disputes involving Costa Rica and Pakistan) it closed its 
market to access by developing country imports for about three years 
without any negative consequences for itself. 277 
Non-compliance by developed countries with the recommendations of 
the DSB also results in non-compliance by developing countries. This 
has been considered to be especially crucial and challenging for the 
continued operation of the dispute settlement system, and could be 
the major reason for encouraging non-compliance by developing 
countries. A further criticism of the weakness of enforcement under 
the DSU is that it will increase tension between developing and 
developed countries. In order to remedy this, developing countries 
must feel that the DSM works for them and that they can participate 
276 Ibid. 
277 Gregory Shaffer, note 187, p. 39. 
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fully in it, the matter of enforcement being one of their main concerns. 
In particular it is argued that, after the Banana dispute278, developing 
countries have no confidence in the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism. 279 
Furthermore, since the use of enforcement measures would result in 
unwanted consequences for the complainant, the use of such 
measures (in this case, withdrawal of concessions) will not be 
invoked. 280 Because the implementation mechanism under the DSU 
provides only prospective remedies, it gives the members an 
inducement to breach their duties to the WTO. The violator has to 
bring his violations to an end only after being caught, while the 
violating trade measures will be preserved at no cost during the whole 
process of the dispute settlement system. To sum up, the current 
system has left developing countries more prone to experiencing 
severe hardship than developed ones. 281 
A more specific criticism is directed at the way in which sanctions are 
applied, by imposing authorized tariff barriers. According to the 
optimum tariff theory, the use of such barriers on imports is likely to 
result in a trade war, which would certainly be to the advantage of the 
more powerful disputing member. Therefore, developing countries are 
discriminated against in two respects. Firstly, not having sufficient 
financial and human resources handicaps their participation in the 
278 European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas, panel report, WT/DS27/ECU, adopted on 22 May 1997; appellate body 
report, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted on 5 September 1997. [hereinafter EC Banana III] 
279 Douglas Ierley, note 193, p. 626. 
280 Lawrence D. Roberts, "Beyond Notions of Diplomacy and Legalism: Building a Just 
Mechanism for WTO Dispute Resolution', (2003), 40(3) American Business Law 
Journal 511, p. 560. 
281 Hansel T. Pham, note 209, p. 354. 
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system. Secondly, the DSB may allow them to retaliate, but they 
cannot put such sanctions into action. 282 
Retaliation is an essential part of the dispute settlement process, since 
it discourages members from breaching their WTO obligations. 
Nevertheless, this function is undermined by the fact that the 
mechanism is limited by the severity of the credible threat of 
retaliation, since retaliation must have severe trade consequences if it 
is to persuade the offender to conform to the covered agreements. 
Hence, because developing countries cannot impose an adequate 
retaliatory threat, they consider that the enforcement system under 
the DSU disadvantages them. 283 
Imposing retaliatory measures not only requires considerable 
economic strength to make them effective but may affect the economy 
of the member applying them. Another factor which favours larger 
members in this respect is that, unlike the smaller and poorer 
countries which rely heavily on importing goods, they do not suffer 
from such reliance. Furthermore, as the effects of countermeasures 
vary, they will tend to be more effective if the country in breach 
depends heavily upon the market of the complainant, while 
conversely, they will be less effective if the offender has a number of 
alternative markets available to it. 284 
282 Fritz Breuss, 'WTO Dispute Settlement: An Economic Analysis of four EU-US Mini 
Trade Wars', (2004), available at 
http: //www. wifo. ac. at/Fritz-Breus. s/Breuss JICT 2004. PDF, last seen on 10-07-06, 
at 10am, p. 33-34. 
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3.3.2 The example of Ecuador 
This is what actually happened in the Banana case, when Ecuador was 
authorized to take countermeasures against the EU. It considered that 
it would be likely to lose any trade war against the EU, or would be 
deprived of aid that was being given by larger members such as the 
EU. It also wished to be able to seek more favourable treatment when 
the Paris Club considered its debt. 285 As Hoekman and Mavroidis point 
out: "'Interestingly, the Banana arbitration acknowledges this point. 
Adoption of countermeasures is simply not an option poorer WTO 
Members should consider. "286 
Thus, the Banana case287, in which developing countries gained a 
favourable ruling against their developed counterparts, is one of the 
cases that have made the implementation process under the DSU 
controversial. This dispute highlights the above-mentioned debate 
about the difficulties facing developing countries in implementing a 
ruling against a larger member. In this example, Ecuador had to 
depend very much on the retaliatory power of the US to influence the 
EU position in the dispute. Without such support from the US, which 
would not have been available if Ecuador had been the only disputing 
member, the effect of Ecuador alone on the EU would have been 
negligible. In fact, Ecuador requested and was given the right by the 
WTO to retaliate against the EU in European intellectual property 
rights, trade in services and product-based tariffs. However, in 
comparison to the EU, the Ecuadorian economy was too small and 
285 Fritz Breuss, note 282, p. 34. 
286 Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, note 198, p. 4., Kevin Buterbaugh and 
Richard Fulton, The WTO Primer: Tracing Trade's Visible Hand through Case Studies, 
(Palgrave, 2007), pp. 100-101. 
287 EC Banana III, note 278. 
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weak to have any worthwhile effect on it; on the contrary, it would 
have harmed Ecuador's economy and consumers. 288 
It was argued that in the Banana dispute289 even the new rule-based 
system did not restore the power balance when Ecuador tried to 
retaliate against the EU. Ecuador was the first developing country 
since the establishment of the WTO dispute settlement system that 
asked for and was granted the right to suspend concessions against a 
rich member. In this case, the arbitration panel allowed Ecuador to 
suspend concessions up to 201.6 million US dollars. Its relative 
economic weakness meant that Ecuador found it difficult to suspend 
concessions, because if it imposed tariff measures on imported EU 
goods, it would lose a vital source of imports. This could lead to 
economic catastrophe, whereas blocking EU access to the Ecuadorian 
market would hardly affect the export potential of the EU's 
multinational enterprises. The latter could simply turn to alternative 
and bigger markets than its own, such as the US and Japan. 290 
The Ecuadorian plan was to withhold its obligations under Article 14 of 
the TRIPS agreement against the EC, which includes the protection of 
performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations. 
Hence, Ecuador would be capable of exporting to other WTO members 
regardless of the permission of the EC copyright owners. But 
Ecuadorian attempts to enhance its export volume were deceptive, 
because it was ruled by the arbitration panel that the remaining WTO 
288 Oxfam GB Discussion Paper, note 219; James Smith, "Compliance 
bargaining in 
the WTO: Ecuador and the Banana Dispute , in 
John S. Odell(ed), Negotiating Trade: 
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members (apart from Ecuador) should comply with their TRIPS duties 
with regard to the EU. Accordingly, no other member could import EU 
phonograms from Ecuador, since they would be subject to Article 51 of 
the TRIPS agreement, which requires the customs authorities to 
prevent access to their markets by such phonograms. There was no 
way that Ecuador could apply the authorized cross-retaliation against 
the EU, a fact that was to some extent due to the country's economic 
weakness in comparison to the EU. 291 
Even suspending its obligations under the TRIPS agreement, which 
was considered one of the most practicable ways in which it could 
impose some sort of threat to force larger members to comply with the 
panel and AB rulings, was proved in this example by Ecuador to be of 
little value. 292 But it is worth mentioning that Ecuador did identify an 
area which could be used by developing countries as an important tool 
to retaliate against larger members in the future. Unfortunately, this 
was undermined by that fact that it was impossible to change the EU 
banana regime as a result of any retaliatory measures used by 
Ecuador, even in TRIPS. In this respect, it was claimed by domestic 
intellectual property lobbies in Brussels and Washington DC that "'it is 
highly unlikely that the European Community will change its banana 
import regime because of Ecuadorian countermeasures in TRIPS". 293 
To date, Ecuador and the other Latin American banana exporters have 
failed to make the EU comply with the DSB ruling in the banana 
dispute. 294 There is a justified fear that EU non-implementation of the 
ruling reflects the wider non-conformance by developed countries in 
agriculture, the area in which the DSM should be the most beneficial. 
291 Ibid. 
292 Fritz Breuss, note 282, p. 34. 
293 Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, note 198, p. 4. 
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The US and EU have shown some hesitation in enforcing the AB rulings 
in the Cotton295 and Sugar296 disp utes297; these are vital developments 
whose results are yet to be seen. 
3.3.3 Political dependence of developing countries 
One of the main criticisms of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding is that it disadvantages developing countries, in that it 
does not entirely eradicate asymmetries among WTO members in a 
dispute. 298 
To start with, a characteristic aspect of the WTO Agreement is that 
there is no external power that is intended to or capable of enforcing 
it. Rather, WTO members formulate approaches designed to deal with 
any offender. In addition, if enforcement methods under the DSU are 
ineffective, members are obliged to depend on other methods in order 
to implement the WTO Agreement. As a result, more powerful 
disputing members, who are capable of causing considerable trade 
damage at fairly little cost to themselves, have the upper hand in the 
multilateral trading system, while developing countries are in a weak 
position. Not only are they dependent on financial aid from the states 
295 United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, panel report, WT/DS267/R, adopted 
on 8 September 2004; appellate body report, WT/DS267/AB/R, adopted on 03 March 
2005. [hereinafter US Cotton]. 
296 EC Sugar, note 188. 
297 Charan Devereaux, Robert Z. Lawrence and Michael D. Watkins, Case Studies in 
US Trade Negotiation: Resolving Disputes, (Peterson Institution for International 
Economics, 2006), p. 261; John W. Head, The Future of the Global Economic 
Organizations: An Evaluations of criticisms leveled at the IMF, the Multilateral 
Development Banks, and the WTO, (Transnational Publishers, 2005), p. 186; Trish 
Kelly, note 237, pp. 183-193. 
298 Fabien Besson, note 199, p. 19; Christian Tietje, 'The WTO Sanction Regime and 
International Constitutional Political Economy', (2008), 1 University of Illinois 
Law 
Review 383, pp. 386-388. 
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to which they export, but they also rely on them politically and 
occasionally militarily. 299 
The enforcement mechanisms of the WTO dispute settlement system 
are structurally prejudiced in favour of states with more powerful 
economies in three ways. First, developing countries can be 
pressurised by the US and the EU to act in accordance with WTO 
obligations and resolutions, since access to their huge markets is vital 
to exporters from developing countries. Developing countries cannot 
exert similar pressure. The huge trade interests of the US, which 
exports all over the globe, would barely be affected by restricted 
admission to the market of any developing country. In disputes where 
there is US or EU political pressure to maintain the offending 
measures, developing countries have very little chance to make use of 
sanctions to oblige the United States and EU to bring these measures 
into conformity with the WTO Agreement. 300 
One of the aspects of this unequal power relation is the political 
influence imposed by richer members on the smaller and less 
developed ones. Military force plays a significant part in this. It is 
argued that many developing countries have bilateral military 
cooperation with larger members and that there is a wide gap between 
the military spending and power between the two. This reduces the 
developing countries' chances of winning a dispute, let alone enforcing 
299 Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, 'Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System and Developing Country Interests', (1999), available online at 
http"//wwwl worldbank. org/wbiep/trade/papers 2000/BPdisput. PDF, last seen on 1- 
08-04 at 8pm, p. 26. 
300 Gregory Shaffer, note 187, p. 38; Niall Meagher, 'Representing Developing 
Countries in the WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings', in George A. Bermann and 
Petros Mavroidis, WTO Law and Developing Countries: Columbia Studies in WTO Law 
and Policy, (Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 219-220. 
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the DSM ruling. The DSU cannot shield developing countries from 
facing such pressure, which would as a result weaken their position in 
the DSM. 301 
The impact of political and economic power on the relationship 
between states has been closely examined by the realist and neo- 
realist models. They have in particular considered the necessity of 
creating and preserving international organizations from the point of 
view of hegemonic countries. It is believed that international trade 
based on the free trade model would benefit states that have superior 
political leverage, while bringing the smaller countries under their 
control and diminishing their political leverage. The most powerful 
states established international trade organizations to enforce a 
system of free trade and tariffs that benefited them, while the 
inclusion of less powerful countries was a consequence of their 
comparative weakness and inability to defy the pressure of the global 
powers. 302 
This is why the WTO was founded as a trans-national institution to 
govern and renovate the regulation of the international trading 
system. In the nineteenth century, military power was used to impose 
the free trade model on autocratic countries that did manage to 
operate outside the areas controlled by the hegemonic powers. 
Building upon this hypothetical example, because of the political power 
imbalance it can be seen how the ultimate outcome of the WTO 
dispute settlement process would not favour developing countries. 
303 
301 Fabien Besson, note 199, p. 19. 
302 Ibid., p. 12., An excellent analyse in this respect also in, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Making 
Globalizations Work: With a New Afterward, (W. W. Norton & Company Ltd, 2007), 
pp. 56-59. 
303 Fabien Besson, note 199, p. 12. 
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For example, Thailand, as a middle-income developing country, has 
had to end disputes at the consultation stage in about half of the 15 
cases it has initiated since the GATT era, because of political 
considerations. 304 In fact, all WTO members ought to think carefully 
about the political and economic elements before invoking the dispute 
settlement system or enforcing a favourable ruling where the political 
and economic cost is even higher. 305 
3.3.4 Panel/Appellate Body recommendations of 
specific methods 
The panel or appellate body can propose methods for enforcement, 
according to Article 19(1) which states, "In addition to its 
recommendations, the panel or Appellate Body may suggest ways in 
which the Member concerned could implement the 
recommendations. "306 However, so far, the panel and the appellate 
body have hardly ever done so. 307 The use of this power is nonetheless 
essential if there is to be a more successful enforcement system, 
because in general enforcing legal rulings is similar to the application 
of legal provisions and is easier when they are more clearly defined. 308 
Moreover, it has been argued that the panels and the appellate body 
have so far been unwilling to make precise suggestions, so as not to 
304 Pornchai Danvivathana, note 189, p. 12. 
305 Kenneth Ruwan Schunken, `The Advisory Center on WTO Law: A Success Story, 
But for Whom? ', (2008), 7 The Law and Practice of International Courts and 
Tribunals 59, p. 62. 
306 Article 19(1) of the DSU, available at www. wto. org, last seen on 19-08-04 at 
10am. 
307 Lucas Eduardo F. A. S Padano, 'Cross-agreement retaliation in the WTO dispute 
settlement system: an important enforcement mechanism for developing countries? ', 
(2008), 7(3) World Trade Review 511, p. 515. 
308 Christopher Duncan, 'Out of Conformity: China's Capacity to Implement World 
Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body Decisions after Accession', (2002), 18 
American University International Law Review 399, pp. 500-501. 
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violate the principle of state sovereignty. On the other hand, the fact 
that WTO members have considerable freedom to plan their means of 
compliance has been strongly criticized throughout the evolution of the 
GATT and WTO dispute mechanisms. In addition, it has been argued 
by some academics that the Understanding has produced an 
inducement for members to interpret rulings in support of the 
preservation of the offending measures, which members have to do 
their best to remove. 309 
Furthermore, while a number of recent rulings show evidence of a 
tendency to make more specific suggestions, the ruling in the US - 
Shrimp case310 clearly shows that the appellate body is still reluctant 
to suggest specific methods of implementation, even though there is a 
clear need for the use of such powers. 311 
The US - Underwear dispute312 is the best instance of a case in which 
the panel suggested specific methods of compliance and where the 
respondent - the United States - immediately made its measures 
consistent with WTO Agreements according to the panel suggestion. 
313 
In order to make further improvements to the rulings of the panel and 
the AB, it has been suggested that in cases involving a developing or 
less developed country as a disputing member under the DSU, they 
ought while making their rulings to pay particular attention to the 
development implications and to the potential effect of their rulings on 
309 Ibid. 
310 US Shrimp, appellate body report, note 229. 
311 Christopher Duncan, note 308, pp. 502-503. 
312 United States - Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and 
Man-Made Fiber 
Underwear, appellate body report, WT/DS24/AB/R, adopted on 10 February 
1997. 
[hereinafter US Underwear] 
313 Christopher Duncan, note 308, p. 504. 
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the social and economic welfare of the developing or less-developed 
country, consulting with appropriate development institutions if 
required. The dispute settlement system is a significant tool for the 
achievement of the development aims of the WTO Agreements. 314 This 
proposal would be a useful guideline to be added to Article 19 (1). It 
could also be applied by the panel and the AB, while suggesting 
methods by which such rulings could be implemented in disputes 
where a developing country or LDC is a disputing party. 
3.3.5 Dissatisfaction with the compensation process 
and the interaction of financial compensation 
While the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding offers compensation 
as an alternative to the use of retaliatory measures, there are 
difficulties attending this option. It has hardly ever been granted, 
which increases the potential for invoking retaliation to implement the 
panel or appellate body ruling. This practice would make retaliation the 
predominant method of implementation in the WTO dispute settlement 
system. 315 Furthermore, the way that compensation is granted, in line 
with Article 22: 2 of the DSU, increases the opportunities for using 
trade sanctions rather than compensation, since it requires the 
consent of both parties. By contrast, if such consent is absent, the only 
314 Communication from Kenya, Text for the African Group Proposals on Dispute 
settlement Understanding, TN/DS42, (24 January 2003), p. 2., more derail of the 
ethical obligation on of the panel and the AB to consider the development dimensions 
of developing countries in their reports in, Shahram Shoraka, 'World Trade Dispute 
Resolution and Developing Countries: Constructing a Framework for Fair Adjudication 
in the WTO', (2006), 3(2) Manchester Journal of International Economic Law 2. 
315 Alan Wm. Wolff, note 267, p. 8; Bruce Wilson, 'Compliance by WTO members with 
Adverse WTO dispute Rulings: the Record to Date', (2007), 10(2) Journal of 
International Economic Law 397, p. 399. 
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option is to invoke the suspension of concessions and other obligations 
against the offending party. 
316 
Compensation, rather than authorising them to suspend concessions 
and other obligations, is more beneficial for developing countries, 
because of their relatively restricted power. For this reason, there is a 
considerable demand on the DSM to force developed countries to pay 
compensation to their developing counterparts. In failing to do so, the 
DSM would be seen as dismissing the significance of the power 
imbalance between the two groups. 317 
During the discussions of the Uruguay Round, a number of developing 
countries highlighted the vital importance to them of compensation 
when GATT obligations had been breached by a developed country. 
With regard to compensation, Nicaragua and Korea put forward some 
suggestions. The submission made by Nicaragua was related to the 
effectiveness of the GATT panels. Thus, in disputes brought by a 
developing country, in the recommendations of the contracting parties 
compensatory means ought to be considered if the amount of 
damages warrants such compensation. Additionally, the time limit for 
enforcement of the contracting parties' decisions should not exceed 90 
days. Finally, the suspension of concessions ought not to be the only 
method considered by the contracting parties for enforcing panel 
recommendations. 318 
316 Simon Lester, Bryan Mercurio, Arwel Davis and Kara Leitner, World Trade Law: 
Text Materials and Commentary, (Hart Publishing, 2008), p. 165. 
317IPRs-online document, not 208, p. 689; Ernesto Zodillo and Patrick Messerlin, 
Trade for development, (Earthscan, London, 2005), pp. 254-256. 
318 Kofi Kufuor, `From the GATT to the WTO: The Developing Countries and the 
Reform of the procedures for the settlement of international 
Trade Disputes', (1997), 
31(5) journal of World Trade 117, p. 139. 
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The Korean suggestion was that where a developing and a developed 
country are the disputing parties and the latter fails to execute Council 
verdicts, the former should be permitted to ask the panel to award 
compensation to it. Hence, it is clear that the requirement of 
compensation in the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO is 
extremely significant for developing countries, and that it would 
improve developing countries' confidence in the multilateral trading 
mechanism. On the other hand, developing countries consider the fact 
that compensation is only voluntary to be a weakness of the 
system. 319 In addition, such compensation is not always monetary, but 
could also take the form of extra concessions. 320 
Article 22 of the DSU is vague enough for WTO members to claim that 
they have the right to grant compensation, instead of bringing their 
violating measures into accordance with the WTO Agreement. Until full 
compensation has been made the issue stays before the DSB. Perhaps, 
by applying a more flexible interpretation of Article 22, developed 
countries could convince developing country members to agree to 
compensation, rather than modifying the offending measures. 321 
The compensation provided under the DSU is inadequate for 
developing countries. In cases where the offending party withdraws 
the inconsistent measure without delay, the benefit of this withdrawal 
will be felt only once it is fully completed. From the time when the 
dispute was initiated to the time when the panel or the appellate body 
319 Ibid, pp. 139-140. 
320 Victor Mosoti, 'Does Africa Need The WTO Dispute Settlement System? ', in 
Gregory Shaffer, Victor Mosoti and Asif Qureshi, Towards A Development-Supportive 
Dispute Settlement System in the WTO, (ICTSD, 2003), p. 81. 
321 Beatrice Chaytor, 'Dispute Settlement under the GATT/WTO: The experience of 
Developing Nations', in James Cameron& Karen Campbell(eds), 
Dispute Resolution in 
the World Trade Organization, (London, Cameron May Ltd, 
1998), p. 267. 
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rules that the measure was inconsistent and it is finally withdrawn, no 
compensation will have been granted to the winning party. This applies 
no matter for how long a period the inconsistent measure was applied. 
This will have negative consequences for the economy of a developing 
country complainant, which would be negatively affected by the 
application of such inconsistent measures for such a long time. 322 
Developing countries can suffer from significant export injury during 
the thirty months that a case is proceeding, yet there is no rule for 
compensation for the injury caused, even if the disputing measures 
are considered to violate WTO law. Smaller developing countries that 
rely on a few exported goods or markets will suffer disproportionately 
serious injury. 323 
In this respect it is proposed that developing countries ought to be 
entitled to compensation for this period as preferential treatment. This 
would provide immediate respite for smaller and poorer members 
during the period in which such measures were being implemented. On 
the other hand, if a dispute involves developed and developing 
countries where the latter is the offending party, the present rules for 
dispute settlement ought to be applied. 324 As a result, developed 
countries would be deterred from taking inconsistent trade measures 
on a frivolous basis against their developing counterpart. This would 
therefore fulfil a significant aim of the dispute settlement system: the 
avoidance of an increase in trade disputes. 325 
322 Working Paper of South Centre, note 205, pp. 43-44. 
323 TRADE, note 181, p. 24. 
324 Working Paper of South Centre, note 205, pp. 44-45. 
325 TRADE, note 181, p. 24. 
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The Sutherland Report (2004) correctly finds that the current 
implementation system of the WTO does not favour developing 
countries when it states: 
"To allow governments to 'buy out' of their obligations by 
providing 'compensation' or enduring 'suspension of 
obligation' also creates major asymmetries of treatment in 
the system. It favours the rich and powerful countries 
which can afford such buyouts while retaining measures 
that harm and distort trade in a manner inconsistent with 
the rule of the system. "326 
The report, while noting that the current practice of compensation is to 
provide extra market access rather than "monetary payments ('cheque 
in the mail')i327 also suggests that it would be useful, especially for the 
poorer and least developed members, "to allow monetary 
compensation from the party required to comply with a dispute 
settlement report, to substitute for compensatory market access 
measures by the winning aggrieved disputant". 328 Nevertheless, the 
report emphasizes that such financial compensation "must be 
exercised to be sure that monetary compensation is only a temporary 
fallback approach pending full compliance, otherwise 'buyout' problems 
will occur". 329 
Indeed, applying financial compensation can create the motivation for 
developed countries not to comply with the WTO rules, thus 
invalidating the established trade measures. To avoid this, it could be 
included in the DSU that when a developed country declines to bring 
its inconsistent measures in accordance with a DSB decision within a 
326 The Future of the WTO: addressing the institutional Challenges in the New 
Millennium, Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai 
Panitchapkdi (The World Trade Organization, 2004), p. 54. [usually referred to as the 
Sutherland Report] 
327 Ibid., p. 53. 
328 Ibid., p. 54. 
329 Ibid. 
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specific time (for example, one or two years) then the amount of 
monetary compensation due would be increased by a specified 
percentage. In these disputes, a fixed time-limit for execution could 
also be included in the DSU; for instance, this could be six months 
from the DSB approval of the ruling of the panel or AB. 330 
The purpose of a punitive rate would be to diminish the motivation for 
a developed country not to comply with WTO rules through the 
payment of financial compensation. The payment of a punitive rate 
could be avoided by a developed country in two ways: the first would 
be to act in full accordance with the ruling and the second would be to 
give compensatory market access of the same value as the amount 
decided by the panel. In this way, the prospect of paying a punitive 
rate could motivate a developed country to make more effort to give 
compensatory admission to its market. 331 
The payment of monetary compensation ought to be independent of 
the obligation to abolish the violating measure. The amount ought to 
be decided with regard to elements such as the effect of that measure 
on the trade of the developing country, the length of time it has been 
in place and the time it takes for exports to recover after the 
elimination of the inconsistent measure. 332 
330 Gregory Shaffer, note 187, p. 42. 
331 Ibid. 
332 Communication from Pakistan, Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference, 
WT/GC/W/162 (1 April 1999), p. 4; Proposal by Mexico, Improvement and 
Clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/91, (16 July 
2007), 
pp. 2-5; Daniel A. Summer, "Reducing Cotton 
Subsidies: The DDA Cotton Initiative", 
in Kim Anderson and Will Martin, Agriculture Trade Reform and the 
Doha 
Development Agenda, (Palgrave Macmillan and World Bank, 2006), pp. 283-285. 
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One problem arising from the adoption of monetary fines would be the 
power imbalance among WTO members. This would be created 
because larger members enjoying greater economic power could easily 
circumvent their obligations by paying any fine, a luxury that 
developing countries cannot afford. However, this problem could be 
resolved by deciding the amount of the fine according to the economic 
strength of the offending member; thus, a sliding scale of fines would 
minimize "discrimination" against poorer members. 333 
Furthermore, to prevent fines from being used to avoid compliance 
with WTO rules, it has been suggested that their level should be 
monitored, with the potential to increase them over time. Such a 
mechanism for monetary fines would restore the balance among WTO 
members and would promote compliance in the DSM. 334 On the other 
hand, in spite of the fact that this idea has been granted some backing 
by the EC, international business academics expect that such a reform 
will not take place in the immediate future, because of the great 
hostility of developed nations. 335 
3.3.5.1 Ex post facto monetary damages 
It has been noted by Mexico that in the present WTO dispute 
settlement system compensation and suspension of concessions may 
only be used by members prospectively. Therefore, in the course of a 
dispute settlement, the offending measures will be preserved 'for free'. 
To address this, applying the principle of retroactivity would enable 
WTO members to benefit fully from the concessions and rights 
333 William J. Davey, note 226, p. 40 
334 Ibid. 
335 Hansel T. Pham, note 209, p. 363., Peter Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of 
the World Trade Organizations: Text, Cases and Materials, 
(Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), p. 296 
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obtained in consequence of the Uruguay Round, by removing the 
impact of this de facto waiver. 336 Hence, it has been suggested that 
when a developing country wins a dispute against a developed one, 
the latter could be required to pay retrospective financial damages. 
These could be decided by the panel, and the DSU could include 
guidelines for the award of such damages. 337 
Adding the payment of retrospective fines as compensation for the 
failure of a developed country to comply with a ruling would bring 
about an improvement in the developing countries' ability to bring 
pressure to bear in settlement negotiations. It would also improve 
their ability to pay for the legal protection of their interests under the 
covered agreements. Further, private law firms could offer special fee 
arrangements in relation to defending developing countries' rights in 
cases before the dispute settlement system. Under US law, private 
lawyers earn a percentage of the award in a winning case, but are paid 
nothing if they lose. 338 
Damage awards of any kind could be made more reliable under the 
DSU by obligating all members to accept an award as binding. 
Additionally, they could implement the financial requirements of an 
award as if it were a binding ruling in their national courts, having the 
right to use the regulations concerning implementation of court 
336 Proposal of Mexico, Negotiations on Improvement and Clarifications of 
the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/23, (4 Nov 2002), p-3- 
337 Gregory Shaffer, note 187, p. 43. 
338 Ibid. In the same vein, Malaysia has also expressed concerns 
that the settlement 
of disputes under the DSM is a lengthy process and 
that inconsistent measures 
remain in force until the adoption of the 
AB report, potentially causing severe 
damage to the interests of the complainant, especially a 
developing country. 
Malaysia therefore proposes the adoption of an 'interim remedy', which at 
the 
request of the complainant shall 
be applied by the panel against the inconsistent 
measure. The respondent would 
be required to guarantee to follow this until the final 
decision is rendered. In Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/15, 
(4 June 2004), pp. 2-3. 
103 
rulings. The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) uses the same technique to make sure that the 
monetary award given by ICSID tribunals will be awarded. If such a 
step were taken by the WTO, this would result in the levying of rates 
on a non-complying member's goods in any of the WTO member 
countries. 339 This could be limited to cases between a developing and a 
developed country, where the latter is the offending party. 
Bronckers and Broek argue strongly in favour of retroactive monetary 
compensation: 
"Retroactivity in financial compensation would introduce a 
significant disincentive against foot-dragging, which is now 
perceived to be a major problem in the dispute settlement 
mechanism. As DSU proceedings can take a long time, 
some Members are seen to exploit this to maintain WTO- 
illegal measures. Also, retroactivity more accurately 
remedies the injury suffered by private traders by providing 
reparation for the period when the injury actually 
occurred . 
"340 
One of the important changes to the DSU that developing countries 
would like to see is the inclusion of prospective remedies in either 
compensation or retaliation. The benefit of retroactive remedies is that 
they diminish the motivation of the disputing parties to delay the 
implementation process, which can occur when remedies are 
prospective only. Such a delay can be engineered by requesting a 
longer implementation timeframe under Article 21.5. Making the 
compensation retroactive would have the benefit of parties reaching an 
agreed solution as early as possible. They would be motivated by the 
fact that compensation would be calculated before the date that the 
339 Amelia Porges, note 223, p. 180. 
340 Marco Bronckers and Naoth van den Broek, 'Financial Compensation in the WTO: 
Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement', (2005), 8(1) Journal of 
International Economic Law 101, p. 122. 
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report was to be enforced; for instance, from the time the report of 
the panel is adopted or from the time the panel is established. 
341 
3.3.6 Options for the reform of retaliation 
Retaliation, which is the final remedy on which the GATT enforcement 
system is built, is considered difficult for the majority of developing 
states to utilize against developed ones. Since only a small number of 
developing countries constitute key markets for developed states' 
exports, the withdrawal of concessions would not in most cases 
constitute a strong sanction. 342 
Implementing the final ruling of the appellate body is considered 
problematic for developing countries. The use of retaliation is not an 
operative device for states that have WTO membership. In spite of the 
rule-based dispute settlement system, only WTO members with great 
economic strength can use the enforcement system effectively. 343 It is 
up to the member who has taken the violating measures to make 
them consistent with a covered agreement and with a DSB decision. 
344 
For instance, as a consequence of a dispute between the EC and the 
Ivory Coast, the permission to enforce countermeasures was given to 
the EC. Accordingly, it imposed a premium on coffee imported from 
the Ivory Coast, which in practice excluded Ivory Coast coffee from the 
EC market. Let us suppose, however, that the situation were reversed 
so that the Ivory Coast was permitted to take countermeasures by 
341 William J. Davey, note 226, pp. 39-40. 
342 Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade, 
(London, Taylor & Francis Group, 2000, second edition), p. 307. 
343 Kim Van der Borght, note 242, p. 1232. 
344 David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement in 
The World Trade 




imposing a premium on cars imported from the EC, thereby excluding 
them from the Ivory Coast market. There is clearly a very great 
difference between the two countermeasures with regard to their 
success in deterring the offender. In this example, the natural 
outcome would be that it would be easier for the EU to sell elsewhere 
the few cars which had been excluded from the Ivory Coast market 
than for the Ivory Coast to sell a large proportion of its coffee to other 
buyers. 345 
The dissatisfaction of developing countries with the current retaliation 
regime under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is reflected in 
the wording of a proposal put forward by developing counties in the 
DSM review process, in order to begin to tackle the difficulties facing 
developing countries in retaliating against developed ones, even with 
the DSB's authorization. It has been suggested that a solution would 
be to modify Article 22, first by adding a compulsory requirement to 
eliminate the inconsistent trade measures, which would encourage 
compliance by an offending developed country member. 346A more 
severe way of reforming the retaliatory response would be to 
terminate the membership of offending members that did not comply 
with a ruling. However, policy makers would be unwilling to introduce 
such a reform, because of concern that their own states would have to 
undergo this sanction. 
In addition, it has been argued that developing countries would not 
be 
able to retaliate effectively, because they have few if any trademarked 
or patented products of their own. One possibility, therefore, would 
be 
for the complaining developing country to be allowed to request 
34 '5 Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, note 
299, p. 26. 
346 TRADE, note 181, p. 31. 
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authorization for the suspension of concessions and other obligations 
in sectors of their own choice. Thus, they should not have to prove 
either that it was not "practicable or effective" to suspend concession 
in the same sector or agreement where the breach took place, or 
secondly that the "circumstances [were] serious enough" to request 
suspension of concessions under agreements other than those 
involving the violation. This burden of proof can be quite heavy, as 
Ecuador's experience in the Banana dispute illustrates. Hence, it has 
been proposed that a new paragraph, 3 bis, be added to Article 22: 
347 
"Notwithstanding the principles and procedures contained 
in paragraph 3, in a dispute in which the complaining party 
is a developing-country Member and the other party, 
which has failed to bring its measures into consistence 
with the Covered Agreements is a developed-country 
Member, the complainant shall have the right to seek 
authorization for suspension of concessions or other 
obligations with respect to any or all sectors under any 
covered agreements. "348 
However, this last proposal regarding the choice of any sector in which 
to suspend concessions will still be problematic for developing 
countries, because the overall trade share of the majority of 
developing countries in all sectors is comparatively small. 349 
An interesting proposal was made by Mexico, applying to 
circumstances where WTO members may not have a trade sector in 
which to make use of retaliatory measures to enforce a ruling without 
harming themselves. This is obviously the case with regard to 
347 Proposals on DSU by Cuba, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, TN/DS/W/19, (9 October 2002), pp. 1-2. 
348 Ibid. 
349 Dan Sarooshi, "The Future of the WTO and its Dispute Settlement System', 
(2005), 2 International Organizations Law Review 129, p. 147. 
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developing countries, whereas others could retaliate more successfully. 
Mexico has proposed, therefore, that members be given the power to 
negotiate remedies. 
"In other words, if the infringing Member has not 
negotiated acceptable compensation, the complainant may 
agree with a third Member the transfer of the right to 
suspend concessions in exchange for a negotiated benefit, 
i. e. 'A' may agree with 'B' the transfer of the right to 
suspend concessions or obligations to `C' in exchange for a 
mutually agreed benefit, which may even take the form of 
cash. "350 
Giving WTO members this right to negotiate remedies would have the 
advantage of creating an encouragement for compliance, since the 
offending parties would acknowledge that there was a stronger 
possibility of retaliation being taken against them and would, 
therefore, be more likely to comply with the ruling. In addition, this 
would result in a better readjustment of concessions, because the 
complainant would have the prospect of a tangible reward in exchange 
for its right to suspend the concessions of the respondent. 351 
An equally interesting proposal, also put forward by a group of LDCs, 
proposed that collective retaliation by several members should be 
permitted once a developing country had brought a successful dispute 
against a developed country which failed to implement the ruling. 
350 Proposal of Mexico, note 336, pp. 5-6. 
351 Ibid. For further analysis and proposed framework for the negotiable remedies, 
see also Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis and Robert 
W. Staiger, `Auctioning 
Countermeasures in the WTO', (2007), 73 Journal of International Economic 
Law 
309; and Mateo Diego Fernandez, "Compensation and 
Retaliation: a Developing 
Country's Perspective', in George A. Bermann and Petros Mavroidis(eds), 
WTO Law 
and Developing Countries: Columbia 
Studies in WTO Law and Policy, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), pp. 242-244. 
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Thus, retaliation would be undertaken by all WTO members, not only 
by the winning developing country on its own. 352 
The benefit of collective retaliation is that it would move the system 
from one of bilateral action to providing a multilateral solution. 353 This 
is important, because the use of retaliation by an individual developing 
country member is not a successful penalty or disincentive to a 
developed country member. 354 As the African Group has suggested, 
"all WTO Members [should] be authorized to collectively suspend 
concessions to a developed Member that adopts measures in breach of 
WTO obligations against a developing Member". 355 Only such a 
collective device would have the real power to encourage compliance, 
and would be advantageous to all members. However, the major 
drawback of the negotiable remedies and collective retaliation is that 
they would require the willingness of WTO members to adopt and 
implement such proposals in reality, whereas in this case especially 
the readiness of developed countries to support developing countries 
in enforcing a favourable decision appears to be absent. 356 
3.3.7 Reconsidering the time for enforcement 
Under GATT, the respondent had no time restriction for enforcement, 
whereas procedures under the DSU specify a time limit for enforcing 
the panel or appellate body's decision. Article 21 in respect of 
enforcing the DSB decision allows members a "reasonable period of 
352 Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 6, number 31, released on 25 September 
2002, p. 3. 
353 Joost Pauwelyn, "The Limits of Litigation: 'Americanization' and Negotiation in the 
ettlement of WTO Disputes', (2003), Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 121, 
pp. 131-132. 
354 Hansel T. Pham, note 209, p. 363. 
355 Proposal by African Group, note 232, p. 3. 
356 Hansel T. Pham, note 209, p. 363-364., Dan Darooshi, note 249, p. 149., collective 
retaliations will also be dealt with chapter 8 section 
8.4.1. 
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time". There is also a guideline contained in Article 21 that a 
reasonable period ought not to exceed fifteen months, starting from 
the adoption of the decision by the DSU. The DSU puts the respondent 
"under surveillance" as soon as the reasonable period has started. 
Article 21, to assist the DSB in accomplishing this duty, requires the 
respondent to present frequent "status reports" at all programmed 
meetings of the DSB. 357 Once the fifteen months have elapsed, if the 
complainant is dissatisfied with the way that the respondent has 
implemented the decision, the former has the right to ask another 
panel to examine the issue. 358 
With regard to the period of implementation, if a developing country is 
participating as respondent, it has been proposed by the South Centre 
that a fifteen-month period is too short and ought to be doubled. 359 
This modification could be included as a special and differential 
treatment, because developing countries, unlike developed ones, are 
comparatively weak and undertaking such a change is more 
problematic and dangerous for them. 360 In fact, this fifteen-month 
guideline period can be lengthened depending on the situation: it "'may 
be shorter or longer, depending upon the particular circumstances" . 
361 
Such an extension has been considered by the panel; however, there 
is no assurance that it will be adopted permanently, although 
357 Carolyn B. Gleason & Pamela D. Walther, 'The WTO Dispute Settlement 
Implementation Procedures: A System In Need of Reform', (2000), Law and Policy in 
International Business 709, pp. 714-715. 
358 Alban Freneau, 'WTO Dispute Settlement System and Implementation of 
Decision: A Developing Country Perspective', (2001), available online at 
http: //Iafrique. free. fr/memoires/pdf/200107AF. pd , 
last seen on 5-08-08 at 7pm, 
p. 55. In this regard Davy argues that the Quad (US, EU, 
Japan, Canada) and 
Australia most often delay the implementation of an adopted report. 
William Davy, 
'Compliance and Remedies', in Federico Ortino and Sergry Ripinsky(eds), 
WTO Law 
and Process, (British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law, 2007), p. 72. 
359 TRADE, note 181, p. 28. 
360 Alban Freneau, note 358, p. 55. 
361 Section (c) of Article 21.3 of the DSU 
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commentators believe that it is essential for safeguarding developing 
countries' interests. 
362 
Where a developing country is a complainant, fifteen months appears 
to be reasonable. However, in reality if the respondent is reluctant to 
implement the ruling, this period could easily be made longer to delay 
the dispute proceedings. This is because the complainant is dependent 
on the intention of the respondent to remove the inconsistent 
measures. 363 Thus, it has been suggested by the South Centre that if a 
developing country which has been successful in a dispute raises an 
enforcement issue against a developed country, the enforcement 
challenge ought to be resolved by the primary panel and the 90-day 
period reduced to 30 days. Moreover, no further procedural obligation 
should be imposed. 364 
However, unless stronger sanctions are introduced, the reform of the 
strict timeframe would be insignificant, although if the panel or 
appellate body made better use of detailed suggestions concerning the 
manner of implementation, this could avert the deliberate delaying of 
the proceedings by respondents. 365 
3.4 Rethinking of Special and Differential 
Treatments of the DSU 
Given that the notion of free trade is based on the principle that 
liberalism needs to be applied equally by all WTO members, a closer 
362 Alban Freneau, note 358, p. 56. 
363 Ibid. 
364 TRADE, note 181, p-28- 
365 Alban Freneau, note 358, p. 56. 
look is required at the well established "egalitarian theory '366 that lies 
at the heart of equality and fairness. This doctrine holds that all people 
in a society should be treated as equals having the same political, 
economic, social and civil rights; nevertheless, some will be less 
advantaged or have special needs and these must considered for an 
equal distribution of welfare, so that all individuals in that society have 
equal opportunities. 367 Although this principle was originally 
established to address inequality at the domestic level and is actually 
applied by developed countries domestically, 368 Garcia argues that it 
could also be applied to the WTO, bearing in mind the similarity 
between individual inequalities within a society and asymmetries- 
whether of wealth, income, natural resources or consumer and market 
strength-between states in the international trading community. In 
addition to these asymmetries, Garcia observes that the inclusion from 
the very beginning of S&D provisions in the international trading 
system, which was initiated by developed countries in the GATT era to 
address inequalities among member states, is based on the egalitarian 
approach and works by advantaging the less advantaged members. 369 
Consequently, while developing countries should have the right to 
benefit form the anticipated gains of the WTO and fulfil their 
obligations in the same way as other WTO members, their special 
366 Also known as Rowel's theory of justice, a Harvard law professor, more detail in 
John Rowel, A Theory of Justice, (Harvard University Press, 1972). 
367 Frank J. Garcia, "Trade and Inequality: Economic Justice and the Developing 
World", Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 21,2000,975, pp. 997-1001. 
368 In the United States, universities such as Harvard and Stanford apply a 'positive 
discrimination' system to accept students from poorer backgrounds even if they have 
not met the standard selection requirements, in order to give them 
better access and 
opportunities, see, also, website, http: //www. harvard. edu/, 
last seen in 27-03-2009 
at 8: 15 pm, and website, http: //www. stanford. edu/, 
last seen in 27-03-2009 at 8: 15 
pm. 
369 Frank J. Garcia, note 367, pp. 1023-1030; Frank J. Garcia, Trade, Inequality and 
Justice: Towards a Liberal Theory of Justice, (Hotei Publishing, 2003). 
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requirements also need to be addressed in order to restore justice and 
fairness in the international trading system, until developing countries 
can compete equally in the international trade arena. Accordingly, 
there could be a 'welfare system' for the international community as a 
whole, as far as the WTO is concerned. 370 
Indeed, unequal partners cannot be treated equally, so even if there is 
a legal obligation on developed countries to treat developing countries 
differently, there is an ethical duty to recognize the special 
requirements of developing countries until their development 
objectives have been realized. S&D treatments should be made 
obligatory rather than optional on the developed member countries of 
the WTO so as to protect the least developed and most vulnerable 
amongst them and to promote the establishment of justice in the 
international trade arena so that the poor do not become poorer. 371 
Unfortunately, despite the fact that the WTO appears to follow this 
egalitarian principle in the form of S&D treatments which, if properly 
implemented, could result in fairer trade for all members, the manner 
in which they are actually implemented is ineffective, leading to a 
demand for the reform of S&D treatments and the establishment of a 
truly 'just' multilateral trading system. 372 
Therefore, for the WTO to be a fairer medium for all its members, it 
has to recognize the differences between them. As a consequence, 
numerous special and differential treatment rules have 
been included 
in WTO treaties to pay special attention to developing countries. 
However, these rules have turned out to be unrewarding for 
370 Ibid, pp. 1014-1023, Joseph E. Stighlitz, Fair 
Trade For All, (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2005), pp. 88-102. 
371 Frank J. Garcia, note 367, pp. 1014-1023 
372 Ibid, pp. 1048-1049. 
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developing countries and LDCs, which are hesitant to use them. They 
feel that such rules highlight the weakness of their position, undermine 
their sovereign equality by linking their privileges to the concept of 
'charity' and raise the fear that these rules would demoralize the 
enforceability of a favourable decision from the DSM if members 
invoke a formal dispute process. Despite the fact that the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism is well known as an automatic system, many 
special and differential treatment rules are not mechanically applied 
whenever it is related to the subject matter of the dispute. 373 
Even the Sutherland Report recognises the doubts of developing 
countries regarding the special and differential treatment (S&D) 
provided in the WTO agreement, and properly questions the purpose 
of the S&D, included in several WTO Agreements. 374 The Report argues 
that "S&D is part of the WTO legal `acquis' and remains a valid 
concept, although the mechanisms of S&D have to be compliable with 
WTO aims. In light of the present characteristic of the trading system 
and global economic realties, these mechanisms require further study 
and research... ". 375 As the issue of the S&D is still highly political, there 
remains real pressure on the WTO to work harder to improve S&D 
provisions. 37' The successful adoption of an effective S&D is vital for 
373 Kim Van der Borght, note 238, pp. 24-25., Petina Gappah, 'The Role of the 
Advisory Centre on WTO Law in Assisting African Countries in WTO Dispute 
Settlement', in Trudi Hartzenbreg(ed), WTO Dispute Settlement: An African 
Perspective, (Cameron May, 2008), pp. 67-68., Frieder Roessler, 'Special and 
Differential Treatment of Developing Countries under the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System', in Ortino and Petersmann(eds), E. U., the WTO Dispute settlement System 
1995-2003, (Kluwe Law International, Netherland, 2004), pp. 87-90. 
374 Kim Van der Borght, note 238. 
375 The Sutherland Report, note 326, p. 24., also, Bernard M. Hoekman and Petros C. 
Mavroidis, The World Trade Organisation: Law, Economic, and Politics, (Routledge, 
London, 2007), pp. 95-96. 
376 Kim Van der Borght, note 238, p. 25., Hart and Dymond argue that "the appeal of 
special and differential treatment is thus wholly political and 
bereft of any economic 
underpinning". Michael Hart and Bill Dymond, 
"Special and Differential Treatment and 
the Doha Development round', (2003), 37(2) Journal of World Trade 395, p. 395. 
More detail on dissatisfaction with S&D in Bernard Hoekman, 
'Operationalizing the 
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the development of WTO law as a whole, since this was one of the 
most important demands of developing countries that led to the 
collapse of trade talks in Seattle 377 and was placed by all WTO 
members in the Ministerial declaration of the Doha development 
round, at the heart of the WTO structure378. 
The Dispute Settlement Understanding has been the subject of 
criticism concerning uncertainty about the way in which the special 
and differential treatment rules are applied. Developing countries 
argue that certain specific articles concerning such treatment379 are 
not written in explicit words, and need to be re-considered: namely 
Articles 4.10,8.10,12.11,21.2,21.7 and 21.8.380 Also, where the 
terms 'should', 'may', 'might' and 'shall' are employed, it is argued 
that it is by no means guaranteed that these provisions can in reality 
be applied on behalf of developing countries381 because they have 
recommendatory force only. 382 
Therefore, it has been proposed that a monitoring system should be 
established in order to ensure the application of S&D rules in favour of 
developing countries, since practice shows the contrary. 383 In addition, 
Concept of Policy Space in the WTO: Beyond Special and Differential Treatment', 
(2004), 8(2) Journal of International Economic Law 405. 
37 Frank J. Garcia, note 276, p. 1045. 
378 Asif H. Qureshi, 'International Trade for Development: The WTO as a 
Development Institution? ', (2009), 43(1) Journal of World Trade 173, p. 187; Doha 
WTO Ministerial 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, (20 November 2001), para. 44. 
379 "At present, there are 145 provisions relating to SDT in the various Uruguay 
Round agreements relating to trade in goods, the GATS, TRIPS, DSU, and various 
Ministerial decisions. ", More detail in Working Paper of South Center, 'History, 
Implementation, and Negotiating Strategy for Developing Countries', Doc No. 
SC/TADP/AN/IRI/1,2002, p. 9. 
380 Every article of the DSU that contains the words 'developing country' is 
mentioned in the Appendices II. 
381 Note by the Secretariat, note 241, p. 31. 
382 Mary E. Footer, note 179, p. 65. 
383 TRADE, note 181, p. 28. 
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the application of special and differential treatment can be made 
certain by improving the wording of these articles, replacing the 
weaker terms with stronger ones to guarantee that S&D provisions in 
the DSU are used in favour of developing countries once they are 
involved in a dispute before the DSM, rather than being included in the 
DSU merely to suggest that developing counties should be given 
special attention in the DSU. Further improvement could be 
accomplished by applying specific guiding principles to guarantee 
thorough application of these articles in support of developing 
nations. 384 
This mode of criticism is not limited to the wording of references to 
S&D in the DSU; the weakness of the S&D is also alleged in terms of 
the capability to implement the rules as stated. Thus, when the WTO 
promises developing countries that it will provide special treatment in 
the form of technical support for them to bring their cases to the DSM 
and does not fulfil its promises effectively, this indeed weakens the 
benefit of such promises. This is the case in Article 27.2 of the DSU 
touched upon above. 
The objectives of the S&D also need to be reconsidered and reformed, 
since its objectives are unclear and ambiguous and do not serve the 
member that invokes the provision. It is argued that this should be the 
first step taken, since "the provision must be proportional to the task 
assigned ". 385 
384 Note by the Secretariat, note 241, p. 31; Edwini Kessie, 'The Legal Status of 
Special and Differential Treatment Provisions Under the WTO Agreements', 
in George 
A. Bermann and Petros Mavroidis, WTO Law and Developing Countries: 
Columbia 
Studies in WTO Law and Policy, (Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 13-14. 
ass Working Paper of South Centre, note 221, p. 3; Gary P. Sampson, World Trade 




A typical example of an ambiguous S&D provided for developing 
countries in the DSU can be seen in Article 21.2, which states that 
"particular attention should be paid to matters affecting interests of 
developing country Members with respect to measures which have 
been subject to dispute settlement". At first glance, an obvious reform 
required is the replacement of the term 'should' with 'shall'. This article 
is also considered to be unclear since (for instance) it does not say 
whether this provision is to apply when developed countries abuse the 
WTO law, when developing countries do so, or in cases where both 
developed and developing countries breach their WTO obligations. Nor 
is it made clear how and by whom special attention is to be paid. It 
may refer to the DSB, according to the surveillance article. However, it 
remains unclear how the requirement for special attention would be 
enforced, because "virtually all of the actions that the DSB takes in 
respect of specific disputes are by negative consensus", 386 
Another example can be found in Article 8.10, which states: 
"'When a dispute is between a developing country Member 
and a developed country Member the panel shall, if the 
developing country Member so requests, include at least 
one panellist from a developing country Member. , 
387 
Oxfam argues that: 
"The DSS has sought to further protect the interests of 
developing country Members by recognising that there may 
be inherent biases in perspectives of industrialised country 
panellists, and that some developing countries may not 
have sufficient human and technical resources to take full 
advantage of the DSS. The DSS thus provides that a 
developing country Member, when it is involved in a 
dispute with a developed country Member, may request 
that at least one of the panellists is from a developing 
386 William J. Davey, note 226, p. 38. 
387 Article 8.10 of the DSU. 
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country. Special, but rather vague provision is made to 
ensure that developing country Members involved in 
disputes are allowed sufficient time to prepare and present 
argumentation, and that their interests are taken into 
account in the design and surveillance of implementation of 
rulings and recommendations. 11388 
This preferential treatment given to developing countries at the panel 
stage is believed by the South Centre (a leading organization dealing 
with developing countries, the WTO and trade and development 
issues) to be executed effectively through the practice of the DSM. It 
is also argued that the provisions in Article 8.10 have clear objectives, 
unlike those of the S&D, since ''the action, the actor and the 
beneficiary are all clearly pointed out". 389 
This provision has received criticism from different angles where it 
clearly misses its objectives. It is argued that making the inclusion of a 
panellist from a developing country subject to the request of the 
developing countries involved in the dispute is pointless and could be 
counterproductive. This is because developing countries still have little 
experience of the dispute settlement mechanism. So it would seem 
reasonable to include a developing country panellist whenever one is 
involved in a dispute. Therefore, it was suggested by the South Centre 
that removing the words 'if the developing country member so 
requests' from Article 8.10 would further improve the application of 
the provision. 390 
From the outset there has been criticism of the functional effectiveness 
of the rule which provides that in disputes where a developing country 
388 Oxfam GB Discussion Paper, note 219, p. 13. 
389 Working Paper of South Centre, note 221, pp. 8-9. 
390 Ibid. 
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is a party, the panel ought to include as a minimum one panellist from 
a developing country. The criticism put forward is that if, from a legal 
perspective, the case is not in favour of the developing country, the 
panellist's attendance will not change matters. On the other hand, 
Victor Mosoti argues that Article 8.10 has more to do with encouraging 
developing countries' faith in the dispute settlement mechanism, 
rather than obtaining their legal assistance. That is why it has to be 
improved and encouraged. 391 
Nevertheless, the developing country panellist might sometimes have 
the opportunity to truly make use of the personal information he has 
in relation to the position of a developing country participating in a 
case. This could to some degree bias the dispute in favour of such a 
country. Certainly, in this rule-oriented dispute mechanism, it is not 
easy to see when the mechanism is being compromised in such a 
situation. However, the developing country panellist could interpret the 
facts in a more convincing way, consequently supporting the 
developing country's position. 392 
Therefore, it has been proposed by Jordan that the provision ought to 
be modified. Firstly, it should be changed so that in cases involving a 
developed and a developing country as disputants one panellist from a 
developing country should be included in the panel. Secondly, in cases 
involving a developed and a least developed country as disputing 
members, the panel selection should consist of one panellist from a 
least developed country. Finally, in cases involving a developing and a 
least developed country, one panellist each from a developing and a 
391 Victor Mosoti, note 320, p. 83. 
392 Ibid. 
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least developed country should be included in the selection of the 
panel. 
393 
In addition, Zambia has noted that least developed countries in 
particular are experiencing difficulties under the DSU and are at a 
disadvantage in a dispute in relation to other members. 
394 Thus, in 
order to improve the functional benefits of this article in their favour, it 
has been suggested by the LDC Group that this article be reformed to 
say: 
"When a dispute is between a least-developed country 
Member and a developing or developed country Member, 
the panel shall include at least one panellist from a least- 
developed country Member and if the least-developed 
country Member so requests, there shall be a second 
panellist from a least-developed country Member. , 395 
This proposal is important, since it addresses the asymmetries among 
developing countries themselves. They are not all the same: there are 
larger developing countries, who are frequent users of the DSM, 
medium-sized developing countries like Thailand and Colombia, and 
the poorest and most vulnerable LDCs. For example, with two 
neighbouring countries such as India and Bangladesh, if a dispute 
takes place between them, Bangladesh certainly feels the pressure of 
a power disparity, making it think carefully before proceeding to a 
formal panel process. This example has, in fact, taken place and will 
be discussed in Chapter five. 
393 Communication from Jordan, 'Jordan's Contributions Towards the Improvement 
and Clarification of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding', 
TN/DS/W/43, (28 
January 2003), p. 4. 
394 Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 6, number 35, released on 17 October 
2002, p. 6. 
395 Victor Mosoti, note 320, p. 83. 
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Improving the S&D provisions in the DSU via a normal negotiation 
process would require significant time and effort, which would be very 
difficult for developing countries to achieve. 396 This could also be used 
by developing countries as a tool to compromise in other areas. In 
addition to the political price that they would pay by compromising in 
this way, they would also need to consider carefully the legal and 
financial resources needed to reform S&D through the WTO 
negotiation process. This would bring to mind the price that developing 
countries had to pay to include and enhance the role of S&D in the 
current agreements throughout the Uruguay Round. This move made 
them part of the overall trade package, since they ought not to be 
used by the larger members as a tool to make compromises. 
397 
It is not easy, considering the differences between developing 
countries, to unify objectives in the S&D by the negotiation process. 
Thus, as argued by the South Centre, one key option is to rely on the 
'authoritative interpretation' by the panel and appellate body 
(according to the Vienna Convention) as a useful device to clarify and 
mandate S&D provisions in the DSU. 398 
Certainly, a more consistent use by developing countries of the special 
and differential treatment rules might be an additional solution. This 
would require more frequent invocation by developing countries, at 
every step in the dispute settlement proceedings. 
Nonetheless, it 
cannot be safely assumed that all developing countries 
have the 
396 Working Paper of South Centre, note 221, p. 6- 
397 Working Paper of South Centre, Analysis of the Hong 
Kong Ministerial Declaration, 
Doc No. SC/TADP/TA/CC/1,2006, p. II-24. 
398 Working Paper of South Centre, note 221, p. 6. 
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necessary understanding of and familiarity with the dispute settlement 
process. 
399 
LDCs take the South Centre proposal a step forward by arguing that 
there ought to be an explicit provision that requires the panel to take 
into consideration the preferential rules provided for developing and 
least developed countries whenever the panel comes across these 
rules, without a request from the disputing parties. Hence, Haiti has 
suggested that Article 12. 11400 be modified in this manner: 401 
"Where one or more of the parties is a developing or least- 
developed country Member, the panel's report shall 
explicitly take into account the provisions on differential 
and more favourable treatment for developing or least- 
developed country Members that form part of the covered 
agreements. 11402 
From the developing countries' point of view, the application of the 
S&D rules has not matched their expectations. 403 One could deduce 
from the analyses above that S&D needs to be made mandatory and 
to be monitored in order to increase its effectiveness. Hence, the 
dispute settlement system could play a fundamental role in 
implementing the S&D rules more effectively, 404 
399 Mary E. Footer, note 179, p. 65. 
400 Article 12.11 of the DSU states that: Where one or more of the parties is a 
developing country member, the panel's report shall explicitly indicate the form in 
which account has been taken of relevant provisions on differential and more- 
favourable treatment for developing country members that form part of the covered 
agreements which have been raised by the developing country member 
in the course 
of the dispute settlement procedures. " 
401 Communication from Haiti, Text for LDC Proposal on Dispute Settlement 
Understanding Negotiations, TN/DS/W/37 (22 January 2003), p. 2. 
402 Ibid. 
403 Working Paper of South Centre, History, Implementation, and Negotiating 
Strategy for Developing Countries, Doc No. SC/TADP/AN/IRI/1,2002, p. 
9. 
404 Working Paper of South Centre, note 221, pp. 15-16. 
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The authoritative interpretation of the S&D provisions has been further 
developed by arguing that they are so unclear and ambiguous as to 
make it virtually impossible for the panel and the AB to develop 
guideline principles. Also that WTO members should go back to the 
negotiating table to come up with more clearly defined S&D 
provisions. 405 Ultimately, it has also been argued that developed 
countries have interacted with developing countries and LDCs in 
preferential agreements and trade-for-aid programmes outside the 
WTO. These have constrained developing countries' bargaining power 
at the consultation stage, in the establishment of panels and even in 
the negotiation of better S&D provisions in the WTO agreements, 
suggesting that 'self-censorship' could be functioning on the part of 
developing countries. 406 
405 Andrew D. Mitchell, 'A legal principle of special and differential treatment for WTO 
disputes', (2006), 5(3) World Trade Review 445; Andrew D. Mitchell, Legal Principles 
in WTO Disputes: Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 267-274; Petros C. Mavroidis, The General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Commentary, 
(Oxford University Press, 2005), 
p. 249; Yong Shik Lee, 'Development and the 
World Trade Organization', in Yong Shik 
Lee(ed), Economic Development Through World Trade: 
A developing World 
Perspective, (Kluwer Law, 2008), pp. 10-11. 
406 Kim Van der Borght, note 238, p. 27. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
"If the DSM is called a 'jewel in the crown of the WTO', there are 
visible flaws inside the jewel", 407 in particular in respect of developing 
countries. This chapter has discussed many aspects of the reform of 
the WTO dispute settlement system in favour of developing countries. 
So far it appears to operate well, and developing countries have more 
confidence in the new system than they had in the GATT 1947 dispute 
settlement system. Thus, the present system is worth saving, and the 
suggestions and proposals made for its reform in favour of developing 
countries need to be given careful consideration. 
In this study several issues have been considered, including the 
existence of disparities in financial and human resources. It has been 
shown that the rule-based process of the WTO dispute settlement 
system is time-consuming and that developing countries do not have 
sufficient money and technical expertise to bring a formal dispute, 
unlike developed countries. The situation is made worse by the 
disastrous effect of private law firms, whose costs are high and which 
do not support the training of developing countries' experts. Moreover, 
the technical support provided by the WTO secretariat is inadequate. 
Even after the creation of the ACWL, developing countries face 
difficulties in this regard. Therefore, a number of proposals have been 
made with regard to the expansion of the capacity of the secretariat, 
the creation of an independent centre related to the WTO to provide 
such support and the establishment of small claims procedures. 
407 Xinjie Luan, "Dispute Settlement Mechanism Reforms and 
China's Proposal', 
(2003), 37(6) Journal of World Trade 1097, p. 1115. 
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Another issue discussed was that of the implementation of the panel or 
appellate body's decisions. It has been demonstrated that the 
enforcement mechanism works in favour of members with stronger 
economies, and that non-compliance has occurred in a number of 
disputes on the part of members like the EU with large economic and 
political power. In addition, the panel and the appellate body are 
hesitant in suggesting detailed methods of implementation. There is a 
great need for reform in this area. 
Compensation should also be reformed to guarantee that developing 
countries can enforce favourable decisions, to which end suggestions 
have included prospective fines and retrospective monetary damages. 
In addition, retaliation measures and the time given for 
implementation could be effectively reformed. Suggestions have also 
been put forward whereby special and differential treatments for 
developing countries could be strengthened. Firstly, because most of 
these provisions are made with no clear indication of how they are to 
be implemented, there is a need for a reform in the wording of the 
relevant articles. 
So far, in the foregoing pages, the structural and procedural faults 
within the WTO dispute settlement system have been discussed. We 
now turn to the substance of the decisions and decisional process of 
the WTO and its dispute settlement mechanism to analyse how 
developing countries fare within it. 
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WTO Jurisprudence and Developing 
Countries 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to consider the role and function of the 
appellate body as stated in Article 3.2 of the DSU. The work of the 
appellate body has given rise to a real debate over whether or not it 
has overstepped its original function of interpretation of international 
and WTO law by starting to make new rules which are politically 
sensitive. Such judicial activism of the panel and AB will be linked to 
the development objectives of developing countries, by addressing the 
neglected though crucial issue of trade-related matters such as TRIPS, 
the environment and human rights. 
The first section will deal with WTO decision-making and developing 
countries. Then the function and jurisprudence of the panel and the AB 
will be analyzed. After that, the dispute settlement system ruling in 
the Shrimp dispute408, environmental issues and developing countries' 
concerns will be discussed. This will lead to a discussion of the absence 
of human rights considerations from WTO jurisprudence and the 
development objectives of developing countries. The chapter concludes 
with a summary. 
408 United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, panel 
report, WT/DS58/R, adopted on 
15 May 1998, appellate body report, 
WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted on 12 October 1998. [hereinafter 
US Shrimp] 
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4.2 The WTO Decision-making Process and 
Developing Countries 
Unlike the situation of the IMF and the World Bank, whose decision- 
making is delegated to a board of directors or the organization's head, 
the WTO decision-making process is by its nature a very difficult way 
to resolve issues related to multilateral trade agreements. This is 
because it requires a consensus among all 150 member governments, 
by applying a one-member-one-vote system. In this regard it has been 
claimed409 that: 
"Reaching decisions by consensus among some 150 
Members can be difficult. Its main advantage is that 
decisions made this way are more acceptable to all 
Members. And despite the difficulty, some remarkable 
agreements have been reached. Nevertheless, proposals 
for the creation of a smaller executive body - perhaps like 
a board of directors each representing different groups of 
countries - are heard periodically. But for now, the WTO is 
i41o a Member-driven, consensus-based organization. 
However, what happens in practice is different; Maniruzzaman 
observes what is described as a "democratic deficit" in the WTO whose 
decision-making has developed into a so-called 'Green Room' process, 
whereby when major trade talks take place, the most powerful 
members (the US, EU, Canada and Japan, which are known as the 
Quad) choose a small number of developing countries to discuss major 
trade-related issues and disengage the rest. Only then is their decision 
subjected to a formal process for the rest of the members to approve 
it. During the Cancun ministerial meeting, developing countries and 
409WTO Website, 
http: //www. wto org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/orgl e. htm#council, last seen 
on 21-05-2008 at 2.30 pm. 
410 Ibid. 
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NGOs protested strongly against this practice, which led both to the 
collapse of the Cancun trade talks, which were held in 2003, and to 
the formal abandonment of the Green Room practice. 411 
Maniruzzaman adds that this does not mean that developing countries 
will have equal treatment during future trade rounds, because many 
do not have sufficient experienced staff or resources to deal with the 
complicated trade talks that take place in the WTO. Therefore, 
developing countries would not be able to participate effectively in the 
WTO trade negotiations process. This would eventually lead to the 
larger and more powerful members imposing their decisions on the 
poorer and less developed ones. Hence, a democratic deficit will 
persist in the WTO decision-making process, leading to renewed calls 
for the creation of a fairer and more equal international trade arena to 
serve the interests of all members. 412 
Indeed, Cancun has resulted in a serious breakdown in the complex 
trade negotiation process. There are many issues still on the WTO 
negotiating table413 which need to be resolved. Developing countries 
will remain silent no longer and their development concerns ought to 
be at the forefront of WTO trade talks for a fairer and more equal 
global trading system. 414 Despite all the optimistic speeches by the 
411 A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, "Managing Globalisation: Challenge Facing International 
Law in the Twenty-First Century', Inaugural lecture held at the University of 
Portsmouth, (2-5-2007), 1, pp. 34-35. 
412 Ibid., Alan V. Deardorff and Robert M. stern, "What You should know about 
Globalization and the World Trade Organization', (2002), 10(3) Review of 
International Economics 404, pp. 417-418. 
413 Such as the Singapore issues (competition polices and investment), agricultural, 
environmental and human rights. 
414 James Gathii, "Book Review, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of 
Trade Negotiations/The Lessons of Cancun', (2006), 104(6) Michigan Law Review 
1361, pp. 1365-1370; see also Gary P. Sampson and 
W. Bradnee Chambers, 
128 
WTO Director General, Pascal Lamy, that more fruitful trade talks will 
be carried out, nothing appears to be happening or on the horizon. In 
this regard it has been argued that: 
"The WTO's negotiating process is simply in a total mess. Developed countries have opposed the adoption of clear 
negotiating rules governing how all WTO Members arrive at decisions in a transparent, inclusive and participatory 
manner. Ministerial meetings are held over the space of a 
few days with the result that the negotiations are 
conducted in a pressure-cooker atmosphere. In addition, 
developed country Members use a panoply of negotiating 
strategies including threats towards poorer countries. 
These and other problems with the negotiating and 
decision-making process at the WTO have unsurprisingly 
contributed to the two failed ministerial meetings as well as 
the start-stop nature of the Doha Round. "415 
Table 3416 lists WTO ministerial meetings, the numbers of participants 
and observing organisations. 
WTO Ministerial 
Conferences 
Date Participant Members 
Observing International 
Organizations 
Hong Kong 2006 149 76 
Cancun 2003 146 76 
Doha 2001 142 74 
Seattle 1999 135 62 
Geneva 1998 132 51 
Singapore 1996 127 49 
Developing Countries and the WTO: Policy approaches, (United Nations University 
Press, Tokyo, 2008). 
415 James Gathii, note 414, p. 1370. 
416 Source: WTO Gateway 
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4.3 The Functions and Powers of the Panel and 
the Appellate Body 
The explanation of the function of the appellate body within the 
dispute settlement system is provided in Article 3.2 of the DSU. 417 
According to this, the function of dispute settlement is to "preserve 
and to clarify the rights and obligations under the covered agreements 
in accordance with customary rules of public international law". 418 The 
appellate body has taken this to mean working within the terms of the 
Vienna Convention rules of interpretation. Clearly, the function of the 
appellate body and the dispute settlement body in general is merely to 
implement the regulations of the WTO. 419 
It is also stated in Article 3.2 that "recommendations and rulings of the 
DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in 
the covered agreements". 420 This clearly shows that the rights and 
duties of the members which are represented by the appellate body 
and the DSB in general are produced by international law, not by other 
laws. 421 
One might conclude from a further analysis of Article 3.2 that the WTO 
is fated to live in a legal vacuum that would not supply safety and 
certainty to the mutual trading structure, and would possibly deprive 
the appellate body as well as the panels of important devices essential 
to protect the privileges and duties of the members under the covered 
417 Lorand Bartels, 'Application of Law in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings', 
(2003), 35(3) Journal of World Trade 499, p. 506. 
418 Article 3.2 of the DSU. 
419 Joel P. Trachtman, 'The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution', (1999), 40 Harvard 
International Law Journal 333, pp. 336-342. 
420 Article 3.2, DSU. 
421 Joel P. Trachtman, note 419, pp. 336-342. 
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treaties. 422 However, it would be wrong to underestimate the 
importance of an appeal division, although appeals are merely on 
matters of law. 423 
The DSU places a limitation on the operation of international law in 
every case that comes before the appellate body. This limitation is 
indicated at the end of Article 3.2 of the DSU and is shown again in 
Article 19.2: 
"In accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 3, in their 
findings and recommendations, the panel and Appellate 
Body cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations 
provided in the covered agreements. " 
4.4 The Appellate Body: a Powerful 'Court' 
4.4.1 Some independent features of the Appellate 
Body 
The appellate body (AB) has been given the right to set its own 
working procedures after a discussion with the Chairman of the DSU 
and the Director-General and to correspond with members so as to 
make them aware of those procedures, according to Article 17.9 of the 
DSU. Moreover, the AB is provided by the DSU with four independent 
lawyers, a secretary and administrative personnel in order to give it 
proper managerial and legal backing. Interestingly, the nomination of 
three of the total of seven judges required to deal with a specific 
appeal has deliberately been made confidential, so as to stop anyone, 
422 Lorand Bartels, note 417, p. 506. 
423 David Palmeter, 'The WTO Appellate Body Needs Remand Authority', (1998), 23 
Journal of World Trade 41, p. 41; Communication from the 
United States, Further 
Contribution of the United States on improving Flexibility and Member Control in 
WTO Dispute Settlement, TN/DS/W/82/Add. 1, (25 October 2005). 
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(even AB members, as well as the secretary) from speculating on who 
has been chosen to judge an appeal. 
424 
Furthermore, the AB, unlike the panel, is not obliged at the first stage 
to exclude from its composition a national from the disputing 
members, unless all the parties decide to accept such a judge. There 
are two reasons for this: it might eliminate a considerable number of 
the appellate members, which would affect the establishment of the 
division. Also, the division members might not be recognized. This 
recognition grants meaning to their function as international 
independent judges. 425 
In addition, although the appellate body is hierarchically lower than 
the DSB, there is an important procedure that allows the AB to pass 
judgment. This is that its decisions will be accepted unless there is a 
negative consensus among the members; and from the WTO practice, 
it has been established that these decisions will inevitably be adopted, 
since the disputing members are not part of this consensus. 426 
During the trade talks in the Uruguay Round the contracting parties 
agreed to establish an automatic panel process by creating the famous 
negative consensus rule. As a result, they foresaw that an important 
new appeal process, managed by the appellate body, would need to be 
added so "that appellate review would help ensure uniform 
424 John H. Jackson, The World trade Organization Constitution and Jurisprudence, 
(Cassell, London, 1998), pp. 78-79. 
425 Ibid. 
426 Steve Charnovitz, `Judicial Independence in the World Trade Organization', in 
Laurence Boisson(ed), International Organizations and International Dispute 
Settlement: Trends and Prospects, ( Transnational, USA, 2002), p. 226. 
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interpretation of Uruguay Round Agreements and guard against 
potential `bad law' resulting from inconsistent panel reports". 427 
It was not long before the AB showed itself to be an active court. The 
way that the AB was actively developing its position in the WTO 
dispute settlement process was believed to be the most significant 
progress within the DSM. Among 12 cases that were taken to the 
appeal process, the AB reserved ten and successfully overturned one. 
The AB (unlike other appeal courts that examine the general wording 
of rulings) makes an in-depth inspection of the panel decision and is 
prepared to make any alteration that is needed to any panel report. 428 
Furthermore, the appellate body has increased its own authority and 
weight, acting as a final court in the WTO dispute resolution process by 
using a collegial approach in rendering its decisions. This has its roots 
in the trade talks which took place after the Uruguay Round, when the 
US and the EU demanded (contrary to Article 17.3 of the DSU) that 
the AB's membership ought to be as broad as possible and that four of 
its seven members should be chosen by the US and EU. However, as a 
result of stiff resistance by other members, they found it difficult to 
achieve such a demand. Instead, they insisted that the view of any AB 
member chosen by the US and the EU ought to be considered in every 
single dispute. 429 
427 Andrew L. Stoler, 'The WTO dispute settlement process: did the negotiators get 
what they wanted? ', (2004), 3(1) World Trade Review 99, p. 106. 
428 William J. Davey, 'The WTO Dispute Settlement System: How Have Developing 
Countries Fared? ', Illinois Public Law and Legal Theory Research Papers Series, 
Research Paper No. 05-17, (2005), available online at 
http: //papers. ssrn. com/sol3/papers. cfm? abstract id=862804, last seen on 4-2-2008 
at11.30am , p. 11. 429 Andrew L. Stoler, note 427, p. 106-107. 
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The AB developed this further, in practice, by taking the view of all of 
its members on any case taken to the appeal process. As a 
consequence, the AB has decided the cases brought to it after 
discussing and approving the decisions of all seven appellate 
members. The result is that not a single case has been decided with 
the disagreement of any of its members. From this perspective, it has 
been claimed that the AB has achieved its objectives and met 
expectations outstandingly well. As noted by Stoler, "judged against 
objectives and expectations in the negotiations, there is no doubt that 
the appellate body has proven to be a remarkable success story". 430 
However, the functions of the panel and the AB are a source of 
dissatisfaction within the dispute settlement process. It is believed that 
the two bodies have moved from their original function of interpreting 
the covered agreements to actually making new laws. This contradicts 
Article 3.2 of the DSU forbidding a panel or the appellate body to "add 
to or diminish the rights of member countries without their consent". 
Developing countries have had serious concerns in this respect. This 
was especially so in the Shrimp case431, which involved a number of 
developing countries against the US, due to the linkage by the AB of 
the environmental rules with trade liberalization under WTO law. 432 
This will be further discussed later in this analysis. 
430 Ibid. 
431 US Shrimp, appellate body report, note 408. 
432 T. N. Srinivasan, "Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trading System After 
Doha', (2002), Yale University Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 842. 
Available at http: //www. publicpolicies. orq/Research/TN%C2%AOSrinivasan-pres. pdf, 
last seen on 14-06-06 at 10 am, p. 
15. 
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4.4.2 Appellate Body: strong jurisprudence or stare 
decisis? 
It has been argued by a member of the WTO's appellate body, James 
Bacchus, that its decisions, like those of the panel, do not formulate 
additional duties or rules: "[T]he fact that the meaning that one 
member may happen to see, however clearly, for a particular word or 
provision or obligation does not happen to prevail after a full and fair 
hearing ... does not mean that the DSB has either added or diminished 
the rights and obligations of that member that are provided in the 
covered agreement", 
433 
What is more, some would argue that the AB cannot go too far in 
developing laws, for two reasons. Firstly, in its reports and cases, 
emphasis is placed on the features of international law, which reflect 
the effort by the appellate division to tackle cautiously and specifically 
the legal issues as well as some of the matters treated in the AB's 
working procedures. 434 Secondly, the appellate body has stated very 
clearly that the WTO and GATT are part of international law and that it 
will apply its principles as set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties. 435 Despite this, there is some evidence that the AB has 
exceeded its real functions and role by starting to make rather than 
interpret law. 436 
433 John Ragosta, Navin Joneja and Mikkail Zeldovich, 'WTO Dispute Settlement: The 
System is Flawed and Must Be Fixed', (2003) 
http: //www. dbtrade. com/publications/wto dispute settlement is flawed. pdf, last 
seen on 12-05-2007 at 10 am, p. 22. 
434 John H. Jackson, note 424, p. 98- 
435 
Ibid. 
436 Mitsuo Matsushita, The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice and Policy, 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003), p. 43.; William Davey, Enforcing World 
Trade Rules: Essays on WTO Dispute Settlement, (Cameron May, London, 2007), 
pp. 11-47. 
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Since the appellate body is in fact a standing judicial court, it is 
possible for it to be even more determined than panels in pursuing its 
previous resolutions. Although only three judges of the seven 
participate in any one division to hear an appeal, the appellate body is 
designed to function on a collegiate foundation. Through this, the 
division is accountable for an appeal, while preserving the right to 
deliberate and consider the opinions of the other members before 
confirming its conclusion. Panels, by contrast, are served by judges 
sitting ad hoc on a specific panel. The appellate body's judgments will 
thus tend to be followed by subsequent panels, in much the same way 
that occurs between an upper court and a lower one. This may be 
either a result of the formal requirements of the legal structure of the 
system or a function of the practical interaction between the two 
437 cou rts. 
As a consequence, in considering previous decisions the AB judges are 
likely to be potentially considering decisions of their colleagues, if not 
their own personal decisions. This appears to indicate that a more 
powerful judicial body has already been formed. 438 "Once standing 
judicial bodies have come into existence... they provide an additional 
mechanism for the further development of the law". 439 
Supporting evidence for this idea is seen in the fact that panels take 
into account the potential opinion of the appellate body, since the 
panel report is more likely to be rejected by the appellate body than 
by the voting of the DSB. Interestingly, the rule-oriented approach has 
437 David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement in The World Trade 
Organization: Practice and Procedure, (Kluwer Law International, Hague, 1999), 
pp. 45-46. 
438 Ibid, p. 46. 
439 Ibid. 
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started to affect the choice of panellists by the states, which are more 
likely to choose one who is able to draw a "good' conclusion, in order 
to convince the appeal division of their position. 
440 
The fact that the appellate body has been accused of developing law is 
an expected outcome of the complexity of using the official 
institutional mechanisms for law-making, such as "the amendment 
and, to a more limited extent, interpretation powers of the WTO". 441 
These accusations might also be expected because of particular 
disputes in the last stages of debates or, sometimes, because of the 
uncertainty of WTO members concerning the articles of WTO 
agreements. However, it is not always easy to distinguish between 
legal interpretation and developing la W. 442. 
In the Banana case443 (1997) the appellate body tackled one of the 
first disputes with a possible loophole in the law. Saint Lucia, a small 
country, sought to have lawyers from the private sector to represent it 
in the dispute. There was opposition to this from a number of states 
(such as United States and Mexico) who claimed that the position was 
unclear regarding the GATT performance, while in the DSU there was 
no regulation allowing private advisors. The appellate body rejected 
this objection immediately, stating that ''it is for a WTO member to 
decide who should represent it... ". 444 This pronouncement, in the 
absence of any written rule, was subject to no other objection inside 
440 John H. Jackson, note 424, p. 98. 
441 Matthew Schaefer, 'Sovereignty, Influence, Realpolitik and the World Trade 
Organization', (2002), 25 Hastings International & Comparative Law Review 341, 
pp. 341-369. 
442 Ibid. 
443 European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas, appellate body report, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted on 5 September 1997. 
[hereinafter appellate body report on EC Banana III] 
444 Ibid, para. 10. 
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the WTO and met with further approval in the business sphere. It is 
also believed that the decision was in favour of developing countries in 
terms of developing laws. 445 Then, in United States - Shirts and 
Blouses446 (in which India challenged the US) India gave the AB the 
chance to set out the essential principles of the doctrine of burden of 
proof. These were gradually built up in subsequent dispute s44' 
Finally, interpretation of WTO agreements is essential, but also 
difficult. Due to the problems of international conciliation and 
independence, introducing judgments in a global field intensifies the 
significance and complexity of this implementation. The idea that 
adjudication and rule-making ought to be kept separate is sound but 
nevertheless awkward to apply comprehensively, as there is a certain 
law-developing element in any form of adjudication. The reading of the 
WTO agreements is a process of dynamic rule-making. 448. 
In the view of Donald McRae, the dispute settlement system presents 
grounds for the advancement of international business law in the 
course of its judgments. Additionally, Lauterpacht believes that 
international courts are not restricted to an involuntary use of law 
445 Steve Charnovitz, note 426, p. 234., An excellent review of the process of the 
interpretation of the Panel and the AB and the relevant case of AB activism can be 
found in Cass's works on Constitutionalization of international trade in Deborah Z. 
Cass, 'The Constitutionalization of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation 
as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade', (2001), 12(1) 
Journal of International Economic Law 29; also in Deborah Z. Cass, The 
Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization, Legitimacy, Democracy and 
Community in the International Trading System, (Oxford University Press, 2005). 
446 United States - Measure Affecting Imports of Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, 
appellate body report, WT/DS33/AB/R, adopted on 23 May 1997. [hereinafter 
Appellate body report on US Wool Shirts and blouses] 
447 Steve Charnovitz, note 426, p. 234. 
448 Jeff Waincymer, WTO Litigation: Procedural Aspects of Formal Dispute 
Settlement, (Cameron May, London, 2002), pp. 394-395. 
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similar to law development in national courts, where fairness is 
ensured by the judges. 449 
The appellate body has been fairly true to its aims in putting the main 
stress in the text of the agreements on its function of interpretation, 
and in using the customary rules of international law stated in the 
Vienna Convention; and it has ruled on many occasions against 
developed countries, the United States being one of them. On the 
other hand, there were considerable concerns expressed by some legal 
scholars before the establishment of the appellate body that it could 
apply a great deal of "'political filtering", and consequently could make 
uncertain progress in the direction of rule-making. 450 
4.4.3 Cases where AB decisions were followed by 
panels and by the AB itself 
Panels follow the appellate body's decisions and the AB follows its own 
precedents, which means that its reports establish rules. A good 
example is Wool Shirts and Blouses, 451 where the panel adopted the 
appellate body's statement: "[We] note that the appellate body has 
made clear... the appellate body also concluded that... ". 452 This 
indicates that in practice panels are likely to cite AB decisions in their 
conclusions. The panel, in referring twice to the findings of the AB, 
indicated a tendency towards considering AB decisions to guide the 
panels' resolutions in subsequent cases. For this reason it appears that 
449 Ibid. 
450 Matthew Schaefer, note 441, Peter Holmes, 'The WTO and the EU: Some 
Constitutional Comparisons', in Grainne De Burca and Joanne Scott(eds), The EU and 
the WTO: Legal Constitutional Issues, (Hart Publishing, 2001), pp. 75-79. 
451 United States - Measure Affecting Imports of Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, 
panel report, WT/DS33/R, adopted on 6 January 1997. [hereinafter Panel report on 
US Wool Shirts and Blouses] 
452 Ibid., p. 11., while dealing with standard of review. 
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a panel would be more likely to try to decide according to legal 
precedent than openly to contend a decision of the AB. 453 
An example where the AB followed its own previous decision as a 
model occurred in the Japan - Alcoholic Beverages case. 454 Here the 
AB referred to United States - Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline when it made one of its initial judgments in 
interpretation of the agreement. Firstly "[I]n United States - 
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, we stressed 
the need to achieve such clarification by reference to the fundamental 
rule of treaty interpretation set out in Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention"; and secondly, "In United States - Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, we noted that ... 11.455 In a 
legal framework, the phrases 'we stressed' and 'we noted' are different 
from the words 'we held'. Their use indicates that the appellate body 
considers that its earlier rulings were not mere opinions, but that those 
subjects were settled by them. 456 
Apparently, the drafters of the WTO did not anticipate such a powerful 
adjudication mechanism. But has the WTO adjudication system shifted 
the power imbalance in the dominant WTO decision-making process 
and restored the balance in the WTO regimen, particularly for the 
economic development of developing countries. 457 
453 Aalmeter & Mavroidis, note 437, p. 405. 
454 Japan - Tax on Alcoholic Beverages, appellate body report, WT/DS1/AB/R, WT/ 
DS10/AB/R/, WT/DS22/AB/4, adopted on 1 November 1996, para. 19. [hereinafter 
Japan Alcoholic Beverages] 
455 Ibid., para. 19. 
456 Palmeter & Mavroidis, note 437, pp. 405-406. 
457 John H. Braton, Judith L. Golostein, Timothy E. Josling and Richard H. Strinberg, 
The Evaluation of the Trade Regime: Politics, Law, and Economics of the GATT and 
The WTO, (Princeton University Press, Fourth printing, 2008). 
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4.5 Developed Countries Bring Environmental 
Issues to the WTO via the DSM 
The procedural aspects of the DSU have much to commend them. 
Nevertheless, the reports rendered by its panels and appellate body do 
touch on issues outside the covered agreements, such as security, 
labour, development and environmental issues, which may cause 
disagreements among the WTO members. 458 Notably, in the Shrimp 
case459 the appellate body advanced the WTO obligations by allowing 
members to take trade measures to enforce their environmental 
agendas. 460 The AB, in the Shrimp dispute, concluded that the United 
States import ban on shrimps from any member did not meet the US 
criteria in protecting the sea turtles as consistent with Article XX (g). 
The appellate body also found the US to be in breach of Article XX, 
since it was discriminating unjustifiably and arbitrarily among the WTO 
members in applying its measures. 461 
Accordingly, the US modified its trade measures by eliminating the 
discriminatory aspect of import bans, imposing the same trade 
restrictions on shrimp imports from all WTO members, together with 
Malaysia. Because the US maintained its trade restrictions against any 
member that did not apply US measures in protecting sea turtles, 
Malaysia appealed against the US measures that were applied to 
458 Kim Van der Borth, 'Book Review, Dispute settlement in the World Trade 
Organization', (2000), 94(2) American Journal of International Law 427, p. 427; 
Tomer Broude, International Governance in the WTO: Judicial Boundaries and 
Political Capitulation, (Cameron May, London, 2004). 
459 US Shrimp, appellate body report, note 408. 
460 Richard Tarasofsky, 'Report on Trade, Environment, and the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism', (2005), available at www. cat-e. org, last seen on 23-02-06 
at gam, p. 5. 
461 US Shrimp, appellate body report, note 408, pp. 63-76. 
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comply with the appellate body decision. 462 As a result of the 
Malaysian action in disputing US compliance with the appellate body 
report in the Shrimp dispute, the AB established463 in 2001 that the US 
trade measures which protect sea turtles did indeed conform to Article 
xx. 464 
A number of criticisms have been made of the AB regarding its ruling 
in the Shrimp dispute. Firstly, it has been argued that the appellate 
body ruling in the case is very serious. By developing WTO law in 
conformity with environmental measures, developed country members 
gained from the dispute settlement system what they were not able to 
achieve in the Uruguay Round trade negotiations, even without acting 
properly in the trade negotiations to address the inclusion of 
environmental issues under the covered agreements. 
465 
For instance, from 1995, the EU was negotiating to modify the WTO 
law in a way which would allow the use of trade restrictions to impose 
the application of multilateral environment agreements on all 
members, whether they had signed these agreements or not. The EU 
was successful to a certain extent in the Doha talks. However, after 
the Shrimp dispute466 the EU does not need to negotiate the inclusion 
462Alan Oxley, 'Implications of the Decisions in the WTO Shrimp Turtle Dispute', 
(2002), available at www. tradestrategies. com. au, last seen on 22-01-06 at 4pm, 
p. 7. 
463 "As we have upheld the panel's finding that the United States measure is now 
applied in a manner that meets the requirements of Article xx of the GATT 1994, we 
do not make any recommendation to the DSB pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU" in 
US shrimp, appellate body, note 408, p. 50. 
464 Robert Howse, 'The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New 
Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate', (2002), 27(2) Columbia 
Journal of Environmental Law 489, p. 493. 
465 Karen J. Alter, 'Resolving or exacerbating Disputes? The WTO's New Dispute 
Resolution System', (2003), 79(4) International Affairs 783, pp. 790-791. 
466 US Shrimp, appellate body report, note 408. 
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of environmental issues in WTO law in order to pursue its 
environmental agenda. 467 
Also, the inclusion of environmental issues through the WTO dispute 
settlement system has been severely criticized for the fact that the 
structure of the WTO dispute settlement system is not properly 
designed to deal with environmental cases. Neither the appellate body 
nor the panels have the required knowledge to examine environmental 
issues. They are composed of trade legal experts, not environmental 
specialists, not to mention the WTO secretariat's inability to provide 
assistance on environmental issues. 468 
In addition, the terms of reference which ought to be applied to the 
panel after the consultation phase place no obligation on the disputing 
members to discuss sufficiently the environmental aspects of the 
complaint. This is not their central concern regarding their obligations 
under the covered agreements. 469 Furthermore, the WTO dispute 
settlement process is not transparent. The closed system policy of the 
DSM raises concerns among environmentalists themselves (let alone 
the developing countries) about the efficiency of addressing 
environmental issues in the system. There are growing demands to 
increase the transparency of the dispute settlement system. This will 
also support the call for multilateral trade talks to provide better 
access to the public. 470 
467 Alan Oxley, note 462, p. 2. 
468 Richard Tarasofsky, note 460, pp. 7-8. 
469 Ibid. 
470 Claude Martin, 'The relationship between trade and environment regimes: What 
needs to change? ', available at http: //www. unu. edu/news/wto/ch07. pdf, last seen 
on 12-01-06 at 10am, p. 154. 
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The Shrimp ruling471 added to the WTO the duty of deciding 
environmental issues through its negotiation process. By doing so, it 
ignored the constant refusal of members to undertake such duties 
since 1996.472 Developing countries were considered to be strong 
opponents of the inclusion of environmental elements in the WTO 
negotiation agenda. In fact, developing countries have used these 
issues as bargaining tools in order to strengthen their position and 
obtain fairer concessions from their developed counterparts. In 
addition, one could view the Doha Round optimistically as a sign that 
environmental issues were being addressed, increasing the potential 
for extensive future negotiation. 473 
One of the most serious concerns for developing countries is that 
developed ones (especially the US and the EU) are the most frequent 
users of unilateral trade barriers to address what they view from their 
perspective to be fundamental environmental issues. What is more, 
the use of these unilateral measures or sanctions can be seen as 
attempts to pressurise other members to meet their criteria, on pain of 
having their exports banned from access to these major markets. 474 
The approval of the use of unilateral trade sanctions by a state outside 
its boundaries would actually undermine the national sovereignty of 
WTO members. In addition, it would severely damage the international 
relations between states, which would in turn harm the global trading 
471 US Shrimp, appellate body report, note 408. 
472 Alan Oxley, note 462, p. 11. 
473 Urs P. Thomas, 'Trade and the Environment: Stuck in a Political Impasse at the 
WTO after the Doha and Cancun Ministerial Conferences', (2004), 4(3) Global 
Environmental Politics 9, pp. 18-19. 
474 Simon SC Tay, 'What To Do About the Debate on Trade and the Environment: 
Global Governance, Southern Perspectives and Snipping the Gordian Knot', (2004), 
available at http: //www. trade-environment. org/output/southernagenda/s-se- 
asia/seasia thinkpiece. pdf, last seen on 27-02-06 at 1: 30 pm, pp. 7-8. 
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system. 475 Unilateral trade measures are in fact in favour neither of 
developing countries nor of the global environment. Therefore, WTO 
members need to find better ways to address these environmental 
issues through multilateral means, instead of acting individually. 476 
The Shrimp ruling477 by the AB overturned the established GATT 
precedent of fifty years' standing regarding environmental issues. 478 In 
an extraordinarily similar dispute under GATT, the panel decided in the 
Tuna-Dolphin479 case that the US unilateral measures to ban the 
import of tuna in order to protect dolphins were against the law of 
GATT. 480 
In relation to the notion that environmental issues would be effectively 
addressed through the political process of the WTO, not by the dispute 
settlement system, Bhagwati professes: 
"some sympathy for [the] view that the dispute settlement 
panels and the appellate court must defer somewhat more 
to the political process instead of making law in 
controversial matters. I was astounded that the appellate 
court, in effect, reversed long-standing jurisprudence on 
process and production methods in the Shrimp/ Turtle 
case. I have little doubt that the jurists were reflecting the 
political pressures brought by the rich-country 
environmental NGOs and essentially made law that 
affected the developing countries adversely. 11481 
475 Beatrice Chaytor and James Cameron, 'The Treatment of Environmental 
Considerations in the World Trade Organization', in Helge Ole Bergesen, Georg 
Parmann, and oystein B. Thommessen(eds. ), Yearbook of International Co-operation 
on Environment and Development (Earthscan Publications, London, 1999), p. 61. 
476 Urs P. Thomas, note 473, pp. 18-19. 
477 US Shrimp, appellate body report, note 408. 
478 Alan Oxley, note 462, pp. 11-12. 
479 United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, panel report, DS21/R, adopted 
on 3 September 1991. [hereinafter US Tuna] 
480 R. Daniel Kelemen, 'The Limits of Judicial Power Trade-Environment Disputes in 
the GATT/WTO and the EU', (2001), 34(6) Comparative Political Studies 622, p. 637. 
481 Jagdish Bhagwati, 'After Seattle: Free Trade and the WTO', in Roger B. 
Porter(ed), Efficiency, Equity, and Legitimacy: the Multilateral Trading System at the 
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Developing countries have raised concerns regarding the manner in 
which the trade and environment discussion was developed, arguing 
that the inclusion of environmental issues in the WTO's deliberations 
would lead to the greater intervention of developed countries in the 
domestic affairs of developing ones, prejudicing their national 
sovereignty. Moreover, the issues brought for discussion regarding the 
inclusion of environmental matters were planned to address mainly the 
interests of OECD members and industrial countries. 482 
Furthermore, developing countries are in more danger of protectionist 
environmental measures applied by developed ones, since they are 
mainly reliant on trading agricultural commodities. By contrast, 
developed countries can simply change their agricultural providers with 
no consideration for developing countries' concerns. Indeed, developed 
countries were accused of not working hard enough to address global 
environmental problems. 483 Another criticism is that the enforcement 
process in the WTO dispute settlement system was created and 
structured to impose economic and financial methods of retaliation, 
which would not be suitable for application in environmental 
disputes. 484 
The AB, in an attempt to justify the approval of sustainable 
development as an international objective, referred broadly to the 
1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development and the WTO 
Committee on Trade and Environment. On the other hand, it 
Millennium, (Brooking Institution Press, 2001), pp. 60-61., cited in Robert Howse, 
note 464, p. 514. 
482 Beatrice Chaytor and James Cameron, note 475, p. 57. 
483 Urs P. Thomas , note 
473, pp. 18-19. 
484 Claude Martin, note 470, p. 143. 
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disregarded the fundamental principle established by these institutions 
that unilateral trade sanctions ought not to be employed to enforce 
environmental agendas unless this was the only option. Article 12 of 
the Rio Declaration affirms485 that "unilateral actions to deal with 
environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing 
country should be avoided". 486 
The inclusion of the environmental measures in a way that would serve 
all members' interests under the WTO umbrella is not an easy task, 
and the link between trade and environment is controversial. 
Developing countries need to be more fairly treated and the special 
conditions of developing countries ought to be given particular 
consideration in multilateral trade negotiations. The breakdown of the 
Seattle trade negotiations is a good example, warning of the heavy 
burden which would be placed on the multilateral trading system. 487 
Indeed, developing countries' development objectives can be seriously 
undermined, since they do not have the capacity to implement or 
identify high-cost environmental measures. These are the domain of 
their developed counterparts, and they require considerable support so 
as to be able to deal with environmental standards in relation to 
trade. 488 In this respect, Francioni argues that: 
"in the real world ... the great disparity in the level of the 
economic and technological development among states 
entails a different capacity of risk awareness and risk 
485 Alan Oxley, note 462, p. 10. 
486 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Report of the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 1992, available at 
http: //www. un. orq/documents/qa/confl5l/aconfl5l26-lannexl. htm, last seen on 
01/03/2006 at 10pm. 
487 Claude Martin, note 470, p. 154., 
488 Supachai Panitchpakdi, 'WTO, Globalization and New Technology: Changing 
Patterns of Competition and New Challenges for Sustainable Industrial Development', 
in Carlos A. Magarianos, Yongtu Long, and Francisco Colman Sercovich(eds), China 
in the WTO, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 175-178. 
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assessment as well as a different capacity in reactive and 
systematic monitoring of the use of hazardous products or technologies. It goes without saying that such inequality is 
magnified when on the export side we have a highly industrial country and on the import side there is a less developed country. ir489 
Examining more closely the criticisms directed to the AB in the Shrimp 
dispute490, one could divide these into two kinds: those regarding the 
procedures of the DSU and criticisms of the development objectives of 
developing countries. The AB has shown that procedural concerns 
(such as terms of reference and use of experts) would not be much of 
an issue in interpreting the WTO agreement in conformity with 
environmental measures, and they could be tackled practically. 
Nevertheless, the failure of the AB to consider and address the 
development objectives of developing countries as far as trade-related 
issues are concerned remains serious for the future of the DSM and 
the multilateral trading system. 
A major environmental problem which has been largely caused by 
developed countries but which affects all countries equally (whether 
developed, developing or least developed) and which must be 
addressed by the WTO is global warming . 
491 Bangladesh and the 
Maldives are now facing rising sea levels as a result of atmospheric 
489 Francesco Francioni, 'Environment, Human Rights and the Limits of Free Trade', in 
Francioni, Francesco(ed), Environment, Human Rights and International Trade, (Hart 
Publishing, 2001), p. 21. 
490 US Shrimp, appellate body report, note 408. 
491 More detail in, Jeffery Frankel, 'Global Environmental Policy and Global Trade', 
Harvard Discussion Paper 08-14, (2008), available online at, 
www. belfercenter. org/climat, last seen on 29-12-2008 at 9: 00 pm. Eric A. Posner 
and Cass R. Sunstein, 'Justice and Climate Change', Harvard Discussion Paper 08-04, 
available online at http: //belfercenter. ksq. harvard. edu/files/SunsteinWeb6. pdf, last 
seen on, 05-01-2009 at 11: 14 am., Arson Cosbey, 'Trade and Climate Change: 
Issues in Perspective', (2008), available online at 
http: //www. iisd. orq/pdf/2008/cph trade climate. pdf, last seen on 04-02-2009 at 
11: 54 am. 
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greenhouse gas emissions, to which the United States is by far the 
world's greatest contributor. Unfortunately, however, they have been 
unable to take legal action against the United States so far. 
Bangladesh, in particular, faces serious problems, since its people are 
mostly dependent on growing rice This crop is highly exposed to rising 
sea levels. It is estimated that as much as one third of Bangladeshi 
territory, including half of the land used for rice farming, will be 
submerged, leaving 145 million people stranded with even less land 
and lower incomes than ever. By the same measure, the people of the 
Maldives, a tiny Indian Ocean nation, are at risk of losing all of their 
1,200 islands within 50 years if the present rate of sea level rise 
continues. 492 
The Kyoto Protocol took the first step towards the recognition of global 
warming and established dates and targets for the reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions. 493 Regrettably, it has no inbuilt 
enforcement mechanism and some countries-especially the United 
States-have shown reluctance to implement it, claiming that the cost 
of cutting emissions exceeds the anticipated gain. This claim is viewed 
as outrageous by many people around the world, who ask how the 
wealthiest member of the international community cannot afford to cut 
its emissions, while other developed nations like Japan, Germany, 
France and Sweden are working hard to do so successfully. These 
latter nations' emissions are pro rata less than half of those produced 
by the United States, yet they enjoy a better standard of living than 
the US in certain measures. 494 
492 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Making Globalizations Work: With a New Afterward, (W. W. 
Norton & Company Ltd, 2007), pp. 164-167. 
493 Lucas Assungäo and ZhongXiang Zhang, 'Domestic Climate Change Policies and 
the WTO', UNCTAD Discussion Papers, No. 164, (2002), pp. 1-2. 
494 Joseph E. Stiglitz, note 492, p. 172. 
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Bearing in mind the Shrimp dispute495, in which the US compelled 
Thailand and its co-complainants to protect sea turtles via the DSM, it 
is argued that WTO law and the dispute settlement system need to 
play a role in saving the whole planet by reducing the effects of global 
warming caused by the market. This could be done by imposing higher 
tariffs or taxes on the most polluting manufacturers, or at least 
interpreting WTO agreements in conformity with climate change 
protection. Unfortunately, in an interview by Stiglitz with a number of 
senior officials of developed countries, while they agreed with the idea 
of climate change, they viewed the interpretation of WTO agreements 
as triggering a nuclear war. 496 
The US and other western countries have retaliated significantly 
against North Korea's nuclear programme, and have even 
contemplated militarily action. By the same token, the threat to the 
earth of global warming is such that all states should collectively 
combat it by the simple action of cutting their emission levels. The role 
of the WTO and its dispute mechanism could be invaluable, but this 
would require a significant shift of the industrialised members towards 
linking climate change issues with trade. Indeed, protecting sea turtles 
is important, but saving the planet is far more crucial. 497 
Perhaps, if the US and the rest of the developed world498 can 
successfully establish an example of an energy-efficient market, the 
495 US Shrimp, appellate body report, note 408. 
496 Joseph E. Stiglitz, note 492, pp. 176-178. 
497 Ibid. 
498 The most advanced climate change plan that will be implemented soon has 
received criticisms as it does not meet expectations and is simply not enough; 
Website, http: //news. bbc. co. uk/1/hi/world/europe/7765094. stm, last seen on 03- 
02-2009 at 8: 37 pm. 
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whole world (especially the larger developing countries like China, 
India and Brazil) will be encouraged to engage in multilateral trade 
talks on effective measures to address global warming. This would 
entail setting WTO rules that are compatible with climate change, even 
without recourse to the WTO dispute settlement system, 499 or the use 
of unilateral trade sanctions which the EU claims to hold against other 
member states. 50° 
4.6 Human Rights: Lessons from Shrimp/ Turtle 
The 'judicial activism', 'constitutionalization' or 'interpretation' of the 
AB has led to a strong debate among commentators and WTO 
members. Some would like to abolish the system and others would 
rather enhance the power of interpretation of the AB. 50' However, 
Pauwelyn argues that: 
"... the imbalance between the WTO judiciary and its 
political branch is here to stay, at least for the 
foreseeable future. It is simply unrealistic to expect that 
in the Doha Round a WTO of 150 Members would 
somehow provide more specific and less ambiguous rules 
than the smaller and less diverse crowd of Uruguay 
Round negotiators did in 1994. If anything, new WTO 
agreements are destined to be even more vague than 
before. " 502 
499 Alina Syunkova, 'WTO Compatibility of Four Categories of US Climate Change', 
National Foreign Trade Council working paper, (Decmeebr-2007), available online at 
www. nftc. oge, last seen on 01-02-2009 at 01: 30 pm, p. 26. 500 Website, 
http: //www. europarl. europa. eu/sides/getDoc. do? type=IMPRESS&reference=200805 
26IPR29942&lanquaqe=FI, last seen on -03-02-2009 at 8: 28pm. sot More detail in Kim Van Der Borght, 'The Reform of the Dispute Settlement System 
of the World Trade Organization: Improving Fairness and Inducting Fear', (2007), 
4(2) Manchester Journal of International Economic Law 2, p. 40., Dongsheng Zang, 
'Textualism in GATT/WTO Jurisprudence: Lessons for the Constitutionalization 
Debate', (2005), 33 Syracuse Journal of international Law and Competition 393. 
502 Joost Pauwelyn, 'The Sutherland Report: a missed opportunity for genuine debate 
on trade, globalization and reforming the WTO', (2005), 8(2) Journal of International 
Economic Law 329, p. 345. 
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As far as developing countries are concerned, the interpretation by the 
WTO of the development objectives of developing countries is vital, 
and developing countries have questioned the adequacy of the WTO's 
jurisprudence in meeting their development objectives. 503 The LDCs 
have argued that: 
"A careful reading of the accumulated jurisprudence of 
the [dispute settlement] system thus far reveals that the 
interest and perceptions of developing countries have not 
been adequately taken into account. The panels and the 
Appellate Body have displayed an excessively sanitized 
concern with legalism, often to the detriment of the 
evolution of development-friendly jurisprudence. "504 
The AB in the Shrimp case505 (analyzed above) brought up trade- 
related issues and WTO agreements. This is not new; the WTO has an 
existing agreement on intellectual property rights (TRIPS) covering 
pure trade-related issues, despite the existence of a separate 
international institution that deals with intellectual property rights, 
known as WIPO. Intellectual property rights (IPRs) have even stronger 
provisions than trade agreements. They not only benefit from National 
Treatment and Most Favoured Nation (MFN) rules but also require 
members to adjust their domestic laws to ensure that these rights are 
properly enforced in their national systems. The inclusion of IPRs in 
the WTO has already been viewed as not particularly benefiting 
developing countries but undermining their development objectives. 
Therefore, this question needs to be revisited in order to produce more 
development-friendly intellectual property rights. 506 Indeed, as with 
503 Asif H. Qureshi, Interpreting WTO Agreements: Problems and Perspective, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 114-115. 
504 Proposal by the LDC Group, Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, TN/DS/W/17 (9 October 2002). 
505 US Shrimp, appellate body report, note 408. 
506 Yong-Shik Lee, Reclaiming Development in the World Trading System, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 123-132. It has also been argued that the 
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the TRIPS Agreement and the adoption of environmental measures by 
the AB in its ruling in the Shrimp dispute507, trade-related measures 
could be adopted in the WTO, and human rights could be a vital trade- 
related issue for the development objectives508 of developing countries 
that have not been adopted in the WTO agreements or 
jurisprudence. 509 
If alleviating poverty and promoting the development of its developing 
country members is a major concern of the WTO free trade 
agreement, 510 the WTO has failed in this task so far; 511 the absence of 
human rights is believed to be a vital factor in this failure. Petersmann 
attributes "the paradoxical fact that many developing countries remain 
poor notwithstanding their wealth of natural resources (e. g. more than 
90 per cent of biogenetical resources in the world) ... to their lack of 
effective human rights guarantees and of liberal trade and competition 
laws". 512 Another valid criticism directed at the WTO because of the 
infringement of property rights has been used by developed countries when they 
were in their development stage; Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking away the Ladder: 
Development Strategy in Historical Prospective, (Anthem Press, London, 2002), 
pp. 82-85. 
507 US Shrimp, appellate body report, note 408. 
508 More detail on human rights and development in Philip Alston, Peoples Rights, 
LOxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 153; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and 
its Discontents, (W. W. Norton, 2003). 
509 More detail in Thomas Cottier, 'Trade and Human Rights: a relationship to 
discover', (2002), 5(1) Journal of International Economic Law 111, pp. 111-127.; 
Debra P. Steger, 'The Culture of the WTO: Why It Needs to Change', (2007), 10(3) 
Journal of International Economic Law 483, p. 492. 
510 The preamble of the Doha Round states that "International trade can play a major 
role in the promotion of economic development and the alleviation of poverty. " See 
also World Trade Report 2008: Trade in a Globalizing World, (World Trade 
Organization, 2008), pp139-140. 
511 Yong-Shik Lee, note 506, pp. 1-8., Bernard Hoekman and Marcelo Olarreada (ed), 
Global Trade and Poor Nations: The Poverty Impact and Policy Implication of 
Liberalization, (Brookings Institutions Press, 2007). 
512 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 'Time for a United Nations 'Global Compact' for 
Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from 
the European integration', (2002), 13(3) Journal of International Economic Law 621, 
p. 632; also Frank Trentmann, Free Trade Notion, (Oxford University Press, 2008), 
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absence of human rights is that it is advancing the interests of 
transnational corporations rather than enhancing the welfare of the 
people through its influence on the economic development process. 513 
For example, in its early days the World Bank, 514 an international 
economic organization that was created to promote development 
(which the WTO needs to consider as well515) in poor countries, took 
the view that human rights were not essential to its mission. 516 This 
was in accordance with the World Bank Agreement, which contained 
no article relating to human rights. There is an argument that the 
denial of human rights as an economic issue, because of the 
perception of it as a political issue, could be derived from the 
interpretation of Article IV, Section 10: 517 
p. 356; John Hilary, "Trade Liberalization, Poverty and the WTO: Assisting Realities', 
in Katrak, Homi and Strange, Roger(eds), The WTO and Developing Countries, 
(Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004), p. 57. 
513 David P. Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations, (Cambridge 
University Press, Second Edition, 2006), p. 218-224; Lori Wallach, Michelle Sforza, 
Ralph Nader, the WTO: Five Years of Reasons to Resist Corporate Globalization, 
(Seven Stories Press, 2000), pp. 6-10; Raj Bhala, Modern CATT Law: A Treatise on 
the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, (Sweet and Maxwell, 2005), p. 552. 
514 Even the EC have evolved from pure trade agreement to the human-rights- 
friendly argument as it argued that "As much as the European Communities evolved 
from a system built almost exclusively on economic integration to a comprehensive 
regime with counterbalancing rules on the environment, social life and human rights, 
equally, the WTO's view of the world must and is expanding beyond merely 
liberalized trade. The inescapable reality is that, in a globalized economy, non-trade 
concerns simply cannot be separated from trade concerns". In Joost Pauwelyn, note 
502, p. 334. 
515 ""The WTO has a function as a development institution. The organization does 
betray some of the indicia of a development institution. Its constitution speaks about 
development: it gives technical assistance; its Ministerial declaration speaks about 
special and differential treatment being placed in the very architecture of the WTO". 
Asif H. Qureshi, 'International Trade for Development: The WTO As a Development 
Institution? ', (2009), 43(1) Journal of World Trade 173, p. 187. The article argues for 
reinforcing the obligation of the WTO to consider the development dimension of 
developing countries as a reply to the denial of such rights. 
516 Heather Marquette, Corruption, Politics and Development: the Role of the World 
Bank, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 1-3. 
517 Koen De Feyter, World Development Law: Sharing Responsibility for 
Development, (Oxford, Intersentia, 2001, ) p. 272-273. 
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"'The bank and its officers shall not interfere in the 
political affairs of any Member, nor shall they be 
influenced in their decisions by the political character of 
the Members concerned. Only economic considerations 
are relevant to their decisions, and these considerations 
shall be weighed impartially in order to achieve the 
purposes stated in Article 1. "sus 
The attitude of the World Bank towards human rights has changed 
since the 1980s. The former General Legal Counsel of the World Bank, 
Ibrahim Shihata, has indicated clearly in his work that the adoption of 
human rights was derived from a re-interpretation of Article IV, 
Section 10. In his view, human rights will be of concern if the 
member's breaches in respect of human rights are very invasive in a 
way that turns out to be alarming. 519. 
The World Bank has maintained its position as a politically impartial 
group excluding the human rights rule. Nevertheless, in September 
1998 in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, it published a document in which it 
promised to foster human rights concerns in its operations. 520 
Human rights are not a political issue and are closely related to the 
economic development of developing countries. Indeed, any 
international financial institution or investor wishing to secure an 
investment in any region, would take into account a range of other 
elements, not necessarily economic, before entering such a market. 
These elements of course include human rights factors. An extra 
518 Article IV, section 10 of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development agreement. 
519 Koen De Feyter, note 517, p. 273. 
520 Christiana Ochoa, 'Advancing the language of human rights in the global 
economic order', (2003), 23 Boston Third World Law Journal 57, p. 86. 
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connection between human rights and economic development is that 
evidence of human rights applications will have a great effect on the 
amount of aid which could be given to any country, or the reduction of 
debt in the case of highly indebted poor countries. 521 
Human rights have attracted international interest so that every state 
or international institution is responsible for the maintenance of human 
rights, as is obvious in conclusions made by the International Court of 
Justice. The ICJ emphasized that there are some requirements for 
every country in terms of fundamental human rights. Additionally, 
according to the international legal principle of jus cogens, no state 
can be involved in human rights abuses and, it makes the protection of 
human rights a relevant issue, if not an essential part, of the projects 
of international institutions. 522 
As far as human rights in the WTO are concerned, it has been 
suggested that Articles 3.2 and 19.2 do not prohibit the application of 
non-WTO law, but give WTO law the upper hand when it conflicts with 
non-WTO law. Therefore, the WTO panel and AB are free to apply 
international law, as long as it does not add to or diminish the rights of 
the members under the covered agreements. 523 It has even been 
argued that the WTO dispute settlement system ought to deal directly 
with human rights violations, so as to benefit from the DSM 
enforcement mechanism to implement human rights, which suffer 
521 Gernot Brodnig, 'The World Bank and Human Rights : Mission Impossible' 
(2002), 17 The Fletcher Journal of Development Studies 1, pp. 8-10. 
522 Gernot Brodnig, note 521, p. 11-12., Mac Darrow, Between Light and Shadow: the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and International Human Rights Law, 
(Hert Publishing, 2003), pp. 129-131. 
523 Lorand Bartels, 'The Appellate Body and Public International Law', in Federico 
Ortino, and Sergry Ripinsky, (eds), WTO Law and Process: the Process on the 2005- 
2006 Annual WTO Conference, (British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law, 2007), pp. 51-58. 
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from poor enforceabiIity. 524 However, this proposal is problematic in 
the current political atmosphere, because the system would require 
major transformations so as to be capable of dealing with direct 
human rights violations. There would have to be a major modification 
in trade sanctions and how they are applied in cases of human rights 
violations, as well as a major change in the philosophy of trade in the 
WTO to accommodate human rights considerations. Theoretically, 
these issues can be resolved, but the current political division between 
developed and developing countries makes it very unlikely that such 
transformations will occur in the WTO regime. 525 
A more sensible view is adopted by Petersmann, who argues that 
there is no reason why the panel and AB should not interpret WTO 
agreements in conformity with human rights; on the contrary, the 
universal recognition526 of human rights puts an obligation on the 
panel and the AB to take into account human rights while interpreting 
WTO law, although they could be prohibited from ruling on direct 
human rights violations. Furthermore, Petersmann contends, in 
524 Lora A. Green, "The Global Fight for the Elimination of Child Labor in Pakistan', 
(2001), Wisconsin International Law Journal 177.; Gabrielle Marceau, 'WTO Dispute 
Settlement and Human Rights', (2002), 13(14) Journal of International Economic 
Law 753.; William H. Meyer, 'Activism and Research on TNCs and Human Rights: 
Building a New International Normative Regime', in Jedrzej George Frynas(ed), 
Transnational Corporations, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp41-48., Susan Ariel and 
Jamie M. Zimmerman, Trade Imbalance: The Struggle to Weight Human Rights 
Concerns in Trade Policy Making, (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 3. 
525 Holger Hestermeyer, Human Rights and the WTO, (Oxford University Press, 
2007), pp. 214-215., Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas J. Schoenbaum and Petros C, 
Mavroidis The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, and Policy, (Oxford 
University Press, Second Edition, 2006), p. 924. 
526 Detail on universality of human rights in Henry J. Steiner, Philip Alston and Ryan 
Goodman, International Human rights in Context: Law and Political Morals, (Oxford 
University Press, Third edition, 2007), p. 475; Javaid Rehman, International Human 
Rights Law: A Practical Approach, (Pearson Education Limited, 2003), p. 5. Also, 
detailed analysis of whether the DSU rules explicitly forbid the panel and AB to 
interpret WTO law in conformity with human rights, in Holger Hestermeyer, note 
525, pp. 215-229; Gabrielle Marceau, note 524. 
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support of the argument that the panel and the AB can interpret WTO 
law in conformity with human rights, that there have already been 
cases where the panel and the AB have ruled in favour of the 
protection of human health in disputes like EC Asbestos, 527 EC 
Hormones528 and Thai Cigarettes. 529 However, it would be naive to 
consider these rulings as recognitions of human rights within the WTO 
regime, since the term 'human rights' has not even been used. 530 
The preamble to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which 
has been used as a main tool in the interpretation of WTO agreements 
by the AB, necessitates respect for human rights, 531 as it clearly states 
that it has: 
Ax... in mind the principles of international law embodied in 
the Charter of the United Nations, such as the principles of 
the equal rights and self-determination of peoples, of the 
sovereign equality and independence of all States, of non- 
interference in the domestic affairs of States, of the 
prohibition of the threat or use of force and of universal 
527 European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products, panel report, WT/DS135/R, adopted on 18-09-2000, appellate body report, 
WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted on 12-03-2001. [hereinafter EC Asbestos] 
528 EC - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), panel report, 
WT/DS26/R, adopted on 18-08-1997, appellate body report, WT/DS48/AB/R - 
WT/DS26/AB/R, adopted on 16-01-1998. [hereinafter EC Hormones] 
529 Thailand - Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes 
from the Philippines, GATT 
panel report, 37th Supp. BSID 200, adopted 7-11-10-1990, WT/DS371/1, Request for 
Consultations under WTO, on 12-02-2008. [hereinafter Thai Cigarettes] 
530 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 'Human Rights and the Law of the World Trade 
Organization', (2003), 37(2) Journal of World Trade 241. Toussaint correctly argues 
that "Incorporated in the body of customary law, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights is, as its name implies, universal; it binds the state and other subjects of 
international law in the exercise of their specific action and responsibilities", in Eric 
Toussaint, The World Bank: A Critical Primer, (Pluto Press, London, 2008), p. 227. 
531 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 'Human Rights, Constitutionalism and the World Trade 
Organisation: Challenges for World Trade Organisation Jurisprudence and Civil 
Society', (2006), 19 Leiden Journal of International Law 633, p. 644. 
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respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for alI", 
532 
A lesson can be learned from the Shrimp dispute533 that, although the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism cannot rule on a direct violation of 
human rights, it can interpret the WTO agreement in conformity with 
human rights. 534 But another most important lesson could be that the 
AB needs to overcome the criticism directed against it in the Shrimp 
dispute that it promoted developed countries' environmental concerns, 
and so worsened protectionism against developing countries. While 
interpreting the WTO law in conformity with human rights, the AB 
needs to put the interests of developing countries at the forefront. It 
should begin by identifying how human rights can promote the 
interests of developing countries in international trade, rather than 
allowing the most expensive standards to be applied in the developed 
countries. Developing countries do not have the means and resources 
to apply or to examine these standards.. This would ease the criticism 
directed at the AB regarding its ignorance of the development 
objectives of developing countries. It would also give more incentive 
for developing countries to participate in the political process for the 
comprehensive inclusion of human rights in the WTO regime and the 
balancing of environmental requirement for the development 
objectives of developing countries. 
532 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 1969, Available online at 
http: //untreaty. un. org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1 1 1969. pdf, last 
seen on 28-10-2008 at 8: 25pm. Originally from Peter, 2008, p. 795. 
533 US Shrimp, appellate body report, note 408. 
534 Joost Pauwelyn , 
"Human Rights in WTO Dispute Settlement', in Thomas Cottier 
and Joost Pauwelyn(eds), Human Rights and International Trade, (Oxford University 
Press, 2005), pp. 208-2011; Gudrun Monika Zagel, 'WTO & Human Rights: Examining 
Linkages and Suggesting Convergence', (2005), 2(2) IDLO Voices of Development 
Jurists Paper Series, p. 32; Joost Pauwelyn, Conflicts of Norms in Public International 
Law: How WTO Law Relates to other Rules of International Law, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), pp. 482-492. 
159 
It has been claimed that, due to the significant influence of human 
rights on such agreements and their importance for developing 
countries' economic development, some WTO agreements cannot be 
interpreted without special reference to human rights. For example, to 
promote sustainable development in developing countries and LDCs, 
the TRIPS Agreement could be interpreted in conformity with the 
human right to health, to allow developing countries to manufacture 
and import affordable medicines. 535 This is explicitly recognized by the 
WTO, and was adopted in the Doha Round in the Declaration on the 
TRIPS agreements and Public Health. 536 In 2003, the General Council 
adopted the decision to implement the 2001 Doha Round and this 
Declaration. 537 Then, in December 2005, the General Council adopted 
an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, 538 which "clarifies how the 
TRIPS Agreement provides flexibilities so as to enable WTO members 
to protect public health and promote access to medicines. This issue 
has been a major concern of developing countries facing severe AIDS 
crises". 539 
Another area of the interpretation of human rights which can be 
applied to the WTO agreement is the human right to food. This is 
connected to the WTO agreement on agriculture. 
540 Hunger is on the 
535 Gabrielle Marceau, note 524, pp. 786-787. 
536 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreements and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/2., 
(adopted on 20 November 2001). 
537 Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement 
and Public Health, WT/L/540, adopted 1 September 2003. 
538 Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641, adopted 8 December 2005. 
539 William J. Davey, 'The WTO: looking forwards', (2006), 9(1) Journal of 
International Economic Law 3, p. 8., also more analyses of the TRIPS and WTO 
dispute settlement system in, Justin Malborn and Charles Lawson (eds), Interpreting 
and Implementing the TRIPS Agreement: Is it Fair?, (Edward Charles, 2008). 
540 In the same vein the preamble of the WTO agreement on agriculture reads: 
"Noting that commitments under the reform programme should be made in an 
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increase and people in many developing countries suffer severely, yet 
they are forced to open their domestic markets to agricultural imports 
which (as a result of heavy subsidies) are priced lower than local 
production costs. This has endangered poor farmers in developing 
countries and deprived poor people of the basic human right to food. It 
is argued that the right to food would compel the panel and AB to 
interpret the agreement on agriculture to guarantee that food is 
properly distributed all over the world. Such a right would also ensure 
that poorer farmers in the developing countries are properly 
protected. 541 
From the perspective of development in poorer countries, it would be 
sensible to require the panel and AB to consider human rights in 
disputes brought before them whenever applicable, just as the 
European Court has played a vital role in promoting human rights in 
EU law, which was established mainly to regulate and facilitate trade 
between its Members, and the creation of the European Court of 
Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, to give 
particular consideration to the role of human rights in relation to the 
WTO agreements. 542 Only then will the right to development be truly 
equitable way among all Members, having regard to non-trade concerns, including 
food security.... " Para (C) of Article 20 of the same Agreement also mentions "non- 
trade concerns, special and differential treatment to developing country Members, 
and the objective to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system, 
and the other objectives and concerns mentioned in the preamble to this 
Agreement". The WTO agreement on agriculture is available online at, 
http: //www. wto. org/english/docs e/legal e/14-ag. pdf, last seen on 3-11-2008, at 
11: 59am 
541Website, 
http: //www. hrichina. org/public/contents/article? revision%5fid=26420&item%5fid=2 
6396, last seen on 14-11-2008 at 1: 30pm; Gabrielle Marceau, op. cit, p. 788; Alberto 
Alemanno, Trade in Food: Regulatory and Judicial Approaches in the EC and the 
WTO, (Cameron May, 2007). 
542 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 'Human Rights, International Economic Law and 
Constitutional Justice', (2008), 19(4) European Journal of International Law 769, 
pp. 795-798; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, note 531, p. 641; Thomas Cottier, note 509, 
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integrated into the WTO regime, which indeed would add a new 
dimension to the development objectives of developing countries in 
the multilateral trading system. The relationship between the right to 
development and human rights has been established by the 
declaration on the right to development, which states: "'The right to 
development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every 
human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute 
to and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in 
which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully 
realized. "543 
As a result of the appellate body ruling on the Shrimp dispute544, the 
WTO has been considered an environmentally friendly regime. Yet it 
remains inactive in the field of human rights. Just as the World Bank 
has done, it is a matter of time until the WTO as an international 
institution has to play a role in the protection of human rights. 545 The 
WTO dispute settlement system can play a leading role in making the 
WTO regime also favourable to human rights, but from the perspective 
of developing countries' development objectives on this occasion. 
4.7 Evaluation of the Appellate Body Process 
It can be argued that those who make decisions in the WTO, mainly 
the appellate body judges, appear to display a strong desire to give 
good reasons for their opinions by passing on the wisdom of an 
pp. 130-1132; Sara Dillon, International Trade and Economic Law and the European 
Union, (Hart Publishing, 2002), pp. 7-9. 
543 Article 1 of the Declaration on right to development, available online at 
http: //www. unhcr. orq/cqibin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain? docid=3b00f22544&paqe=s 
earch, last seen on 01-11-2008 at 10pm; More detail on the evolvement of right to 
development in Stephen Marks, 'The Human Right to development: Between 
Rhetoric and Reality', (2004), 17 Harvard Human Rights Journal 137. 
544 US Shrimp, appellate body report, note 408. 
545 Shale Horowitz and Albrecht Schnabel, Human Rights and Societies in Transition: 
Causes, Consequences, Responses, (United Nation University Press, 2004), p. 415. 
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extremely experienced board of judges, more than was the case with 
their precursors in GATT. 546 Moreover, "the wheel does not have to be 
reinvented". 547 Therefore, justice and legality are not the only basis for 
courts when they decide to pursue prior decisions; they do so also on 
the basis of effectiveness. At present, courts benefit from the efforts 
made in the recent past in addressing the same legal issues. What is 
more, the tendency to follow precedent leads to rules being made 
clearer and more definite, which is to the advantage of the legal 
system as well as the individuals who participate in it. 548 
It can also be argued that it is desirable for countries to be bound by 
the rules they have approved willingly in a specific agreement and that 
no convention could be set up in a perfectly plain manner that is free 
from vagueness and debate. Thus, if the convention lacks a particular 
provision, it will be an expected part of the dispute resolution function 
to overcome such a shortcoming through the work of judges. 
Otherwise, the disputing members will not enjoy the benefit of such a 
function. 549 
However, developing countries have fears that the interpretation of the 
panel and the AB could undermine their development objectives. They 
have expressed their concerns about the inclusion of environmental 
issues via the interpretation of the panel and the AB in the 
Shrimp/Turtle dispute. This has indeed prompted the interest of larger 
and more developed members and given them what they were not 
capable of getting through the negotiation rounds. Moreover, climate 
change which is vital for developing countries' interest has not been 
546 David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, note 437, p. 408. 
547 Palmeter & Mavroidis, note 437, p. 402. 
548 Ibid. 
549 Jeff Waincymer, note 448, p. 390. 
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brought into the equation. It has also deprived developing countries of 
strong bargaining tools to win more favourable concessions from 
developed countries in the trade rounds. Conversely, human rights, 
which represent a vital element of the development objectives of 
developing counties (especially the poorer people within the 
developing world) and an integral part of the universal right to 
development, have been ignored by the WTO agreement and the 
jurisprudence of its dispute settlement mechanism. The panel and the 
AB need to interpret the WTO agreement in conformity with human 
rights to promote its own legitimacy and reclaim the development 
objectives of developing countries. As Sengupta observes: 
"The rights approach to development requires us to re- 
examine the ends and means of development. If 
improvement of well-being of the people based on the 
enjoyment of rights and freedoms is the objective of 
development, economic growth consisting of the 
accumulation of wealth and gross national product would 
not be an end in itself. It can be one of the ends, and can 
also be a means to some other ends, when `well-being' is 
equivalent to the realization of human rights. ... 
[A] 
prosperous community of slaves who do not have civil and 
political rights cannot be regarded as a community with 
well-being, "550 
550 Arjun Sengupta, 'The Right to Development as a Human Right', (2000), available 
online at http: //www. hsph. harvard. edu/fxbcenter/FXBC WP7--Sengupta. pdf, 
last 
seen on 11-10-2008 at gam. 
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4.8 Conclusion 
Difficulties in the decision-making process of the WTO have to lead to 
highly political issues, such as the trade-related issues of the 
environment and human rights, remaining unresolved. In their own 
interests, the developed countries have already included the TRIPS 
Agreement in the WTO during the Uruguay Round. The panel and the 
AB have developed a strong tradition of interpretation and clarification 
of the WTO law. Developing countries fear that the interpretation of 
the panel and the AB has been used against their developmental 
needs. They argue that the panel and the AB in the Shrimp dispute 551 
allowed developed countries to promote their agenda and obtain what 
they failed to win through the decision-making process, by legitimizing 
the environmental restriction by the US of imports from developing 
countries. Meanwhile, human rights in areas like IPRs and the right to 
health and food, which have the potential to do more good for 
vulnerable people in developing countries, have been ignored in the 
jurisprudence of the DSM. 
Having considered how developing counties have been treated so far in 
the WTO dispute settlement system, we will explore next the 
importance of third-party rights for developing countries in the light of 
the obstacles discussed above. 
551 US Shrimp, appellate body report, note 408. 
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-5- 
Justification of the Participation of 
Developing Countries as Third Parties 
5.1 Introduction 
According to Chinkin, the definition of third parties in international law 
is "those outside a bilateral relationship, whether formally created, for 
example by treaty or the commencement of proceedings, or occurring 
through events such as the outbreak of armed conflict". 552 The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties applies the term 'third parties' to 
international persons who are not signatories to a particular treaty or 
convention, 553 in other words, non-members. However, in international 
legal proceedings that come before international courts, third parties 
are members of such international institutions or treaties, not the 
actual disputing members who brought and initiated a particular case 
(normally identified as complainant and respondent) but who would 
have substantial interests554 in the application and interpretation of the 
decision. 555 
Hence, contrary to the bilateral nature of the definition of international 
disputes given by the Permanent Court of Justice, 556 many disputes 
may certainly be of a multilateral nature that encompasses the main 
552 Christine Chinkin, Third Parties in International Law, (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1993), p. 7- 
553 Article 2H of the Vienna Convention states: "A third State means a "State not a 
party to treaty. " 
554 This will be dealt with in section 5.2. 
555 Chinkin, note 552, pp. 7-9. 
556 The definition of the Permanent Court is "a disagreement on a point of law or fact, 
a conflict of legal views or interests between two persons", cited 
by Chinkin, note 
552, p. 15. 
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disputing parties and third parties. 557 This is indeed the case in 
disputes brought to the WTO dispute settlement system. Most of these 
have a multilateral flavour and third parties' rights are reserved in 
most of the cases that are dealt with in the DSM. 558 However, the DSU 
could be criticised because its rules are less multilateral than its 
disputes. This reflects the increased tendency for countries to share 
trade interests. 
Third party rights have received significant attention in WTO members' 
proposals during their sessions on the review of the dispute settlement 
understanding. 559 In contrast, little attention has been given by 
academics to the reform of such rights. Third party participation is 
restricted, confusing and in need of extensive reform. For instance, 
despite the fact that they can be fully represented during the appellate 
review, the presence of third parties in panel reviews is restricted. 560 
Yet again, the AB and panel have complicated the issue of third parties 
by allowing amicus curiae to make their submissions case by case. 
This decision has divided opinion between members who reject such 
involvement56' and those who accept it and present guidelines on how 
it could take place. 562 
To begin with, it would be reasonable to question why third parties 
matter in the WTO dispute settlement system. Is there any economic 
551 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
558 The official WTO website is a useful device to identify disputes between WTO 
Members and parties appearing as main participants or as third parties: 
www. wto. orq. 
559 See detailed proposals on dispute settlement system gateway on the WTO 
website. 
560 Donald McRae, 'What is The Future of WTO Dispute Settlement? ', (2004), 7(1) 
Journal of International Economic Law 3, p. 11. 
561 Indian and Malaysia have openly rejected the acceptance of amici curiae in the 
special sessions of the review of the DSB. 
562 Communication from the European Communities, TN/DS/W/38, (23 Jan 2003). 
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benefit in acting as a third party, or would members gain a systematic 
legal advantage from their participation as third parties? It has also 
been suggested that there are special circumstances where a member 
ought to be deterred from participating as a third party, let alone as a 
complainant. These situations include when one country is being given 
preferential access by another to its market in breach of the core MFN 
rule. This states that exporters must not benefit from measures which 
are incompatible with WTO law. 563 This is the case where developing 
countries have participated as third parties in the DSM. The Banana 
case, 564 is one in point. Here, some countries from Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific (ACPs) were on the side of the EU in 
defending their preferential access to the EU banana market, -565 and 
more recently the Sugar dispute566 which also involved a number of 
developing countries attempting to defend access of their sugar to the 
EU. 567 This will be examined later in the chapter. 
This chapter presents an analysis of the importance of third party 
status for developing countries in order to support the argument that 
enhancing or extending third parties' roles can do more good than 
harm for developing countries in the course of a dispute. Firstly, the 
function of third parties will be dealt with. Then a number of issues 
563 Chad P. Bown, "Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants, 
Interested Parties and Free Riders', (2005), available online at 
http: //people. brandeis. edu/Ncbown/papers/free ride. pdf , last seen on 10-01-07 at 11am, p. 8. 
564European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas, panel report, WT/DS27/ECU, adopted on 22 May 1997; appellate body 
report, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted on 5 September 1997. [hereinafter EC Banana III] 
565 More detail can be found in Timothy E. Josling and Timothy G. Taylor (eds), 
Banana Wars: The Anatomy of a Trade Dispute, (CABI Publishing, 2003) 
566 EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar, panel report (complaint by Thailand, Brazil and 
Australia), WT/DS/283/R, WT/DS266/R, WT/DS265/R, 15 October 2004, appellate 
body report, WT/DS/283/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS265/AB/R, adopted on 28 
April 2005. [hereinafter EC Sugar] 
567 More detail on the Sugar dispute is available on www. oxfam. org. 
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such as cost effective statutes, multilateral inspiration, access to 
justice and legal experience will be discussed. 
5.2 Confusing rules of function 
There are both implicit and explicit third party rights stated in the WTO 
dispute settlement understanding. The former arise in the first stage of 
the dispute process consultations, in that any WTO member who has a 
substantial trade interest is allowed to join the consultation. In this 
situation a member must register its interest with the disputing parties 
and the DSB within 10 days of the request for the establishment of the 
consultation. Such intervention in the consultation process is subject 
to the acceptance by the disputing parties that the substantial trade 
interest of the intervener is adequate. 568 However, third parties are 
given the explicit right to participate in the panel and the appellate 
process. According to Article 10 of the DSU, every WTO member with a 
substantial interest in a dispute has the right to participate as a third 
party. Third parties are entitled to present to the panel their oral and 
written submissions and to receive the submissions of the disputing 
members to the first meeting of the panel. Submissions made by third 
parties shall be reflected upon in the final decision. 569 
This issue has raised a number of controversies. The first relates to the 
extent of such rights: whether they ought to be extended or whether 
the current rules are sufficient, and whether extending the scope of 
third parties' rights would place an extra burden on the parties. A 
568 Article 4.11 of the DSU 
569 Article 10.2 of the DSU explicitly states that "Any Member having a substantial 
interest in a matter before a panel and having notified its interest to the DSB 
(referred to in this Understanding as a `third party') shall have an opportunity to be 
heard by the panel and to make written submissions to the panel. " 
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balance needs to be struck. On the other hand, since the rules are 
unclear in this regard, access to consultations as third parties could be 
facilitated, especially for developing countries. 570 
With regard to the appeal process, although all parties (not only third 
parties) can make an appeal, those third parties which have reserved 
their third party rights according to Article 10.2 of the DSU will have 
the right to present written submissions and to be heard by the 
appellate body. 571 
Hence, any member which may have an interest in a dispute can 
reserve its right to act as a third party. Generally speaking, there are 
many reasons for intervention in a dispute. The interest could be legal, 
economic, political, moral, ideological or all of these. 572 WTO members 
with a substantial trade interest may participate in the consultation 
process, and a member with a substantial interest may participate in 
the panel and appeal processes. In this regard, one may wonder 
whether such issues are in need of reform, 573 or whether it would be 
better not to attempt to mend something that is not broken. 574 
If the significance of the interest is shown to be great, the panel and 
the AB will already allow enhanced third party rights for the 
participants, giving extra access to third parties. For example, in the 
570 This issue will dealt with in more detail in the coming chapters. 
571 Article 17.4 of the DSU. 
572 Christine Chinkin, note 552, p. 18. 
573 Some Ideas by Mexico, Diagnosis of the Problems Affecting the Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism, TN/DS/W/90, (16 July 2007), p. 7. 
574 More detail can be found in Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, 'Fixing What Ain't 
Broke? " Third Party Rights, Consultations, and the DSU', (2004), available online at 
http: //www. qeorcietown. edu/users/mlb66/DSU. pd , last seen on 22-02-07 at 10am. 
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EC - Tariff Preferences575 dispute, allowance was made for the 
enhancement of third party rights for all participants. This included 
additional rights allowing them to "observe the first substantive 
meeting with parties; receive the second submissions of the parties; 
observe the second substantive meeting with the parties; make a brief 
statement during the second substantive meeting with the parties; 
review the summary of their respective arguments in the draft 
descriptive part of the panel report ", 576 
However, the actual function of third party rules is not as 
straightforward as it might appear, but rather unclear and sometimes 
confusing. The panel and the AB have been criticized for the way they 
use their discretionary powers in granting so called `enhanced' or 
'extended' third party rights to countries with significant interests, 
according to Article 12 of the DSU. 57 The AB has also been censured 
for adding a new context for the use of third parties' rights by 
accepting an amicus curiae from a third WTO member, which is the 
case with Morocco in the EC - Sardine dispute. 578 
575 EC - Tariff Preferences, panel report, WT/DS246/R, adopted on 
01-12-03; 
appellate body, WT/DS246/AB/R, adopted on 20 September 2004. [hereinafter EC 
Tariff Preferences] 
576 EC - Tariff Preferences, panel report, annex A, note 575, paras. A-1. 57 For example, the panel was criticized in the cotton disputes for not enhancing ACP 
third parties' rights; more detail in chapter Seven. 
578 More detail can be found in Nick Covelli, 'Member Intervention in World Trade 
Organization Dispute Settlement Proceedings after EC-Sardines: The Rules, 
Jurisprudence, and Controversy', (2003), 37(3) Journal of World Trade 763, p. 673., 
third party participation in the EC Sardine will be dealt with, in chapter seven section 
7.4.3. 
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5.2.1 Third parties are different from multiple 
complainants 
In circumstances where two or more WTO members wish to bring a 
claim to the DSM on the same subject, Article 9 of the DSU allows for 
a single panel to deal with multiple complaints579 whenever it is 
feasible, adding that where more than one panel is set up the schedule 
for their proceedings ought to be coordinated. 580 Article 9 states: - 
"1. Where more than one Member requests the 
establishment of a panel related to the same matter, a 
single panel may be established to examine these 
complaints taking into account the rights of all Members 
concerned. A single panel should be established to 
examine such complaints whenever feasible. 
2. The single panel shall organize its examination and 
present its findings to the DSB in such a manner that the 
rights which the parties to the dispute would have enjoyed 
had separate panels examined the complaints are in no 
way impaired. If one of the parties to the dispute so 
requests, the panel shall submit separate reports on the 
dispute concerned. The written submissions by each of the 
complainants shall be made available to the other 
complainants, and each complainant shall have the right to 
579 The EC has criticised the provision since it leads to delay in the process and 
proposed a new para three for article 9 as follows: "Experience has shown that this 
often leads to delay in the resolution of disputes. One way of limiting this problem 
and thus accelerating procedures would be to provide that Members that have either 
participated in consultations requested by another Member or requested their own 
consultations on the same matter should be entitled to become parties to a panel 
proceeding when a panel is established without having to wait for the requirements 
of the DSU to be met before requesting the establishment of a panel. " 
Such an amendment could be effected by introducing a new paragraph 3 into 
Article 9 as follows: "In order to facilitate the establishment of single panels to 
consider multiple complaints, any Member that has participated pursuant to Article 
4.11 in consultations requested by another Member may join in any request to 
establish a panel under Article 6.1 without having to request its own consultations 
and any Member that has held consultations concerning the same matter may make 
a request for the establishment of a panel for consideration at the same meeting of 
the DSB even if 60 days have not elapsed from the date that it requested the 
consultations. " In Communication from the European Communities, TN/DS/W/38, (23 
January 2003), p-2- 
580 Ibid. 
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be present when any one of the other complainants 
presents its views to the panel. 
3. If more than one panel is established to examine the 
complaints related to the same matter, to the greatest 
extent possible the same persons shall serve as panellists 
on each of the separate panels and the timetable for the 
panel process in such disputes shall be harmonized. " 
Multiple complainants' provisions are different from those for third 
parties under the dispute settlement system. Complainants are the 
principal disputing parties which have to make requests for 
consultations, classify the inconsistent measures that apply to the 
respondent and find grounds for their claims in the covered agreement 
in which they claim that such measures are inconsistent. Co- 
complainants and third parties have different procedures as stated in 
the DSU. The WTO, therefore, clearly differentiates the two types of 
participant in its documents. 581 The use of the multiple complainant 
provisions is popular in the WTO dispute settlement system. Members 
often intervene as co-complainants in the course of the consultation 
process. In such cases the requirement of a single panel will most 
certainly be met. As a result, complainants will be subject to the single 
panel rule stated in paragraph 2 of Article 9, which allows them to gain 
access to the written submissions of the parties, to attend the 
proceedings and to present their own views. 582 
581 Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, 'Three's a Crowd: Third Parties and WTO 
Dispute Settlement', (2006), available at 
http: //www georgetown. edu/users/mlb66/Third%2OParties%20January%202006. pdf 
, last seen on 12-02-07 at 
12pm, p. 9; Peter-Tobias Stoll and Frank Schorkopf, World 
Economic Order, World Trade Law, (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), p. 255. 
582 Antonis Antoniadis, 'Enhanced Third Party Rights in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding', (2002), 29(3) Legal rssues of Economic Integration 285, p. 291. 
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5.3 Development-friendly WTO rules 
5.3.1 Third parties vs. free ride 
Some academics have argued that developing countries, and least 
developed countries such as African countries, have no need for the 
dispute settlement system, because of their small amount of trade. 
Rather, they have other urgent concerns; for example, combating 
malnutrition, poverty and AIDS or developing better governance. 583 
Hence, developing countries ought not to be involved with the DSM, 
but should gain what benefit they can from 'free-riding' on other 
members' cases. 
To start with, as has been argued in Chapter four, despite the fact that 
the WTO ought to give particular consideration to developing countries' 
development objectives, the WTO rules have the contrary effect. The 
dispute settlement system can be characterised as 'development- 
unfriendly', in that its rules tend to favour their developed 
counterparts. Hence, developing countries need to interact more with 
the DSM and to have their say on the evolution of WTO rules. 
Whatever the truth of this argument, the function of the dispute 
settlement system is essential to the operation of the WTO. Thus, 
developing countries' involvement in the DSM is essential for the 
accomplishment of the WTO dispute mechanism and for incorporating 
developing countries extensively into the multilateral trade sphere. 584 
Additionally, the dispute settlement system is founded on the idea that 
583 Victor Mosoti, 'Does Africa Need The WTO Dispute Settlement System? ' in 
Gregory Shaffer, Victor Mosoti and Asif Qureshi, Towards A Development-Supportive 
Dispute Settlement System in the WTO, (ICTSD, 2003), pp. 73-74. 
584 Julio Lacarte-Muro & Petina Gappah, 'Developing Countries and the WTO Legal 
and Dispute Settlement System: A View from the Bench', (2000), 3(3) Journal of 
International Economic Law 395, p. 395. 
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any trade measures that have been undertaken by a state member 
could be disputed by other members, with the intention that any 
member, no matter what its economic status, can engage in an 
economic dispute with larger members. Large numbers of poorer 
members believe that their involvement is important to the credibility 
and acceptability of the dispute settlement mechanism, enabling them 
to protect their interests appropriately in the WTO. 585 
The significance of participation in the dispute settlement system 
ought not to be underrated. This is the medium in which the 
jurisprudence of GATT rules was once shaped. Hence, the dispute 
settlement procedure has grown to encompass policy-making 
procedures. If a country cannot participate strongly in the dispute 
settlement proceedings, it cannot influence the shaping of policy that 
might affect its interests in the long run. 586 
Thus, the dispute settlement system is concerned not only with 
disputes, but also with the development of a body of international 
business rules and jurisprudence which will lead the multilateral 
trading system for many years in the future. By not participating, 
developing countries will miss a significant opportunity to influence the 
development of international trade rules. For example, there is no 
reason why developing and least developed nations cannot be at the 
forefront of the continuing review of the system. Moreover, there is no 
justification for African states not to participate as third parties in the 
same way as the United States or the European Union do, and in the 
585 Ibid. 
586 Beatrice Chaytor, 'Dispute Settlement under the GATT/WTO: The experience of 
Developing Nations', in James Cameron & Karen Campbell(eds), Dispute Resolution 
in the World Trade Organization, (London, Cameron May Ltd, 1998), p. 267. 
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same number of disputes. 587 Indeed, those members that are the most 
deeply involved in the dispute settlement process will have the 
greatest chance to influence the interpretation and application of 
international trade law to their benefit. 588 
Involvement in developing WTO law through its dispute settlement 
system can be argued on two grounds to be more significant than 
developing national law through the national judicial system. Firstly, it 
is hard to modify or interpret WTO law through political methods, 
which increases the effect of jurisprudence in the WTO. The WTO law- 
making structure is still rather ineffective, since unlike domestic or EC 
law, consensus is needed to amend WTO law. The process of 
modifying it occurs in irregular meetings, roughly once in every 
decade, and involves complex negotiations among nearly 140 
members with different interests, principles, degrees of development 
and concerns. Additionally, the provisions in the WTO agreements are 
usually written in an obscure way, since bargaining practice is 
complicated. In this way, members have handed over important de 
facto authority to the dispute mechanism to interpret and actually 
develop WTO rules. 589 
Secondly, the appellate body's judgments will subsequently be 
followed by panels, in a process rather similar to that by which an 
upper court influences lower ones through the formal structure of a 
legal system, or otherwise through the practical interaction between 
587 Victor Mosoti, note 583, pp. 73-74. 
588 Gregory Shaffer, 'How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for 
Developing Countries', in Gregory Shaffer, Victor Mosoti, and Asif Qureshi, Towards a 




the two courts. 590 The AB judges, in considering prior decisions, are 
likely potentially to be considering decisions of their colleagues, if not 
their own personal decisions. This appears to indicate that a more 
powerful judicial body has already entered into reality. 591 "Once 
standing judicial bodies have come into existence ... they provide an 
additional mechanism for the further development of the law. "592 
In addition, trade negotiations under the WTO are complex and the 
ability of developing countries to participate effectively in them is 
limited. Observers frequently state that developing countries have few 
trade representatives. They will often send only one diplomat to 
negotiate in the WTO and other international institutions. As a result, it 
is argued, developing countries ratified a number of policies in the 
Uruguay Round without actually knowing their contents. Therefore, 
developing countries may feel that their concerns have not been 
addressed properly in these trade negotiations. Thus, they would wish 
to pursue their interests by other means. 
593 
In addition, the development of international trade law taking place 
within the dispute settlement system has resulted in the DSM being 
accused of exceeding its function of interpretation by making new law. 
This could be turned to the advantage of developing countries which 
participate as third parties, as they would have the opportunity to 
present their arguments in front of panels and the appellate body. 
590 David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement in The World Trade 




593 Henrik Horn, Giovanni Maggi & Robert W. Staiger, 'The GATT/WTO as an 
Incomplete Contract and the Role of Dispute Settlement Procedures', (2005), 
available at http: //www. princeton. edu/Nmaggi/hms092805. completedraft. pdf, last 
seen on 06-03-06 at 11: 50am, p. 4. 
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Such participation would mean that their interests would be considered 
in the subsequent rulings, with considerable consequences for the 
jurisprudence and function of the DSU. 594 
One of the reasons why developing countries ought to pay particular 
attention to such participation is that it is believed that third party 
rights are vital for increasing the credibility of the WTO dispute 
mechanism, which gives every member a chance to have its say on 
the making of WTO rules as a main function. 595 It has been argued by 
Japan that third parties may present valuable submissions that can 
shape the rulings of the panel and the AB. They can also provide 
important information for future cases, especially if they are brought 
on similar grounds, in which case the 'arguments and rebuttals are 
resources' of enormous significance. 596 
There is growing evidence in support of the Japanese idea. To start 
with, Shaffer argues that the EU and the US participate as third parties 
in all cases where they are not the complainant or the respondent. In 
this way, they do not miss the opportunity to be third parties at the 
appellate stage, where the effect on interpreting WTO rules is greatest. 
The EU and the US participate systematically as third parties so as to 
have their say on the development of the WTO law, in order to 
safeguard their trade interests. 597 In particular, the US, EC and Japan 
594 ICOH online document, African Countries and the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System, available online at 
http: //www. icoh2009. co. za/unique/tralac/pdf/African Countries and the WTO Disp 
ute Settlement System. rtf, last seen on 015-01-2009 at 12-31pm, p. 2., Michael S. 
Matsebula, 'European Community's Subsidies on Sugar: Observations on African 
Participation as a Third Party in the Challenge at the WTO', in Trudi Hartzenberg(ed), 
WTO Dispute Settlement System: An African Perspective, (Cameron May, 2008), 
pp. 91-102. 
595 Minutes of meeting, TN/DS/M/14, (20 April 2004), p. 16. 
596 Proposal by Japan, TN/DS/W/22, (28 October 2002), p. 4. 
597 Gregory Shaffer, note 588, p. 11. 
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often take part as third parties, even if they do not have direct 
interests in the dispute. 598 
The dispute settlement system is used to 'fill gaps', sometimes even to 
overturn the conclusions of trade talks between WTO members. 
Therefore, by not seeking the opportunity to act as third parties in 
disputes where they might have an interest, developing countries will 
miss a vital chance to protect their development objectives. By 
contrast, by taking such roles they could help to create more 
development-friendly WTO rules that enhance their involvement in the 
multilateral trade arena. 599 
5.3.1.1 Australia: a medium-sized member's views on third 
parties 
As Shaffer has done in analysing the position of developing countries 
in the WTO dispute settlement, it is useful to consider what resources 
are available to developed countries and how they can develop their 
legal and financial capacity. By doing this, we can establish some 
strategies to be used by developing countries to maximize the use of 
their own resources. Hence, it is useful to consider how Australia, a 
medium-sized developed country, has dealt with third party rights. 600 
Australia faced difficulties in winning "concessions from larger 
Members and in influencing systemic change under the GATT". 601 it 
sees the WTO, and especially its new dispute settlement mechanism, 
as an improvement over GATT. This is particularly so in cases in which 
598 Calvin Manduna, "Daring to Dispute: Are there shifting trends in African 
participation in WTO dispute settlement? ", Tralac Trade Brief no. 3, (2005), p. 5- 
599 Ibid. 
600 Gregory Shaffer, note 588. 
601 Bryan Mercurio, "The Australian contribution to the jurisprudence of the WTO 
dispute settlement process', (2003), available at 
http: //www. qtcentre. unsw. edu. auZnews/docs/australia WTO. pdf, last seen at 12-03- 
07 at 10am, p. 47. 
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Australia has direct involvement as a principal party, or more often 
indirectly as a third party. 602 
Therefore, Goh and Witbreuk argue, third party status has offered 
many advantages to the Australian position in the multilateral trading 
system by improving its market access. As we have seen in the Shrimp 
case603, identifying whether or not the trade measures that are applied 
by its industries are consistent with WTO rules is important. In 
particular, shaping the interpretation of rules in trade sectors that are 
vital from the Australian perspective, such as agricultural export 
subsidies, the environment and trade-related intellectual property, by 
presenting its views as a third party. 604 
Australia, as a medium-sized WTO member, views third party rights as 
a significant tool to protect its market interests by protecting its access 
to any WTO market, and its broader interests by having its say in the 
development of the WTO rules and jurisprudence. For example, by 
being a third party in the Shrimp dispute605, it gained greater entry to 
the Spencer Gulf prawns market and clarity on the relationship 
between trade and the environment in the WTO. In other words, 
Australian prawns gained access to the United States market. 
602 Ibid., p. 47. 
603 United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, panel 
report, WT/DS58/R, adopted on 15 May 1998, appellate body report, 
WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted on 12 October 1998. [hereinafter US Shrimp] 
604 For example, "The outcome in Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents confirmed the 
consistency of Australia's legislative approach to this area of intellectual property", 
Gavin Goh and Trudy Witbreuk, "The WTO Dispute Settlement System', (2001), 
available at http: //www. dfat. gov. au/trade/neqotiations/disputes/wto disputes- 
papers-dispute settlement. doc, last seen on 04-03-07 at gam, 2001, p. 22; Bryan 
Mercurio, note 601. 
605 This case has been dealt with in chapter four section 4.5. 
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Furthermore, the "legitimacy of multilaterally pursued environmental 
concerns was upheld". 606 
Australia is an active third party, having participated as such more 
often than as a main complainant or respondent. It has been a third 
party in 43 disputes, a complainant in seven and a respondent in nine. 
Another example of the significance of third party rights for Australia is 
EC - Hormones607, in which it secured access to the EU market by 
providing hormone-free beef. It also made its views clear regarding 
the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, which created important 
jurisprudence and practices from an Australian perspective. 608 
Tanakan argues that "the WTO Members, as principal parties, are 
entitled to efficient dispute resolution with stringent timetables, 
confidentiality, and limited appellate review. The WTO Members also 
maintain rights to intervention as third parties and the authority for 
final decision to secure their interests in multilateral trade. "609 These 
opportunities have been effectively understood and utilised by 
Australia in the dispute system for the good of its trade interests. 
606 Gavin Goh and Trudy Witbreuk, note 604, p. 14. 
607 EC - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), panel report, 
WT/DS26/R, adopted on 18-08-1997, appellate body report, WT/DS48/AB/R - 
WT/DS26/AB/R, adopted on 16-01-1998. [hereinafter EC Hormones] 
608 Gavin Goh and Trudy Witbreuk, note 604, pp. 28-29. 
609 Maki Tanakan, 'Bridging the Gap between Northern NGOs and Southern 
Sovereigns in the Trade-Environment Debate: The Pursuit of Democratic Dispute 
Settlements in the WTO under the Rio Principles', (2003), 30 Ecology Law Quarterly 
113, p. 150. 
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5.3.1.2 The Cotton dispute 
The Cotton dispute, 610 and in particular the `peace clause', is argued by 
many to be a landmark in dealing with developing countries' concerns 
over agricultural subsidies that have been applied by their developed 
counterparts. This dispute set a precedent for future cases on 
agriculture subsides. The Cotton dispute involved Brazil as 
complainant, the US as respondent and a number of third parties: 
Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, Chinese Taipei, the European 
Community, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Venezuela, 
Japan, Benin and Chad. The last two are LDCs which had never before 
used the DSM. Brazil gained a favourable decision and the US 
agriculture subsidies were ruled to be inconsistent with WTO rules. 611 
For Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) an issue has arisen in the last two 
decades. It emerged when three West African countries - Benin, 
Burkina Faso and Mali - developed competitiveness in their cotton 
industries. They applied market-oriented rules and withdrew 
government support from their cotton manufacturers. On the other 
hand, the US increased its cotton subsidies up to 80%, a luxury which 
developing countries cannot afford. This significantly depressed the 
world cotton price and harmed unsubsidized cotton producers, 
including those in Africa. 612 Such a situation is reminiscent of the 
Uruguay Round, where Brazil succeeded in challenging US cotton 
subsidies. 
610 United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, panel report, WT/DS267/R, adopted 
on 8 September 2004; appellate body report, WT/DS267/AB/R, adopted on 03 March 
2005. [hereinafter US Cotton]. 
611 More details can be found in Karen Halverson Cross, "King Cotton, developing 
countries and the 'peace clause': the WTO's US Cotton Subsidies decision", (2006), 
9(1) Journal of International Economic Law 1. 
612 Elinor Lynn Heinisch, 'West Africa versus the United States on cotton subsidies: 
how, why and what next? ', (2006), 44(2) Journal of Modern African Studies 251, 
pp. 251-274. 
182 
However, with regard to our topic it would be useful to examine how 
the Sub-Saharan African LDCs of Benin and Chad gained from their 
involvement as third parties, bearing in mind that they were active in 
trade talks and the use of the DSM. There is no doubt that Benin and 
Chad reduced their financial costs, improved their familiarity with the 
dispute settlement system and overcame procedural inequities (such 
as the implementation process) which had been serious flaws in the 
DSU. 
Firstly, in light of the fact that it is difficult to reach a conclusion 
through the WTO decision-making process, the Sub-Saharan African 
LDCs realized that the WTO dispute settlement system could be used 
as an effective tool to impose a trade-related agenda. They went 
through both the legal channel (represented in the DSM by being third 
parties) and the political channel, by putting the issue on the trade 
talk agenda, which was one of the main reasons behind the failure of 
the Cancun ministerial conference in 2003, making their views known 
to the public and to decision-makers613 This use of the WTO dispute 
settlement system gave West Africa a stronger political position in the 
trade negotiations with regard to cotton subsidies, which was one of 
their key demands. 614 In addition, as regards the political channel, 
they brought strong and convincing arguments against the US cotton 
subsidies, which were considered vital elements in the winning of the 
case. Oxfam has claimed that one of the main reasons that the US 
ought to enforce the Cotton ruling is because of its failure to refute the 
613 Ibid., pp. 261-265. 
614 Oxfam, 'Dumping: the Beginning of the End? Implications of the Ruling in the 
Brazil/US Cotton Dispute', Oxfam Briefing Paper, August 2004, p. 2. 
1Ö3 
convincing arguments presented by West African members from 
Cancun and beyond. 
615 
Secondly, and most importantly, the two least developed SSA 
members were involved in developing DSM jurisprudence with regard 
to the enhancement of third parties' rights. This involvement would 
benefit not only Chad and Benin, but all SSA members of the WTO. 
They engaged in a complex technical discussion with the panel to 
make a precedent on the issue of the enhancement of third parties' 
rights, 616 which although it was rejected, showed 
"that the input of Benin and Chad caused the Panel to 
perform a legal evaluation of the issue which may act as a 
foundation for future argumentation. Thus, DS267 suggests 
that SSA Members should be encouraged to participate in 
the DSB - at least as third parties if not as complainants - 
in order to influence the evolving jurisprudence to better 
reflect their interests. "617 
This is a strong response by the panel, which will serve as a guide for 
future cases. It is a strong interaction with the system and provides 
potentially vital jurisprudence for developing countries. 
The action by Chad and Benin established the precedent that third 
parties will have the opportunity to have their say in the evolution of 
the DSM. It confounds those who believed that third parties would be 
expelled from influencing the sprouting jurisprudence of the WTO 
dispute settlement system. This engagement in enhancing third 
parties' rights could have been a vital precedent that SSA countries in 
particular, and developing ones in general, want to see in the evolution 
615 Ibid., p. 17. 
616 Adam Gross, 'Can Sub-Saharan African Countries Defend their Trade and 
Development Interests Effectively in the WTO? ', (2006), 18 European Journal of 
Development Research 368, pp. 374-375. 
617 Ibid., p. 383. 
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of the DSM. 618 The panels "were responsive to the views expressed 
and as a result of those views they performed a thorough legal 
analysis619. " This response was illustrated by the panel report from 
para 7.1396 to para 7.416, which, it is argued by Gross, "would not 
have occurred had Benin and Chad not called for it in their 
submissions. Moreover, this legal evaluation may provide a foundation 
for further argumentation in future disputes. , 620 
Thirdly, Benin and Chad, by reserving third party status, have actively 
engaged in the panel process and have provided strong evidence 
against the negative consequences of the US cotton subsidies. 621 They 
have certainly presented vital arguments that convinced the panel to 
make its decision in favour of Brazil. As Oxfam argues: "This evidence 
has certainly helped the panel to reach its conclusions. 11622 In its ruling 
in this particular case, the panel considered views presented by Benin, 
Chad and other third parties as supportive arguments in favour of 
Brazil's claims. 623 The removal of the inconsistent measure will no 
doubt benefit the SSA countries as much as Brazil. 
The panel stated that it had therefore 
"taken into account serious prejudice allegations of other 
Members to the extent that these constitute evidentiary 
support of the effect of the subsidy borne by Brazil as a 
Member whose producers are involved in the production 
and trade in upland cotton in the world market. However, 
we have not based our decision on any alleged serious 
prejudice caused to them. "624 
618 Ibid. 
619 Ibid. 
620 Ibid., pp. 374-375. 
621 Oxfam, note 614, p. 11. 
622 Ibid. 
623 Karen Halverson Cross, note 611, p-36- 
624 US Cotton, panel report, note 610, para. 1415. 
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Nevertheless, there are some disadvantages without which third 
parties could have functioned in a more sophisticated manner. Chad 
and Benin, although even more affected than Brazil by the inconsistent 
measures implemented by the US, were denied the request for 
enhanced third party rights. They were also excluded from bilateral 
negotiation on the removal of the inconsistent measure between Brazil 
and the US. 625 
It is also obvious from the last part of the panel ruling that it did not 
consider the harm being caused by the US cotton subsidies regime to 
the third parties was the same as that suffered by Brazil. Should this 
remain unresolved, it could be a weakness with respect to third 
parties' rights, so it needs to be reformed. 626 This will be discussed in 
the next chapter, on the reform of third parties' rights. But one ought 
to remember that third parties can make their own case if they believe 
that their interests have not been sufficiently addressed by the panel 
or the AB. Finally, Chad and Benin gained valuable experience as a 
result of being third parties in the Cotton dispute. 
Two LDCs, Benin and Chad, put their views on the table by making 
submissions as third parties before the panel and the AB, arguing that 
their cotton industry was at stake because of US practices. This would 
also improve their bargaining position in the course of trade talks. 627 
Their involvement in the Cotton dispute628 is considered an important 
step towards enhancing developing countries' participation in the 
dispute settlement system. It also refutes the argument that such 
625 Adam Gross, note 616, p. 375. 
626 Article 10 requests the panel merely to reflect on third parties' arguments. 
627 Calvin Manduna, note 598, pp. 6-7., Hilton Zunckel, 'An African Awakening in US 
Upland Cotton: Lessons from LDCs', in Trudi Hartzenberg(ed), WTO Dispute 
Settlement: An African Perspective, (Cameron May, 2008), pp. 129-130. 
628 US Cotton, note 610. 
186 
participation is undesirable for reasons of low trade volume, or other 
priorities such as poverty, education and health-related problems. This 
has opened the door for SSA members and other LDCs to participate in 
the DSM. 629 There are, however, some disadvantages that need to be 
addressed. 
5.4 Obtaining experience from participation as 
third parties 
We have seen that one of the main problems that would face any 
developing country wishing to participate in the WTO dispute 
settlement system is the lack of legal resources. Such participation 
would increase its financial burden. As noted by Shaffer, there is a 
sharp contrast between developed and developing countries in the 
numbers and preparation of the legal staff dealing with the dispute 
settlement system. 630 Djibouti has suggested that the fact that no LDC 
has ever participated in the DSM (so that they have no expertise and 
little idea how the system works) is the main reason for their absence 
and apparent lack of interest. 631 As argued by Pornchai Danvivathana, 
"experience in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism cannot be 
gained ... overnight. Capacity-building, of which 
developing countries 
are badly in need ... and 
have called for repeatedly, is no 
exception. "632. 
629 Calvin Manduna, note 598, pp. 6-7. 
630 For more details see in general chapter two. 
631 Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/14, (20 April 2004), p. 4. 
632 Pornchai Danvivathana, 'Case Study on Thailand's Experience in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System', (2006), ICTED paper, available online at 
http: //www. ictsd. orq/dloque/2006-01-25/Pornchai. pdf, last seen on 12-03-2007 at 
9: 45am, p. 12. 
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9 
While this problem was analysed in Chapter two (with reflections on 
major proposals invoking the rights of third parties where they have 
indirect interests) examining it from a different angle would make a 
great contribution to the legal capacity building of WTO officials and 
bureaucrats of developing countries. It would give them an actual 
insight into the operation of the dispute settlement system. By so 




needs on the table and enhancing their legal 
Developing countries are suffering from a lack of financial means to 
bring a dispute. They are also handicapped by a lack of legal experts 
on WTO law, as explained above. Participating as third parties would 
be fundamental to overcoming such weaknesses. Third party 
involvement is vital for developing countries in this respect. Through 
this participation they will significantly develop their knowledge 
regarding the process of the dispute and the functioning of the DSM, in 
a way that would not be possible by being passive members. "As one 
former Appellate Body Member has advised, developing countries 
should not hesitate to take up this role in appropriate conditions, 
because their familiarity with the inner workings of the system will 
stand them in good stead. "634 
633 Proposal by the African Group, Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, TN/DS/W/15 (25 September 2002), p. 5. 
634Unctad online document, World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement: Appellate 
Review, No. UNCTAD/EDM/Misc. 232/Add. 17, (2003), Available online at 
http: //www. unctad. orqlen/docs/-edmmisc232addl7 en. pdf#search 
='Module%203.2%20in%20this%20Course%20deals%20with%20the%20panel%20 
process%20of%20the%2OWTO%20dispute', last seen on 10-03-2009 at 2: 04 pm, 
p. 37. 
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The participation of developing country members in the proceedings of 
the dispute settlement will improve significantly their understanding of 
how the dispute mechanism works. It will also enhance their 
familiarity with the internal workings of the mechanism in order to be 
well prepared to protect their interests. 635 Therefore, one wonders why 
some would argue that in any case brought before the DSM in which 
developing countries have a substantial interest, they would have to 
reserve third party status in the case. Third party participation should 
be used on a regular basis so as to improve their involvement in the 
DSM. 636 
It has been suggested that the obligation to provide trade or financial 
intere st in the dispute as a condition for participating as a third party 
ought to be removed when a developing country wants to participate. 
Also, developing countries ought to have the right to participate as 
third parties at any step in the process of the dispute. In order to 
reach this target, there is a need for a reform of Article 4.11 by 
abolishing the condition of "trade" interests for developing countries. 
Third party developing countries should also be brought up to date 
with the events taking place among the disputing parties throughout 
the consultations. As argued by Costa Rica, the panel and the AB 
ought to give particular consideration to the claims made by third 
parties, rather than just indicating their arguments in the descriptive 
part of the ruling. 637 
635 Julio Lacarte-Muro & Petina Gappah, note 584, p. 397; Henry S. Gao, 'Aggressive 
Legalism: The East Asian Experience and Lessons for China', in Henry Gao and 
Donald Lewis(eds), China's Participation in the WTO, (Cameron May, London, 2005), 
p. 321. 
636 Calvin Manduna, note 598, p. 10. 
637 Communication from Costa Rica, Proposal by Costa Rica - Third Party Rights, 
TN/DS/W/12 (24 July 2002), p. 1. 
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Increasing the participation of developing countries in the process of 
dispute settlement would help them to obtain legal knowledge about 
the process and rules of the dispute system, and to become more 
familiar with its functioning. This, in turn, would safeguard their 
development interests in the long run. However, this could be 
negatively influenced by the ruling of the panel or appellate body. For 
this reason, a new rule must be included in order to ensure that third 
party developing countries can obtain access to all the papers and 
information, as well as have the right to play a part in the whole 
process. This would make a real contribution towards developing the 
ability and skills of the lawyers and government representatives of 
developing countries. 
The appeal process, where the WTO jurisprudence and practices can 
be seen to evolve, is the most important part of the dispute process. 638 
It is also believed that the use of the appellate process is vital for the 
legitimacy of the DSM, which has been invoked by both developed and 
developing members. 639 It is argued in this respect that developing 
countries which have utilized their third party rights in the appellate 
review have gained significant experience in the operation of the AB. 
Among these frequent users are India and Brazil. It is believed that 
third party rights represent a key solution to improving developing 
countries' experience of the dispute settlement system. 
5.4.1 The examples of Jamaica and Chile 
GATT was established mostly by developed countries, with little if any 
involvement by their developing counterparts. The international trade 
638 This has been dealt with throughout chapter four. 
639 For example, India and Brazil are larger developing countries which invoke the AB 
more frequently than others. 
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arena witnessed another major reform during the Uruguay Round, in 
which developing countries did not express their views and 
development needs adequately. This applies to the issues negotiated 
which favoured larger members with few concessions for smaller 
members (such as the TRIPS and Trade in Services agreements) and 
to negotiations conducted on the DSU which came into force in 1995 in 
Marrakech. 
This situation changed after the review of the dispute settlement 
understanding agreed between WTO members in 1999. Developing 
countries made considerable contributions to the review process, and 
articulated their views in numerous proposals concerning what they 
want to be reformed in the DSM. Third party participation has played a 
role in this. 
For example, Jamaica, a developing country that had never been a 
principal party before the DSB, but has participated as a third party in 
eight cases, 640 believes that its participation as a third party has 
improved its familiarity with the dispute settlement system. 
Additionally, it has given it a better understanding of the negotiations 
and of the dispute system review, which will enhance the position of 
developing countries in the dispute settlement system . 
641 Apart from 
its own proposal on the reform of the DSU, it was able to consider 
views presented by other members. As a result of being a third party, 
Jamaica was "prepared to work with other participants in developing 
their proposals ", 642 
640For Jamican cases as third parties, see http: //www. wto. orq/enqlish/thewto 
e/countries e/iamaica e. htm, last seen on 12-5-2008 at 12pm. 
641Minutes of meeting, TN/DS/M/5, (27 February 2003), p. 5. 
642Ibid. 
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The representative of Chile, 643 while presenting the Chilean views in a 
special session on the negotiation of the DSU conducted by the WTO, 
The representative of Chile, 644 while presenting the Chilean views in a 
special session on the negotiation of the DSU conducted by the WTO, 
in order to strengthen its position in the special meeting on the review 
of the DSM and to add value to its argument, stated in his introduction 
that "Chile was not a frequent user of the dispute settlement 
mechanism, although in the past year it had become more involved as 
a third party and, on several occasions, it had provided its views on 
procedural issues. "645In this particular meeting, Chile presented its 
views on certain aspects of the EU proposals and argued in favour of 
an increase in the number of appellate body members to operate on a 
full-time basis. 646 
5.4.2 Gaining access to disputants' submissions 
(enhancing internal transparency) 
Third parties will benefit from receiving information related to a 
dispute (such as the parties' submissions to the panel) and also from 
being heard by the panel and disputing members. 647 Hence, the 
present situation is unlike that in national legal systems. There, the 
public are allowed to attend court hearings and all the information and 
submissions made by the parties are in the public domain, unless such 
643Chile was a third party in 18 cases; for more details, see 
http: //www. wto. orq/enqlish/thewto e/countries e/chile e. htm, last seen on 23-0-6- 
2008 at 9: 13pm. 
644Chile has also effectively participated in the discussion on the reform of third party 
rights, in Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/4,6 November 2002, p. 3. 
645 Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/1, (12 June 2002), p. 5. 
646 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
647 Website, htt www. wto. or wto en lish trato e dis ue dis settlement 
cbt e/c6s3p2 e. htm, last seen on 2-05-2005 at 10am., Andreas F. Lowenfeld, 
International Economic Law: International Economic Law Serious, (Oxford University 
Press, Second Edition, 2008), p. 176. 
lO? 
data is subject to the law of confidentiality, which restricts certain 
special data presented by the parties from being published. 
Confidentiality laws are subject to the power of the courts, whose 
decisions are published and are available both to the parties and to the 
public once the final ruling is issued. 648 
Other international tribunals - for instance, the International Court of 
Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the 
European Court of Human Rights - do, in fact, apply an open access 
policy that allows the public, not just members, to attend the dispute 
settlement process. However, this is regrettably not the practice 
applied in the WTO dispute settlement system. 
649 In this, only the 
affected parties and third parties have the right to attend the panel 
and AB hearings, and to receive parties' submission or make their own 
submissions. As a result, WTO members who participate as parties or 
third parties in a dispute before the DSM have the exclusive 
opportunity to observe directly the working of the system. 650 
Therefore, third party status derives its importance from being the 
only formal method to gain access to the WTO settlement system for 
those who do not wish to appear as principal parties. This will allow 
such members to have an actual insight into the operation of the 
DSM. 651 One reason would be to achieve a prompt settlement of 
disputes between parties, as Maki Tanakan argues: 
648 Donald McRae, note 560, pp. 10-11. 
649 Communication from the European Communities, TN/DS/W/1, (13 March 2002), 
p. 6. 
650 James Bacchus, 'Shining light on WTO dispute settlement system', (2004), 
available online at http: //www worldtradelaw. net/articles/bacchusopendoors. pdf, last 
seen on 13-03-2007 at 5pm, p. 3., Gary P. Sampson, Trade, Environment and the 
WTO: the Post Seattle Agenda, (Johns Hopkins University Pres, Washington, 2000), 
pp. 116-117. 
651 Donald McRae, note 560, p. 11., also David A. Deese, World Trade Politics: Power, 
Principles, and Leadrships, (Routledge, London, 2008), p. 175. 
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"The WTO Members crafted the DSU and the Working 
Procedures to maintain a subtle balance between efficient 
dispute settlement and multilateral policy articulation. The 
DSU and the Working Procedures greatly emphasize 
confidentiality so as to facilitate extensive discussion about 
sensitive matters between parties to the dispute, while 
allowing broad participation of third parties in dispute 
settlement proceedings by using 'substantial interests' as a 
"652 qualification without more articulation. 
Since the arguments of the parties and third parties presented in their 
submissions may affect the rulings in WTO dispute settlements, they 
constitute important information for other members. This is 
particularly so for those which might turn to the dispute settlement 
procedure in a related case. 
653 
More telling still, it is believed that restricting access to the WTO 
disputes system process for parties and third parties is vital to 
accomplishing one of main objectives of the DSU: to secure a positive 
solution. As stated in Article 3.7 of the DSU, "the aim of the dispute 
settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute". It 
is also the case that the theory behind the confidentially of the 
consultation could be applied to the panel and AB processes, under 
which a significant number of disputes are resolved. 654 WTO members 
are also forbidden to attend the dispute process until the adoption of 
the final report of the panel or the AB. 655 
652 Maki Tanakan, note 609, p. 149. 
653 Proposal by Japan, note 596, p. 4. 
654 Communication from the European Communities, TN/DS/W/1, (13 March 2002), 
p. 6. 
655 There is a debate in this respect, in which India has opposed the EU proposal, 
which states that "The EC is in principle of the view that all Member countries, 
independently of whether they are party to the dispute or not, should have right of 
attendance during panel/AB proceedings. There may be, however, a need to develop 
special rules to deal with business confidential information in specific cases" in 
Communication from the European Communities, TN/DS/W/7, (30 May 2002), p. 6. 
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How much access to the process of the dispute settlement ought to be 
opened is subject to debate among WTO Members, mainly between 
developed and developing countries. The EU has proposed that the 
dispute process ought not only to be open to the public without the 
right to intervene, but also to allow access to amici curiae and to set 
guidelines for their intervention. There is also a relevant Japanese 
proposal that all the information presented during any dispute must be 
made available to all WTO members, without their needing to be 
parties or third parties to the dispute, and to the public. 656 
However, developing countries believe that the public should not be 
allowed to attend the hearings. Nor should amici curiae have the right 
to intervene before the DSM. Article 13.1 is clear in respect of the 
latter and is in no need of reform. 657 However, what is more 
interesting in this respect is that some of the major developing 
countries which have been fairly active in using the DSM argue that if 
the reformed DSU is to ensure greater transparency with regard to the 
dispute settlement system (especially internal transparency) there 
needs to be improved rights for third parties. As stated by the 
Malaysian representative in a special session of the review of the DSU, 
"Malaysia would support the idea of enhancing third-party rights, as 
this would be 'true transparency'. "658 Until greater transparency rules 
656 Proposal by Japan, note 596, p. 4. A similar view is held by the US; 
Communication from the United States, Further Contribution of the United States to 
the Improvement of the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO Related to 
Transparency - revised legal 
drafting, TN/DS/W/86, (21 April 2006). 
657 Details of amici curiae are given in chapter eight section 7.4.2. 
658 The Malaysian view is presented in Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/1, (12 June 
2002), p15; India shares the same view, in Minutes of Meeting, 
TN/DS/M/4, (6 
November 2002), p. 3. 
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can be agreed, 659 enhancing the access of third parties to the dispute 
settlement process is a more realistic option and articulates the 
demands of developing countries. 
660 
WTO members which have an interest in an issue raised before the 
DSM could choose to free-ride, benefiting from MFN rules. 
Alternatively, they could choose a more active approach by reserving 
their interest as third parties in a dispute. This would give them 
potential access to the system, and they would benefit from receiving 
the information presented by the parties. They could also make their 
own submissions to the panel or the AB, and obtain a hearing from the 
panel and the disputing members. 661 However, it is argued that third 
parties' rights are restricted and sometimes confusing in ways that 
prohibit them from effectively defending their interests before the 
DSM. These need to be enhanced and clarified to achieve a better 
exercise of such rights. How third party rights can be reformed is the 
subject of later chapters. 
It has been argued by the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu that: 
"The current DSU regime only allows the third party to join 
in at the first substantive review stage. Given that 
resource and monetary constraints often preclude small 
and developing Member countries from making full use of 
659 Jackson argues that there is nothing on the horizon for an immediate solution to 
opening up the WTO dispute settlement system to the public: John H. Jackson, 
Sovereignty, the WO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), pp. 119-121. 
660 As was argued in a special session of the DSU: "A primary objective of Chinese 
Taipei's proposal on transparency was to increase the access of third parties to 
relevant documentation and to increase generally their knowledge about the dispute 
settlement process. She said that Chinese Taipei would take into consideration the 
views expressed by participants when drafting its legal text for the consideration of 
the Special Session. " Minutes of Meeting held in the Centre William Rappard, on 16- 
18 December 2002, TN/DS/M/7, (26 June 2003), p. 6. 
661 Website, http: //www. wto. orq/wto/english/tratop e/dispu e/disp settlement 
cbt e/c6s3p2, last seen on 12-03-2009 at 1: 17 pm. 
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the system, we support a number of the amendments 
proposed by Costa Rica, 662 the EU663 and Jamaica664 to 
enhance third parties' accessibility to information and 
knowledge of the dispute settlement system. At the same 
time, however, we do have certain reservations about 
other proposals... ". 665 
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662 Costa Rica proposal, note 637. 
663 Communication from European Communities, TN/DS/W/1, (13 March 2002). 
664 Communication from Jamaica, TN/DS/W/21, (10 October 2002). 
665 Communication from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen 
and Matsu, TN/DS/W/25, (27 November 2002), pp. 2-3. 
666 Source, Some Ideas by Mexico, note 573, p. 37. 
667 Rule 27 of the Working Procedures of the Appellate Body. 
668 Article 12.3 of the DSU. 
669 Article 4.11 of DSU. 
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5.4.3 The Sugar dispute 
I have chosen to discuss the Sugar . 67' and Cotton680 disputes, since 
they concerned developing countries from sub-Saharan Africa that had 
never participated in the DSM, either as complainants or as 
respondents. These countries made their first appearance as third 
parties and faced difficult issues such as health and social problems. 
They also had small trade volumes, which made it virtually impossible 
for them to use the DSM. In these two cases, smaller developing 
countries decided to have their say about the evolution of WTO 
practices and jurisprudence. 681 
An examination of the economies of developing countries reveals that 
their GDP is likely to come mostly from rural activities. Hence, 
advancing trade talks regarding agriculture would most benefit 
developing countries' integration into the multilateral trading system. 
This is what most developing countries were expecting from the 
Uruguay Round. However, developed countries did not give actual 
concessions on agriculture, and negotiations were slow in this 
respect. 682 In addition to the successful Cotton dispute, the Sugar 
670 Appendix 3.3 of DSU. 
671 Circulation and Derestriction of the WTO documents (WT/L/452) 
672 The USA, the EC and the Advisory Center publish their submissions in their web 
sites. Australia, Canada and New Zealand may provide them upon request. 
673 Article 12.6 and Appendix 3.6 of the DSU. 
674 Articles 12.7,15 and Appendix 3 of the DSU. 
675 Articles 21.3 (c), 22.6,25 of the DSU. 
676 Rules 21,22 and 28 of the Working Procedures of the Appellate Body. 
677 Article 10.3 of DSU. 
678 Article 4.11 of the DSU. 
679 EC Sugar, note 566. 
680 US Cotton, note 610. 
681 ICOH online document, note 594, p. 3., Michael S. Matsebula, note 594, pp. 83-84. 
682 For more details, see Kevin Watkins, 'WTO Negotiations on Agriculture: Problems 
and Ways Ahead', Background Briefing Paper for Session 1, (2004), Online at 
http: //www 120 org/publications Phase%20II/Ag%2OSubsidies/Background%2OPape 
rs/G20 Oxford Watkins. gdf., last seen on 03-02-2009 at 1: 12 pm. 
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dispute was another victory in respect of developing countries and 
agricultural issues. In the first case, it was ruled that the direct cotton 
subsidies applied by the US were inconsistent with WTO rules, and that 
the indirect sugar subsidies applied by the EU were in breach of its 
own rules. 683 In the Cotton dispute, the third parties were on the side 
of the complainant (Brazil) which won the case, whereas in Sugar they 
supported the respondent (EU) which lost. The perspective will also be 
different, addressing the argument that developing countries gain 
experience from acting as third parties. 
In the Sugar case, which came before the DSM in 2002, the EU sugar 
regime was challenged by Australia, Brazil and Thailand. The 
complainants claimed that EU sugar was highly subsided in a way that 
considerably depressed market prices and the incomes of other sugar 
exporters. The EU - Sugar dispute is an example of where developing 
countries have participated as third parties and have made effective 
use of the DSU. Australia, Brazil and Thailand brought a dispute 
against the EU regarding its sugar regime. In this case, fourteen 
developing countries participated as third parties and presented their 
arguments. Seven were from Africa (Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland and Tanzania), six were 
from the Caribbean (Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad & 
Tobago and St. Kitts & Nevis) and one (Fiji) was from the Pacific. 684 
683 For comparative analysis of the cases, see Stephen J. Powell and Andrew 
Schmitz, 'The Cotton and Sugar Subsidies Decisions: WTO's Dispute Settlement 
System Rebalances the Agreement on Agriculture', (2005), available online at 
http: //www. ufl. edu/centers/itl/pdf/rp001. pdf, last seen on 10-6-2006 at 9pm. 
For more detail on the effect of the EU sugar regime, see Oxfam, Dumping on the 
world: How EU sugar policies hurt poor countries, Oxfam Briefing Paper. March 2004; 
CIDSE-APRODEV Position paper, Reform of the Sugar Regime in the European Union: 
Policy Recommendations from a development perspective, April 2005. 
684ICOH online document, note 594, p. 5. 
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The Sugar dispute set a record for the number of third parties 
participating in a single dispute, which was previously held by the 
Banana case. Third parties in the Sugar dispute were the fourteen ACP 
members plus India, China, the USA, Cuba, Canada, Colombia, 
Paraguay and New Zealand. With the four protagonists, this made 26 
WTO members in total. In addition, this dispute was very important in 
two respects: the operation and jurisprudence of the DSU, and the 
process of the upcoming trade talks. 685 
In an ideal world, developing countries would have wished for the 
ruling to be in favour of the EU. This would have protected their 
preferential access to the EU market from any negative consequences 
that might result from a ruling against its regime. They would also 
have wished for the main reason to be given as the protection of their 
preferential access. In general, it is important for developing countries 
to submit their special circumstances and development needs to the 
panel for consideration in its report, and to create a precedent for 
future disputes that may be brought on similar grounds. This is 
especially the case for African third parties, which are widely absent 
from the process and which therefore miss the chance to have their 
development requirements taken into account in the evolution of the 
WTO Rules. 686 
It is also worth mentioning that although the above-mentioned wish 
was not met, the panel did consider the wider needs of developing 
countries. It found that for the EU to subsidize sugar and re-export 
Indian or ACP sugar was illegal. This was viewed by many observers to 




countries. 687 The panel also took into account the interests of 
developing countries which had reserved third party rights, by ruling 
that any reform which took place ought not to harm them. 688 However, 
since the panel provided no guidelines, it is argued that this was 
undermined by the fact that it remained unclear how such a ruling 
could be implemented. 689 
The experience that ACP countries have gained from their participation 
as third parties is invaluable. They have learned how to pool their 
resources, and to speak with one voice by electing a minister from 
Mauritius to represent them in the hearing. They have asked for their 
third party rights to be extended in order to be more effective in the 
second meeting and the drafting of the panel decision. Within their 
restricted access to the first meeting of the panel, ACP countries have 
also actively engaged in technical arguments to protect their 
development interests, which is the main objective of the WTO. 
Additionally, they have made it very clear that their economies and the 
687 For example, Oxfam, Dumping on the world: how EU Sugar Policies hurt poor 
countries, No 61, April 2004; Also, Oxfam, the Great EU Sugar Scam, how the 
Europe's Sugar regime devastating livelihood in the developing World, No. 27; and 
Kevin Watkins, 'WTO Negotiations on Agriculture: Problems and Ways Ahead', 
Background Briefing Paper for Session 1, (2004), available online at 
http: //www. 120. orq/publications/Phase%20II/Ag%2OSubsidies/Background%20Pape 
rs/G20. Oxford. Watkins. pdf, last seen on 3-04-2008 at 11am. 
688 "In this regard, the Panel notes the recent statement of the European 
Communities on 14 July 2004 that the European Communities 'fully stands by its 
commitments to ACP countries and India' and that with the reform of its sugar 
regime, the ACP countries and India will 'get a clear perspective, keep their import 
preferences and retain an attractive export market. "' In EC Sugar, compliant by 
Brazil, panel report, note 566, para 8.8; see also paras. 8.5-8.6-8.7. 
689 Obale Offah Ako, "the Liberalization of Trade in Agricultural Products Between ACP 
Countries and the European Community Under the WTO Regime', Research 
Dissertation of Cape Town University, (2005), available online at 
http"//lawspace law. uct. ac. za: 8080/dspace/bitstream/2165/100/1/ObaleO+2005. pdf 
, 
last seen on 3-6-2008 at 8pm, p. 59. 
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welfare of their peoples are at stake, 690 by referring to the Banana 
dispute with regard to the negative consequences it had on the 
economy of Dominica, a Caribbean island. 
691 
The least developed members from Africa, which participated for the 
first time in the DSM, have provided a greater insight into the 
operation and functioning of this body. In this, they have followed 
larger developing countries like Brazil and India, in that they have 
increased their confidence in the system by increasing their 
involvement. This is an effective way for developing countries to 
familiarize themselves with the dispute settlement system until they 
are effectively integrated into the multilateral trading system. 692 
Apart from gaining experiences from their own efforts in preparing and 
presenting their case, the Sugar dispute693 witnessed a desirable form 
of collaboration between developing countries and their developed 
counterparts. There was a consultation between the EC and ACP 
members regarding the most appropriate method of preparing and 
presenting their legal arguments before the panel and the AB. The ACP 
countries also received legal advice from a private lawyer funded by 
the EC under the Cotonou Agreement Assistance Programme. There is 
no doubt that this collaboration has enhanced their experience of the 
DSM. 694 The pattern of support which was found in the Ec - Sugar and 
Banana695 disputes is a desirable issue that would certainly benefit 
developing countries which are third parties to a dispute, and will 
690 "Raise the standard of living, provide full employment and a high and ever 
increasing level of real income... " ICOH online document, note 594, p. 6. 
691 ICOH online document, note 594., pp. 6-7. 
692 Ibid. 
693 EC Sugar, note 566. 
694 Calvin Manduna, note 598, pp. 8-9. 
695 EC Banana III, note 564. 
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enhance their familiarisation with the multilateral trading system. It is 
certainly advantageous that these improvements should be seen in the 
future, regardless of the existence of an agreement or convention to 
grant such support. 
Despite the fact that the efforts of the ACP countries were not enough 
to win the case, "useful lessons were learned through the spirited, 
multi-pronged strategy adopted by the ACP sugar producers to defend 
their interests in this dispute". 696 However, the access to disputes as 
third parties, as well as to the dispute data, is rather restricted and in 
need of reform. Such access would allow better functioning and insight 
for third parties in the course of disputes, but would not affect the 
rights of the principal parties. 
5.5 Cost Effectiveness 
5.5.1 Financial costs 
It is argued by Mataitoga that '"capacity development in the area of 
international trade law, international economic and public international 
law must now be a priority area for all developing country Members of 
the WTO, if they are to have a fighting chance of protecting their rights 
under the multilateral trading system". 697 
Therefore, one of the main reasons for the use of third party rights 
(rather than being a party in the WTO dispute settlement system) is 
that although "third parties enjoy significantly less rights than parties", 
696 Calvin Manduna, note 598, pp. 8-9. 
697 Isikeli Mataitoga, 'The World Trade Organisation [WTO] Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism: a Developing Dountry Perpspective', available online at 
http: //documents. ag. gov. fj/wtoDisputeResolution-mataitoga. pdf, last seen 5-01- 
2007 at 5pm, p. 11. 
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698 the financial cost of being a third party is significantly lower. Thus, 
WTO members which reserve third party rights before the DSM will 
have their say on the disputed issues. This will gain them access and 
improve their familiarity with the system, but at reduced costs in time 
and money. 699 
The Advisory Centre on WTO law provides support and legal advice for 
developing countries which share an interest in certain disputes. 
Because WTO decision-making is not really effective, each case 
brought to the DSM is important for the interpretation of WTO law. 
Hence, just as their developed counterparts use all their formal 
resources to register their interests as third parties (so that, for 
example, EC countries pool their resources over trade issues through 
the European Commission) so developing countries can improve their 
participation as third parties by "pooling their legal support from the 
Advisory Centre, although in a less formal way. By preparing joint 
third party submissions, the Advisory Centre could place the dispute 
settlement panels and the AB on notice of the views of developing 
countries in individual cases. 11700 
698 Stewart and Karpel, 'Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)', 
(2000), 31 Law and Policy in International Business 593, available at 
http: //www. law. georgetown. edu/iournals/lpib/symp00/documents/stewart. pdf, last 
seen on 12-11-05, at 11 am. 
699 Stewart and Karpel, note 698, and Christina L. Davis, "Do the WTO Rules Create a 
Level Playing Field: Lessons form the Experience of Peru and Vietnam", in John S. 
Odell, Negotiating Trade: Developing Countries in the WTO and NAFT, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), p. 225. This was exactly what Brazil did when it wanted to 
reduce the cost of making its case to the DSM, according to Shaffert, Ratton Sanchez 
and Rosenberg, 'The Trials of Winning at the WTO: What Lies Behind Brazil's 
Success', (2008), 41 Cornell International Law Journal 384, pp. 469-740. 
700 Gregory Shaffer, note 588, p. 50. 
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Developing countries have smaller economies than developed ones, so 
bringing a dispute as a main respondent could damage such an 
economy. An illustration would be as the one discussed above with 
regard to the implementation of the ruling of the panel and AB. This 
could have a disastrous effect on a developing economy. Nevertheless, 
developing countries ought to be practical and take advantage of any 
opportunity to participate in the DSU. This could be done by 
participating as third parties whenever their interests might be 
affected by a dispute. 701 
5.5.2 Political costs 
Considering the process of the dispute settlement under the DSU, 
developing countries will pay the highest political and economic cost if 
they attempt to use the implementation tools provided by the DSU to 
enforce the final decisions that are approved by the DSM, especially 
against larger members. 702 However, as third parties are not part of 
the enforcement process, they cannot obtain compensation or request 
retaliation against the respondent if found guilty. 703 As a result, being 
a third party would remove the political and economic risks that might 
threaten developing countries in the implementation process. 
The concern about the power imbalances between developed and 
developing countries, which handicap the latter in bringing their cases 
to the DSM and stifle the creation of better opportunities for third 
parties, is clearly argued during the negotiation on the reform of the 
DSU. 
701 ICOH online document, note 594, p. 6. 
702 Details are given in chapter three section 3.3. 
703 Gavin Goh and Trudy Witbreuk, note 604, pp. 5-6. 
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"Furthermore, developing countries register their interest in 
cases by participating as third parties. In other words, 
account has to be taken of the free-riding within the 
system. Developing countries might not initiate cases also 
because of trade reasons. They might not feel comfortable 
in bringing cases to the system because of fear that this 
might in some way affect bilateral relations. "704 
In addition, although third parties do not have the right to participate 
in arbitration705 concerning enforcement matters, they will benefit from 
gaining access to the panel which examines the enforcement process. 
They will be able to decide whether such a dispute is important for 
them or not, and can bring their own dispute later if they believe that 
this is worth doing. 706 
In fact, it is believed that third party status would particularly benefit 
those with no experience of the WTO dispute settlement system and 
those who are unable to stretch their budgets. This is the case for the 
bulk of developing countries. Third party status would allow them to 
build up their legal capacity, while paying less than they would as full 
parties: 
"However, a third party does not need to spend effort in 
bringing a complaint to a panel and can attend the first 
meeting of the panel where it can present its own views. It 
will enjoy the benefits of a successful result for the plaintiff 
on an MFN basis. So for a new WTO member being a third 
party means gaining experience, while spending relatively 
little, and coming to integrate oneself into the system. 11707 
704 Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/14, (20 April 2004), p. 7. 
705 Third parties attempts to intervene in the compliance Arbitration process will 
be 
dealt with in chapter eight section 8.4.1. 
706 Gavin Goh and Trudy Witbreuk, note 604, p. 5. 
707 Jin Gu, 'China and the WTO Dispute Settlement Three Years On', (2005), available 
online at http: //www. nottinqham. ac. uk/iaps/GuJinq%20paper. pdf, 
last seen on 25- 
10-2007 at 5pm, p. 27. 
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An example of a WTO member that is aware of the reduction in cost 
achieved by participating as a third party is China. This is the most 
populous developing country, if not the most powerful. China has 
recently joined the WTO and has little experience of its dispute 
settlement system. It has been a third party in 60 cases since its entry 
in 2002 and finds that third party status is a less expensive and less 
challenging way of using the dispute settlement system. In fact, China 
was a third party in the Sugar dispute708. Here, it presented the 
damage to its sugar industry as a result of the EU sugar regime as 
having led to a 35% reduction in Chinese sugar prices. More recently it 
presented its argument in the case of US measures against Korean 
semiconductors. 709 
As far as self-confidence is concerned, having no experience of WTO 
law and little training in the dispute settlement system will hinder the 
position of developing countries during the meetings of the panel and 
the AB. They need to have high self-confidence in arguing their case 
during the course of litigation. Being a third party helps in improving 
this. China, although the largest developing country, is also fearful of 
any damage to its trade relations with other large WTO members like 
the US or the EU, as a result of disputes against them before the DSM. 
So it prefers to make indirect challenges through the exercise of its 
third party rights. This is even more of an issue for small and medium- 
sized developing countries. Being a third party "involves less financial 
expenditure and requires less legal skill than acting directly as a 
complainant". 710 However, one ought to remember that third parties 
face the risk that their concerns may not be fully considered by the 
708 EC Sugar, note 566. 
709 Jin Gu, note 707, p. 28. 
710 Ibid., pp. 29-30., Julia Ya Qin, 'Chain, Indian, and the 
Law of the World Trade 
Organisation', (2008), 3(1) Asian Journal of Comparative Law 1, p. 26. 
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panel or the AB, 711 and that their participation has been described by 
some as 'minimal usage'. 712 This issue is on the reform agenda and will 
be dealt with in more detail in Chapters six, seven and eight. 
5.4.3 Joint responsibilities 
Third parties, by their nature, do not exist unless there is an actual 
dispute involving a complainant and respondent, to one of which they 
can add their support. This leads to a dispute of a multilateral nature. 
Hence, third parties will have the advantage of sharing the 
responsibilities of the dispute with the party they choose to support: 
the complainant or the respondent. The third party benefits from "this 
amendment would allow several developing countries713 to collaborate 
and unify their resources, experiences and legal expertise to give them 
a just opportunity to present their cases adequately and to minimize 
their costs". 714 Evidence of this has been seen in the EC - Sugar715 and 
Banana disputes716, in which the EC supported ACP countries acting as 
third parties. 
5.6 Multilateral Flavour 
The two world wars resulted in the introduction of borders between 
states and the application of the protectionist approach all over the 
world. This has had a negative consequence on the world economy. As 
711 Jin Gu, note 707, p. 29-30. 
712 Adam Gross, note 616. 
713 Certain developing countries in East Asia, because of their character, would prefer 
to participate indirectly in the DSM, "Yet it is remarkable that Japan, despite its huge 
power and experience, chooses so often to come in as a third party. Hence, one 
might suppose that the character of East Asian countries is to become engaged in 
the DSS in this more indirect way. " Jin Gu, note 707, p-27- 
714 More detail in Tamer Nagy Mahmoud, 'The WTO Dispute Settlement System: an 
International Perspective', (2001), available online at http: //www. sit-edu- 
qeneva. ch/Tam. wto. htm, last seen on 6-02-2007 at 10am. 
715 EC Sugar, note 566. 
716 EC Banana III, note 564. 
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a result, GATT was established to build a new multilateral trading 
system. 
Originally, the GATT dispute mechanism was mainly the plaything of 
developed countries. Now, however, under the WTO, it is considered 
that the involvement of developing countries is vital for the survival of 
the multilateral trading system. 717 Therefore, one could argue that 
third party participation will lead to trade disputes that have a 
multilateral flavour. Third parties will give panels and the AB a wider 
viewpoint from which to make to their final decisions, as well as 
covering the wider interests of WTO members in both developed and 
developing countries. In turn, this will strengthen the multilateral 
trading system718 and so boost the legitimacy of the dispute 
settlement system. 719 
The fact that most international cases result in multilateral 
consequences that affect the interests of third parties must also be 
considered. Indeed, just like other international cases, the 
international trade disputes dealt with in the WTO have multilateral 
consequences, which often require the intervention of a third party to 
protect its substantial interest. 720 Jordan has argued that "effective 
participation of third parties would enrich the dispute settlement 
process by allowing parties to a dispute, and Members with interests in 
717 James Smith, 'Inequality in international trade? Developing countries and 
institutional change in WTO dispute settlement', (2004), 11(3) Review of 
International Political Economy 542, pp. 542-543. 
718 Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, note 581, p. 1. 
719 Katrin Arend, 'Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the settlement 
of disputes (DSU): Article 10', in Riidiger Wolfrum Peter-Tobias Stoll and Karen 
Kaiser, WTO Institutions and Dispute Settlement, (Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), p. 374. 
720 Communication from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen 
and Matsu, note 665, p. 2. 
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the outcome of a 
proceedings" . 
721 
certain dispute, to fully participate in the 
Nevertheless, a dispute is mainly about the principal parties, i. e. those 
who have the major rights and duties throughout the dispute process. 
It is also relevant that, unlike domestic courts, the DSM is not about 
strict enforcement of rulings. It is used as a tool to tell the disputing 
parties what is or is not consistent with WTO law. Hence, the DSU 
provides parties only with control over the dispute process and the 
panel or AB report until it is finally adopted by the DSB. However, 
admitting that the parties should have the main control of the dispute 
settlement process ought not to undermine the multilateral spirit of 
the international trade dispute mechanism. Therefore, third parties are 
not only vital, but their role also needs to be enhanced, albeit not in a 
way that would be identical to (or go beyond) the rights of principal 
parties. 722 The DSM has developed to be of a truly multilateral 
nature. 723 This would abolish any fear that multilateralism will weaken 
the system, contrary to those who believe that the DSM will crumple 
as a result of increasing intervention by third parties. 724 Additionally, in 
cases where there are multiple complainants, disputing members 
"could demonstrate wide support for their causes and possibly attract 
the attention of the public as well". 725 
721 Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/8, (30 June 2003), pp. 4-5. 
722 Minutes of meeting, TN/DS/M/7, (26 June 2003), p. 16. 
723 The majority of disputes involve more that two parties; see WTO. org 
for details of 
cases. 
724 Chi Carmody, 'Of Substantial Interest: Third Parties Under GATT', (1997), 18 
Michigan Journal of International Law 615, p. 615, Muhammad 
Ijaz Latif, 'The WTO 
Dispute Settlement System: Analyses and Implication for Pakistan', (2007), 42 
Journal of Asian and African Studies 447, p. 455- 
725 Tamer Nagy Mahmoud, note 714. 
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5.6.1 Shared responsibilities 
There are certain types of international issue that require a global 
effort so as to overcome the problem, and which cannot be resolved 
by the efforts of a single country. An example of such an issue was 
provided by Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, which 
participated as third parties in the EC tariff preference dispute. This 
dealt with drug trafficking and related crimes. Drug trafficking in this 
instance cannot be solved by the EC on its own. It is a worldwide 
problem which requires the efforts of the international community as a 
whole to apply the appropriate principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations and international law. 
Drug trafficking, in other words, requires multilateral collaboration in 
order to fight against it. Third parties, both developed and developing, 
can help by adding a multilateral dimension to a global problem in a 
globalised world. It has been argued that, "the multinational dimension 
of drug trafficking is such that it does not lie within the power of any of 
the world's countries single-handedly to eliminate this threat. In the 
fight against drugs, every State should have a task to accomplish that 
is commensurate with its own circumstances and capacities. "726 
5.7 Access to Justice 
Interesting work has been done by Asif Qureshi on the participation of 
developing countries in the dispute settlement system. While arguing 
that they face difficulties in gaining access to the DSM for several 
reasons, such as a lack of legal and financial resources, enforcement 
and procedural inequities, he also states that participating in the DSM 
726 EC - Tariff Preferences, panel report, annex 
A, note 575. 
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is vital for their future in the global trading arena. Furthermore, he 
holds that equality in the WTO ought to be restored by improving 
developing countries' access to justice. Qureshi suggests that 
enhancing third party rights has a role to play in this. 7z' He argues 
that: 
"procedural justice relates to fairness in terms of 
participation in the dispute settlement system at all levels 
and forms, including particularly the consultation, Panel, 
and Appellate processes. This involves, for example, the 
need to sanitize the consultation process from possible 
external linkages; the need to strengthen third party 
rights; being able to join as a co-respondent; and 
generally ensuring that all parties have similar rights of 
participation. "728 
This argument is based on the fact that many developing countries 
have gained access to WTO justice for the first time by participating as 
third parties. For example, El Salvador and Nigeria first accessed the 
system as third parties in the Shrimp dispute729, while Nigeria took this 
further by intervening in the appellate process. 730 As of November 
2008, the EU and the US have more balanced records. The EU has 
been a complainant in 76 cases, a respondent in 56 and a third party 
in 76 cases. The US has been a complainant in 85 cases, a respondent 
in 97 and a third party in 67 cases . 
731 All of the statutes applicable 
under the DSM have been invoked frequently by both countries. 
727 Asif H. Qureshi, 'Participation of Developing Countries in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System', (2003), 47(2) Journal of African Law 174. 
728 Ibid., p. 194. 
729 US Shrimp, note 603. 
730 Maki Tanakan, note 609, p. 155. 
731 It is worth noting that Japan is slightly different from the EU and the US in that it 
has participated most often as a third party. This can be explained by the far-eastern 
culture of indirect confrontation and has nothing to do with the procedural inequality 
and power imbalance facing developing countries in the DSM. 
212 
The involvement of developing countries in the system tells a different 
story. From a regional point of view, Sub-Saharan African members 
have never sought access to the dispute settlement system as 
complainants or respondents, but they have done so as third parties. 
In addition to Nigeria who was a third party in the Shrimp dispute 732 1 
ACP countries were third parties in the Banana 733and Sugar 
734cases. 735 There is no doubt that these disputes were fundamental 
for the development of WTO jurisprudence. Many Latin American and 
Caribbean countries have also accessed the system only as third 
parties, examples being Surinam, St. Lucia, St Vincent, Barbados and 
Jamaica. In Asia, most of the developing countries have been third 
parties far more frequently than principal participants. For example, 
India has been the complainant in 14 cases, the respondent in 17 and 
a third party in 48 others, while Thailand has been a complainant in 14 
cases, a respondent in one and a third party in 34 instances. Finally, 
China has been a complainant in one case, a respondent in six and a 
third party in 60. 
Developing countries thus tend to use third party status more than 
their developed counterparts, which have no problem with their access 
to the system. Indeed, some developing and less developed countries 
have only ever accessed the WTO dispute settlement system as third 
parties, because of the inequity and power imbalance in the 
multilateral trading system. Table 5 shows that developing countries 
have used the system in the main as third parties. 
732 US Shrimp, note 603. 
733 EC Sugar, note 566. 
734 EC Banana III, note 564. 
735 ICOH online document, note 594, p. 2. 
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Table 5: 736 Developing countries' third-party participation 
Member As Third Party As Complainant As Respondent 
Antigua & Barbuda - 1 - 
Argentina 20 14 16 
Bangladesh 1 1 - 
Barbados 4 - - 
Belize 4 - - 
Benin 1 - - 
Bolivia 1 - - 
Brazil 49 23 14 
Cameroon 1 - - 
Chad 1 - - 
Chile 21 10 12 
China 62 2 10 
Colombia 15 5 3 
Costa Rica 9 4 - 
Cöte d'Ivoire 4 - - 
Cuba 13 - - 
Dominica 3 - - 
Dominican Republic 3 - 3 
Ecuador 9 3 3 
Egypt 4 - 4 
El Salvador 9 - - 
Fiji 3 - - 
Ghana 1 - - 
Grenada 1 - - 
Guatemala 11 6 2 
Guyana 3 - - 
Honduras 12 6 - 
India 51 17 19 
Indonesia 4 4 4 
Jamaica 8 - - 
Kenya 3 - - 
Madagascar 4 - - 
Malawi 3 - 
Malaysia 2 1 1 
736 Source: www. wto. org 
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Mauritius 5 - - 
Mexico 45 17 14 
Nicaragua 6 1 2 
Nigeria 1 - - 
Pakistan 8 3 2 
Panama 2 5 1 
Paraguay 15 - - 
Pe ru 8 2 4 
Philippines 5 5 4 
St. Kitts and Nevis 3 - - 
St. Lucia 3 - - 
St. Vincent 1 - - 
Senegal 2 - - 
Singapore 4 1 - 
Sri Lanka 3 1 - 
Suriname 1 - - 
Swaziland 3 - - 
Chinese Taipei 37 2 - 
Tanzania 3 - - 
Thailand 37 12 3 
Trinidad and Tobago 3 - 2 
Turkey 18 2 8 
Uruguay 5 1 1 
Venezuela 15 1 2 
Vietnam 2 - - 
Zimbabwe 1 - - 
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5.8 Concluding remarks 
As the world trading system becomes ever more globalised, this will 
lead to more disputes of a multinational kind. Consequently, third 
parties' interests will most certainly be affected. Third party status is 
granted at the consultation stage to members with substantial trade 
interests, and at the panel and appellate stages to members with 
substantial interests. 737 If the interest is of special importance, third 
parties' rights can be extended. This raises the question of whether all 
these peculiarities are for the good. 
Third party participation is clearly vital for access to justice by 
developing and less developed countries since (unlike principal party 
status which has not been used by a great number of poorer 
countries) it has been invoked by both. Developing countries, by 
acting as third parties, are able to bring their views to the table. They 
can, as a result, make their views known to the public at reduced 
financial and political cost in comparison with participation as principal 
parties. 
The involvement of third parties adds a multilateral flavour to a 
dispute, enabling the AB and panels to make their rulings in a way 
which will protect the multilateral trading system. There is also a set of 
shared responsibilities which require an effort from all members of the 
international community, developed and developing. However, 
disputes that are brought before the DSM are more multilateral than 
the procedures provided under the DSU, and the function of third party 
rights does not always meet their expectations. 
737 This has been dealt with in section 5.2. 
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Developing countries argue that third party rights are restricted, 
unclear and confusing, and that they ought to be reformed to protect 
developing countries' rights properly within the DSM. Many views have 
been put forward with regard to the reform of third party rights. These 
issues need to be examined, and proposals evaluated, in order to find 
the right balance in reforming third party rights without adversely 
affecting the rights of the main disputing parties. 
There are a number of advantages for developing countries in being 
third parties. However, this status also carries a number of 
disadvantages, without which third parties would function better for 
the good of the multilateral trading system and the developing world's 
integration in it. Thus, the next chapter deals with how third party 
rights and participation in consultation could be reformed in the 
interests of the members of developing countries. 
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-6- 
Informal Third Parties: the Consultation 
Dilemma, Finding New Trends 
6.1 Introduction 
There are several political and legal means for the peaceful settlement 
of international economic disputes. 738 The Hague Convention for the 
Pacific Settlement of Disputes has identified ten methods to settle such 
disputes: bilateral or multilateral negotiations, good offices, mediation, 
inquiries, conciliation, ad hoc or institutionalized arbitration, judicial 
settlement by permanent courts, "resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements", "other peaceful means of their own choice" and 
dispute settlement by the UN Security Council (e. g. pursuant to 
Articles 34-38 of the UN Charter). This includes other UN organs or 
other international organizations. A mixture of these political and legal 
processes of peaceful dispute settlement is recognized and organized 
by existing international institutes such as the UN and the WTO. 
739 
The WTO dispute settlement understanding encompasses all the main 
means of peaceful dispute settlement recognized by public 
international law. These include bilateral and multilateral consultations, 
good offices, conciliation, mediation, panel and appellate review 
procedures and arbitration. More interestingly, however, Petersmann 
notes that the WTO dispute settlement process has become truly 
738 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, "Justice as Conflict Resolution: Proliferation, 
Fragmentation, and Decentralization of Dispute Settlement in International Trade', 




multilateral. He argues that, unlike the narrow application of Articles 
62 and 63 by the World Court, the GATT and WTO adjudication 
systems are "characterized by frequent participation of third parties in 
consultations, panel proceedings, and appellate review as a means of 
avoiding conflict and preventing separate, additional disputes". In 
addition, such rights are being used at the very beginning of the 
dispute process (at the consultation stage, according to Article 4.11 of 
the DSU). This allows members who have substantial trade interests to 
join the consultation. 740 
Consultation is indeed an important stage of the WTO dispute 
settlement system. In fact, the first real dispute brought to the DSM, 
having been inherited from the GATT adjudication system, was settled 
quickly in consultation. This was the Malaysia - Prohibition of Imports 
of Polyethylene and Polypropylene dispute74' between Singapore as 
complainant and Malaysia as respondent. Consultation is also 
important in case of the escalation of a dispute, so that the parties can 
agree on the terms of reference which are to serve as guidelines for 
the panel and the AB during the course of the dispute. 
In this chapter, the arguments and analyses of earlier chapters will be 
built on. This will be done by examining how the problem of developing 
countries is relevant when considering the reform of third party 
provisions in consultation. In addition to the importance of third party 
status for developing countries discussed above, there are specific 
issues related to intervention at the consultation stage by developing 
countries. The proposals of the member states and academics have 
740 Ibid., p. 302- 
741 Malaysia - Prohibition of Imports of Polyethylene, request 
for consultations under 
Article XXIII. 1 of the GATT 1994 by Singapore, WT/DS1/1, settled on 13 January 
1995. [hereinafter Malaysia Polyethylene] 
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varied. We shall consider how third party intervention in consultation 
could be reformed to better serve the interests of the smaller and less 
developed countries. 
Some have expressed concerns that enhancing third party 
participation in consultation would undermine the process of early 
settlement. However, this is not the case for developing countries. 
Many developing countries have no experience of the WTO dispute 
mechanism, and have extremely restricted legal and financial 
resources. Some cannot identify the existence of the inconsistent 
measures that affect their interest, and many (in cases where they 
wish to initiate a formal dispute) fear the political and economic 
strength of their larger and more developed counterparts. They are 
also apprehensive about the arbitrary discrimination that takes place 
against the participation of third parties in the consultation stage as a 
result of discretionary powers granted to the disputing parties under 
Article 4.11 of the DSU. 
The next section will examine the function of the consultation process 
and what has been proposed so far. Next, the arguments will be 
considered in favour of the claim that third parties undermine early 
settlement. Then, the effectiveness of the conduct of the consultation 
process will be dealt with. After that the question of unfair settlement 
and third parties will be dissected, as will the role of the third party in 
encouraging the fact-finding process at the consultation stage. Finally, 
the proposed reform of third party provisions in consultation will be 
analysed and conclusions drawn. 
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6.2 The Consultative Process 
The WTO dispute settlement process starts with a request for 
consultation. Provisions that deal with the consultation stage are 
stated in Article 4 of the DSM, according to which the party requesting 
consultation begins by preparing a document that explains the legal 
basis of the dispute presented to the DSM and the relevant Councils 
and Committees. 742 The DSM encourages the disputing parties to make 
every effort to make the consultation successful. 743 Once the request 
for consultation is made, the disputing parties have 30 days maximum 
to start the consultation process in good faith in order to reach a 
mutually agreed solution. Failure to do so by any of the participants 
leads to the establishment of a panel. 744 Disputing parties will have 60 
days to conduct consultation. 745 Article 4 also allows for a shorter 
timeframe for consultation in cases of urgency in respect of perishable 
goods, and emphasises that the dispute process should be accelerated 
to the greatest extent possible. 746 
More interestingly, para 6 of Article 4 requires the consultation process 
to be confidential, 747 while Para 11 of the same article adds that 
members who have substantial trade interests748 in the consultation 
process have the right to joint consultations according to paragraph 1 
of Article XXII, of GATT 1994, paragraph 1 of Article XXII of GATT, or 
the corresponding provisions in other covered agreements. Such rights 
742 Article 4.4 of the DSU 
743 Articles 4.1 and 4.2 of the DSU 
744 Article 4.3 of the DSU 
745 Article 4.7 of the DSU 
746 Articles 4.8 & 4.9 of the DSU 
74' Article 4.6 states that "Consultations shall be confidential, and without prejudice 
to the rights of any Member in any further proceedings". 
Hence the advantages 
discussed in chapter four for third parties, which have the advantage of being 
entitled access to the dispute and its related information and 
facts. 
748 See also chapter five, section 5.2. 
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are subject to a ten-day notice period after the date of the circulation 
of the request for consultations, and to the approval of the disputing 
parties which have requested consultation, if they find that the claim 
of substantial trade interest is well-founded. If the request for joint 
consultation is accepted, the DSM must be informed. Otherwise, if the 
request is rejected any interested party has the right to present its 
own request for consultation. Developing countries' interests are also 
considered, by asking members to pay special attention to these 
during consultation. 749 
It is worth mentioning that the DSU is somewhat confusing in using 
stricter language for members who want to participate in consultation. 
It requires them to have a "substantial trade interest". 750 It is more 
lenient with members seeking to participate in the panel stage, 
because it requires them to have a "substantial interest" without 
mentioning "trade". 
The provisions in paras 6,10 and 11 of Article 4 of the DSU cover a 
number of issues that need to be carefully examined. They raise a 
number of controversies. The consultation is confidential and only 
'parties' and 'third parties' are allowed to participate, while developing 
countries' special needs are to be given special consideration. We have 
to ask if developing countries are satisfied with the current rules that 
govern the consultation process and whether those concerning third 
parties help developing countries in the process. If so, how can third 
party involvement in the consultation process be reformed in a way 
that would not undermine the aim of the consultation process, or 
should it be left as it is? 
749 Article 4.10 of the DSU 
Aso See also chapter five, section 5.2 
1) 27 
The review of the dispute settlement system has witnessed a varied 
participation by both developed and developing countries. Many 
proposals have been put forward, and while members were discussing 
the provisions that related to third parties in the dispute process, some 
proposals were made to reform the participation of third parties in the 
consultation process. These proposals need to be examined, and an 
evaluation needs to be made, in order to see how third party rules in 
consultation can be best reformed. But first, it will be helpful to review 
what has been suggested hitherto. 
6.3 Existing Proposals on Third Party Rights in 
the Consultation Process 
A number of proposals were put forward by WTO members concerning 
third party participation during the review of the dispute settlement 
understanding. These include some ideas on reforming third parties' 
participation in the consultation stage. It should be noted that the 
nature of such reform proposals is "deeper procedural changes, more 
directly affecting the rights of Members". 751 Among the members, the 
need for the enhancement of third party rights is not the subject of 
much debate. The core issue is how far this enhancement should go. 
They certainly do not want to hinder the benefits of the principal 
parties in favour of extended third party rights. Hence, a balance 
needs to be restored. Such unanimity on the extension of third parties' 
rights certainly applies to the reform of third party rules in the panel 
751 Peter Balas, "Chairing the DSU Negotiations: An Overview', in Dencho Georgiev 
and Kim Van der Borght(eds), Reform and development of the WTO dispute 
Settlement System, (Cameron May, London, 2006), p. 28. 
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and the appellate process, 752 but reforming third party provisions in 
the consultation stage has raised some controversies. 
To start with, one of the most comprehensive proposals on third party 
intervention was put forward by Costa Rica. One of its main objectives 
was to extend third party rights in the consultation process. Costa Rica 
wanted the more restricted term 'substantial trade interest' in Article 
4.11 to be replaced with the broader term `substantial interest'. Also, it 
wanted to remove the right of the principal parties to decide whether a 
third party has the right to intervene or not, by removing the last part 
of the same article, which states that this applies, 753 
"'provided that the Member to which the request for 
consultations was addressed agrees that the claim of 
substantial interest is well-founded. In that event they 
shall so inform the DSB. If the request to be joined in the 
consultations is not accepted, the applicant Member shall 
be free to request consultations under paragraph 1 of 
Article XXII or paragraph 1 of Article XXIII of GATT 1994, 
paragraph 1 of Article XXII or paragraph 1 of Article XXIII 
of GATS, or the corresponding provisions in other covered 
agreements. "754 
In line with the Costa Rican proposal (but in a more restrictive 
manner) African countries have proposed that developing countries be 
given a special right to access the system as third parties without 
being required to show a trade or economic interest as a prerequisite. 
They have also proposed that such preferential access should be 
allowed at any stage of the dispute (the consultation, panel and 
appellate phases) and that such rights be given only to developing 
752 Ibid. 
753 Communication from Costa Rica, revision, Third Party rights, TN/DS/W/12/Rev. 1, 
(6 March 2003), pp. 1-2. 
754 Last part of article 4.11 of the DSU. 
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countries. 755 It is worth mentioning that the EU, as a bloc of developed 
countries, has in its formal proposal agreed in principle with the Costa 
Rican proposal on opening up the consultation process to third 
parties. 756 Furthermore, Jamaica has also expressed the wish to see 
Article 4.11 of the DSM clarified, especially concerning the terms 
'substantial trade interest' and 'substantial interest'. It believes that 
there should be such a guideline for third parties' access to the 
consultation process, and prefers it to be that of 'substantial interest' 
in general. 757 
In this regard, Chile has clearly argued `yin support of a proposal that 
would make it mandatory for third parties to be joined in 
consultations. The distinction between Articles 4.11 and 10.2 of the 
DSU needed to be eliminated. It was imperative for there to be some 
sort of symmetry between the rights of third parties during the 
consultations and the panel phases of the dispute settlement 
process. "758 India has also clearly stated that it "could support the 
proposal aimed at expanding the rights of third parties during the 
consultation stage under Article 4.11 of the DSU". 759 
On the other hand, some members have approached the extension of 
the access of third parties to the consultation phase with caution. For 
instance, the proposal presented by Chinese Taipei is to enhance the 
transparency of the DSM, but not during the consultation process: 760 
755 Proposal by the African group, TN/DS/W/15 (25 September 2002), p. 4. 
756 Communication from the European Communities, TN/DS/W/38, (23 January 
2003), p. 4. 
757 Communication from Jamaica, TN/DS/W/21, (10 October 2002), p. 2. 
758 Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/4, (6 November 2002), p. 3. 
759 Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/5, (27 February 2003), P. 10. 
760 Communication from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen 
and Matsu, TN/DS/W/25, (27 November 2002), p. 1. 
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`"We are not in favour of the proposal from Costa Rica to 
modify the 'substantial trade interests' provision. Our view 
is that, at the consultation stage, when the DSB has not 
yet been formally involved in its adjudication function, 
'substantial trade interests' should continue to be a 
requirement for third-party participation. This is to ensure 
that the necessary space and simplicity for the disputing 
parties is retained in the consultation stage, and that 
consultation is preserved as an important method of 
settling trade disputes. We do agree fully, however, with 
Jamaica's proposal that guidelines be developed in order to 
prevent the arbitrary refusal of third party requests for 
consultations. , 761 
These proposals need to be further examined to see how reforms could 
be made to enhance the position of developing countries with regard 
to the DSM, but in a way that would not harm the dispute settlement 
process and the principal parties' rights. This current debate certainly 
requires further development, with a special consideration should be 
given to the practice of GATT/WTO cases. 762 There is a fear that third 
parties would undermine the principal parties' rights and place an 
unwanted burden on the dispute process. 763 
6.4 Early Settlement 
As mentioned earlier, Chinese Taipei disagreed with the proposal 
presented by Costa Rica to extend the access of third parties to the 
consultation phase. The objection was on the grounds that it would 
place an additional burden on the disputing parties. These concerns 
were elaborated during a special session of the negotiation of the DSM. 
The Taipei representative, while agreeing with the principle of 
761 Ibid., p. 3. 
762 Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/4, (6 November 2002), pp. 1-2. 
763 Communication from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen 
and Matsu, note 760, p. 2. 
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increasing the access to information for third parties during the panel 
and the AB stages, stated that: 
`Chinese Taipei was conscious of the uneasiness of some 
participants who seemed to be of the view that enhanced 
third party rights [would] make the dispute settlement 
process cumbersome and frustrate the efforts of the 
parties to find a mutually satisfactory solution to their 
dispute. In Chinese Taipei's view, these concerns were 
misplaced and did not take into account the profound 
effects a case could have on third parties. "764 
This argument has been further developed in a number of interesting 
studies by Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, 765 who have argued that 
the multilateral nature of WTO disputes makes it more difficult for the 
disputing parties to reach an agreement, because of the complications 
resulting from the increased number of parties involved in the case. 
Thus, "defendants are least likely to concede in multilateral disputes, 
perhaps because they have more trade at stake, or because 
coordination of deals is necessarily more complex". 766 
764 Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/6, (31 March 2003), p. 6. 
765 This is one side of the coin. Others believe that third parties' participation in 
consultation is vital. It is argued in this regard that "A quick survey carried out in 
Geneva showed that most of the senior diplomats tend not to deal with the DS in 
general or in the negotiations. It is usually the newer or younger diplomats who deal 
with it. Due to the breadth of issues they have to cover, the DS receives little 
attention. The consequence is that the issues are not receiving as much attention as 
they should due largely to resource constraints. We recommend that delegations 
should make an effort to attend DSB and DSB special session meetings and 
familiarize themselves with the issues at play. Setting up a legal monitoring unit 
within the African Group that could always explore possibilities of participating as 
third parties in disputes, joining consultation in ... many 
disputes and even bringing 
joint disputes when such an occasion presents itself should be encouraged. " Victor 
Mosoti, 'Does Africa Need The WTO Dispute Settlement System? ', in Gregory Shaffer, 
Victor Mosoti and Asif Qureshi, Towards A Development-Supportive Dispute 
Settlement System in the WTO, (ICTSD, 2003), p. 23. 
766 Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, 'Transatlantic Trade Conflicts and GATT/WTO 
Dispute Settlement', Conference on Dispute Prevention and Dispute Settlement in 
the Transatlantic Partnership . 
European University Institute/Robert Schuman Centre, 
Florence, Italy (3-4 May 2002), available online at 
https: //www law berkeley. edu/students/curricularproqrams/ils/papers/Busch%20and 
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It has also been argued that consultation was a vital stage of GATT, at 
which most disputes were settled or otherwise withdrawn, It has even 
been argued that this stage was more important than the GATT 
panels. 767 In addition, in their first study directly related to third 
parties, Busch and Reinhardt argued that the reform of third party 
participation in consultation would hamper the process and would be of 
no benefit to the dispute settlement system. This argument is based 
on the assumption that enhancing third party participation in the 
consultation phase could negatively affect the early settlement of 
disputes in consultations in which the disputing parties could have 
reached a mutually agreed solution. Even transparency ought not to 
be extended to the consultation process. 768 
The same statistical model has also led to the main hypothesis that 
third party participation in the consultation phase would reduce the 
possibility of early settlement. Busch and Reinhardt claim that 60% of 
disputes have reached mutually agreed solutions without third party 
involvement. By contrast, only 26% of cases that have witnessed third 
party intervention have reached mutually agreed solutions. 
Furthermore, while 9 percent of the cases without third party 
intervention have been subject to a ruling, 45 percent of the cases 
with third party intervention have reached the ruling stage. 769 
%20Reinhardt%20--%2OPetersmann%2OProject. pdf, last seen on 02-06-2008 at 
gam, p. 8. 
767 Marc L. Busch, `Democracy, Consultation, and the Paneling of Disputes under 
GATT', (2000), 44(4) Journal of Conflict Resolution 425, p-425- 
768 Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, 'Fixing What Ain't Broke? Third Party Rights, 
Consultations, and the DSU', (2004), available online at http: //www. georgetown. edu 
/users/mlb66/DSU. Pdf, last seen on 30-09-2007 at 1pm, pp. 1-3. 
769 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
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Busch and Reinhardt also argue that this can be generalized regardless 
of the issue, size or economic and power imbalance. Using the same 
dataset, they then claim that in disputes with no third party 
intervention the possibly of a ruling is 8%. In disputes in which third 
parties have intervened the possibility of a ruling rises to 29%. 7° 
Hence, contrary to what has been proposed by Costa Rica, they 
suggest that the term "substantial trade interest' ought to be retained 
for those parties wishing to intervene in the consultation process, 
while a party's right to deny access to third parties in consultation 
ought also to be retained. However, a guideline ought to be introduced 
to control such denials. Because most third parties will want to know 
what has led to the mutually agreed solution, the parties ought to 
present a report on their settlement to the DSB, with access allowed to 
all WTO members. By thus enhancing transparency in respect of the 
publication of the settlement report, the intervention of third parties in 
the consultation phase could be minimized. 771 
This argument has been developed further to prove Busch and 
Reinhardt's hypothesis. A recent study examines in more detail the 
statistical methodology applied to cases brought to the DSM up to 
2002. It is claimed that third party interventions in consultations would 
undermine early settlement, since it would make negotiation more 
difficult by increasing the 'audience costs' and 'transaction costs' of the 
negotiation process before the formation of the panel. 
772 
70 Ibid., pp. 11-13. 
71 Eric Reinhardt argues in another study that "WTO rules especially encourage the 
addition of third parties to complaints, thereby adding to the costs of transacting any 
one dispute. " Eric Reinhardt, 'Aggressive Multilateralism: The Determinants of 
GATT/WTO Dispute Initiation, 1948-1998', (1999), available at 
http: //www isr umich edu/cps/pewpa/archive/archive 99/19990004. pdf, p. 14. 
772 Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, 'Three's a Crowd: Third Parties and WTO 
Dispute Settlement', (2005), available online at 
? 29 
Therefore, it can be seen that the consultation stage is vital. While 
enhancing third parties' participation in the consultation stage could 
undermine early settlement, this would hinder the efficiency and 
function of the DSM, especially at the pre-trial phase which third 
parties could severely damage. 773 It is also clear that the term 
`substantial trade interest'774 in Article 4.11 is there to preserve 
parties' autonomy775 and freedom to negotiate mutually agreeable 
solutions, without the interference of third parties which do not have 
crucial economic interests in the case. 776 Busch and Reinhardt do 
recognize that transparency is vital for any judicial system, but they 
believe that this is outweighed by the argument that neither third 
party involvement nor transparency should apply at the pre-trial 
stage. 777 This is because they would raise the transaction costs, and so 
http: //wage. wisc. edu/uploads/WTO%2OConference/busch reinhardt %20third%20p 
arties. pdf, last seen on 23-10-2007 at 4pm, pp. 2-3. It is also argued by Davy and 
Porges that "In at least nineteen cases, more than one Member has individually 
complained about a measure of another Member. In other cases, there have been 
joint consultation requests and/or joint panels. Some respondents in these cases 
have complained that such multiple requests put an inappropriate burden on them 
because they may end up having to conduct essentially the same consultation 
several times. This is a particular problem for Members with small delegations in 
Geneva. While joint consultations may be a useful mechanism to use, they may be 
viewed as undesirable from the respondent's point of view to the extent that they 
make settlement negotiations with individual countries more difficult. " William J. 
Davey & Amelia Porges, 'Performance of the System I: Consultations & Deterrence', 
32 The International Lawyer 695, p. 695. 
73 Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, note 772, p. 5. 
74 See also chapter five, section 5.2. 
75 Chinese Taipei further explained in a special session on the DSM that "while [it] 
was in favour of strengthening third-party rights, it was also of the view that their 
rights should be less than those of the parties to the dispute. In that context, it was 
not in agreement with Costa Rica that the 'substantial trade interest' provision in 
Article 4.11 of the DSU should be amended to make it easier for third parties to 
participate in consultations between the parties to the dispute". Minutes of Meeting, 
TN/DS/M/6, (31 March 2003), p. 6. 
776 Busch and Reinhardt, note 772, pp-9-10. 
"' In connection with this, Lawrence argues that "There is some uncertainty 
concerning whether transparency interests should be extended to include the 
consultation phase of the process. Legitimacy is enhanced through public disclosure 
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make the bargaining process more difficult and hinder the reaching of 
a mutually agreed solution. 778 
What makes third party intervention more awkward for the settlement 
process is that it may come from an active participant who could raise 
new issues and arguments that would sidetrack the disputing parties' 
focus on the matter under dispute. Moreover, although third parties 
cannot bring an argument not stated in the terms of reference, they 
could "draw attention to other arguments that fit within the terms of 
reference, but which the complainant and defendant had not thought 
to introduce or - worse still - do not favor". 779 Therefore, third parties, 
by broadening the disputed issue to secure their interests, will limit the 
areas of agreement between the parties, hence reducing the prospect 
of settlement. 780 
of the negotiations that take place among the parties prior to the panel process. 
Disclosure can serve to focus the discussion of the parties and promote settlement 
through a need to court public opinion. An argument can be made that public 
disclosure is appropriate given the existence of alternative general fora for the 
settlement of international disputes and that the overarching goals of the World 
Trade Organization are best served by confining the dispute process at all stages to 
issues solely related to the covered agreements. The benefits of transparency, 
however, appear to be less significant than at other stages of dispute settlement. 
This is due in part to the fact that the consultation phase is a negotiated process 
rather than an adjudicatory one. There is far less incentive to protect general notions 
of justice. The authority of the international institution is not threatened. The 
primary objectives of the negotiation phase are to reduce international tensions and 
conclude potential disputes rapidly and inexpensively whenever possible. The 
perceived loss of legitimacy is miniscule when compared to the benefits to 
operational efficiency and the international community afforded by the informality of 
the consultation phase. It may even be argued that the public filing requirements 
may impose excessive costs at the consultation phase. The added flexibility afforded 
to the parties to include issues not directly pertinent to WTO principles should not be 
discounted. This benefit also serves as an added incentive to the parties to conclude 
a settlement prior to the commencement of the panel phase. " Lawrence D. Roberts, 
'Beyond Notions of Diplomacy and Legalism: Building a Just Mechanism for WTO 
Dispute Resolution', (2003), 40 American Business Law Journal 511, pp. 543-544. 
"8 Busch and Reinhardt, note 772, p-13- 
779 Ibid. 
780 Ibid., p. 15. 
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In the main, Busch and Reinhardt use a quantitative approach to 
gather evidence for their study, confirming the results of the above- 
mentioned statistical analysis. This found that a similar percentage of 
third parties might undermine the possibility of an early settlement in 
the consultation process. 781 It also developed another method of 
quantitative examination which proved the same hypothesis: that third 
parties could undermine early settlement. This was done through 
developing models and variables to estimate their effects. For 
example, model IV indicates that 78% of the disputes involving third 
parties reach the stage of ruling. The results of the study show the 
following: 
"With no third parties and the other variables held at their 
sample means, the probability that the dispute goes to a 
ruling is just 0.08. With third parties, the odds rise to 0.29. 
Add to this the complication of systemic issues, however, 
and the likelihood of witnessing a ruling soars to 0.71. In 
short, third party participation makes all the difference 
between whether a dispute gets settled early or goes to a 
ruling. "782 
As a result, it has been proposed that the term `substantial trade 
interest' ought to be retained in Article 4.11, but ought to be more 
precisely defined to distinguish it from a systematic interest. According 
to the latter term, third parties would be willing to make early 
settlement even more difficult by raising broader issues that cannot be 
addressed properly outside the dispute process. 783 In addition, while 
781 Ibid., p. 23. 
782 Ibid., pp. 23-25. 
783 Chile's representative also "welcomed the proposal by Costa Rica and said that it 
was a major contribution to the work of the Special Session. He said that Chile was 
particularly interested in the issue of third-party rights having recently participated 
as a third party in a dispute. While supportive of the proposal to expand third-party 
rights, Chile was also of the view that the rights of third parties should never equal 
or exceed those of a party to a dispute. It should be borne in mind that the WTO 
dispute settlement system was designed in such a way to promote bilateral solutions 
to disputes. It flowed from this basic premise that some leeway should be given to 
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the members have the right to deny the access of third parties to 
consultation, the denial should be clearly stated to allow equal access 
to third parties during consultation. Furthermore, in cases where a 
settlement was agreed, there ought to be made available to all WTO 
members a detailed report of how the settlement took place between 
the parties. This would reduce the incentive of third parties who want 
to know what settlement is agreed upon. 784 
Along the same lines, a study by Henric Adey also used quantitative 
methods to examine cases brought to the DSM from 1995 to 2004. It 
had the same focus on the third parties in the pre-trial stage 
(consultation) and confirmed the finding that third parties could 
undermine early settlement and increase the possibility of a trial and 
ruling. It recognized. that early settlement would give the most 
desirable result in terms of the cost, time and settlement of the 
dispute. 785 Adey's concern is the same: that third parties would 
increase the negotiation costs and serve to distract the disputing 
parties from the main issue under dispute. 786 
In fact, consultation is a vital stage in the dispute settlement process 
and, indeed, the analyzed hypothesis raises serious worries. However, 
four observations can be made. First, these studies are in the main 
the parties to explore the possibility of reaching mutually agreed solutions to 
disputes. The flexibility granted to parties could be severely compromised, if third 
parties were accorded similar rights. According extensive rights to third parties could 
also affect the timeframes of the dispute settlement system". Minutes of Meeting, 
TN/DS/M/4,6 November 2002, p-3- 
784 Busch and Reinhardt, note 772, pp. 30-31. 
785 Henric A. Adey, 'Plaintiff Coalitions in WTO Disputes: Co-Complainants and 
Interested Third Parties', Georgetown University, (2007), available online at 
http: //www. qeorqetown. edu/users/haa/papers/Paper2 HenricAdey. pdf, last seen on 
30-10-2007 at 9am, p. 1-2. 
786 Ibid., pp. 2-4. 
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quantitative 787 and there is a need for a qualitative examination. 
Secondly, it is the unique and interesting character that the WTO has 
given to the participation of third parties in the consultation process 
(allowing them to present interests which in some instances may be 
very broad or not precisely related to the disputed issue) that is 
beneficial to the application of the MFN principle and the wellbeing of 
the WTO system as a whole. In the meantime, the disputing parties 
are in full control of the consultative process, allowing them to respond 
to, and adopt, what they believe is in the interest of a particular 
dispute. Simultaneously, they keep the bigger picture in mind, without 
787 In this regard Qurashi argues that "some of these measures are more transparent 
and relevant than others in terms of shedding an accurate light on the participation 
of developing Members in the WTO dispute settlement process. Some quantitative 
measures based on the number of disputes resolved through the dispute settlement 
process involving developing Members are questionable. First, where they include 
disputes resolved through consultation. Whereas this process of the dispute 
settlement system is important, it contributes to the distortion of the results, in that 
the consultation process does not partake of the core of the litigation process. 
Further, it is a process where the "power ratio' between Members can lend itself to 
the resolution of disputes; and arguably its inclusion can provide a measure of this 
'power ratio', as much as anything else. 
"The process of consultation between developed and developing Members takes 
place in an uncontrolled environment which allows for the possibilities of external 
linkages to the dispute. The discrepancy in the ratio of economic and political power 
between the two parties can open up the possibility of the more powerful Member 
linking external considerations to the settlement of the dispute. There is a case 
therefore for discounting the consultation process when measuring the frequency of 
the dispute settlement user by developing Members. Second, quantitative measures, 
which do not differentiate between the different forms of participation and their 
burdensome nature, need also to be noted. Thus, participation in the consultation 
process, as well as participation as a third party, is not as burdensome a process as 
participation as a complainant in the actual panel and appellate process of the 
dispute settlement system. Third, statistics on the number of times developing 
Members have engaged as complainants or third parties without further ado are 
incomplete because they do not have a reference point as a measure. Thus, what 
does '79 occasions of complaints on the part of developing Members' on its own 
convey? Finally, quantitative measures can be opaque in terms of whose 
participation within the Member State complaining is actually being recorded, i. e. the 
extent to which the complaint is government inspired and initiated, or results from 
requests made by the domestic industry, or other interested parties. " Asif Qureshi, 
'Participation of Developing Countries in the WTO Dispute Settlement System', 
(2003), 47(2) Journal of African Law 174, pp. 181-182. 
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necessarily dealing with it in the consultation process. 788 Thirdly, the 
overall number of disputes settled at the consultation stage is high. 
According to the WTO official website, 202 of the 332 disputes brought 
to the DSM in its first ten years of operation to July 2005 (that is, 
significantly more than half) have been settled without even reaching 
the panel stage. 789 Fourthly, other scenarios, as far as developing 
countries are concerned, have not been considered. These need to be 
looked at with regard to third parties' participation in consultation, 
apart from the issue of early settlement. 
6.5 Awareness among Third Parties' Not 
Escalate Disputes 
Notwithstanding the statistics that show that third party participation 
in consultation would lead to a panel process in a way that would 
undermine early settlement, third parties could play a role in not 
escalating cases but instead encouraging early settlement during 
consultation. This is especially the case when a third party which has 
intervened in consultation sees that it would protect its interests more 
efficiently through a mutually agreed solution or through the 
withdrawal of the case to give more time for negotiation. Hence, third 
parties could try to put pressure on the disputing parties to convince 
them to resolve the case through negotiation, so as to reach a 
mutually agreeable solution that would protect the interests of all the 
disputing parties. 
788 Qi Zhang, consultation within WTO Dispute settlement: A Chinese Perspective, 
(Peter Lang, 2007), pp. 119-121. 
789 Website, http: //www. wto. org/enqiish/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/displ e. htm, last 
seen on 10-02-2009 at 1: 21pm. 
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There is evidence of this having taken place in the pre-trial stage of 
the Sugar case. 790 This particular example involved a large number of 
third party interventions in consultation (about 25) due to the 
significance of the case for WTO jurisprudence. A number of third 
parties made attempts to persuade Australia, Brazil and Thailand to 
withhold their request for the establishment of the panel. As has been 
noted by Danvivathana, "some of these had called upon the 
complainants ... to withdraw their requests for the establishment of a 
panel, even though they were exercising their legitimate right to use 
the dispute settlement system of the WTO after they had exercise[d] 
[their] judgment as to whether action under these procedures would 
be fruitful". 791 
However, in this dispute Brazil and the rest of the co-complainants did 
not believe that it was in their interests to settle the case. They 
preferred to go to the panel. The unnecessary escalation of disputes is 
no more in the interest of the disputing parties than it is of third 
parties. Awareness among third parties that they should not 
overburden the dispute settlement process is evident during the panel 
and AB processes, which they have organized themselves to speak 
'with one voice' instead of operating individually. 792 Indeed, the 
consultation process is where disputes can be settled at a very early 
stage. Even so, it can be seen as the first step towards the panel and 
AB stages. Nevertheless, there is an awareness among third parties 
that they should not overburden the dispute settlement mechanism 
790 More details in chapter four section 5.4.3. 
791 Pornchai Danvivathana, "Case Study of Thailand's Experience in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System', Working Paper of ICTSD Asia Dialogue on WTO Dispute 
Settlement and Sustainable Development Jakarta, (25 and 26 January 2006), 
Available at http: //www. ictsd. orq/dloque/2006-01-25/Pornchai. pdf, last seen on 22- 
07-06 at 7am, pp. 2-3. 
792 More detail of this analysis in chapter five section 5.3.1.2. 
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but should continue to support the settlement of disputes, either 
through direct negotiation with disputing parties to settle their 
disputes promptly whenever it is appropriate, or by organizing 
themselves (i. e. by choosing a single spokesperson and position) for 
the sake of efficient negotiation at the consultation stage. 
6.6 The Vital Role of Members' Power and 
Ability in the Negotiation Process 
6.6.1 Developing countries and the power-driven 
GATT process 
Costa Rica argues that it is useful to look at the GATT dispute 
settlement process while analyzing the need for the reform of third 
party participation in the DSM. 793 It is worth recalling the Uruguay 
dispute brought under GATT, which shows developing countries' 
frustration with the diplomatic process and the pressure put upon 
them in this regard. This prevented them from protecting their 
interests at that time. 794 Indeed, one common aspect of the GATT 
adjudication system and consultation in the WTO DSM is that the 
economic power of the disputing parties has a significant impact on the 
dispute process. 
Alilovic argues that due to the absence of a binding panel procedure, 
the majority of cases under the GATT dispute system were settled by 
diplomatic means. Here, economic strength was a key element, if not 
the most important influence on the outcome. This certainly 
disadvantaged the poorer and less powerful GATT members. This is 
793 Communication by Cost Rica, TN/DS/W/12, (24 July 2002). 
794 More detail of the Uruguay dispute is given in chapter one. 
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illustrated by the fact that developing countries offered absolute 
concessions in 82% of their GATT disputes, whereas the EC and Japan 
did so in only 46% and 54% respectively. Hence, the GATT 
adjudication system favoured the more economically powerful at the 
expense of the poorer and less powerful members. 795 
For this reason, some developing countries, such as Venezuela, were 
not fully satisfied with the settlements taking place under GATT. Their 
requests for a panel (which were constantly denied) would have re- 
established their cases before the DSM, with a reduced incentive to 
discuss mutually agreed solutions at the consultation stage. It has 
been argued that this is because "with a binding dispute mechanism, a 
more judicial panel, and a standing AB, complainants are bringing 
forward cases which were once thought to be too complex or sensitive 
[so] they would have been blocked under the GATT rules. Such 
complex cases are not amenable to resolution through negotiation. "796 
Some tend to believe that the consultation phase is insignificant and 
that its sole function is as a preparatory stage for the panels. In these 
circumstances, the disputing parties engage in "nothing more than a 
fact-finding, legal discovery where the legal officials clamp down on 
incautious commentary and attempt to get as much out of the other 
side as they can". On the contrary, the pre-trial negotiation stage 
ought not to be misjudged; it has a vital role to play in the dispute 
process. Indeed, there are many bureaucrats and trade attorneys who 
believe that crucial political and economic achievements can be 
accomplished during meaningful negotiation in the consultation 
795 Robert Alilovic, 'Consultation under the WTO'S dispute settlement system', 
(2000), 18 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 279, p. 295. 
796 Ibid., p. 296. 
238 
phase. 797 After all, a great proportion of WTO disputes are settled 
through consultation. Nonetheless, there is a great deal of 
dissatisfaction with the current procedures which govern consultation 
under the DSU. Among several aspects of the current pre-trial 
negotiations stages according to Article 4 of the DSM requiring serious 
review is the involvement of third parties. 
6.6.2 Developing countries and the WTO consultation 
phase 
6.6.2.1 Developing countries require special attention 
Submissions by developing country members of the WTO indicate 
dissatisfaction with the level of seriousness with which members 
approach the need to obtain a satisfactory settlement of the matter at 
hand before resorting to seeking the establishment of a panel. 798 Other 
developing country members have indicated the need to prevent the 
arbitrary refusal of third party requests for consultations, 799 and the 
need for consultations to take into account the financial and human 
resource constraints (especially of the less developed countries) in the 
conduct of such consultations. This all indicates a need to strengthen 
the consultative process and to make developing country participation 
in such a process more effective. Third parties will be discussed in 
more detail later. 
Developing countries, especially those which have no in-house legal 
counsel, encounter many difficulties with regard to consultation. This 
is because they do not have the resources required to carry out 
79' Ibid. 
798 Submission by Jamaica, note 757. 
799 Submission by the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, revision, TN/DS/W/36, 
(22 January 2003). 
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consultations. There are special arrangements for developing countries 
in Article 4.10 of the DSU, which calls for "special attention to the 
particular problems and interests of developing countries Members". 
This provision could be made more effective if it were accompanied by 
technical assistance to enable developing countries to consult on an 
equal footing with other WTO members. 80° 
The provisions of Article 4.10 are a further example of the failure of 
the S&D to meet its aims: in this context to give developing countries 
particular consideration during the consultation stage. This makes one 
wonder whether this addresses the developing countries' special 
circumstances in the consultation process. 80' 
It is true that developing countries are given extra time in 
consultations because they need to be treated differently from their 
larger counterparts. However, this is not sufficient on its own to 
. improve their position in the consultation phase. In practice, 
developing countries find it difficult to decide on a place and a 
timetable for consultation. They also find it difficult to obtain all the 
information necessary to plan their arguments. These difficulties are of 
a procedural kind. 802 
Another perspective would be that since the 'special attention' that is 
required is not clearly defined, it "should also be given to the efforts 
that developing countries are making to comply with their obligations, 
800 Joost Pauwelyn, "The Limits of Litigation: "Americanization" and Negotiation in the 
Settlement of WTO Disputes', (2003), Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 121, 
pp. 134-135. 
801 Working Paper of South Centre, Review of the Existing Special and Differential 
Treatment Provisions: Implementing the Doha Mandate, Doc No: sc/tadp/sdt/1, 
(2002), p. 13. 
802 Ibid. 
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since WTO agreements require many administrative and legislative 
reforms, which can be lengthy and difficult to accomplish". 803 
Therefore, to enhance such provisions, authoritative interpretations 
need to be made by the panels and the AB to clarify the meaning of 
'special attention'. This would develop a general guideline to be applied 
to all the problems in the consultation processes that involve 
developing countries. 804 
Furthermore, as far as consultation is concerned, Article 12.10805 of 
the DSU does in part give developing countries the right to extend the 
consultation timeframe, and, if the parties fail to agree on such an 
extension, the Chairman may intervene to decide the issue. The main 
objective of this provision is to give particular consideration to 
developing countries' limited legal and financial resources, allowing 
them to present their cases without the restriction of narrow 
timeframes. Bearing this objective in mind, it has been argued to the 
contrary that this would not save developing countries' limited 
resources. In practice, it has been pointed out, the shorter the dispute 
resolution process the better it is for developing countries. In this 
respect, it is suggested that the extension of the timeframe could be 
803 Ibid. 
804 Ibid. 
805 Full text of Article 12.10 is: "In the context of consultations involving a measure 
taken by a developing country Member, the parties may agree to extend the periods 
established in paragraphs 7 and 8 of Article 4. If, after the relevant period has 
elapsed, the consulting parties cannot agree that the consultations have concluded, 
the Chairman of the DSB shall decide, after consultation with the parties, whether to 
extend the relevant period and, if so, for how long. In addition, in examining a 
complaint against a developing country Member, the panel shall accord sufficient 
time for the developing country Member to prepare and present its argumentation. 
The provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 20 and paragraph 4 of Article 21 are not 
affected by any action pursuant to this paragraph. " 
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restricted to adding (for instance) 30 days under Article 4.7 and 10 
days under Article 4.8.806 
Allocating more time for developing countries in the consultation 
process would on its own help to address their special needs and 
would make the consultation stage easier for them. The DSU has made 
separate provisions to assist in the granting of special attention for the 
developing countries in Article 4.10 of the DSU. 807 
From the perspective of reform of the DSU, it has been suggested 
that, in order to strengthen Article 4.10, a provision ought to be added 
that if a developed and a developing country which are parties to a 
dispute decide to request a panel, the developed country member 
(whether complainant or respondent) should be required to explain to 
the panel how it had considered the particular problems and interests 
of the developing country member at the consultation stage. 808 
6.6.2.2 Bona fides in consultation 
The paradox is that it is believed that there is a trend for good faith 
not to be implemented appropriately during the consultation stage by 
the disputing parties. This makes the disputing parties in the 
consultation process relatively confident that neither party will be 
altogether truthful. There is then a recourse to a formal panel process, 
within a considerably short time on some occasions. This has 
undermined the process of reaching mutually agreed solutions during 
806 Working Paper of South Centre, note 801, pp. 9-11. 
807 Ibid. 
808 Communication from India on behalf of Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, 
Honduras, Jamaica and Malaysia, Dispute Settlement Understanding Proposals: Legal 
Text, TN/DS/W/47, (11 February 2003), pp. 2-3. 
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consultation. 809 In addition, there is a serious criticism that disputing 
members are not sincere in the conduct of their consultations. In 
particular, developing countries argue that developed ones do not take 
into consideration the problems and interests of developing countries 
stated in Article 4.10 while they are at the consultation level. 810 It is 
argued by Donald McRae that ""there is a consultation obligation before 
requesting a panel. But in many respects that obligation is pro 
forma. i811 
Moreover, the consultation phase is described as being conducted in a 
small room in the WTO headquarters in Geneva and lasting no more 
than two or three hours. The language normally used in consultations 
is English, with no interpreters, transcript or recording being 
involved. 812 
The consultation rules under the DSU impose no clear obligations on 
the disputing parties to participate effectively in consultation, while the 
requirement "'to engage in these procedures in good faith in an effort 
to resolve the dispute" is subject to the disputing parties' readiness to 
participate in good faith during the consultation stage. Not all 
disputant members have shown the same bona fides in the 
consultation process. Some appear to deliberately misuse the system's 
inherent flexibility to frustrate the conduct of fruitful consultations. 
This has resulted in many WTO members explicitly declaring their 
809 Alan Wm. Wolff, 'Problems with WTO Dispute Settlement', (2001), 2 Chicago 
Journal of International Law 417, p. 7. 
810 Note by the Secretariat, Concerns Regarding Special and Differential Treatment 
Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions, WT/COMTD/W/66 (16 February 2000), 
p. 32. 
811 Donald McRae, 'What is The Future of WTO Dispute Settlement? ', (2004), 7(1) 
Journal of International Economic Law 3, pp. 9-10. 
812 William J. Davey and Amelia Porges, note 772, pp. 704-705. 
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concerns regarding the efficiency of the consultation phase, and calling 
for the enhancement of the relevant rules in the DSU so as to ensure 
that effective consultation can take place. 813 
The absence of clear obligations on the disputing parties during 
consultation in the DSM means that all they have to do is to make 
their request, perhaps meet once, wait for the sixty-day period to end 
and then proceed to the panel stage. This encourages a negative 
attitude among the disputing parties. They feel that consultations are 
merely a pre-forum stage and "at best, a cooling-off period". 814 
"Generally speaking, consultations will encourage the 
resolution of disputes in the relatively straightforward 
cases, in the absence of overwhelming domestic political 
pressures. Even for those settled, the consultation itself is 
only a procedure to bring the parties to the table for 
serious negotiations and acts as one of the factors leading 
to the settlement, rather than as the single contribution to 
i8 the resolution. 15 
Hence, when third parties are involved in high profile cases, they alone 
cannot be blamed for negatively affecting the settlement process in 
the consultation phase. 
Indeed, as has been argued by Mitchell, one of the main drawbacks to 
the principle of good faith is that there is no underlying legal ground to 
decide if a member has acted in good faith or bad faith. This is the 
813 Kim Van der Borght, 'Critical Essay: The Review of the WTO Understanding on 
Dispute Settlement: Some Reflections on the Current Debate', (1999), 14 American 
University International Law Review 1223, pp. 1233-1234. 
814 Ibid.; also, Robert Howse and Damien J. Neven, 'Mexico- Corn Syrup: Mexico - 
Anti-dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup form the United States, 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States', in Henrik Horn and Pertros 
C. Mavroidios(eds), The WTO Case Law of 2001, (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
pp. 147-149. 
815 Xin Zhang, 'Implementation of the WTO Agreements: Framework and Reform', 
(2003), 23 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 383, pp. 414-415. 
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result of the vagueness surrounding the definition of `good faith' in 
international law, and of the hesitance of WTO panels and the AB to 
set out the general principles governing the use of the term in the 
context of WTO disputes. Establishing such detailed principles would 
certainly make it easier and more practical to decide whether a WTO 
member had acted in good faith or not. 816 These underlying principles, 
having once been well defined, could later be formally adopted in 
Article 4 of the DSU. Given that members might not conduct 
consultations effectively, to increase effectiveness Jamaica proposed 
that members conducting consultations ought to present a written 
paper to the DSB. This would have to be truthful and brief, to enable 
an assessment of the likelihood of a mutually agreed solution. The 
paper would have the benefit of making the operation of the dispute 
settlement system more systematic, and one should be presented to 
the panel if it so requested. 817 On the other hand, it is virtually 
impossible for the panel to guarantee that the measures that have 
been presented to it have not been properly executed during the 
consultation process. Nor can it effectively compel the disputing 
parties to conduct consultation against their wi11.818 
816 Andrew Mitchell, 'Good Faith in WTO Dispute Settlement', 7 Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 339; Marion Panizzon, Good Faith in the Jurisprudence of the WTO: 
The Protection of Legitimate Expectations, Good Faith Interpretation and Fair Dispute 
Settlement, (Hart Publishing, 2006), p. 371; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 'WTO dispute 
Settlement Practice 1995-2005: Lessons from the Past and Future Challenges', in 
Yasuhei Taniguchi, Alan Yanovich and Jan Bohanes(eds), The WTO in the Twenty- 
first Century: Dispute Settlement, Negotiations, and Regionalism in Asia, (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, first Edition, 2007), p. 44. 
817 Communication from Jamaica, Contribution by Jamaica to the Doha Mandated 
Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), TN/DS/W/36 (22 January 
2003) p. 1. 
818 Kim Van der Bought, 'The Reform of the Dispute Settlement System of the World 
Trade Organization: Improving Fairness and Inducting Fear', (2007), 4(2) 
Manchester Journal of International Economic Law 2, p. 35., The AB has clearly 
stated that, "consultations are by definition a process, the results of which are 
uncertain", US - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling , appellate 
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Improving the consultation stage would, in turn, improve the 
participation of developing countries in the dispute settlement system. 
It is not so costly and takes less time than starting a formal dispute, 
expenditure being a real concern for developing countries. 819 However, 
most of the proposals that have been made to improve the 
consultative process have the drawback of increasing the formal itY820 
of consultation, which by its character ought to remain an informal 
forum for dispute settlement . 
821 But there have been interesting 
proposals made to increase the firmness of the language used to 
conduct consultations, which would not affect the informal character of 
the process. 
It has been suggested that although the WTO and NAFTA have 
different procedures for the settlement of disputes, they share the 
feature that the dispute is triggered by the request for consultation. 
However, NAFTA uses stronger language to encourage the disputing 
parties to negotiate effectively and reach a settlement, than the 
language employed in the WTO's procedural rules. The latter merely 
make it clear that reaching a mutually agreeable resolution is the 
preferred way to settle a dispute. Also, the disputing parties may 
request the use of good offices, mediation or conciliation by the 
Director General at any stage of the dispute process. 822 
body report, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted on 7 April 2005, para. 317. [hereinafter US 
Gambling] 
819 Ibid. 
820 Consultation is defined as "negotiation between parties aiming to settle the issues 
concerned. With an informal character, it is a flexible instrument of implementation 
that is extremely suitable when States are reluctant to relinquish sovereign powers". 
Xin Zhang, note 815, p. 411. 
821 Paul Shanahan, 'Implementation: The Multilateral Review Process and Dispute 
settlement', in Benoit Blarel, Garry Pursell, Alberto Valdes(eds), Implications of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement for South Asia: The Case of Agriculture, (World Bank, 
1998), p. 82. 
822 Rafael Leal-Arcas, 'Choice of Jurisdiction in International Trade Disputes: Going 
Regional or Global', (2007), 16 Minnesota Journal of International Law 1, pp. 21-22. 
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NAFTA, by contrast, more robustly requires that 
"The parties should make every attempt to come to a 
resolution of the matter between them in a mutually 
acceptable manner by a) providing sufficient information to 
each other regarding their rights which have been harmed 
under NAFTA, b) treating confidential or proprietary 
information with the same level of care as the other party, 
and c) trying to avoid a solution that adversely affects any 
other party". 
Unlike the situation under the WTO rules, the use of good offices is 
also obligatory. In NAFTA, in case of a failure in the bilateral 
negotiations, a NAFTA Free Trade Commission, including a 
representative from a state which is a member of NAFTA, must be 
established within ten days. The Commission has the right to seek the 
views of experts, to recommend the use of good offices, meditation, 
conciliation or any other method of peaceful dispute resolution, or to 
propose principles and guidelines to support the disputing parties in 
reaching a mutually acceptable solution. Only after all attempts have 
failed can the disputing parties request the establishment of an 
arbitration panel. 823 
Thus, it can be seen clearly that the use of stronger language and two 
levels of consultation would make the process more meaningful and 
allow more time for the disputing parties to negotiate mutually 
agreeable solutions. Such proposals would not affect the informal 
nature of the consultation process in the WTO. Unfortunately, the 
difficulties facing developing countries are not limited to conducting 
effective consultations, as they are also most vulnerable to less 
823 Ibid. 
247 
favourable settlements of disputes at the consultation stage, which is 
the subject of the following section. 
6.7 Unfair Settlement 
In general, trade disputes can be resolved either through negotiation 
(which is described as a power-based dispute settlement process) or 
through the adjudication of a third party (which is recognized as a 
rule-based approach). 824 However, resolving trade disputes in a 
power-based dispute mechanism, in the form of negotiation between 
the disputing parties, tends to give control of the settlement of the 
case to the more powerful party, whether in economic, political or 
military terms. Hence, in such systems the trade interests of the 
smaller and less powerful parties tend to be undermined, especially 
when bargaining with a larger and more powerful party. In this regard, 
it is argued by Matsushita that "when the resolution of a dispute is 
negotiated between a party with more economic and political power 
and another party with less of such power, the weaker party is often 
pressed to make concessions against its will". 825 
On the other hand, a rule-based dispute mechanism, like the one in 
the WTO, is more beneficial for developing countries, as they can sue 
the larger and more powerful members, providing that they had the 
resources available to bring and pursue such a case. 826 In fact, 
developing countries have brought a number of successful cases 
against developed members such as the EU and the US through the 
824 Kim Van der Borght, note 813, p. 1232; Davey and Porges, note 722, p. 4. 
825 Mitsuo Matsushita, `Accomplishment of the WTO Dispute Settlement system -A 
Review of Some WTO Jurisprudence', (2006), available online at 
http: //www adb. org/Documents/Events/2006/WTO-Dispute-Settlement- 
Mechanisms/paper-matsushitsa. pdf, last seen on 26-10-2007 at 4pm, p. 4. 
826 Ibid. 
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WTO dispute settlement system. Among the many instances are: the 
US - Underwear case827 (Costa Rica v. US), US - Shrimp/Turtle828 
(India, Pakistan, Thailand and Malaysia v. US), EC - Tariff Preferences 
829(India v. EC) and the US - Cross Border Gambling Regulation810 
case (US v. Antigua-Barbuda). 831 
However, the WTO dispute settlement system is not merely a legal 
process. It has other features that allow negotiation between the 
disputing parties. In identifying the processes of dispute settlement in 
the WTO, and bearing in mind the economic and political power of the 
disputing parties, three stages can be identified. The first is the pre- 
trial stage, where power can play a significant role. At the second 
stage, the panel and AB processes are more legalistic and reduce the 
impact of any power imbalance between the disputing parties. Finally, 
at the post-trial stage, the economic and political power of the 
disputing parties may have a vital role in the dispute process. Here we 
shall examine the pre-litigation stage and consider the role of third 
parties. 
Hoekman and Mavroidis argue that in cases where bilateral 
settlements take place between developing countries and their 
developed counterparts, the settlement is more likely to be unfair: 
827 United States - Restrictions on Imports of. Cotton and Man-Made Fiber 
Underwear, appellate body report, WT/DS24/AB/R, adopted on 10 February 1997. 
[hereinafter US Underwear] 
828 United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, panel 
report, WT/DS58/R, adopted on 15 May 1998, appellate body report, 
WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted on 12 October 1998. [hereinafter US Shrimp] 
829 EC - Tariff Preferences, panel report, WT/DS246/R, adopted on 01-12-03; 
appellate body, WT/DS246/AB/R, adopted on 20 September 2004. [hereinafter EC 
Tariff Preferences] 
830 US Gambling, note 818. 
831 Mitsuo Matsushita, note 825, p. 4. 
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"When developing countries participate in such deals along 
with developed countries, because of the inequality of 
power between the two, they might be forced to non wTO- 
compatible solutions. On the other hand, when they do not 
(which is the vast majority of cases) they might see their 
rights under the WTO contract diminished since the parties 
to such deals hardly have the incentive to respect MFN. i832 
According to Article 3 of the DSU, one of the objectives of the DSM is 
to confer security and predictability on the multilateral trading 
system. 833 James Smith, a former AB member, argues that "these 
expectations reflected the conventional wisdom that moves to 
establish binding, third-party Arbitration in international law generally 
favor smaller, less powerful states, whose bargaining leverage in 
specific disputes is enhanced when impartial judges publicly endorse 
their position". 834 This supports the contention of Shaffer that "fear of 
political and economic pressure from the United States and EC 
undermines their ability to bring WTO claims", 835 
Shaffer makes an interesting point in this regard. He argues that 
developed countries such as the EU and the US are well prepared to 
take up the cost of bringing their cases to the DSM. Developing 
countries, on the other hand, have a limited legal and financial 
832 Hoekman & Mavroidis, 'Enforcing Multilateral Commitments: Dispute Settlement 
and Developing Countries', (1999), available on line at, 
http: //www2. cid. harvard. edu/cidtrade/Issues/hoekman. pdf, last seen on 20-07-04 
at9am, p. 17. 
833 Victor Mosoti, "Does Africa Need The WTO Dispute Settlement System? ', in 
Gregory Shaffer, Victor Mosoti, and Asif Qureshi(eds), Towards A Development- 
Supportive Dispute Settlement System in the WTO, (ICTSD, 2003), p. 6. 
834 James Smith, "Inequality in international trade? Developing countries and 
institutional change in WTO dispute settlement', (2004), 11 Review of International 
Political Economy 542, p. 543- 
835 Gregory Shaffer, "How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for 
Developing Countries', in Gregory Shaffer, Victor Mosoti, and Asif Qureshi, Towards a 
Development-Supportive Dispute Settlement System in the WTO, (ICTSD, 2003), 
p. 14. 
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capacity, which makes it harder for them to exploit the legal 
procedures under the DSU. This will increase the developing countries' 
motivation to accept an unfair settlement outside the legalized WTO 
dispute settlement system. Shaffer argues: 
"'When developing countries are unable to mobilize legal 
resources cost-effectively, their threats to invoke WTO 
legal procedures against a developed country lack 
credibility. Unless developing countries are able to develop 
techniques to more cost-effectively mobilize legal 
resources, they actually could be worse off under a 
legalized system that has become much more resource- 
intensive in its demands. "836 
In connection with the significance of the economic power of the 
parties to the GATT dispute settlement system, Guzman and Simmons 
argue that in the WTO consultation process the economic or political 
influence of the parties also matters. In this respect, they assert that if 
consultation involves parties with unequal economic or political power, 
the most probable result is early settlement, because a smaller or less 
powerful defendant is more prepared to accept the demands of the 
larger and more powerful party. In addition, the more economically or 
politically powerful member "might be especially able to extract and 
employ implicit threats of retaliation in order to avoid a panel. On the 
other hand, fairly symmetrical disputing pairs might be more likely to 
resort to panels if neither side has the leverage to force a concession 
from the other. f, 837 
836 Ibid., pp. 14-15. and Gregory Shaffer, "The Challenges of WTO Law: Strategies for 
Developing Country Adaptation', paper presented at The WTO at 10: The Role of 
Developing Countries in Negotiations and Dispute Settlement, Cairo, Egypt, ( 11-13- 
2006), available on line at, http: //www. worldtradelaw. net/articles/shafferdc. pdf, last 
seen on 28-03-2009 at 7: 35 pm, pp. 16-20. 
837 Andrew Guzman and Beth A. Simmons, 'To Settle or Rmpanel? An Empirical 
Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the World Trade Organization', (2002), 31(1) 
part 2 Journal of Legal Studies 216, pp. 216-217. 
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Guzman and Simmons have examined a number of cases involving 
disputing states of different strengths, in order to discover whether a 
power imbalance would mean that the dispute would not reach a panel 
but would be settled at the consultation phase. Guzman and Simmons 
considered cases which were brought both by developed and by 
developing countries in each of these categories. It was found that 
economic power imbalances could lead to cases not being taken to the 
panel stage. For instance, they examined the GDP of the disputing 
parties and found that, where the respondent or the complainant had a 
higher GDP, the weaker party would be more likely to settle at the 
consultation stage, rather than taking the case to the panel phase. 838 
In addition, Guzman and Simmons looked at the 'bilateral trading 
relationships' of the disputing parties to examine the effect of any 
power imbalance on the settlement of the dispute at the consultation 
stage. This was done in light of the fact that it is one of the main tasks 
of the WTO to give market access to other members based on the MFN 
treatments. Such trade and economic dependence of the developing 
countries on their larger counterparts will negatively affect the 
negotiating power of the former. This could result in a dependent 
member making concessions during consultations, so as to avoid 
risking the preferential access to the respondent's market. Hence, "the 
greater the dependence of the complainant on the export market of 
the defendant, the more willing the complainant should be to accept 
concessions, and the less likely it is that the case will escalate" . 
839 
Many developing countries which are members of the WTO find that 
over 90% of their exports rely on special access to the markets of 
developed countries. As a result, if one of the disputing parties has a 
838 Ibid., pp. 217-218. 
839 Ibid. 
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lower GDP than the other, and a greater market dependence, then 
whether as respondent or complainant, its bargaining power will be 
negatively affected. This would make it likely to accept an 
unfavourable settlement during the consultation phase, and lessen the 
likelihood of the case going to the panel phase. 840 
Petersmann argues that the ideal method of peaceful dispute 
settlement is one which is non-discriminatory, and one which provides 
equal rights to the disputing parties to defend their interests under fair 
and just procedural rules. In addition, he considers that both 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) approaches (such as mediation, 
arbitration and conciliation) and binding dispute settlement systems 
(such as the WTO dispute mechanism) are useful and could be chosen 
to resolve any trade conflict, depending upon the conditions and 
circumstances of the dispute. Furthermore, he argues that a binding 
dispute mechanism is more likely to be preferred by the smaller and 
less powerful parties, since it reduces the power imbalance among the 
conflicting parties. 841 
Thailand was forced to settle early in seven disputes for political 
reasons842. In addition, Petersmann contends that LDCs face difficult 
situations in the WTO and cannot seek the establishment of a WTO 
panel. This is not because they do not have enough cases to bring 
forward, but because they face many impediments, such as the high 
840 Ibid. Also, Zejan and Frank, in an empirical analysis, link the difficulties of facing 
developing countries, and particularly LDCs, when negotiating with their developed 
counterparts in the consultation phase over the amount of aid and preferential 
development programmes that they receive; Pilar Zejan and Frank L. Bartels, 'Be 
Nice and Get Your Money: An Empirical Analysis of World Trade Organization 
Disputes and Aid', (2006), 40(6) Journal of World Trade 1021, pp. 1021-1023. 
841 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, note 738, pp. 303-307. 
842 This has been dealt with in chapter three, section 3.3.3. 
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cost of bringing a case, non-cooperation from the private sector and 
the fact that their economies are often dependent on special trade 
preferences awarded by the more developed members. It is possible 
that an LDC, such as Bangladesh, could decide to use the DSM and try 
to lessen the power imbalance. This could be achieved by seeking the 
assistance of the ACWL (and to a limited extent the WTO secretariat) 
according to Article 27.2 of the DSU. However, Bangladesh and many 
other LDCs were advised by both the ACWL and the WTO secretariat 
not to proceed to the WTO panel phase. 843 
The dispute that was brought by Bangladesh was concluded at the 
consultation phase without a request for a panel. This is very 
interesting in terms of illustrating how developing countries could 
perhaps settle in consultation without gaining full concessions from the 
defendant. More interestingly, it could show how they may be advised 
to do so by those who were supposed to be defending them and 
bringing their cases forward to the panel and the AB. This is explicit 
evidence of how unfair settlements can happen during the consultative 
process. 
In addition, other interesting forms of misuse of the settlement 
process in the consultation phase have been identified. Practice shows 
that although the consultation phase has been successful to a certain 
extent in settling disputes without the need to go to the panel and the 
AB, the political nature of the consultation has been abused by some 
members in order to delay cases and to avoid the establishment of 
panels. This is because when the disputing parties have reached a 
mutually acceptable resolution they could continue consulting with 
843 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, note 738, pp. 308-309. 
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each other even after the expiry of the 60-day limit. This is why some 
members agree to settle, not for the sake of the settlement, but for 
the sake of the delay and the avoidance of the initiation of a panel. In 
a great number of disputes, the consultation stage has taken up to 15 
months to conclude, instead of the 60 days provided in Article 4. 
It has been suggested by Okediji that multilateral negotiation could be 
a useful bargaining strategy, helping developing countries to reduce 
the power disparities between them and their developed counterparts, 
while negotiating the TRIPS agreement. 844 He argues that: 
"In short, the dichotomy between national and 
international affairs is increasingly difficult to sustain. The 
overlapping of domains with respect to just one state actor 
becomes unmanageable when multiple actors converge to 
negotiate a multiplicity of issues, as is typically the case in 
multilateral trade negotiations. Indeed, the characteristic 
use of coalitions in multilateral settings is one way to 
manage this complexity, even as it introduces an 
additional set of issues to the broader negotiation 
process. 11845 
A very recent case illustrates the importance of the role of third parties 
in helping to negotiate a settlement in support of a smaller and less 
developed member against a larger and more developed one. In this 
case, Antigua and Barbuda called for the support of other WTO 
members to support it in attempting to force the US to negotiate a 
compliance settlement regarding the Gambling dispute846. It failed to 
convince the US to make its inconsistent measures comply with the 
WTO rules, despite the ruling of the panel and the AB against the US 
844 Ruth L. Okediji, 'The Nexus Symposium: An Interdisciplinary Forum on The 
Impact of International Patent & Trade Agreements in the Fight against HIV & Aids', 
(2003), 17 emory int'l I. rev 819, pp. 841-843. 
845 Ibid., p. 843. 
846 US Gambling, note 818. 
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behaviour. Therefore, since Antigua's retaliation would go unnoticed by 
the US, it asked other members to help it to put pressure on the US to 
meet its obligations and to implement an adopted ruling against its 
restriction of internet gambling. This is what happened when Antigua 
decided to negotiate a mutually acceptable resolution with the US 
(which they initially wanted) without seeking the DSM's final decision. 
Mark Mendel, the leading counsel to the Antiguan government on the 
case, 847 
`reiterated to WTO Members at the 22 May meeting that 
what his government wanted most was a mutually 
acceptable compromise. However, he said, 'The US never 
engaged with us in any discussions with a view to 
settlement or compromise. The only solution we were ever 
offered by the United States was for us to abandon our 
claim and go away. 111848. 
This raises serious questions about the function of the WTO dispute 
settlement system for developing countries. In fact, a comparison 
could be drawn between the implementation stage and consultation 
stage, since the notion of power plays a vital role in both. Developing 
countries are less politically and economically powerful, have greater 
market dependence, and depend economically on the preferential 
access provided by developed countries. This makes it more difficult 
for them to negotiate settlements with their developed counterparts at 
the consultation and implementation stages of the WTO dispute 
process. For this reason, the African group proposed a joint 
implementation, which would allow a developing country to form a 




coalition of WTO members to implement an adopted decision against 
developed countries. 849 
The presence of the same "power ratio' between developed and 
developing countries during consultation has also led Qureshi to 
propose the attendance of a third member or a WTO official in the 
course of the consultation phase. This presence would be for 
monitoring purposes, and could reduce the effect of the power 
difference between developed and developing countries during 
consultation. 850 The approach taken by the African group regarding 
joint retaliation, and the idea put forward by Qureshi regarding the 
attendance of third members during consultation, also represent the 
views of both WTO members and academics. One can argue that third 
party intervention can play a role in reducing the power imbalances in 
negotiations. It can also back up the Costa Rican proposal for the 
enhancement of third party rights in the consultation process. 
6.7.1 Pressure on violators to participate in fact 
finding 
As has been discussed, mutually agreed resolutions are always 
preferable and are the prime objective of the consultation process 
under the DSU. However, this function has been undermined by the 
unwillingness of some of the disputing parties to negotiate in good 
faith. This is because they consider the consultation phase to be a pre- 
trial stage and do not participate in an effective fact-finding process 
during consultation. 851 Indeed, engaging in fact-finding during the 
849 More detail on the power imbalance at the enforcement stage and on the African 
proposal is given in chapter three section 3.3.6. 
850 Asif H. Qureshi, note 787, p. 197. 
85 p Alan Wm. Wolff, note 809, pp. 422-423. 
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consultation phase is vital for defending the measures under dispute. 
This may both prove vital for the removal of some, if not all, of the 
measures under dispute. It will also help to identify and prepare for 
the issues and measures that will need to be discussed before the 
panel in case of an escalation of the dispute. Effective fact-finding 
processes will help to develop the legal bases and agreements of the 
dispute. Some claims could be eradicated if the complainants reached 
agreement, which would lead to better functioning of the panel. The 
absence of discussion and fact finding have undermined the 
effectiveness of the consultation stage. 852 
The India - Patent case illustrates how vital it can be for effective fact- 
finding processes to be undertaken during the consultation phase. 
During the consultation process, while investigating the factual matters 
of this dispute, the US requested some information about "an 
administrative system for receiving 'mailbox' patent applications". 
India, however, refused to respond to the US queries. 
853 
The AB in the India - Patent insisted on the importance of the fact- 
finding process in consultation and stated that: 
"All parties engaged in dispute settlement under the DSU 
must be fully forthcoming from the very beginning both as 
to the claims involved in a dispute and as to the facts 
relating to those claims. Claims must be stated clearly. 
Facts must be disclosed freely. This must be so in 
consultations as well as in the more formal setting of panel 
proceedings. In fact, the demands of due process that are 
implicit in the DSU make this especially necessary during 
consultations, for the claims that are made and the facts 
that are established during consultations do much to shape 
852 William J. Davey and Amelia Porges, note 772, p. 705. 




and the scope of subsequent panel 
Moreover, it has been argued that the majority of the proposals that 
have been put forward to strengthen the consultation process would 
lead to an increase in the formality of the process. This, by its nature, 
is informal and needs to remain so. 
855 
Apart from these proposals, it has been suggested that the fact- finding 
process between the disputing parties ought to be encouraged. It has 
even been suggested that a distinction could be made between the 
principle of good faith and fact finding in the consultation process, or 
that the principles and rules of the functioning of the fact-finding 
process in the consultation could be established, which would result in 
a more effective consultative process. The AB has explained the 
consequences of the good faith and due process during consultations 
in the above-mentioned statement. However, it is not the function of 
the AB to separate the fact-finding process from the exercise of good 
faith in consultation, since by "making it a separate function it would 
be likely to change the nature of consultations, which would be 
contrary to the spirit of the DSU". 856 
In parallel with fact-finding issues, it has been argued that third party 
intervention would have the advantage of enriching the consultative 
process by adding different dimensions and claims regarding the issue 
under dispute. This would result in stronger legal claims, in order to 
make more convincing arguments to win the case in favour of the 
854 India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, 
appellate body report, WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted on 12 December 1997, para. 94. 
[hereinafter India Patent] 
855 Kim Van der Borght, note 813, pp. 1237-1238. 
856 Ibid. 
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parties that they support. The third parties would also add multilateral 
pressure on reluctant respondents, in order to negotiate effectively 
and bring the breaching measures into conformity with WTO rules. 857 
Another dimension regarding the facts being raised during the 
consultation process is that they can be unitized in the parties' and 
third parties' written submissions before the panel. The result is that a 
third party which had not participated in the consultation, or whose 
request to intervene in the consultation was declined by the disputing 
party, would be prevented from gaining valuable information about the 
dispute which would have strengthened its arguments before the panel 
and the AB. 858 
6.8 Discrimination among Third Parties in 
Consultation 
There are certain steps which need to be taken before a WTO member 
can intervene in the consultation process, according to para 11 of 
Article 4 of the DSU. Hence, any member that wishes to intervene 
must notify the DSB and the principal disputing parties of its interest 
and intention to intervene within a certain time limit. The principal 
disputing parties are then allowed to examine whether this interest is 
'well founded'. 859 This has resulted in many intervention requests 
being rejected. Para 11 gives an individual right to the principal parties 
(defendant and respondent) to accept or decline other members' 
requests to intervene as third parties in the consultation process. Such 
857 ]in Gu, 'China and the WTO Dispute Settlement', (2005), available online at 
http: //www. nottinqham. ac. uk/iaps/GuJinq%20paper. pdf, last seen on 25-10-2007 at 
5pm, p. 27. 
858 WTO Analytical Index, World Trade Organisation Legal Affairs Division, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 1139-1140. 
859 Article 4.11 of the DSU 
? 60 
declination of intervention is frequently based on the fact that the 
substantial trade interest860 is not satisfied . 
861 
For instance, this unconditional power to reject third party intervention 
in the consultation stage is frequently used by the US, which will allow 
only a member with a direct trade interest in a dispute to participate 
and will decline those who have broader systemic interests in the 
dispute. This practice has led to a denial of some members' requests 
to intervene in consultation, while others have been allowed to 
intervene. As a result, many allegations of discrimination and 
unfairness have been made. 862 The use of the rights provided in para 
11 of Article 4 are described by Davey as follows: "The absence of 
control over the respondent's discretion has led to complaints of abuse 
and 'stacking' the consultations. "863 Distinguishing between parties 
which have and do not have substantial trade interests in the 
consultation is a general practice of the US. It requires third parties to 
provide information and take other measures to demonstrate that they 
have such interests when seeking intervention. 864 
Even those who have some reservations concerning the enhancement 
of the rights of third parties in the consultation phase admit that the 
rights in para 11 of Article 4 have been used excessively. They argue 
860 See also chapter five, section 5.2. 
861 S. Narayanan, 'Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO: need for 
improvement and clarification', Indian Council for Research on International 
Economic Relations Working Paper no. 117, (2003), available online at 
http: //www. icrier. orq/pdf/wpll7. pd , 
last seen on 3-6-2008 at 1 pm, p. 44; 
Discussion Paper from the European Communities: Review of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), Brussels, 21 October 1998; James Smith, note 834, p. 552. 
862 Gavin Goh and Trudy Witbreuk, 'The WTO Dispute Settlement System', (2001), 
available at http: //www. dfat. qov. au/trade/-neqotiations/disputes/wto 
disputes- 
papers-dispute settlement. doc, last seen on 04-03-07 at gam, 2001, p. 
14. 
863 William J. Davey and Amelia Porges, note 772, pp. 2-3. 
864 Ibid., p. 5. 
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that guidelines ought to be developed to overcome the excessive use 
of para 11 of Article 4 of the DSU. 865 Third party intervention in 
consultation is vital, although in practice such participation is 
restricted. This validates members' calls for the reform of third party 
participation in consultation, which, therefore, needs to be dealt with. 
Practice shows that: 
"the respondent has denied claims of 'substantial trade 
interest' from parties who both expressed and had obvious 
substantial trade interests, or accepted such claims only 
from parties likely to be sympathetic, or denied 
participation by any WTO Member that had requested 
consultations in its own right866... In the end, the historical 
trend may overwhelmingly favor enforcement over 
settlement, particularly where it is clear that a 
respondent's exclusion of parties from Article XXII 
consultations is not in aid of settlement but purely for 
obstruction and delay. 11867 
6.9 Developing Countries' Direct Interests 
It has been argued that the capacity of developing countries is 
restricted. This imposes a serious challenge in identifying valid trade 
barriers that affect their exports. Supporting developing countries to 
identify clearly and understand any existing inconsistent trade 
measures will allow them to pursue more legally robust and successful 
disputes. 868 Also, once a request for consultation is made, a formal 
dispute is triggered under the WTO, a DS number is allocated and the 
request is published on the WTO website. Therefore, the consultation 
process plays a vital role in allowing members to gather more facts 
865 Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/7, (26 June 2003), p. 6. 
866 William J. Davey and Amelia Porges, note 772, p. 701- 
867 Ibid. 
868 Roderick Abbott, 'Are Developing Countries Deterred from Using the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System? ', (2007), available online at www. ecipe. org/archived- 
events/are developing-countries-deterred-from-using-the-wto-dispute-settlement- 
system, last seen on 4-9-2007 at 3pm, pp. 12-13. 
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and information related to the dispute and to " exchange views about 
any violation of the rules that has been alleged". 869 
In fact, many smaller developing countries have desired to participate 
as third parties in the consultation process, because they have real 
interests in a dispute and believe that by doing so they can discover 
whether such a dispute would negatively affect their interests. 
Enhancing third party rights would allow developing countries to 
intervene effectively in consultation without being obstructed. Then, a 
developing country which had intervened in a consultation could 
decide if it was in its interests to make its own request for a 
consultation regarding the issue under dispute. 870 
There are various ways to participate in the different stages of the 
DSM; thus, the effort to participate will also vary according to how a 
member chooses to do so. Joint consultation as a third party is the 
easiest way for developing countries to be involved in the DSM. In 
Roderick Abbott's words, "to seek to join in (that is, to be present) as 
a third party during bilateral consultations does not take much effort 
(a simple request), nor require any active participation, whereas the 
pursuit of a case into a panel procedure as a complainant does involve 
substantial, and at times prolonged, investment of resources in time 
and effort". 871 
869 Ibid., p. 7. 
870 S. Narayanan, note 861, p. 46- 
871 Roderick Abbott, note 868, pp. 6-7. 
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6.10 The Reform of Third Party Rights in 
Consultation: Substantial Trade Interest vs. 
Substantial Interest 
When making proposals to enhance the rules that govern the 
consultation phase, it is vital to consider and maintain the informal 
character of the process. 872 Strengthening third party rights in 
consultation will not affect the informal character of the political 
process. More importantly, it is vital to consider the interests of the 
developing countries when analyzing the reform of third party 
intervention in the consultation process. This is because it is easier for 
developed countries to be involved in the consultation, panel and AB 
stages, as they have the legal and financial resources required. 
Additionally, they face less political restraint and have wider trade 
interests. This is reflected in the statistics on WTO cases, where 
developed countries account for an overwhelming majority of the 
disputes brought to the DSM, both as principals and as third parties. 873 
Unlike their developed counterparts, developing countries face many 
obstacles once they have decided to bring a case to the WTO dispute 
mechanism. Their limited financial and legal resources, as well as 
political constraints such as military and trade dependence, could 
prevent them from bringing a dispute, despite the fact that they have 
often expressed their concerns regarding procedural injustices that 
872 Asif H. Qureshi, note 787, p. 197. 
873 In this respect the representative of China has argued that 
"Such an approach 
was too rigid and failed to take into account the differences among 
the requesting 
countries. Furthermore, it could also lead to a practice where the responding Member 
might be tempted to routinely reject all the requests, especially where they 
considered that one particular request was not justified. 
" Minutes of Meeting, 
TN/DS/N/32, (29 June 2006), pp-1-2- 
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restrict their interactions with the WTO dispute settlement system. 874 
For developing countries, the option of being a third party is vital. This 
helps them to develop their experience and familiarity with the 
system, and make their views and interests known. It is also a more 
cost-effective way, both financially and politically, to access the 
DSM. 875 
Additionally, as far as consultation is concerned, third parties can help 
developing countries to avoid unfair settlements in the consultation 
phase. In addition, by encouraging the fact-finding process they can 
put pressure on the respondent to move towards a negotiated 
settlement in the consultation phase without resorting to the panel. 
Finally, third party status can assist developing countries to decide 
whether the case is significant enough to warrant the move to the 
panel stage. 
The DSU has chosen a restrictive approach regarding third party 
intervention in all stages of dispute settlement, including the 
consultation, panel and AB processes. This is so even when third 
parties have a very substantial trade interest directly related to the 
dispute. This has raised objections to the present role of third parties 
in the dispute settlement process and to proposals for reform being 
made. 876 
874 More detail on these issues in chapters two and three. 
875 More detail on these issues is given in chapter four. 
876 Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/1, (12 June 2002), p. 4. 
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6.10.1 Removal of Members' discretion to decline a 
third party's participation 
The views of members and academics have varied on how third party 
intervention in consultation could be enhanced. These views need to 
be examined carefully. For example, Chinese Taipei and Jamaica have 
both proposed that principal parties should keep their right to decline 
third parties' requests to intervene in consultation. However, they 
argue that a guideline ought to be developed to prevent discriminatory 
rejection of such requests. 
This proposal has been criticised as unrealistic on the grounds that it 
would be difficult to develop appropriate guidelines which would 
eliminate such discrimination without prejudice to the rights of 
principal and third parties. Indeed, it has proven difficult for WTO 
members to reach an agreed and unified definition of the term 
'substantial trade interests'. 877 In addition, it is argued that 
"there appears to be no basis for the fear expressed by 
Chinese Taipei that if the rules relating to third parties 
joining in the consultations were relaxed, the sanctity of 
the consultation process would be adversely affected. Even 
under the existing provisions of Article 4.11 of the DSU, if a 
party' s request to join the consultations is refused, that 
party can seek direct consultations, which cannot be 
refused. 11878 
It has been suggested that an 'all or nothing' approach should be set 
as a guideline for the rejection of third party intervention in 
$" "There was also the risk of discrimination among Members requesting to be joined 
in the consultations. Practice appeared to indicate that it was the defending Member 
which usually rejected requests to be joined in the consultations by third countries. 
Attempts to address this issue in the past had focused on finding an appropriate 
definition for the term substantial trade interest". Such efforts had so far failed as 
participants could not agree on a common definition. Minutes of Meeting, 
TN/DS/M/23, (26 May 2005), pp. 1-2. 
878 S. Narayanan, note 861, p. 45. 
266 
consultation. According to such a rule, the parties to a particular 
dispute would have to accept all the requests of third parties to 
intervene in consultation, or else decline them all. 879 However, this 
proposal is weak, since the majority of third party requests are made 
on a genuine basis. 880 So it would be unfair for those with a very 
significant interest in the dispute to be punished by the application of 
an Nall or none' rule. 
Interestingly, the rule that allows disputing parties to decline third 
party intervention makes it more difficult for WTO members to act as 
third parties in consultation than to make a separate request for 
consultation as a co-complainant. Hence, all WTO members have 
unconditional rights to undertake their own consultations. 881 
Bearing in mind that third parties have the inalienable rights to 
establish their own panel (according to Article 4) and to appear as co- 
complainants (according to Article 9) much time is wasted. The EC has 
argued that "third parties in consultations that decide that they want 
to lodge a request for a panel have to undertake new consultations of 
their own. As a result, considerable time is lost and several panels may 
come about on the same subject. i882 Also, joining as a co-complainant 
would result in even more complicated disputes and would increase 
their transactional costs. This is because co-complainants have more 
879 "The G-7 advocates an 'all or nothing' approach to third party participation - 
according to which the responding Member would have the option of accepting or 
rejecting all such requests, but would not have the option to discriminate among 
would-be third parties" Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 10, number 14,26 
April 2006. 
880 S. Narayanan, note 861, p. 45. 
881 Then they could join the dispute as a co-complainant, according to Article 9. 
882 Discussion paper from the European Communities, Subject: Review of the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU), Brussels, 21 October 1998, available online at 
http: //www lancs ac uk/fass/law/intlaw/ibuslaw/-docs/wt-eu-dsrev. htm, last seen on 
12-9-2007 at 12 am. 
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rights than third parties and because third party claims and interests 
must be considered and examined by the panel and the AB. 883 
Therefore, it could be argued that third party rights should be 
enhanced at the consultation stage. Otherwise, members with 
interests in a case will be limited to being co-complainants, which 
would create an extra burden on the dispute process, especially in a 
multilateral world. Improving third party rights would be a better 
option, and would restore the balance in the system between being a 
complainant, a co-complainant and a third party. Therefore, third 
parties need to have better options available to them and their 
requests for participation should not be rejected on frivolous grounds. 
The removal of the discretion that is currently given to the disputing 
parties is a simple and straightforward proposal. 884 It would eradicate 
any misuse of power and discrimination against third parties who want 
to join the consultation stage. 885 
6.10.2 Substantial interest only 
Another issue raised by Chinese Taipei is whether 'substantial trade 
interests' ought to be kept as a requirement for third party 
intervention. It expressed a concern that to keep the restrictive 
approach of admitting only third parties who have substantial trade 
interests into the consultation is unjustified for a number of reasons. 
To start with, the DSU offers the disputing parties other diplomatic 
883 Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/8, (30 June 2003), pp-4-5- 
884 In this regard Norway's representative "said that Norway... had a few questions 
which it would like Costa Rica to respond to and also to clarify certain aspects of its 
proposal. Why should there be a difference in the rights accorded under Article 4.11 
of the DSU to third parties at the consultations phase and those accorded to them 
under Article 10.2 during the panel stage? The easiest solution would be to opt for 
Costa Rica's proposal which would eliminate the discretion of the responding 
Member. " Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/4, (6 November 2002), p. 4. 
885 Discussion paper from the European Communities, note 882. 
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settlement options and they could invoke Article 5, which allows the 
use of mediation and other forms of ADR. Also, the principal parties 
are not restricted to the mediation provided for in Article 5. They can 
use private mediation and any other diplomatic means to settle their 
dispute peacefully, without affecting other parties' interests. This gives 
the principal parties greater flexibility regarding the participation of 
third parties. However, the principal parties have to notify the DSB of 
their settlement results, and third parties have the right to comment if 
they find that such settlements are against their interests, or else they 
can make their own request for a formal dispute process. 886 This 
allows the disputing parties a greater degree of confidentiality. Also, if 
they feel that the involvement of a third party could affect the 
settlement process, this process would differ from the consultation 
that would take place within a formal settlement process. 
In addition, using differing definitions of 'substantial interests' for 
accessing the consultation and panel processes would result in an 
incoherent and inconsistent approach, and in a discriminatory 
exclusion of third parties from the consultation phase. By contrast, 
unifying the definition of 'substantial interest' would result in more 
coherent, equal and fair access for third parties during all the stages of 
the dispute process. 887 It has also been argued that the fact that the 
term 'substantial trade interest' is not defined in para 11 of Article 4 of 
the DSU makes it even more difficult to reach a consensus between 
the WTO members on an exact definition. The fact that there has been 
886 Miryana Nesic, "International Trade Disputes the WTO Regime: What Happened to 
the Mediation Option? ", available on line at 
http: //www. cpradr. orq/EICPR/International Trade Disputes. pdf, last seen on 10-10- 
2007 at 8am, pp. 6-8. 
887 Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/7, (26 June 2003), pp. 3-4. 
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no agreement between the members so far tends to reinforce this 
argument. 888 
Thus, the term `substantial trade interest' ought simply to be replaced 
by the term 'substantial interest'889 to bring it into conformity with the 
provisions that govern third party intervention at the panel stage. As 
Carmody argues, in response to those who are worried about the 
collapse of the WTO as a result of third party intervention in disputes, 
the use of the term 'substantial interest' would be enough to guarantee 
the continuance of the DSM: 
"There are also reasons to suggest that multipartite 
intervention may not become a problem in the future 
either. One reason is the inability of Members to show 
`substantial interest', regardless of how illusory a standard 
that might be. Alternately, Members may not want to 
intervene, or as it appears from the Bananas Trilogy, may 
be content to allow other Members to appear on their 
behalf. A further pragmatic reason may be that not all 
Members have the resources to intervene. Even the 
redoubtable Office of the United States' Trade 
Representative has recently stated that it is unable to 
pursue every trade-related matter in which the U. S. has an 
interest due to lack of resources. Thus, the argument that 
the WTO resolution system will collapse as a result of 
vigorous third party participation must be repudiated. The 
Bananas Trilogy is not the first, nor in all likelihood will it 
be the last time that multiple intervention will occur. There 
is every indication that WTO dispute resolution is becoming 
truly multilateralized, thereby fulfilling its original 
conception. This development should ensure that future 
possibilities for third party participation remain of 
substantial interest. "890 
888 Ibid. 
889 The interpretation of substantial interest is examined, infra, in chapter eight. 
890 Chi Carmody, 'Of Substantial Interest: Third Parties under GATT', (1997), 18 
Michigan Journal of International Law 615, p. 615., the interpretation of the 
substantial interest will be dealt with in chapter eight section 8.4.2. 
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6.10.3 Notification of mutually agreed solutions and 
third parties 
Practice shows that in a dispute involving two advanced developed 
countries, a mutually acceptable solution was reached, but notification 
of the mutually agreed resolution of the case was delayed and the 
third party that had intervened in the case (which was a developing 
country) had also not been notified. Therefore, it was suggested that a 
developing country intervening in the consultation process ought to be 
regularly informed of developments as they occur. It should also be 
informed of any settlement agreements that take place. The latter 
could be enhanced by adding a specific timeframe for the notification 
of the settlement of the DSM to Article 3.6 of the DSU. 891 
In addition to a timely notification of any mutually agreed solution, an 
interesting point made by Switzerland could be supported in this 
respect: that the disputing party should not only notify the mutually 
agreed solution to the DSB and third parties, but also provide them 
with an account of the substance of the agreement, since the other 
WTO members and third parties would have a genuine interest in 
knowing to what extent such a settlement could nullify their trade 
interests. This suggestion was also aimed at improving the 
transparency aspect of the DSM. 892 
One of the main points regarding the reform of third party rules is the 
need to maintain a balance between the rights of third parties and 
891 TRADE Working Paper: 'Issues Regarding the Review of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism', (1999), available online at 
http: //www southcentre. org/publications/trade/dispute. pdf, last seen on 01-07-07 at 
10am, p. 32. 
892 Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/34, (4 August 2006), p. 2. 
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those of the principal parties. It is clear that the former ought not to 
exceed the latter at the consultation stage. In this regard, one ought 
to remember that after all it is at the ultimate discretion of the 
principal parties to decide whether the dispute is to be withdrawn or 
settled, or whether other means provided by the DSU for peaceful 
settlement should be used, or even whether it should be escalated to 
the panel. This gives the principal parties priority over third parties in 
the consultation process. 
Indeed, the enhancement of third party participation in the 
consultation process reflects a wider variety of developing countries' 
views. For example, Colombia argued during a special review of the 
DSU that it `"did not share the view that strengthening third-party 
rights would invariably delay the dispute settlement process. The 
rights of third parties should not be decided by the parties to the 
dispute. , 893 Mexico also argued that it "had been a third party in 
several disputes and was in support of the enhancement of third-party 
rights", 894 while "the representative of Switzerland welcomed the 
proposal by Costa Rica and said that it was a major contribution to the 
work of the Special Session. He said that Switzerland could support 
most of the proposals, especially those relating to the granting of an 
unfettered right to third parties to join in consultations. "895 Norway 
also said that it "could support most of the proposals advanced by 
Costa Rica". 896 
893 Minutes of meeting, TN/DS/M/5, ( 27 February 2003), p. 11. 
894 Minutes of meeting, TN/DS/M/7, (26 JUNE 2003), P. 5. 




So far we have seen how the relationship between developing countries 
and the GATT dispute mechanism has developed in such a way that 
many of them have participated only as third parties. Their participation 
in the WTO is increasing, but they have expressed many concerns 
regarding the function of the WTO dispute settlement system. Yet, 
many have experienced the WTO only as a third party. The majority of 
developing countries have restricted legal and financial means to bring 
their own cases. They are also under severe political, economic and 
even military pressures, which influence their decisions as to whether 
and how to pursue their cases. They have also complained in the 
appropriate forums that they suffer from procedural injustice. Their 
development objectives have, therefore, been undermined by the 
functioning of the WTO, AB and panels. 
Third party rights are particularly important for developing countries 
during the consultation stage, allowing them to decide whether in a 
particular dispute it would be in their interests to bring their own case. 
The participation of a third party on the side of a developing country 
complainant would also help to increase the pressure on the respondent 
to conduct effective consultations in good faith, in order to reach an 
agreed solution and implement it. Such third party involvement would 
also prevent a developing country complainant having to accept an 
unfair settlement as the result of a power imbalance, whether financial, 
political or military. 
Third party status gives developing countries a vital opportunity to 
develop their familiarity with the system in a more cost-effective 
manner. It provides them with access to the dispute mechanism with 
less political and economic restraints, and helps them to fulfil their 
2 7J 
international responsibilities. However, third party intervention is not a 
straightforward process. The WTO allows its members to intervene in 
the consultation, panel and appellate stages, but the DSU has restricted 
the rights of third parties more at the consultation stage than at the 
panel stage, requiring a "substantial trade interest" to be shown and 
making intervention subject to the principle parties' consideration and 
acceptance. 
Allowing easy access for third parties to the consultation stage would 
serve the interests of developing countries. This is exactly what the 
Cost Rican proposal intended to do. Therefore a number of steps can be 
taken to remove unnecessary obstructions that would impede third 
parties from participating in consultation when they have a substantial 
interest in the case: 
" The removal of the discretion of the disputing parties to decline third 
party participation; 
" The replacement of the term 'substantial trade interest' by 
'substantial interest', to be coherent with the provisions that govern 
third party intervention at the panel stage; and 
" Notifying third parties in the consultation stage of the progress of the 
consultation and any agreed resolution. 
Controversy and ambiguity arise regarding the participation of third 
parties not only in the consultation stage, but also in the panel and 
appeal processes. Therefore, the subject of Chapter seven will broaden 
the discussion on third parties' rights by analyzing their intervention in 
the course of a dispute. 
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-7- 
Third Parties in the Panel and Appeal 
Process: How Much is Too Much? 
7.1 Introduction 
The DSM has considered the broader interests of all WTO members, 
and the multiplicity of its cases, by allowing a member with a 
substantial interest in a dispute to participate as a third party during 
the panel and the AB stages. 897 According to a basic definition, a third 
party can be a person, 898 a national group, a state or an international 
institution. The WTO has allowed the second and third in this list, but 
so far has not allowed an individual to become a third party, although 
some attempts have been made. NGOs can already join the DSM as 
amici curiae, after being allowed to do so by the panel and the AB. 
Evidence was shown in the Shrimp dispute899 and the Asbestos 
case900. The intervention of an NGO would not be the subject of 
discussion. Rather, the access of a member state to the DSM as a joint 
third party would be dealt with. 
897 Palmeter and Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organisation: 
Practices and Procedure, (Second edition, Kluwer Law International, 2004), p. 109. 
898 Prof Robert Howes, American law professor, submitted a brief during the EC - 
Sardine dispute. The AB declined to admit it, but retains discretion to accept such a 
brief. 
899 United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, panel 
report, WT/DS58/R, adopted on 15 May 1998, appellate 
body report, 
WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted on 12 October 1998. [hereinafter Appellate body report on 
US Shrimp] 
900 European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing 
Products, appellate body report, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted on 
12-03-2001. 
[hereinafter Appellate body report on EC Asbestos] 
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At this point it is useful to link this chapter with previous ones. During 
GATT, developing countries rarely used the adjunction system. The 
WTO dispute settlement system was established on the assumption 
that developing countries could use it whenever they disputed an 
issue, regardless of their size and power. However, this has not 
happened and developing countries still face difficulties regarding the 
use of the WTO dispute settlement system. Nevertheless, there is an 
area in the DSM that is of particular importance for developing 
countries, and a considerable number of them have become involved 
in the DSM as third parties. Third party status appears to be vital for 
developing countries to be able to put forward their views and 
familiarise themselves with the system. It also helps protect 
developing countries from unfair settlements during the consultation 
stage. Having discussed the reform of third party status in the 
consultation phase, we will consider such reform during the course of a 
dispute. We will also examine how this could enhance the position of 
developing countries in the system without sacrificing balance and 
stretching third party provisions too far. 
The issue of enhancing third party rights was put on the negotiation 
agenda during the review of the DSM. It has proved to be popular 
amongst the negotiating members, 901 receiving considerable support. 
The DSM has allowed situations where third party rights can be 
extended, and so far this has been granted in four cases: EC - Banana 
111902, EC - Trade Preferences903, EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar904, 
901 The Members' opinions in the special session will be discussed in the coming 
section. 
902 European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas, panel report, WT/DS27/ECU, adopted on 22 May 1997; appellate body 
report, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted on 5 September 1997. [hereinafter EC Banana III] 
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and EC - Hormones905. Similarly, the request to extend third party 
rights has also been declined in many instances, such as the panel 
report in the US - 1916 Act906, Australia Salmon 907 dispute. Many ideas 
have been proposed to boost the participation of third parties in the 
DSM, including giving more rights for third parties to participate in the 
panel stage, allowing greater access to documents and the 
submissions of the participants, and giving them the opportunity to 
participate by direct intervention at the appellate stage without joining 
the dispute, according to Article 10.3 of the DSU. However, there is a 
question as to whether extending third party rights ought to 
undermine the main parties' rights during the settlement process. 
More urgently, there is the question of how third party rights can be 
improved in a way that serves the interests of the developing 
members. 908 
First, the current rights of third parties in the panel and the appeal 
process will be looked at. Then a comparison between third party 
rights in the WTO and ICJ will be made. Next, enhanced third party 
903 EC - Tariff Preferences, panel report, WT/DS246/R, adopted on 01-12-03; 
appellate body, WT/DS246/AB/R, adopted on 20 September 2004. [hereinafter EC 
Tariff Preferences] 
904 EC Sugar, EC - Export Subsidies on Sugar, panel report (complaint by Thailand, 
Brazil and Australia), WT/DS/283/R, WT/DS266/R, WT/DS265/R, 15 October 2004, 
appellate body report, WT/DS/283/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS265/AB/R, 
adopted on 28 April 2005. [hereinafter EC Sugar] 
905 EC - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), panel report, 
WT/DS26/R, , adopted on 18-08-1997, appellate 
body report, WT/DS48/AB/R - 
WT/DS26/AB/R, adopted on 16-01-1998. [hereinafter EC Hormones] 
906 United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (Complaint by Japan), panel report 
WT/DS162/R, 29 May 2000, appellate body report, WT/DS162/AB/R, adopted on 28 
August 2000. [hereinafter US Act 1916 complaint by Japan], United States - Anti- 
Dumping Act of 1916 (Complaint by EC), panel report, WT/DS 136/R, adopted on 31 
March 2000. [hereinafter US Act 1916 Complaint by EC]. 
907 Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, panel report, WT/DS18/R, 
adopted on 12 June 1998. [hereinafter Australia Salmon] 
908 David Evans and Celso De Tarso Pereira, 'DSU Review: a view from the inside', in 
Rufus Yerxa and Bruce Wilson(eds), Key Issues in the WTO Dispute Settlement: the 
First Ten Years, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005), pp. 261-262. 
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rights during the panel process will be analyzed with reference to 
developing countries. Finally, the evolution of third party rights in the 
appeal process will be discussed with reference to amicus curiae and 
developing countries. The chapter ends with a summary. 
7.2 Third Party Rights in the Panel and AB 
Processes 
Third party intervention during the course of litigation is governed by 
Article 10 for the panel process and Article 17 for the AB process of the 
DSU. As far as the panel process is concerned, Article 10 is divided 
into 4 sections. Para 1 recognizes that third parties have a right to 
participate in the DSM by stating: "The interests of the parties to a 
dispute and those of other Members under a covered agreement at 
issue in the dispute shall be fully taken into account during the panel 
process". Para 2 of Article 10 allows WTO members which are not 
party to a dispute and which have a substantial interest909 to join the 
dispute and present oral and written submissions. In addition, the 
submission of these parties "shall be reflected in the panel report". 910 
Para 3 allows third parties to access the submissions of the parties 
during the first meeting911 of the panel. 912 Para 4 allows third parties 
to bring their own case against inconsistent measures and to invoke 
909 This is different from the requirement to participate in consultation. More detail 
on "substantial trade interest' versus 'substantial interest' in consultation can be 
found in chapter five. 
910 In all of the decisions made by the panel, the view of third parties is stated in the 
panel report found on the WTO website. 
911 Even in the first meeting they are limited: "But a third party cannot participate in 
meetings between parties, even, the first one. Third parties are not allowed to put 
questions to parties, although these, with the panel, can put questions to third 
parties. " Pierre Monnier, 'Working Procedures: Recent Changes and Prospective 
Developments', in Dencho Georgiev and Kim Van Der Borght(eds), Reform and 
development of the WTO dispute settlement system, (Cameron May, London, 2006), 
p. 227. 
912 The panel usually meets twice, according to the DSM. 
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"'the original panel wherever possible". Appendix 3, para 6 allows all 
third parties which have notified the DSB of their interest in a dispute 
to be invited in writing to present their views during a session of the 
first substantive meeting of the panel set aside for that purpose. All 
such third parties may be present during the entirety of this session. 
There is a great difference between third party participation in the 
panel process and the consultation stage. A third party in the panel 
process does not have to be a third party in the consultation, and the 
access of a third party to the panel is easier than the narrow 
requirements of 'substantial trade interests' and the disputing parties' 
approval to join the consultation. 'Substantial interest'913 is the only 
requirement to join the panel process, and this is usually not even 
questioned, making it almost automatic to join the panel as a third 
party. In practice, members with broader systematic interests are 
allowed to participate as third parties during the panel stage. 914 
What happens in practice is that the DSB gives other interested parties 
ten days from the initiation of the panel to show their intention to 
participate as third parties. In the DSB meeting which sets up the 
panel, it is sufficient to do so verbally. However, after that, and within 
or after this time period of the initiation of the panel, interested parties 
can make a written notification to the DSB via the WTO secretariat of 
their wish to participate as third parties during the panel process. 915 A 
third party may intervene on behalf of a respondent or a complainant. 
913 See also chapter five, section 5.2. 
914 WTO Secretariat, A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004), p. 9. 
915 Ibid. 
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Third party intervention in the appeal process is governed by Article 
17.4 of the DSU. Para 4 of Article 17 states that the right to appeal is 
an exclusive right of the main parties, and third parties cannot request 
an appeal on their own. However, it allows third parties who have 
participated in the panel to "be given an opportunity to be heard by 
the AB". There are additional guidelines provided in the AB working 
procedures for participants, now called 'third participants' in the appeal 
process. However, the panel as well as AB have been very active in 
this regard, and has departed from the rules as originally set out in the 
DSU, as will be discussed later. 
7.3 Extended Third Party Rights during the 
Panel Process 
7.3.1 The EC - Banana III dispute 
The Banana case916 is a landmark dispute in WTO jurisprudence and 
the evolution of third party rights. Apart from the significant number of 
third parties intervening in the case, the panel extended the right of 
third parties to participate at the request of the third parties 
themselves. More specifically, these members requested that they be 
granted the right of presence at all meetings of the panel with the 
parties, as well as the right to make statements at all such meetings. 
Furthermore, they demanded the right to receive copies of all 
submissions and other materials, and to be granted permission to 
make written submissions to both meetings of the panel. While the 
DSB took note of these statements, there was no consensus on such 
participation in the dispute and what broader rights should be granted 
916 EC Banana III, note 902. 
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beyond those provided in Article 10 of the DSU, which restricted 
participation in the first meeting of the panel. 917 
The panel accepted the request for an extension of third party rights 
and allowed members of governments of third parties to observe the 
second substantive meeting of the panel with the parties. The panel 
also envisaged that observers would have the opportunity to make a 
brief statement at a suitable moment during the second meeting. 918 
The reasons for extending these rights were: 
A% i) the economic effect of the disputed EC banana 
regime on certain third parties appeared to be very large; 
(ii) the economic benefits to certain third parties from 
the EC banana regime were claimed to derive from an 
international treaty between them and the EC; 
(iii) past practice in panel proceedings involving the 
banana regimes of the EC and its Member States; and 
(iv) the parties to the dispute could not agree on the 
issue. 
As a consequence of our ruling, the third parties in these 
proceedings enjoyed broader participatory rights than are 
granted to third parties under the DSU. "919 
Covelli observes that this ruling by the WTO panel was very 
"generous" and a departure from the practice of GATT, 920 approaching 
917 Website, http: //www. wto. orq/english/res e/booksp e/analytic index e/ 
dsu 04 e. htm#fntext357, last seen on 12-2-2008 at 10: 20am. 
918 EC - Bananas III, panel report, note 902, para. 7.8. 919 Ibid. 
920 The Banana III dispute was a departure from the GATT practice, as third party 
rights were extended when there was an agreement between the disputing parties to 
grant third parties such extended rights. The panel in Banana III extended the rights 
of third parties, with all the disputing parties agreeing with such an extension. 
Website, 
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closely the practice of the ICJ. He also distinguishes between two 
types of third party: the first are those who were party to a 
preferential trade agreement with the EC (the Laime Convention); and 
the second consisted of Canada and Japan, which were not party to a 
preferential trade agreement with the EC. In GATT there had to be an 
agreement between the parties to extend third party rights. However, 
after the panel ruling in Banana III, third party rights could be 
extended, even if the parties had not agreed to do so. 921 Covelli also 
observes that the panel established a precedent by extending the 
rights of two members (Canada and Japan) who were not party to a 
'plurilateral trade agreement' with any of the parties. In this regard, 
the panel's decision can be criticized, as neither of the two members 
would suffer severe economic damage as a result of the measures 
imposed by the EC on the import of bananas. Nor were they party to 
any special trade agreement with disputing parties, as the Banana II 
had given extended rights only to those parties with special trade 
agreements with the EC. 922 
While acknowledging that third party status is vital for developing 
countries, it is clear that they mostly make their case jointly with other 
members (either developed or developing countries) and in many 
cases where they have had a very special interest in a case they have 
intervened as third parties after the establishment of the WTO. 923 
Developing countries did not secure better third party rights as a result 
http: //www. wto. org/enqlish/res e/booksp e/analytic index e/dsu 04 e. htm#fntext 
357, last seen on 12-2-2008 at 10: 20am 
921 EEC- import Regime for Bananas, GATT panel report, DS38/R, adopted on 11 
June 1994, paras. 7-8-9. [hereinafter Banana II], and Nick Covelli, 'Public 
International Law and Third Party Participation in WTO Panel', (1999), 33(2) Journal 
of World Trade 125, pp. 130-135. 
922 Ibid. 
923 Most developing countries participate in the system as third parties. More details 
on recent trends are presented in chapter four. 
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of the request for enhanced third party rights in the EC - Banana 
dispute. They could not participate with parties after the second 
substantive meeting of the panel and their request for participation in 
the interim stage was declined by the panel, 924 even though they had 
a very significant economic interest in the case. Also, as a result of the 
panel's statement that they "'enjoyed broader participatory rights than 
are granted to third parties under the DSU", 925 this ruling applied only 
to the EC dispute. Developing countries could not be guaranteed to 
have the same "limited enhanced third party rights" in subsequent 
cases initiated under the DSU. Therefore, the enhancement of third 
party rights on a permanent basis is a matter for the WTO, as a rule- 
making body through the DSB, to deliberate. Indeed, the 
strengthening of third party rights is just one of many issues that have 
been raised by WTO members during the course of the DSU Review 
Process. 926 This early anticipation by Footer will be substantiated by an 
examination of some very recent disputes in the following sections. 
7.3.2 EC - Hormones and US - 1916 Act 
Canada and the US brought a dispute against the EC measures 
concerning meat and meat products (hormones)927 in which each 
complainant requested extended third party rights in the other's case. 
The panel approved their requests, granted further rights to Canada 
and the US to access all the information in both disputes, and allowed 
924 EC - Bananas III, panel report, note 902, para. 
7.9. 
925 EC - Bananas III, panel report, note 
902, para. 7.8. 
926 Mary E Footer, `Developing Countries' Practice in the Matter of WTO Dispute 
Settlement', (2001), 35(1) Journal of World Trade 55, pp. 90-94. 
927 EC - Hormones, panel report, note 
905. 
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the US to attend the second meeting of the panel and to present its 
view to the panel in the proceedings initiated by Canada. 928 
At the appeal stage, the EC expressed its disagreement with the 
panel's decision to grant additional third party rights to Canada and 
the US, arguing that extending the rights of third parties was against 
the rules of the DSU, specifically Article 9.3, and was outside the 
panel's terms of reference. It also argued that the decision to give 
Canada access to information that the EC had placed before the US 
panel prejudiced the EC's right to defence. 929 The AB rejected the EC 
claims and showed strong support for the decision issued by the panel 
in this regard. The AB stated: 
"We consider the explanation of the Panel quite 
reasonable, and its decision to hold a joint meeting with 
the scientific experts consistent with the letter and spirit of 
Article 9.3 of the DSU. Clearly, it would be an 
uneconomical use of time and resources to force the Panel 
to hold two successive but separate meetings gathering 
the same group of experts twice, expressing their views 
twice regarding the same scientific and technical matters 
related to the same contested European Communities 
measures. We do not believe that the Panel has erred by 
addressing the European Communities' procedural 
objections only where the European Communities could 
make a precise claim of prejudice. It is evident to us that a 
procedural objection raised by a party to a dispute should 
be sufficiently specific to enable the panel to address it. 930 
*ý* 
"Having access to a common pool of information enables 
the panel and the parties to save time by avoiding 
928 Website, http: //www. wto. orq/enqlish/res e/booksp e/analytic 
index e/dsu 04 e. htm#227, last seen on 14-05-08 at 9: 30pm. 
929 EC Hormones, appellate body, note 905, para. 39. 
930 Ibid. 
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duplication of the compilation and analysis of information 
already presented in the other proceeding. Article 3.3 of 
the DSU recognizes the importance of avoiding 
unnecessary delays in the dispute settlement process and 
states that the prompt settlement of a dispute is essential 
to the effective functioning of the WTO. In this particular 
case, the Panel tried to avoid unnecessary delays, making 
an effort to comply with the letter and spirit of Article 9.3 
of the DSU. f1931 
In addition to the disagreement expressed by the EC in this case, 
Covelli has linked the Hormones dispute932 to EC - Banana 111933, 
arguing that the panel unjustifiably granted addition rights to a third 
party in these cases, contrary to past practice, when there was no 
agreement between the principal parties to extend third party rights, 
and the third party was not part of any special trade agreement with 
the disputing parties. 
934 
Notwithstanding the above, in the US - 1916 dispute (similarly to the 
EC - Hormones case) Japan and the EC initiated a separate dispute 
against the US 1916 Act, which deals with anti-dumping measures. 
Both Japan and the EC requested extended third party status in their 
cases against the US to allow them to access information and attend 
all of the proceedings before the panel. 935 In particular, the EC 
requested permission to make a written statement to the second 
meeting of the panel. 936 In this case, and counter to its ruling in the 
931 Ibid. 
932 EC Hormones, note 905. 
933 EC Banana III, note 902. 
934 Nick Covelli, 'Member Intervention in World Trade Organisation Dispute 
Settlement Proceedings after the EC-Sardines: The Rules, Jurisprudence, and 
Controversy', (2003), 37(3) Journal of World Trade 673, p. 678. 
935 The request in both cases: US-Anti-Dumping Act 1916, Complaint by the EC, 
panel report, note 906, para. 39.; US-Anti-Dumping Act 1916, Complaint by Japan, 
panel report, note 906, para . 3.1&3.2. 936 US Act 1916 Complaint by Japan, panel report, note 906, para . 3.1. 
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Hormones case (in spite of the similarity) the panel declined the 
request of Japan and the EC to have extended third party status in 
each other's disputes. 
The panel based its ruling on the fact that the cases did not "involve 
the consideration of complex facts or scientific evidence", 937 which 
would justify enhanced third party rights, as well as the fact that the 
US refused to give extended rights to the EU and Japan. 938 In addition, 
the panel did not consider that the maintenance of 'due process `939 in 
the case justified additional access of the third party to the second 
substantive meeting of the panel, finding that it was adequate to 
provide "in due course meaningful non-confidential summaries of their 
submissions to the Panel, ". 940 as required by Article 18.2 of the DSU 
and subject to a formal request to be made by the third party. 941 
In this case, the AB had approved the panel's rejection of the request 
of Japan and the EC to obtain enhanced third party status, and again 
the AB confirmed the ruling of the panel to grant extended third party 
status in the Hormones dispute. 942 The AB found that it was at the 
absolute discretion of the panel to provide additional rights to third 
parties, "not unlimited and ... circumscribed, for example, by the 
requirements of due process". 943 It also concluded that neither Japan 
nor the EC had "shown that the Panel exceeded the limits of its 
discretionary authority". 944 This last sentence has led to criticism, in 
937 Ibid. para . 6.34. 938 Ibid. 
939 In other legal systems, this is known as 'natural justice'. 
940 US Act 1916 Complaint by EC, panel report, note 906, para . 6.35. 941 
Ibid. 
942 Ibid., para . 147-148. 943 Ibid., para . 150. 944 
Ibid. 
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that the possibility of procedural prejudice was arguably even more 
pronounced in this case than in EC - Hormones one, because the panel 
seemed to have made up its mind about Japan's request before Japan 
had raised it. 945 
In spite of the similarities, the WTO's website, while explaining the 
dispute settlement understanding, recognizes the contrast in the 
panel's ruling in both disputes. 946 Hence, so far, one can agree with 
the view of the panel, even though it has been inconsistent, 
unpredictable and sometimes unpersuasive in its rulings. While the 
grant of extended third party rights to the ACP countries in Banana is 
understandable, it is not justifiable to give Canada and Japan such 
rights. In addition, the panel did not give a clear answer as to why it 
was vital to give the US and Canada enhanced third party status in the 
Hormones dispute, while rejecting the request of the EC and Japan in 
nearly indistinguishable conditions in the US - 1916 Act dispute. In 
fact, "the only logical answer one can reach is that the leaving of the 
scope of third party rights to Panels has been a failure". 947 In addition, 
the panel in the 1916 Act dispute failed to consider the due process 
which served as grounds for granting enhanced third party rights in 
Banana, adding greater procedural hazard for the parties. The panel 
was writing its interim report on the EC complaint and holding the first 
and second substantive meetings of Japan's case in the meantime. In 
this case, the EC and Japan would present the same arguments and 
facts to the panel, since they brought their case on the same subject. 
945 Nick Covelli, note 934, p. 680. 
946 "In contrast to the EC - Hormones dispute, the Panel on US - 1916 Act refused to 
grant the European Communities and Japan enhanced third-party rights in each 
other's case". Available on line at 
http: //www. wto. orq/enqlish/res e/booksp e/analytic index e/dsu 04 e. htm#article 
10, last seen on 12-12-2007 at 7pm. 947 Nick Covelli, note 934, p. 680. 
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As a result, Japan would be at risk of its case being decided even 
before it was looked at. Moreover, the US was at risk of its arguments 
not being considered in the Japan case, since they had been dealt with 
in the EC case. Moreover, the panel had considered the US arguments 
in the Japan case while writing the interim report of the EC case, then 
it prejudiced the EC's position, since it did not have the opportunity to 
refute these arguments. This is surprising, since the factual 
particularities of the case posed a much greater risk for procedural 
prejudice than EC - Hormones. 948 
7.3.3 The 'applicants' in the EC - Trade Preferences 
and EU - Sugar disputes 
The EC - Trade Preferences dispute witnessed a significant amount of 
third party intervention. 949 In this case, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru 
and Venezuela, which were called 'the applicants' by the panel, jointly 
requested enhanced third party rights. They claimed that their 
substantial interest was of special importance, because they were 
party to the special trade arrangement with the EC which was the 
subject of the panel's involvement in the dispute. 950 They linked their 
case to that of the ACP countries in Banana, in which third parties 
were granted additional rights. They argued that their position, as 
recipients of special access to the EC market according to the EC's 
Drugs Arrangements, was very similar to the ACP countries' position as 
948 Antonis Antoniadis, 'Enhanced Third Party Rights in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding', (2002), 29(3) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 285, p. 296. 
949 About 18 WTO Members have participated as third parties. 
950 EC - Trade Preferences, panel report, annex 
(A), note 903, para. 1. 
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recipients of special access to the EC market according to the Lome 
Waiver. 951 
India argued that enhanced third party rights should be given not only 
to the applicants, but also to all developing countries intervening as 
third parties in the dispute, apart from the US (which did not present 
adequate justification for extra rights). India also warned the panel 
that the rights of the principal parties ought to be distinct from those 
granted to any third party. 952 The EC, without objecting to the granting 
of additional rights to all third parties, viewed Uruguay and the US 
(unlike Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Pakistan) as 
ineligible for additional third party rights. The EC remained silent about 
Cuba, Mauritius, Sri Lanka and Venezuela. 953 Pakistan, as party to a 
special trade agreement with the EC, joined the applicants and 
requested extended third party status. Brazil, Cuba, Mauritius, 
Paraguay and the US did not comment on whether or not they were 
entitled to be granted enhanced third party rights, but argued that 
additional rights for a third party, if granted, should be granted to all 
third parties in the dispute. 954 
The panel decided to grant enhanced third party rights to all third 
parties on the grounds that the case was like the EC - Banana one. 
The latter case, it argued, had a significant economic impact on all the 
developing countries which intervened as third parties in the case, be 
they members or non-members of the EC Drug Arrangement. The US 
could also `have a significant trade policy as a preference-giving 
951 Ibid., para. 3. 
952 Ibid., para. 4. 
953 Ibid., para . 
5. 
954 Ibid., para. 6. 
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country". In addition, according to the issue of due process, it was 
more appropriate to give all third parties the same enhanced third 
party status. The panel adopted India's argument on the distinction 
between the rights of the parties and those of third parties, stating 
that when granting any additional rights to third parties it was 
important to guard against inappropriate blurring of the distinction 
drawn in the DSU between parties and third parties. 955 Hence, all third 
parties were allowed to: (a) observe the first substantive meeting with 
the parties; (b) receive the second submissions of the parties; (c) 
observe the second substantive meeting; (d) make a brief statement 
during the second substantive meeting; and (e) review the summary 
of their respective arguments in the draft descriptive part of the panel 
report. 956. 
One obvious comment ought to be made: that third parties in EC - 
Trade Preferences received the highest level of extended third party 
rights granted to any third party. They were allowed access to the 
descriptive draft of the interim review process. This will be discussed in 
more detail in the coming chapter on the reform of third party rights, 
where it will be argued that enhancing the access of third parties to 
both parts of the interim review process means that the descriptive 
draft and interim reports should be more formalized by the panel. 
In the EC - Sugar dispute, Kenya and Cote d'lvoire registered their 
interest as third parties after the expiration of a 10-day time limit from 
the initiation of the panel. This was a practice in the GATT dispute 
mechanism which was carried over to the DSM. The disputing parties 
accepted Kenya's intervention as a third party, but Brazil, Australia 
955 Ibid., para. 7. 
956 Ibid., Para. 8. 
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and Thailand (the complainants) objected to the intervention request 
made by Cote d'lvoire. 957 As Article 10 of the DSU does not specify a 
time limit for the notification of an interest to the DSU, the panel cited 
the ruling of the AB in the EC - Hormones dispute. It found that it had 
'marginal discretion' in this regard. However, there was a need to: (1) 
consider the due process of the dispute; (2) not adversely affect the 
composition of the panel; and (3) not hinder the panel's process. 
Therefore, the panel accepted all requests for third party participation, 
including those of Kenya and Cote d'lvoire. 958 
The panel in the EC - Suger dispute appears to have given particular 
consideration to the interests of developing countries. It allowed Kenya 
and Cote d'Ivoire to participate as third parties, even though they had 
not notified the DSB within 10 days of the establishment of the panel. 
Also, more importantly, the panel took the enhancement of third party 
rights a step further than in previous cases, by allowing developing 
countries who were third parties to review the descriptive draft of the 
interim stage. This was declined in the Banana dispute. 
From the outset of the EC sugar dispute, the ACP countries organized 
themselves and appointed Mauritius to make a request for enhanced 
third party rights in the panel's proceedings. The panel decided to 
extend such rights to all third parties. In this case, however, the third 
parties were to receive a copy of the written questions to the parties 
posed in the context of the first substantive meeting of the panel. They 
would also receive the rebuttals made by the parties during the second 
meeting, attending the second substantive meeting of the panel 
passively and without making any submissions to the panel process as 
957 EC Sugar, complaint by Brazil, panel report, note 904, paras. 
2.1-2.2. 
958 Ibid, paras . 
2.2-2.3. 
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observers only. They were to review the summary of their respective 
arguments in the draft descriptive part of the panel report. 
959 
Subsequently, the ACP countries again organized themselves and 
appointed Guyana to make a request to the panel to be permitted to 
make written and oral submissions during the second meeting of the 
panel. The panel declined their request and ruled that it was a matter 
of due process to give all third parties the equivalent extended third 
party rights. 960 
The panel had been innovative again in this case, overturning the 
GATT practice by deciding that it had the right to admit a third party at 
any time. This was contrary to the opinion of many WTO members, 
who believed that the admission of a third party ought to be restricted 
to a certain time limit. 
961 There is also a clear contradiction between 
this ruling and the panel's decision in the EC - Trade Preferences 
dispute. Both disputes had a mixture of third parties: some were party 
to a special trade agreement with the EC and some were not. 
However, although they were not allowed to make submissions during 
the second meeting of the panel, the outcome of the case was 
economically significant to all third parties. 962 If we look at the second 
request made by the ACP to enhance third party rights, the panel was 
inconsistent with its ruling in Banana III, in which the ACP held that 
exact position. 
959 Ibid, para. 2.6. 
960 Ibid, paras. 2.7-2.8-2.9. 
961 This will be looked at in more detail in chapter eight. 
962 The panel stated that it ruling was made "in light of the importance of trade in 
sugar for many third parties", EC Sugar, complaint by Brazil, panel report, note 904, 
para. 2.5. 
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The responsibility of the panel to identify the best approach for a third 
party to defend its legitimate interest effectively is vital, especially for 
developing countries. In this regard the WTO secretariat has noted 
that: 
""In a dispute, a developing country Member complained 
that if the Panel did not reconsider its position on third 
party requests and allowed third parties to present 
arguments in support of their legitimate trade interests as 
the process unfolded, third party developing country 
Members would not be able to adequately protect their 
interests in keeping with the commitments under the WTO 
Agreement which encouraged growth and development in a 
manner consistent with their respective needs and 
concerns at different levels of economic development. "963 
Until this point, the panel had failed to identify a consistent approach 
in dealing with the shortage of rights provided to third parties in the 
DSU. 964 Developing countries in similar situations had been granted 
different rights. They had received the most enhanced ever third party 
rights in the Trade Preference case, but the panel in Sugar had 
overturned its practices on the enhancement of third party rights by 
granting developing country third parties even more restricted 
procedural rights than those given in the Banana III dispute. This, in 
fact, brought forth the argument made previously by Footer. 965 She 
argued that developing country third parties will not have a 
guaranteed enhanced position in all cases in which they have a very 
special interest, unless the DSU is permanently reformed to 
963 Note by the Secretariat, Concerns Regarding Special and Differential Treatment 
Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions, WT/COMTD/W/66 (16 February 2000), 
p. 32. 
964 Argentina argued in this regard that "It was difficult to justify the current rules in 
the DSU which restricted third parties to receiving only the first written submission of 
the parties and to attending a special session of the first substantive meeting". 
Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/23, (26 May 2005), p. 2. 
965 This is dealt with in Section 7.3.1, note 926, which deals with the EC-Banana 
dispute. 
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encompass better provision of rights to third parties. The practice of 
the panel in Banana III, EC - Trade Preferences and EC - Sugar did 
not give developing country third parties clearer or more predictable 
enhanced rights to defend effectively their rights as third parties. It 
has been argued with regard to EC - Sugar that "in light of this case 
law, it is very difficult for a third party to know whether the panel will 
grant extra rights". 966 
7.4 Extended third 
appeal process 
party rights during the 
The practices regarding third party intervention in the appellate 
process have evolved and expanded over time. In the early stages of 
the DSM, interested parties which wished to participate in the panel 
had to make a submission to the AB in writing about their desire to 
participate in the appellate process as third participants, stating their 
legal reasoning. Such written submissions had to be submitted within 
25 days after the notice of the appeal. Failure to do so would exclude 
the party from participating in the panel as a third participant in the 
appeal process. 
96' However, such procedures are no longer a main 
requirement for a third participant to participate in the AB process. The 
participation of third parties has been extended, and a new practice of 
'passive third participant' has evolved as a result of the demands made 
(explicitly and tacitly) by disputing parties over time. Recently, the AB 
966 Pierre Monnier, Working procedures: "Recent Changes and Prospective 
Developments', in Dencho Georgiev and Kim Van Der Borght(eds), Reform and 
development of the WTO dispute settlement system, (Cameron May, London, 2006), 
p. 280. 
967 It has been stated in the earlier working procedures of the AB that "any third 
party may file a written submission, stating its intention to participate as a third 
participant in the appeal and containing the grounds and legal arguments in support 
of its position, within 25 days after the date of the filing of the Notice of the 
Appeals". Working Procedures for Appellate Review, (Dated 28-2-1997), 
WT/AB/WP/3. 
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has modified its work and allowed for the criteria set out below to be 
used by a third participant in the appeal process. 968 Now, as a result of 
the amendments made by the AB in 2002, its working procedures 
have made it easier for third parties to join in its oral hearings. 969 
The AB's new working procedures distinguish between the terms 'third 
party' and 'third participant', the latter being one who participates in 
the appellate stage. 970 According to the new working procedures, a 
'third participant' can intervene in the appeal process in three different 
ways. Firstly, it can make a written submission within 25 days "after 
the date of the filing of the Notice of Appeal", 971 in line with the old 
rules, writing submissions "to facilitate their positions being taken fully 
into account by the division hearing the appeal and in order that 
participants and other third participants will have notice of positions to 
be taken at the oral hearing". 972 Secondly, a third party can intervene 
by notifying the secretariat in writing "if it intends to appear at the oral 
hearing, and, if so, whether it intends to make an oral statement" 
during the 25 days provided in Article 24.1.973 Thirdly, it can write to 
the appeal division expressing its wishes to be involved as a third 
party after the expiry of the 25 days of the notice of appeal. 974 Before 
deciding whether or not to invite a third party to the AB hearing in this 
situation, the AB will weigh up the need to ensure due process for the 
968 WTO Secretariat Publication, A Handbook on the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System, (Cambridge University press, Cambridge, 2004), pp. 65-66. 
969 Peter Van Den Bossche, 'The Making of the 'World Trade Court': the origins and 
development of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Origination', in 
Rufus Yerxa 
and Bruce Wilson(eds), Key Issues in the WTO Dispute Settlement: the 
First Ten 
Years, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005), p-71- 
970 Article 1 
971 Article 24.1 
972 Article 24.3 
973 Article 24.2 
974 Article 24.4 
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other participants and the need for an "orderly and efficient 
hearing". 975 
Those who make a written submission to the AB or notify the 
secretariat within 25 days of the notice of appeal will have the right to 
be present at the oral investigation and to present an oral statement. 
By contrast, for those who make a request after the 25 days, their 
right during the hearing is at the discretion of the AB. 976 Also, upon the 
request of the AB, a third party may be required to provide further 
submissions, depending on the circumstances of the dispute. 97 
Furthermore, the AB has absolute discretion to grant a third party 
additional procedural rights in certain conditions; such rights must 
follow the "appropriate procedure for the purposes of that appeal" and 
be in the "interests of fairness and orderly procedure in the conduct of 
an appeal". 978 The AB can also extend the timeframe for a third party 
to make written submissions whenever it sees that "strict adherence to 
a time period set out in these Rules would result in a manifest 
unfairness". 
979 
7.4.1 The AB and passive observers 
The device of passive third party observers was first used by the AB in 
the Argentina - Footwear dispute. Then, the US, Indonesia, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay participated as third parties in the panel stage. 
The US and Indonesia had followed the procedural rule stated in Article 
24 of the original AB working procedures, and had been granted third 
975 Article 24.4; Nick Covelli, note 934, p. 681. 
976 Rule 27.3 
97 Rule 28.1 
978 Rule 16.1 
979 Rule 16.2 
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participant status in the appeal process. 980 However, Paraguay did not 
follow the procedural rules stated in the original working procedures 
and had been allowed to observe the hearing of the appeal without 
presenting "oral arguments or presentations". It acted only as a 
"passive observer". 981 This was decided on the grounds that no 
objection was made by the other participants, and that third parties 
had the right to intervene according to Articles 10.2 and 17 of the 
DSU. 982 Consequently, and following the same line of reasoning, the 
AB granted passive observer status in the appeal hearings of the US - 
Lamb, 983 EC - Asbestos984 and Chile - Price Band System985 disputes. 
In this regard it has been argued that, like the panel, the AB has 
retained a wide discretion to decide what procedural rights are given 
to third parties in the appeal process. The AB has used such discretion 
at surprising and unexpected times, by creating the status of passive 
observer in the above-mentioned examples. The AB went even further, 
contradicting its own procedural rules by making new rules not stated 
in the original version of its working procedures. It is, therefore, the 
discretion given to the AB, similar to the panel's use of discretionary 
980 Argentina - Safeguard Measures in Imports of Footwear, appellate 
body report, 
WT/DS121/AB, adopted on 12 December 1999, para. 6. [hereinafter Argentina 
Footwear] 
981 Ibid., para. 7. 
982 Ibid. 
983 US - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Frozen, 
Chilled and Frozen Lamb form 
New Zealand and Australia, appellate body report, WT/DS177/AB/R, 
WT/DS/178/AB/R, adopted on 14-12-1999, para 9; [hereinafter US Lamb], Japan 
and Canada were passive observers 
984Appellate body report on EC Asbestos, note 900, para. 4. 
985 In this case Japan and Nicaragua were allowed to participate as 
'passive 
observers', Chile Price Band System and Safeguard Measures 
Relating to Certain 
Agriculture Products, appellate body report, WT/DS207/AB/R, adopted 23 Oct 2002, 
para. 6. [hereinafter Chile Price Band] 
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power, which has been executed 'inconsistently', 'unpredictably' and 
'controversially'. 986 
7.4.2 The AB and amicus curiae briefs 
The possibility of the AB accommodating amicus curiae briefs for those 
not party to a dispute, even as third parties, is a debatable matter. 
Nevertheless, the tendency of the AB to undertake amicus curiae 
briefs987 as a recognized rule is clear in its recent decisions. 988 
Regarding the panel stage, in the Shrimp/Turtle dispute989 the AB 
considered that the right to seek information ought to include the 
entitlement to undertake and regard amicus curiae briefs after 
reserving the panel report, according to Article 13.1 of the DSU. Thus, 
the AB gave consideration to two measures in the submission and 
acceptance of amicus curiae briefs. Any WTO member can submit an 
amicus curiae brief to a panel or the AB if it wishes to, and "private 
organizations and individuals" may submit amicus curiae briefs to a 
986 Nick Covelli, note 934, p. 682. 
987 NGOs' access to the DSM is an evolving issue and is highly debatable; developing 
countries fear NGOs are mostly based in developed countries and have not been very 
helpful for developing countries in terms of the WTO dispute settlement system. 
However, a more recent trend is developing since NGOs like Oxfam have shown 
support for developing countries and they could support developing countries to 
identify the inconsistent measures and help them to prepare and present the legal 
agreement, rebuttals and submission in the course of disputes. More detail on the 
debate over NGO access to the WTO dispute settlement system in Marco Slotboom, A 
Comparison of WTO and EC Law: Do Different Objectives and Purposes Matter for 
Treaty Interpretation, (London, Cameron May, 2006), pp. 203-239; also Robert 
Howse, The WTO System: Law, Politics and Legitimacy: Law Politics and Legitimacy, 
(Cameron May, London, 2007); Michelle Ratton Sanchez, 'Brief observations on the 
mechanisms for NGO participation in the WTO', (2006), available online at 
http: //socialsciences scielo org/scielo php? pid=S1806-64452006000100004 
&script=sci arttext&tlng=en, last seen on 21-6-2008 at gam; and Marco M. 
Slotboom, 'Participation of NGOs before the WTO and EC tribunals: which court is the 
better friend? ', (2006), 5(1) World Trade Review 69. 
988 Mitsuo Matsushita, The World Trade Organization Law, Practice and Policy, 
(Oxford University press, Oxford, 2003), p36. 
989 Appellate body report on US Shrimp, note 899. 
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panel or the AB according to Articles 13.1 and 17.9 of the DSU 
respectively. 
990 
In the Shrimp/Turtle case, the AB affirmed that the panel, by not 
accepting voluntary information from parties which were not members 
of the WTO (environmental institutes in this case) had initially made a 
mistake in limiting its power. The AB justified this, although the panel 
surely enjoyed the discretionary power to seek more information, 
including information from parties not members of the WTO (the 
environmental institutes). However, it was not specific as to how it 
should obtain this information. 991 
Regarding the appeal stage, in the Carbon Steel case992 the AB's 
powers to allow amicus curiae briefs from non-members of the WTO 
arose once more in the period of the appeal. Whereas the EU, a 
conflicting party, disagreed with the adoption of amicus curiae briefs, 
as well as with Mexico and Brazil being third parties, the US argued for 
their adoption. The Carbon Steel case raised many of the same issues 
as the Shrimp/Turtle case. As it was aware that the DSU had not 
explicitly allowed or forbidden its approval of amicus curiae briefs, the 
AB relied on the power vested in it by DSU Article 17.9 to establish its 
working procedures, and assumed the power to adopt amicus curiae 
briefs. 993 Here, the United States supported the decision that the AB 
division can consider an appeal in order to improve procedures in 
990 Mitsuo Matsushita, note 988, pp. 36-37. 
991 Deborah Z. Cass, 'The Constitutionalization of International Trade Law: Judicial 
Norm-Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International 
Trade', (2001), 12(1) Journal of International Economic Law 29, p. 61. 
992 United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and 
Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, appellate body 
report, WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted on 7 June 2000. [hereinafter US Carbon steel] 
993 Arthur E. Appleton, 'Amicus Curiae Submission in the Carbon Steel Case', (2000), 
3(4) Journal of International Economic Law 691, p. 694. 
? 99 
particular conditions, when the existing procedures have not dealt with 
a procedural issue arising in a case. This power is mentioned in Rule 
16(1) of the working procedures. 994 
The decision of the AB to approve amicus curiae briefs in these cases 
met with opposition. To start with, some members of the WTO 
(particularly developing countries) argued that it was inappropriate to 
allow external participants to affect the interpretation and decisions of 
the WTO, since a WTO agreement is between the parties who have 
approved it. 995 Moreover, there was a real concern among the 
members of the WTO that this might threaten their rights and duties, 
and would modify the involvement of the organizations within the WTO 
system. Another argument was that the AB's justification of using 
Article 16(1) was statutorily part of the General Council's duty. 996 
Furthermore, there was concern over a care issue. With the additional 
procedure, external persons and organizations would have a privilege 
which could not be enjoyed by the members of the WTO, permitting 
them to affect the interpretation of legal matters related to a particular 
case. In fact, that privilege is exclusive to the disputing parties and the 
third party. 997 On the other hand, in the Carbon Steel case, 998 the AB 
stressed that the privilege of submitting amicus curiae briefs was 
merely for WTO parties. In the case of submissions from persons not 
994 Ibid. 
995 Mitsuo Matsushita, note 988, p. 37. 
996 Geert A. Zonnekeyn, 'The Appellate Body's Communication on Amicus Curiae 
Briefs in the Asbestos Case. An Echternach Procession? ' (2001), 35(3) Journal of 
World Trade 553, p-555- 
997 Ibid., pp. 555-556. 
998 US Carbon steel, note 992. 
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members of the WTO, the AB would decide whether or not to approve 
such requests. 
999 
Finally, the AB clearly considers that it has the power to allow and 
examine amicus curiae briefs, and that this does not "add to or 
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered 
agreements". It is difficult to accept this view, because Article 13 of 
the DSU gives privileges to panels to seek information and make 
practical recommendations. Nevertheless, the DSU makes no parallel 
statement of equivalent rights to the AB. As far as Article 17.4 of the 
DSU is concerned, there is a restriction on WTO members' rights to 
make a submission before an appellate division. Consequently, the AB 
allows non-members to have rights which a number of WTO parties 
may not have. Therefore, it is difficult to see how the AB can allow 
itself the authority to accept amicus curiae briefs without adding to or 
diminishing "the rights and obligations provided in the covered 
agreements". 1000 
In the Asbestos case, '°°' a debate took place among WTO parties 
concerning the possibility of adopting amicus curiae briefs by the AB 
according to Article 16(1) of the working procedure. As a result, it 
seems that the AB was advised by the Chair of the WTO General 
Council to deal with the matter of amicus curiae briefs extremely 
cautiously. Hence, in the appeal period, the Asbestos case witnessed 
17 amicus curiae brief requests by non-WTO members. These were 
999 Christine Chinkin and Ruth Mackenzie, 'Intergovernmental Organizations as 
"Friends of The Court', in Laurence Boisson(ed), International Organization and 
International Dispute Settlement: Trends and Prospects, (USA, Transnational, 2002), 
p. 151. 
1000 Geert A. Zonnekeyn, note 996, p. 555. 
X001 Appellate body EC Asbestos, note 900. 
101 
declined by the AB on the grounds that the requests did not 
satisfactorily fulfil the provisions made in the Additional Procedures. 
But, because of the strong criticism directed at it by states members 
that it had overstepped its rules, the AB did not clarify what these 
provisions related to. 1002 Despite the opposition of WTO members to 
the acceptance of amicus curiae briefs, in the EC - Sardine dispute the 
AB developed this issue further and allowed WTO members to submit 
amicus curiae briefs for the first time. 
7.4.3 Members and amicus curiae briefs: The case of 
Morocco (EC - Sardine) 
In the EC - Sardine dispute, Colombia, which was a third party in the 
panel process, missed the 25-day deadline. 1003 However, it sent a 
request to the AB after the expiration of the 25 days to attend the 
appeal hearing without making a written submission. The AB informed 
the disputing parties that it wished to allow Colombia to participate as 
a 'passive observer'. The EC and Ecuador raised the concern that there 
was no legal basis for the term 'passive observer', and that Colombia 
should have followed the rules. Regardless of the arguments raised by 
1002 Christine Chinkin and Ruth Mackenzie, note 999, pp. 151-152. Nathalie 
Bernasconi-Osterwalder(ed), Environment and Trade: A Guide to WTO Jurisprudence, 
(Earthscan Publications, 2005), p. 325. To illustrate the broader dissatisfaction of 
WTO Members, Mexico argued that "Regarding external transparency, amicus curiae 
briefs had been submitted in just 9 per cent of all cases - 15 times - but in 13 of 
these cases, Members had expressed concerns at DSB meetings". Minutes of 
Meeting, TN/DS/M/14, (20 April 2004), pp. 2-3. 
1003 In this case the old rule 24 was in function, which give third participant rights to 
those who filed a written request within 25 days of the notice of the appeal. 
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Ecuador and the EC, the AB1004 allowed Colombia to participate as a 
`passive observer'. '005 
In this dispute, the AB was creative'006 on the issue of amicus curiae 
briefs, despite the controversy and widespread dissatisfaction of WTO 
members, and developing countries in particular. The AB allowed 
Morocco, which had not even intervened in the panel process as a 
third party, to submit an amicus curiae brief during the appeal 
process. Peru raised an objection to the AB's decision to accept an 
amicus curiae brief from a WTO member, arguing that: 
'Awhile it welcomes non-Member submissions where they 
are attached to the submission of a WTO Member engaged 
in dispute settlement proceedings, the DSU makes clear 
that only WTO Members can make independent 
submissions to panels and to the AB. Peru argues further 
that the DSU already provides conditions under which WTO 
Members can participate as third parties in dispute 
settlement proceedings. According to Peru, accepting 
amicus curiae briefs from WTO Members that did not notify 
their third party interest to the DSB would be allowing a 
WTO Member impermissibly to circumvent the DSU. "loop 
Canada supported Peru's view that the AB had exceeded its authority 
by accepting a Moroccan brief when it had not notified its interest to 
1004 As a result of these cases the AB has modified its working procedures to allow 
the participation of third parties as passive observers, which applies to working 
procedures for appellate review, WT/AB/WP/4,1 May 2003. 
1005 EC - Trade Description of Sardine, appellate body report, WT/DS231/AB/R, 
adopted on 26 September 2002, para. 18. [hereinafter EC Sardine] 
1006 In this regard it has been argued that "Members could be tempted to view EC - 
Sardines as the high point of Appellate Body activism, which the Appellate Body will 
be advised not to repeat too quickly". C. L. Lim, 'The Amicus Brief Issue at the WTO', 
(2005), 4(1) Chinese Journal of International Law 85, p. 119. It has also been argued 
elsewhere that "Finally, and probably most importantly, in Sardines, the Appellate 
Body came back in style, as it were, not only accepting an amicus brief from a 
private individual (myself), but also making clear for the first time that its discretion 
extends to briefs submitted by WTO Members themselves". Robert Howse, 
'Membership and its Privileges: the WTO, Civil Society, and the Amicus Brief 
Controversy', (2003), 9(4) European Law Journal 496, pp. 506-507. 
1007 EC Sardine, note 1005, paras. 65-66. 
-O3 
the DSB at the beginning of the dispute, and emphasised that the 
issue of accepting amicus curiae briefs raised a wider controversy 
between WTO members during negotiation sessions. It argued that all 
briefs should be declined, since they were irrelevant to the dispute. 1008 
Similarly, Chile1009 and Ecuador agreed with Peru and Canada that the 
AB had acted contrary to the DSU, and by doing so the AB "would 
accord Morocco more favourable treatment than Colombia, which was 
accorded passive observer status in this appeal". logo 
The AB disagreed with the objection made in this regard. It considered 
that it did have the right to accept or reject amicus curiae briefs 
submitted in the appeal process, since "neither the DSU nor the 
Working Procedures explicitly prohibit acceptance or consideration of 
such briefs". loll The AB argued that in using such power they did not 
differentiate between amicus curiae briefs submitted by WTO members 
and non-members. 1012 The AB also stated that it agreed with the EU 
demand not to treat WTO members less favourably than non-members 
in accepting amicus curiae briefs. 1013 The AB stated that the mere fact 
that Peru invoked the DSU rules on when and how a member can 
participate as a third party in a dispute "does not, in our view, lead 
inevitably to the conclusion that participation by a Member as an 
amicus curiae is prohibited". 1014 In this regard, the AB did not share 
the view of Peru. It believed that whereas third party intervention is 
governed by the DSU, in particular Articles 10 and 17.4, the 
1008 Ibid., para. 103. 
1009 Ibid., para. 111. 
1010 Ibid., para. 115. 
1011 US-Lead and Bismuth II, appellate body report, WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted on 
7 June 2000, para. 2601. [hereinafter US Lead and Bismuth II] 
1012 EC Sardine, note 1005, para. 162. 
1013 Ibid., para. 164. 
1014 Ibid., para. 165. 
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acceptance of amicus curiae briefs leads to "legal authority" being 
granted to the AB in Article 17.9 of the DSU to set up its working 
procedures. 1015 
The AB also decided that its acceptance of amicus curiae briefs did not 
make this an automatic right. It should be examined on a case-by- 
case basis in a way that would not affect "fair, prompt and effective 
resolution of trade disputes. " For instance, a request would be refused 
if made at the last minute of the appeal process, so that admitting 
such a brief "would impose an undue burden on other participants". 1016 
After accepting the brief submitted by Morocco, the AB went on to 
address how relevant the brief was to the appeal process. The AB 
found that the brief provided factual data in the main but would 
conflict with the function of the AB, which had examined the legal 
aspects of the case only. It also found some aspects of the brief that 
would have been of legal help to the AB. 1017 However, it eventually 
decided not to consider the legal argument stated in the Morocco brief, 
since it would not be of "legal assistance" to the appeal. '°'8 
During a special meeting to discuss the issues raised in EC - Sardine, 
members voiced strong dissatisfaction with the acceptance of the 
Moroccan brief in the appeal process. Colombia, supported by China, 
argued that it had participated as a passive observer because it had 
X015 Ibid, para. 166. 
1016 Ibid., para. 167. 
1017 Ibid., para. 169. 
1018 "'We indicated earlier in this Report that we would return to the question whether 
Morocco's amicus curiae brief assists us in this appeal when considering the issue of 
completing the legal analysis under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and the GATT 
1994. In the light of our decision not to complete the analysis by making findings on 
these provisions, we find that the legal arguments submitted by Morocco in its 
amicus curiae brief on Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and on the GATT 1994 
do 
not assist us in this appeal. " EC-Trade Description of Sardine, appellate 
body, note 
1005, para. 314. 
0 
strictly followed the AB procedural rules. These did not allow members' 
amicus curiae briefs at the time it had made its request. Also, during 
the oral hearing Colombia had requested the appeal division to 
comment on the acceptance of the amicus curiae briefs without 
commenting on the substance of the dispute. The Colombian request 
was declined. It was also novel and included in the DSU; hence, 
Colombia argued that the AB had granted more advantageous 
treatment to non-parties than it had granted to third parties. '°'9 
Peru, Chile and Ecuador reaffirmed their disapproval of the acceptance 
of the Moroccan brief that was made in the course of the dispute. 
Canada warned that the AB had to deal with the issue of amicus 
curiae briefs with extreme caution, since the issue was still under 
discussion between WTO members. Mexico, India, Brazil, Egypt, 
Turkey, Indonesia, Uruguay and Malaysia had all disagreed with the 
AB's acceptance of the Moroccan brief, arguing that the AB had 
exceeded its authority by establishing a new category which was not 
included in the WTO rules. This, they argued, disadvantaged third 
parties which had followed the rules, by not allowing them to 
participate in oral hearings. They urged the AB not to diminish the 
rights of WTO members by accepting such a brief, unless it was 
decided by the members themselves during the review of the DSB. 1020 
Only Morocco agreed with the AB's claim that it did not participate as a 
third party according to Article 10 because it had missed the 10-day 
deadline of notification of interest to the DSM. By accepting its brief, 
the AB had allowed Morocco to defend its legitimate interest in the 
dispute. This eventually led to many members denying that their 
1019 Minutes of meeting, WT/DSB/M/134, (29 January 2003), p. 15. 
1020 Ibid., pp. 11-21. 
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approval of the AB report of the EC - Sardine case signified their 
approval of the AB acceptance of amicus curiae briefs. '02' 
It appears that as a result of its activism in earlier cases and by 
admitting amicus curiae briefs from non-WTO members, the AB was 
left with no choice in the Sardine dispute other than to act against the 
explicit rule of the DSU by which third parties were allowed to 
intervene in a dispute. It had allowed Morocco to intervene in the 
appeal without notifying its interest according to Article 10 of the DSU. 
Thus, the AB now had to respond to the accusation that it had granted 
more rights to non-members than WTO members themselves 
enjoyed. 
1022 
As far as the AB and third parties are concerned, it is argued that the 
AB extended the rights of third parties by allowing them to be 'passive 
observers', and by allowing members that had not intervened before 
the panel to participate as third parties in the appeal process. The AB 
considered the extension of third party rights in parallel with the 
effectiveness of the dispute process, without undermining parties' 
rights, such as by allowing any severe delay in the dispute process. By 
the same token, the discretion of the AB also showed that there were 
shortcomings in the DSU rules governing third parties in the WTO 
dispute settlement system. These rules were sufficient neither at the 
panel stage nor in the appeal process, and thus they needed to be 
revisited. However, the unexpected creativity of the AB undermined 
the certainty and credibility of the WTO dispute settlement system. 
1023 
1021 Ibid. 
1022 Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 6, number 33, released on 2 October 
2002, and C. L. Lim, note 1006, pp. 115-116. 
1023 Nick Covelli, note 934, p. 686. 
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With regard to developing countries, making it easier for third parties 
to access the AB appeal process would certainly be in their interests. 
Developing countries can now more easily access and participate as 
passive observers, instead of going through the formality of the 
original working procedures of the AB. These require a written request 
to be made within 25 days of notice of the appeal. 1024 They can also 
more easily participate in the appeal process without even 
participating as a third party in the panel, by submitting an amicus 
curiae brief to the AB. In fact, intervening with an amicus curiae brief 
is less costly than participating in the DSM. This is particularly helpful 
for poor and less developed members with considerable resource 
constraints. 1025 
Developing countries which participate as passive observers are not 
able to participate in the oral hearing during the AB process. 1026 The 
latter is considered the most important process of the AB for the 
participant to hear the matter under dispute. 1027 Participating with an 
amicus curiae brief in the appeal process does not involve active 
participation in the DSM. It simply requires the sending of a written 
submission to the AB. This involves neither attendance at the appeal 
process nor participation in the oral hearing of the AB. Therefore, 
developing countries which intervene via an amicus curiae brief are 
deprived of gaining a true experience of the DSM. This leaves space 
for consideration of proposals made for the reform of third party rights 
during the AB process in favour of developing countries. 
1024 James Smith, 'Inequality in international trade? Developing countries and 
institutional change in WTO dispute settlement', (2004), 11(3) Review of 
International Political Economy 542, p. 542. 
1025 Robert Howse, note 1006, p. 509. 
1026 Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/5, (27 February 2003), p. 3. 
1027 James Smith, note 1024, p. 542. 
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7.5 Conclusion 
It appears that while third party status under the DSU is undeniably 
important, the rights provided for third party participation in the WTO 
dispute settlement system are insufficient. The DSU provides minimal 
rights for third parties, although these are increasingly exercised in the 
WTO. This has led the panel and the AB to use their discretion in 
enhancing the rights of third parties during the course of litigation. 
However, this has been at the expense of predictability and the 
security of the system. Third party rights have attracted WTO 
members' attention during the review of the DSM. 1028 There is general 
agreement amongst WTO members and academics that third party 
rights are in need of clarification and reform, but more debate needs 
to take place about how such reform should be implemented. 
In particular, developing countries appear to be unable to secure 
better rights as third parties during the panel process. For instance, in 
EC - Sugar the panel gave them fewer rights than were provided in 
Banana III, even though these cases were almost identical. Developing 
countries have also been dissatisfied with their involvement as third 
parties at the AB level, although they have been allowed to participate 
directly as third parties in the appeal process without having notified 
their interest to the DSB according to Article 10 of the DSU. It would 
also appear that allowing amicus curiae briefs is not the ideal approach 
to this issue. This leads us to Chapter eight, which scrutinizes the 
1028 "I am not surprised about the considerable number of proposals that tend to 
enhance these rights. There are good reasons to increase third party rights ... 
Enhancing third party rights seems to be the appropriate answer. " C. D. Ehlermann, 
'Process of Clarification and improvement of the DSU', in F. Ortino and E. 
U. 
Petersmann(eds), The WTO Dispute Settlement System 1995-2003, (Kluwer Law 
International, Netherlands, 2004), p. 111. 
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The Reform of Third Party Involvement in 
the Panel and AB Processes 
8.1 Introduction 
It would be helpful to begin this review of the reform of third party 
rights in the WTO by reproducing an account of interesting comments 
made by the Venezuelan representative concerning the negotiation 
process of the DSU: 
"It would make a useful contribution to the negotiations by 
helping Members to concentrate on the most important 
issues. He said that the lack of a common objective had 
contributed to the failure by Members to fulfil the mandate 
given by Ministers at Doha. He said that the mandate was 
intended to identify fundamental improvements and 
clarifications, rather than just problems. Members should 
have no difficulty in identifying the fundamental problems 
which exist. 111029 
The AB and the panel have used their discretion and extended the 
procedural rights of third parties on a case-by-case basis. This has not 
only eased access, but also allowed wider participatory rights during 
the course of a dispute. However, such discretion has come at the 
expense of the predictability and credibility of the WTO dispute 
settlement system. As argued by Covelli, third party rights under the 
WTO are evolving to become broader, yet are still vague and 
confusing. 1030 
1029 Minutes of meeting, TN/DS/M/14, (20 April 2004), p. 13. 
1030 Ibid., p. 125-126. 
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Third party rights are an evolving issue in the international arena, and 
such rights are still unclear and limited, '031 despite efforts made by the 
AB and panels to enhance these rights during the course of litigation. 
As stated previously, there is a degree of agreement between WTO 
members and academics that third party rights during the panel and 
AB processes need to be clarified and reformed. 1032 Nevertheless, they 
are divided on how far such reform should go. Developing countries 
also seem to have found a way to interact with the DSM through 
participation as third parties, and their interest is crucial. At the same 
time, the reform of third party rights must not be at the expense of 
the principal parties or of the effectiveness and fairness of the dispute 
settlement process. Hence, any reform proposal needs to be balanced. 
The reform of third party rights will now be discussed with special 
reference to developing countries. 
Firstly, the views of WTO members will be analyzed by looking at their 
proposals and their participation in the special sessions held to review 
the WTO dispute settlement system. Then, a number of proposals will 
be discussed in connection with developing countries. The first reform 
issues to be considered will be the 'substantial interest' 
1033 
qualification, and whether or nor it is fruitful to place a 10-day time 
limit on notification of interest. Access and participation by third 
parties during the panel process will then be discussed, as will the 
question of whether enhanced access and participation could allow for 
1031 Further detail in Jin Gu, 'China and the WTO Dispute Settlement Three Years On', 
(2005), available online at http: //www. nottinqh im. ac. uk/iaps/GuJing%20paper. pdf, 
last seen on 25-10-2007 at 5 pm, p. 27., and Whitney Debevoise, 'Access to 
Documents and Panel and Appellate Body Sessions: Practice and Suggestions for 
Greater Transparency', (1998), 32 The International Lawyer 817, p. 834., Minutes of 
Meeting, TN/DS/M/30, (23 June 2006), p. 2. 
1032 Thomas A. Zimmermann, Negotiating the Review of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding, (Cameron May, London, 2006), pp. 176-182. 
1033 See also chapter five, section 5.2. 
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more participation of third parties in the interim review process. This 
will be followed by an examination of the proposal for direct 
intervention in the appeal process, together with a consideration of 
third party concerns in the panel/AB report. The chapter will close with 
concluding remarks. 
8.2 Members' Proposals on the Enhancement of 
Third Party Rights 
Proposals put forward by WTO members will first be looked at in this 
section. Costa Rica proposed that third parties ought to have access to 
all proceedings, hearings and information provided to the panel and 
the AB by the parties or third parties involved in a dispute. This is to 
address the concern raised that third parties ought to be considered in 
the panel and the AB report, and not just able to reflect on it. In 
addition, it was suggested that third parties ought to have a right to 
intervene in the appeal process even if they had not participated in the 
panel stage. It should be equivalent to the right given to third parties 
to join the panel stage, even if they had not joined the consultation 
process. Costa Rica also proposed that third parties should have 
access to the interim review stage, 1034 and to any consultation that 
takes place between parties in order to decide how best to implement 
a ruling. 1035 
On the other hand, Chinese Taipei, while accepting Costa Rica's 
proposal on allowing third parties full access to all information and 
proceedings of the panel and the AB, disagreed on whether third 
1034 In the interim review process the panel prepares and distributes the first draft of 
its ruling to the parties for their comments before the final adoption of the ruling of 
the panel. 
1035 Communication from Costa Rica, revision, TN/DS/W/12/Rev. 1, (6 March 2003). 
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parties should have access to the interim stage, since it could increase 
the complexity of the dispute process in a way that could also 
undermine the parties' rights. Nor did Chinese Taipei believe that third 
party views ought to be considered in the panel and the AB report, 
because they should deal only with claims affecting the principal 
parties. 1036 
Jamaica accepted that extended third party rights should be decided 
on a case-by-case basis under the current practice and that this should 
remain, as it does not affect the function of the DSM by increasing the 
burden. However, it stated that guidelines ought to be developed 
"such as agreement of parties to give enhanced rights, trade share of 
third parties, contribution to the economy, and existing legally binding 
agreements", based on which third party status could be extended in a 
more coherent and transparent manner for parties having a substantial 
trade interest in a particular matter. This view is linked to a third 
opinion on the extension of third party rights during the consultation 
stage, namely that third parties should be required to have a 
'substantial trade interest' and that guidelines ought to be developed 
to define this term. Furthermore, once the enhanced third party status 
is provided, access to all information and proceedings should be 
allowed, 1037 
China'038 and Jordan also want to see third parties having access to all 
panel meetings. In addition, Jordan agreed with Costa Rica that third 
parties' views ought to be considered in the panel report. 1039 In their 
1036 Communication from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen 
and Matsu, TN/DS/W/25, (27 November 2002). 
1037 Communication from Jamaica, TN/DS/W/21, (10 October 2002), p. 3. 
1038 Communication from China, revision, TN/DS/W/51/Rev. 1, (13 March 2003), p. 2. 
1039 Communication from Jordan, TN/DS/W/43, (28 January 2003), pp. 4-5. 
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proposals, members of the African group agreed with Costa Rica that 
third parties should have access to all documents and proceedings 
during the panel stage. Similarly, they want third parties to have 
access to documents and proceedings of the AB, and to be given the 
opportunity to be heard. Similarly, they believed that their views 
should be reflected in the AB's decisions, by improving Article 17.4 of 
the DSU. 1040 The African group added that the interpretation of the 
term 'substantial interest' should be broadened when it is applied to 
third parties who are developing countries, by adding new wording to 
Article 10.2.1041 
8.3 Minutes of Meetings 
The proposal for enhancement of third party rights provided by Costa 
Rica generated much interest and was discussed in a special meeting. 
Some 17 WTO members, both developed and developing countries, 
participated in the discussion and their views were varied. Some fully 
agreed with the proposal. Others agreed in the main whilst holding 
some reservations. Only one member had strong reservations about 
the need to enhance third party rights. 1042 
The US, India, Norway, Peru, Mexico and Canada supported without 
reservation the proposal for the enhancement of third party rights 
provided by Costa Rica. For their part, the EU, Chile, Colombia, 
1040 They proposed that "Article 17.4 should be amended by replacing it with the 
following: The parties to the dispute may appeal a panel report. Third parties in the 
panel proceedings, if they request, shall have a right to attend the proceedings and 
have an opportunity to be heard and to make written submissions to the Appellate 
Body. Their submissions shall also be given to the parties to the dispute and shall be 
reflected in the Appellate Body report. " Communication form Kenya, TN/DS/W/42, 
(24 January 2003), p. 2. 
1041 Ibid. 
1042 Minutes of meeting, TN/DS/M/4, (6 November 2002), pp. 1-8. 
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Indonesia, Switzerland, Korea, Brazil, Hong Kong, Ecuador, Argentina 
and Japan agreed in the main with the enhancement of third party 
rights in the course of a dispute, whilst expressing some reservations. 
The EU and Indonesia believed that access to the interim stage need 
only be given to the parties involved, while Chile and Ecuador also 
argued that third parties ought not to have access to the interim stage 
and that their views ought not to be considered by the panel and AB. 
Colombia suggested that third parties be granted access at the interim 
stage, but had reservations about their being able to intervene directly 
throughout the AB stage. 
Switzerland claimed that it was unfeasible to intervene directly in the 
AB process without joining the panel process, while Brazil generally 
agreed with the enhancement of third party rights. However, it 
expressed some reservations about the participation of third parties in 
the second substantive meeting of the panel, arguing that it should be 
allowed only for the parties involved. Hong Kong disagreed with Costa 
Rica that third parties should be able to intervene directly in the AB 
process, be granted access to the interim stage and have their views 
considered in the panel and the AB report. Argentina argued that third 
party views ought not to be dealt with in the panel and the AB report, 
and that third parties should not have the privilege of directly 
intervening in the AB stage. Finally, Japan believed that third parties 
should not be able to access the second meeting of the panel and the 
interim stage. 1043 
Only Australia raised strong concerns about the enhancement of third 
party rights, stating that it would severely damage the function of the 
1043 Ibid. 
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DSM and would undermine the rights of the principal parties. 
Notwithstanding this one major reservation, the majority of members 
agreed that the issue of enhancing third party rights should be 
discussed and analyzed in more detail. This should be done in order 
not to hinder the process of the DSM and to restore a balance between 
the rights of the principal parties and those of third parties. Even Costa 
Rica stated that it had tried not to be exclusive. 1044 
8.4 Enhancing Third Party Access to the Panel 
Process 
At the panel stage, third parties are limited to the first of the panel 
meetings and banned from accessing the second. io45 The panel has the 
right to enhance third party rights so that they can participate in all of 
the panel hearings. However, such a practice comes at the expense of 
the predictability of the system. Several reform proposals have been 
made to improve third party rights during the panel. These are: third 
party provisions to allow a third party with a substantial interest to 
attend and participate in both the first and second meetings of the 
parties; and third parties having the right to access all non-confidential 
1044 Ibid. 
1045 In this regard it has been argued that "At the panel stage, third parties can make 
oral presentations and submit their views in writing, but they can do so only at the 
start of the process (DSU Article 10 and DSU Appendix 3, paragraph 6, in WTO, 
1995). "Panelists typically hold two substantive meetings, each of which may involve 
multiple sessions. Third parties are allowed to submit their views and be present 
during only one session of the panel's first substantive meeting. During other 
sessions and the entire second meeting, where the disputants' rebuttals and 
panelists' questions are addressed, they have no right to participate or observe. In 
terms of documents, third parties receive only the submissions of the disputants to 
the first meeting, not subsequent rebuttals or written responses to questions. The 
level of access for third parties at the panel stage is thus quite restricted under rules 
negotiated by WTO governments in the Uruguay Round". James Smith, 'Inequality in 
international trade? Developing countries and institutional change in WTO dispute 
settlement', (2004), 11(3) Review of International Political Economy 542, pp. 552- 
553. 
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information presented in the first and second meetings of the 
panel. 
1046 
Such proposals appear uncontroversial. There has been a suggestion 
that enhancing the access of third parties would have the benefit of 
increasing transparency in the WTO, both external and internal. 
Granting third parties access to all information and proceedings of the 
panel would improve internal transparency, paving the way for 
opening the system to the public. 1047 The first part of the proposal, 
however, has raised some objections. It has been argued that the 
second meeting is mainly for the principal parties. Third parties should 
have the right only to attend the second substantive meeting of the 
panel passively, without making written or oral submissions. Also, any 
additional participation should be left to the panel. 1048 This line of 
reasoning is weak, because the panel has been 'inconsistent', 
'unpredictable' and 'unpersuasive'. In particular, developing countries 
1046 In this regard, Costa Rica presented an amendment to Article 10.2 as follows 
"Any Member having a substantial interest in a matter before a panel and having 
notified its interest to the DSB within 10 days after the date of the establishment of 
the panel (referred to in this Understanding as a "third party") shall have an 
opportunity to be heard by the panel, to make written submissions to the panel and 
to be present and participate at all the substantive meetings of the panel with the 
parties to the dispute. These submissions shall also be given to the parties to the 
dispute and shall be reflected in the panel report. The panel shall endeavour to 
address in its findings the arguments and views expressed by third parties as related 
to the terms of reference of the panel. " Communication from Costa Rica, revision, 
note 1035, p2. The same proposal has also been adopted by the African Group, in 
Communication from Kenya, note 1040, p. 2. 
1047 Antoniadis Antonis, 'Enhanced Third Party Rights in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding', (2002), 29(3) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 285, and, 
Ng'ong'ola Clement, 'African Member States and the Negotiations on Dispute 
Settlement Reform in the WTO', Tralac Working Paper No. 11, (2006), available online 
at https"//www givengain com/unique/tralac/pdf/20060202 ng'ong'olawpll. pdf, last 
seen on 21-6-2008 at 4: 48pm, pp. 18-19. 
1048 In this regard an amended proposal on article 10.3 was made by Costa Rica, in 
Communication from Costa Rica, revision, note 1035, p2; The EC, in Communication 
from the European Communities, TN/DS/W/1, (13 March 2002), p10, Chinese Taipei, 
in Communication from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen 
and Matsu, revision, TN/DS/W/36, (22 January 2003), pp. 1-2. 
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which are third parties are barred from presenting their views in the 
second meeting of the panel, even if they have a very significant 
interest in the dispute, as in the Sugar case. In contrast, other third 
parties, like Japan and Canada, who had no real economic interest in 
the Banana case 1049, were allowed to present their views to the second 
meeting of the panel. 
At this point it is useful to compare the position of third parties in the 
WTO with the practice of the ICJ, since the AB has clearly stated that 
WTO law is part of international law by declaring at the initial stages 
that its rules cannot be interpreted in isolation from international law. 
Thus, "to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in 
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law", loco they will be applied in accordance with the 
Vienna Convention on the law of treaties: '°51 
"The 'general rule of interpretation' set out above has been 
relied upon by all of the participants and third participants, 
although not always in relation to the same issue. That 
general rule of interpretation has attained the status of a 
rule of customary or general international law. As such, it 
forms part of the 'customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law' which the AB has been directed, 
by Article 3(2) of the DSU, to apply in seeking to clarify 
the provisions of the General Agreement and the other 
'covered agreements' of the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization (the 'WTO 
Agreement'). That direction reflects a measure of 
1049 These two cases have been dealt with in chapter seven, sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.3. 
1050 Article 3.2 of the DSU. 
1051 More detail can be found on the WTO official website at: 
http: //www. wto. org/english/res e/booksp e/analytic index e/dsu 01 e. htm#article 
3, last seen on 13-02-2008, at 10am, and Tania Voon, Cultural Products and the 
World Trade Organization, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007), pp. 123- 
125. 
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recognition that the General Agreement is not to be read in 
clinical isolation from public international law. " °52 
The ICJ also allows for a third party to intervene in a case according to 
Articles 62 and 63 of the court statutes. Both articles deal with 
intervention before the ICJ, but according to Article 62 permission is 
required from the court for a third party to intervene, whereas under 
Article 63 it is automatic. 1053 Also, unlike a third party intervening 
according to Article 62, one doing so under Article 63 is bound by the 
court's decision. However, the procedure is the same: Article 85 of the 
Rules of the court, which deals with procedures of Article 62, is copied 
in Article 86 of the Rules of the court, which deals with the procedures 
of Article 63. Both Articles are different from the rules provided to a 
third party in the WTO by Article 62. This article shares a common goal 
with Article 10 of the DSU, since both require the approval of the court 
and neither is bound by the ruling. 
The rights provided to a third party in the ICJ are greater than those in 
a WTO case. According to Article 10 of the DSU, third party 
participation is restricted to the first meeting of the panel. Also, third 
parties are not allowed to participate in the interim stage before the 
final ruling of the panel. Third party intervention before the ICJ is 
1052 United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline (US - 
Gasoline) 
, Appellate 
Body Report, WT/DS/AB/R, adopted on 29 April 1997, p. 17. 
[hereinafter US Gasoline]; also, India - Patent, appellate body report, supra note 
853, para. 46.; and United States - Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access 
Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabyte or Above from Korea (US - 
DRAMS), panel report, WT/DS99/R, adopted on 29 January 1999, para. 6.13. 
[hereinafter US DRAMS] 
1053 Nevertheless, both articles 62 and 63 are very restrictively used. In this regard it 
has been argued that "despite the apparent wording of Article 63 according 
intervention as of right in the defined circumstances, the Court has still remained 
restrictive and unwilling in fact to allow it as of right". Christine 
Chinkin, 
"Intervention Before the International Court of Justice , in 
Weiss, Friedl(eds), 
Improving WTO. dispute Settlement system Procedures, (Cameron May, London, 
2000), p. 112. 
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allowed for access to information and for participation in all 
proceedings before the court. 
1054 Therefore, this improvement would 
be in the spirit of the rules of the ICJ. 
Indeed, allowing third parties to attend and participate in all of the 
panel meetings is consistent with the spirit of international law, since 
third parties in the ICJ, once permitted to intervene in the case, are 
allowed to participate in all of the hearings before the court. It is also 
consistent with the spirit of multilateralism that dominates the WTO, in 
which third parties regularly intervene in the DSM. Allowing them to 
participate in the hearings would certainly improve their current rights, 
which are usually described as being limited, restrictive and sometimes 
minimal. This would also benefit developing countries, which are often 
quick to take the opportunity to participate in the DSM as third parties 
in order to improve their experience of the system. It would also 
create a means for their views to be heard on disputed issues that 
could affect their trade interests. 
In addition, it can be observed that although the GATT practice was for 
third parties to organize themselves and choose one of their number to 
present all their views during the course of the dispute, this has not 
happened in the WTO. Therefore, it is proposed that the DSU allow one 
member to participate as a third party on behalf of a group of 
interested WTO members. This would particularly benefit developing 
countries, as they would be able to pool their resources when 
1054 Ibid., pp. 126-130. 
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intervening as third parties, holding as they do many views in 
common. 
1055 
8.4.1 Article 18.2 of the DSU and better access 
According to Article 18.2 of the DSU, the submissions of the disputing 
party to the panel or the AB are treated as confidential documents. 
They are made available only to the parties involved in the dispute and 
to third parties. It also grants the disputing parties the right to make 
submissions of their own positions to the panel or the AB, as well as to 
disclose them to the public if they so wish. In addition, parties which 
are not third parties have the right "upon request of a Member, [to] 
provide a non-confidential summary of the information contained in its 
written submissions that could be disclosed to the public". 
China and Costa Rica proposed that the provision stated in Article 18.2 
of the DSU ought also to be extended to third parties, so that they are 
able to access the submissions made by parties and third parties to 
the panel or the AB. China rightly argued that confidential data in the 
parties' submissions ought to be excluded, while Costa Rica argued for 
a 15-day deadline for the non-confidential summary, or a time limit 
agreed between the party and requesting party. A better proposal to 
extend third party access to the parties' communications with the 
panel, AB, or arbitrator was made in the Chairman's text: 1056 
1055 However, there are examples where developing countries as third parties have 
organised themselves and chosen one to present their case during the course of a 
dispute. 
1056 In this regard the arbitrator means those who deal with level of compliance with 
adopted reports and the suspension of concessions as stated in Para 6 of Article 22: 
"... if the Member concerned objects to the level of suspension proposed, or claims 
that the principles and procedures set forth in paragraph 3 have not been followed 
where a complaining party has requested authorization to suspend concessions or 
other obligations pursuant to paragraph 3(b) or (c), the matter shall be referred to 
arbitration. Such arbitration shall be carried out by the original panel, if Members are 
j2 
"Written submissions to the panel, or the AB or the 
arbitrator shall be treated as confidential, but shall be 
made available to the parties to the dispute, and to third 
parties as foreseen in Article 10. Nothing in this 
Understanding shall preclude a party to a dispute from 
disclosing statements of its own positions to the public. 
Members shall treat as confidential information submitted 
by another Member to the panel or the AB which that 
Member has designated as confidential. Members may 
designate certain information that they submit to the 
panel, the AB or the arbitrator as '[privileged]'. Such 
information shall be treated in accordance with procedures 
to be established by the DSB. '°57 
"A party to a dispute shall also, upon request of a Member, 
provide a non-confidential summary of the information 
contained in its written submissions that could be disclosed 
to the public. [A: After each meeting of a panel or oral 
hearing of the AB], each party and third party to a dispute 
shall, if requested by any Member, provide a non- 
confidential version of the written submissions it has made 
to the panel [A: prior to that meeting], that could be 
disclosed to the public within [fifteen days] [30 days] after 
the date of such request. The Secretariat shall establish 
and administer a dispute settlement registry at the WTO to 
facilitate access to these non-confidential versions of 
written submissions. The DSB shall establish rules and 
procedures governing the Secretariat's administration of 
the registry. i1058 
available, or by an arbitrator appointed by the Director-General and shall be 
completed within 60 days after the date of expiry of the reasonable period of time. 
Concessions or other obligations shall not be suspended during the course of the 
arbitration". More detail online at 
http: //www. wto. orq/enqlish/res e/booksp e/analytic index e/dsu 08 e. htm, last 
seen on 12-11-2008 at 11am, Peter Van Den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the 
World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials, (Cambridge University Press, 
Second Edition, 2008), pp. 305-306. 
1057 Special session of the Dispute Settlement Body, Report by the Chairman, 
TN/DS/9, (6 June 2003), p. 9. 
1058 Ibid. 
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The chairman's proposed text is preferable to the proposals made by 
Cost Rica and China, by adding the access of the third party to the 
arbitrator according to Article 22.61059 of the DSU. Practice shows that 
the third party would have valid concerns at this stage. This would also 
be a better formulation of the practice of the arbitrator regarding 
Article 22.6 of the DSU, where the third party has failed to obtain 
consistent access to the arbitration procedures. In EC Banana III 
(which was complained about by the US) the arbitrator declined to 
allow Ecuador to participate as a third party, since it had a very special 
interest in the dispute. It claimed that Article 22 does not contain any 
rules related to third parties, and the arbitrator did not see that 
Ecuador's interests could be harmed as a result of the arbitration 
process. 1060 
However, in EC - Hormones, the arbitrator granted Canada and the US 
third party status on three grounds: 
(i) that the interests of the EC would be affected and the EC 
did not object to Canada and US participation as third 
parties; 
(ii) that both Japan and the US could be affected by the 
outcome of the arbitration procedure; and 
1059 Usually carried out by the original the panellist, in Kara Leitner and 
Simon 
Lester, 'WTO dispute settlement 1995-2007: a statistical analysis', (2008), 
11(1) 
Journal of International Economic Law 179, p. 188. 
1060 European Communities - Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas, recourse to arbitration by the European Communities under 
Article 22.6 of 
the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB, adopted on 9 April 1999, para. 2.8. [hereinafter EC Banana 
III recourse to arbitration by EC] 
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(iii) due process. Both the US and Canada were permitted to 
participate in arbitration hearings, to make a statement 
towards the end of each hearing and to obtain a copy of 
the written submissions presented in the arbitration 
process. 
1061 
By contrast, in the Brazil - Aircraft dispute, the Australian request to 
participate as a third party in the arbitration proceedings was declined. 
The reasons were that there were no rules relating to third parties in 
Article 22 of the DSU, and the arbitrator did not see that Australian 
interests could be affected as a result of the arbitration process. 1062 
The arbitrator stated: 
"We note in this respect that third party rights were 
granted in the Article 22.6 arbitrations concerning 
European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and 
Meat Products (Hormones) and rejected in the EC - 
Bananas (1999) Article 22.6 arbitration. We do not consider 
that Australia in this case is in the same situation as 
Canada and the United States in the EC - Hormones 
arbitrations, nor even in the same situation as Ecuador in 
the EC - Bananas (1999) arbitration. Indeed, Australia 
never initiated dispute settlement proceedings against 
Brazil with respect to the export financing programme at 
issue. Moreover, Australia did not draw the attention of the 
Arbitrators to any benefits accruing to it or any rights under 
the WTO Agreement which might be affected by their 
decision. "1063 
1061 European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and 
Meat Products 
(Hormones), recourse to arbitration by the European Communities under 
Article 22.6 
of the DSU, WT/DS26/AR, adopted on 12 July 1999, para. 7. 
[hereinafter EC 
Hormones recourse to arbitration by EC] 
1062 Brazil - Export Financing Programme 
for Aircraft, recourse to arbitration by the 
Brazil under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS46/ARB, adopted on 
28 August 2000, 
paras. 2.4-2.5. [hereinafter Brazil Aircraft recourse to arbitration 
by Brazil] 
1063 Ibid, para. 2.6. 
1ý 1 
The adoption of the "chairman text" proposal on Article 18 of the DSU 
would guarantee that third parties would at least have access to the 
submission made by the disputing parties to the arbitrator, without 
disrupting the arbitration process. This would notably also be 
important for developing country third parties. These third parties 
often do not have the resources to follow all stages in the dispute, and 
may sometimes intervene in the panel stage but find themselves 
unable to go further, to the appeal process or, indeed, the arbitration 
procedures. As a result of this proposal, developing country third 
parties would have access to information on the arbitration process at 
considerably reduced cost, without disrupting the arbitration process. 
This would bolster the transparency of the WTO, as well as giving 
developing country third parties a better insight into the submissions 
prepared. Thus, it would enrich their experience of the DSM. It would 
certainly help with preparing and debating their own submissions to 
the panel, AB, or arbitrator in future disputes. This would be in the 
spirit of international law, which allows third parties complete 
participation in the ICJ dispute process once admitted to intervene in 
the case. It would also enhance internal transparency as a step 
towards opening the whole system to the public in the future. 
At this stage it is useful to look at the relationship between third 
parties' rights and the enforcement mechanism under the DSM. In an 
attempt to strengthen the retaliatory power of developing countries, it 
has been suggested that third parties ought to be allowed to retaliate 
against the offending member. 1064 But a closer examination of this 
proposal suggests that it would not add significantly to the retaliatory 
1064 Ngangjoh N. Yenkong, 'Third Party Rights and the Concept of Legal Interest 
in 
World Trade Organization Dispute settlement: Extending Participatory 
Rights to 
Enforcement Rights', (2004), 38(5) Journal of World Trade 757. 
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power of a complainant developing country, especially when the 
complainant and third party intervening on its side are developing 
countries. To clarify this issue, consider the example of the US - 
Underwear1065 dispute. Here, it would still have been difficult for Costa 
Rica to retaliate against the US and force it to comply with DSB 
rulings, even if it had been allowed to do so collectively with India, a 
larger developing country which actually participated as a third party 
in this dispute. Nor, in the US - Cotton Yarn 1066dispute, would it have 
substantially reduced the economic and political costs to Pakistan (the 
complainant) of retaliating against the US. This could have led to a 
trade war, even if done jointly with India as a third party. This 
proposal also suffers from a lack of support from both developed and 
developing member countries, since there has (as of December 2008) 
been no proposal for extending third party rights to retaliation and 
suspension of concessions. 
The same arguments apply even when a developed country intervenes 
on the side of a developing one. Ecuador and the other Latin American 
co-complainants and third parties are still struggling to implement the 
AB ruling in the Banana dispute1067 against the EU, while the US has 
settled its own concerns in this respect. If a real collective element is 
to be added to retaliation, then the collective relation scheme 
suggested by the African group, which allows all WTO members to 
1065 United States - Restrictions on imports of 
Cotton and Man-Made Fibre 
Underwear, WT/DS24/R, panel report, adopted on 08 November 1996; 
WT/DS24/AB/R, Report of the Appellate Body, adopted on 10-02-1997. [hereinafter 
US Underwear] 
1066 United States - Transitional Safeguard 
Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from 
Pakistan 
, panel report, 
WT/DS192/R, adopted on 31 May 2001, appellate body 
report, WT/DS192/AB/R, adopted on 08 October 2001. 
[hereinafter US Cotton Yarn] 
1067 European Communities - Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas, panel report, WT/DS27/ECU, adopted on 
22 May 1997; appellate body 
report, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted on 5 September 1997. 
[hereinafter EC Banana III] 
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retaliate against the offending party, would be preferable to collective 
retaliation by the complainant and third parties. The former would add 
real strength to the retaliatory power of a developing country 
complainant, and mark a significant movement from unilateralism to 
multilateralism. 1068 
The most beneficial method of implementation for developing countries 
might be monetary compensation, which could be usefully extended to 
developing countries as third parties. Unfortunately, however, 
monetary compensation in not part of the practice under the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism. Thus, third parties are denied a right 
that the main disputing parties have. 1069 Considering the current 
credibility of the WTO rules and their implementation, it could be 
argued that it is an advantage for a third party, especially a developing 
country third party, to be outside the current enforcement mechanism 
of the DSM. 1070 
8.4.2 The interpretation of 'substantial interest' 
The DSU has a strict requirement at the consultation stage of 
'substantial trade interest' being present for a party to intervene, 
subject to the approval of the disputing parties. It is, however, more 
lenient on the intervention of a third party in the panel and AB stages, 
with 'substantial interest' being the only requirement. There is 
widespread agreement among WTO members'°7' and academics'°72 
1068 More detail in chapter three section 3.3.6. 
1069 Analyses of the monetary compensations in chapter three section 
3.3.5. 
1070 More detail in chapter five section 5.2. 
1071 This view was expressed in the proposal made 
by Costa Rica note 1035, Jamaica 
note 1037, Jordan note 1039 and Taiwan note 1036. 
1072 Nick Covelli, "Member Intervention in World Trade Organization Dispute 
Settlement Proceedings After EC-Sardines: The Rules, Jurisprudence, and 
Controversy', (2003), 37(3) Journal of World Trade 673, Antonis Antoniadis, note 
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that the term 'substantial interest' ought to remain as a requirement 
for intervention in the WTO dispute settlement process. The rationale 
behind this is to sustain the balance between the rights of the parties 
and those of third parties, whilst not overburdening the system by 
allowing third parties without a real interest to intervene in a dispute. 
However, the question could be raised as to how the term `substantial 
interest' should be interpreted: narrowly, to cover legal or direct trade 
interest in a dispute, in line with the ICJ interpretation; or more 
broadly, to include those with wider systemic interests in a dispute. 
The AB succinctly reflected on the term `substantial interest' of Article 
10.2 of the DSU in the Banana dispute by adopting a broader 
interpretation. It said that this ought not to be limited to `a legal 
interest' in the dispute, by stating: 
"We agree with the Panel that 'neither Article 3.3 nor 3.7 of 
the DSU nor any other provision of the DSU contains any 
explicit requirement that a Member must have a "legal 
interest" as a prerequisite for requesting a panel'. We do 
not accept that the need for a 'legal interest' is implied in 
the DSU or in any other provision of the WTO Agreement. 
It is true that under Article 4.11 of the DSU, a Member 
wishing to join in multiple consultations must have 'a 
substantial trade interest', and that under Article 10.2 of 
the DSU, a third party must have 'a substantial interest' in 
the matter before a panel. But neither of these provisions 
in the DSU, nor anything else in the WTO Agreement, 
provides a basis for asserting that parties to the dispute 
have to meet any similar standard. Yet, we do not believe 
that this is dispositive of whether, in this case, the United 
States has 'standing' to bring claims under the GATT. f1073 
1047, Chi Carmody, 'Of Substantial Interest: Third Parties under GATT', (1999), 18 
Michigan Journal of International Law 615, Ng'ong'ola Clement, note 1047. 
1073 EC - Bananas III, appellate body, note 1067, para. 
132. 
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The AB also emphasised in the following paragraphs its belief 
"that a Member has broad discretion in deciding whether to 
bring a case against another Member under the DSU. The 
language of Article XXIII: 1 of the GATT 994 and of 
Article 3.7 of the DSU suggests, furthermore, that a 
Member is expected to be largely self-regulating in deciding 
whether any such action would be 'fruitful'. 111074 
In the same vein, a group of LDCs has proposed that substantial 
interest ought to be interpreted as follows: 
"For purposes of developing and least-developed country 
Members, the term 'substantial interest' shall be 
interpreted to include any amount of international trade; 
trade impact on major domestic macro-economic indicators 
such as employment, national income, and foreign 
exchange reserves; the gaining of expertise in the 
procedural, substantive, and systemic issues relating to 
this Understanding; and protecting long-term development 
interests that any measures inconsistent with covered 
agreements and any findings, recommendations and 
rulings could affect. 111075 
An alternative suggestion is ""that each WTO Member should be 
allowed to exercise its own judgement as to whether participation as a 
third party would be fruitful. This ... is the only guideline on 
initiating 
action as a main party under the DSU". 1076 This is indeed consistent 
with the current practice of the DSM, which allows automatic access 
for third parties without inspection of whether they have a specific 
trade interest in the outcome of a case, or a broader interest in the 
interpretation of the covered agreements. 107 Indeed, WTO members, 
and particularly developing countries, have so far intervened on a 
1074 Ibid, paras. 135-136. 
1075 Communication from Kenya, note 1040, p. 2. 
1076 Ng'ong'ola Clement, note 1047, pp. 18-19. 
1077 Gavin Goh and Trudy Witbreuk , The 
WTO Dispute Settlement System, 2001, 
available at http: //www. dfat. qov. au/trade/neqotiations/disputes/wto 
disputes- 
papers-dispute settlement. doc, last seen on 04-03-07 at 9 am, p. 
14., Ngangjoh N. 
Yenkong, note 1064, pp. 766-768. 
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genuine basis only when they have a real interest in a particular 
case. 1078 
Further relaxation of the requirements for third party participation 
would also encourage greater involvement of African and LDC member 
States in DSU proceedings. 1079 There is, for example, currently no time 
limit for third parties to register their interest with the DSB, as stated 
in Article 10. It has been proposed that third parties should have the 
right to participate before a panel if they register their interest within 
10 days of the initiation of the panel. 1080 This proposal is more 
concerned with the establishment of the panel, since parties and third 
parties cannot serve as panellists, and establishing a 10-day 
deadline'0$1 would help to prevent delays during the selection of 
panellists. 1082 
Such a proposal is described as a modest contribution to the process 
of review of the DSM. This is true, since the panels have already 
adopted the past practices of GATT, and have denied interventions by 
third parties which have not met the 10-day deadline for notification of 
X0'8 More detail in chapter six section 6.9. 
10'9 Ng'ong'ola, note 1047. pp. 18-19. 
soso This could be added to article 10.2 of the DSU: "Any Member 
having a 
substantial interest in a matter before a panel and having notified its interests to the 
DSB within 10 days after the date of the establishment of the panel 
(referred to in 
this Understanding as a "third party")..... " This is proposed in Communication 
from 
the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, revision, note 
1048, p. 1.; by Costa Rica, in Communication from Costa Rica, 
Revision, note 1046, 
p. 2.; by China, Communication from China, TN/DS/W/51, (5 March 
2003), p. 2.; by 
Jordan in Communication from Jordan, note 1039, p. 4.; and by the EC in 
Communication from the European Communities, TN/DS/W/1, (13 March 2002), p. 8. 
X081 "Regarding third-party rights, she said that Colombia was supportive of 
the 
proposal by Jamaica. Colombia did not share the view that strengthening 
third-party 
rights would invariably delay the dispute settlement process. 
The rights of third 
parties should be not be decided by the parties to 
the dispute". In Minutes of 
Meeting, TN/DS/M/527, (February 2003), p. 11. 
1082 Communication from Jordan, note 1039, p. 4. 
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their interest. '083 The panels have also adopted a number of conditions 
under which developing countries are allowed to participate as third 
parties, even if they have not notified the DSB within 10 days. These 
include: (1) considering the due process of the dispute; (2) not 
adversely affecting the composition of the panel; and (3) not hindering 
the panel process. This is in the interests of developing countries such 
as Morocco, which had in the past missed such a deadline and so 
would have been banned from intervention in the panel process. 
Therefore, the current practice of the panel appears to be more 
sensible than the introduction of a 10-day deadline in Article 10 of the 
DSU. 
The proposals on the term "substantial interest' would perhaps best 
characterise the advantage that the DSM has over the ICJ, in allowing 
easier access for third parties. They also support the proposition that 
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism can be described as a true 
multilateral process, since there are few bilateral disputes and the 
majority of cases involve more than two disputing parties. 1084 Third 
parties have always been allowed to intervene and their requests have 
never been denied. 1085 In contrast, third party intervention has very 
1083 E. Kessie, "the "Early Harvest Negotiation" in 2003', in F. Ortino and E. U. 
Petersmann(eds), the WTO Dispute settlement System 1995-2003, (Kluwe Law 
International, Netherland, 2004), p. 127. 
1084 More detail can be found in chapter four. A better system for third parties has 
been proposed by John P. Gaffney, 'Due Process in the World Trade Organization: 
The Need for Procedural Justice in the Dispute Settlement System', (1999), 14 
American University International Law Review 1173, pp. 1212-1213. 
1085 "There are also some key differences between the ICJ and DSU of the WTO in the 
settlement of disputes. In the case of the ICJ, third parties can intervene in the case 
before the court if they can convince the court that they have an interest of a 
legal 
nature that is likely to be affected by the decision. In practice, the ICJ will rarely 
allow a third party intervention. On the other hand, Article 10 and 
Appendix 3 of the 
DSU permit third parties an opportunity to be heard and 
to make written 
submissions; they can also make oral submissions. For example, in the 
EC - Banana 
case there were six parties (including the European Commission 
(EC)), which 
represented 15 States and 20 third parties. The Appellate Body 
in the EC - Banana 
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rarely been applied in the case of the ICJ. 1°86 As has been discussed, 
Article 62 states that it is for the court to decide whether such a 
member has a valid interest in intervening or not. This was very 
narrowly applied by the court, with many requests being denied. 
Examples include that made by Malta in 1981 to intervene in the 
dispute between Tunisia and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The situation 
changed in 1990, when the court allowed Nicaragua to intervene in the 
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, 1087 which involved El 
Salvador and Honduras. This was considered a breakthrough for third 
parties in the World Court, being the first case to examine third party 
rights in the ICJ. 1088 In this regard, any member wishing to intervene 
according to Article 62 has to present convincing proof to the court to 
show that such an interest in a dispute exists; and legal grounds must 
be explained in detail by the interested member. The court has 
absolute power to decide whether such a legal interest in a dispute is 
valid or not. 1089 Therefore, it could be suggested that the current 
case clarified that a State could seek the establishment of a panel even if did not 
have a legal interest or could not show an actual trade impact. The interest in 
ensuring free international trade in goods and services, as well as the interest in 
clearly determining rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement, provide 
sufficient grounds to pursue WTO dispute settlement. However, the difference 
between the ICJ and the DSU in allowing third party intervention is a difference of a 
procedural nature and is otherwise justified by the specialized character of the legal 
regime to which the DSU is organically linked". Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, 'Multiple 
international judicial forums: a reflection of the growing strength of international law 
or its fragmentation? in Symposium: Diversity or cacophony? New sources of norms 
in international law', (2004), 25(4) Michigan Journal of International Law 929, pp. 
954-955. 
1086 In this regard it has been argued that "third parties can intervene in the case 
before the court if they can convince the court that they have an interest of a legal 
nature that is likely to be affected by the decision. In practice, the ICJ will rarely 
allow a third party intervention. " In Rao, note 1085, p. 954. 
1087 Case Concerning Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v 
Honduras; Nicaragua intervention) I. C. J. Rep. 1992 92. 
1088 Rebecca Wallace, International Law, (Fourth Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
2002), pp. 304-305; Malcolm Evans, International Law, (First Edition, 
Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2003), pp. 577-578. 
1089 Rebecca Wallace, International Law, (Fifth Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
2005), pp. 332-333. 
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status quo practice of the DSB regarding a broader interpretation of 
the term 'substantial interest' (which is virtually automatic for access 
of third parties to the panel process) ought to be retained. This should 
apply whether the substantial interest is a legal, trade or even broader 
systematic interest in the dispute, without being restricted to a certain 
time-limit. In line with this scheme, the African group has recently 
revised its proposal and suggested that Article 10.2 ought to be 
modified to state: 
"Any Member may participate as a third party before a 
panel by notifying its interest to do so to the DSB and shall 
have an opportunity to be heard by the panel and make 
written submissions to the panel. These submissions shall 
also be given to the parties to the dispute and shall be 
reflected in the report. "1°90 
8.5 Interim Report 
The interim review process is for the panel to prepare its final report 
and to consider the final comments of the parties before the adoption 
of the panel report. The interim review consists of two steps. The first 
is the descriptive draft, which is prepared by the panel after the 
second meeting and presents the facts and arguments submitted in 
the dispute. This descriptive draft is distributed to the parties, who 
should comment on it within a certain time limit to be decided by the 
panel. 1091 After this, the second step starts, when the panel provides 
the parties with the interim report. This comprises the facts, 
arguments and findings of the panel. The parties can ask the panel in 
writing to review certain elements of its interim report within a certain 
time limit, again set by the panel. In such a case, the panel will meet 
with the party to discuss its written comments. If no comments on the 
1090 Communication from the delegation of Cote d'Ivoire on behalf of the African 
Group, TN/DS/W/92, (5 March 2008), p. 1. 
1091 Article 15.1 of the DSU 
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interim report are made by the parties, then "the interim report shall 
be considered the final panel report and circulated promptly to the 
Members"'. 1092 The interim review stage must not exceed the time limit 
stated in Articles 8 and 12 of the DSU. 
1093 
In this regard, the DSU has no provision that allows third parties to 
intervene during the interim review stage, this being an exclusive right 
of the principal parties. In practice, however, panels have adopted a 
contradictory position in this regard. In Banana III the panel declined a 
request made by developing countries to be allowed to participate 
during the interim review process. However, in the EC - Trade 
Preference dispute, the panel enhanced the rights of third parties to 
allow them to access the descriptive draft without making any 
comments. 1094 The second and more recent rulings allow third parties 
to be even more important than the drafter of the DSU, and the 
current provision under the DSU fails to provide sufficient rights for 
third parties in the course of a dispute. However, in EC - Sugar, the 
panel overturned its practice in EC - Trade Preferences, and did not 
allow ACP third parties to participate in the interim review process. 
Therefore, the opportunity for a third party to access the interim 
review process exists, but it is vague and unpredictable, not a 
guaranteed right. 
The most interesting proposals were made by Costa Rica in connection 
with paras 1 and 2 of Article 15. Indeed, a number of submissions 
have been made. As far as para 1 is concerned, it was proposed that 
third parties should have the right to receive a copy of the descriptive 
1092 Article 15.2 of the DSU 
1093 Article 15.3 of the DSU 
1094 
More detail in section 7.3.3 of chapter eight. 
- 
draft and to make comments on it. 
1095 With regard to para 2, it was 
suggested that third parties should have the right to receive a copy of 
the interim report without having the right to make comments on it. 
Such a right was to remain exclusive to the disputing parties. 1096 
Adopting reforms that would allow third parties to participate in the 
interim review stage would certainly contribute to the transparency 
and multilateralism of the WTO, as would allowing third parties to 
participate in all meetings of the panel. In addition, this would follow 
the past practice of GATT, in which it appears that third parties had 
broader procedural rights, which were limited only by the panel's 
terms of reference. 1097 Moreover, it was important not to modify the 
second part of para 2 of Article 15. This allows for disputing parties to 
make further comments and meet again with the panel with regard to 
certain aspects of the panel report, while maintaining restricted rights 
for the disputing parties only, without interference from third parties, 
so as not to increase the complexity of the dispute by adding to the 
burden on the disputing parties. 1098 This would also sustain the judicial 
1095 Communication from Costa Rica, revision, note 1046, p. 2-3.; Communication 
from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, 
revision, note 1048, p. 2.; Report by the Chairman, Ambassador, note 1057, p. 6-7.; 
Communication from the European Communities, TN/DS/W/38, (23 January 2003), 
p. 4. 
1096 Communication from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen 
and Matsu, revision, note 1048, p. 2. 
1097 More detail in Chi Carmody, note 1072, and Mary Footer, 'Some Aspects of Third 
Party Intervention in GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings', in Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann(eds), The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, (London, Kluwer Law 
International, 1997). 
1098 In this regard it has been argued that The primary aim of the WTO 
dispute 
settlement mechanism is to secure a 'positive solution to a dispute' for the parties 
to 
the dispute, at all stages. The participation of the third party should not 
be allowed 
to increase the complexity of the dispute process". Communication 
from the 
Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, revision, note 1048, p. 4. 
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economy of the parties, to allow them to negotiate and decide on how 
the dispute should continue. 
'099 
The advantage for developing countries acting as third parties is that 
allowing them to access all the stages of the panel, including the 
interim review process, would give them first-hand experience of the 
function of the DSM step-by-step, without their being restricted to a 
certain aspect of the panel procedure. The Costa Rican proposal on 
third party access to the interim review process is a better formulation 
of the panel practice regarding the extension of third party rights, 
without sacrificing the balance between parties' and third parties' 
rights. 
8.6 Articles 8.10,12.10 and 27.2 of S&D and 
Third Parties 
The analysis of the S&D provisions of the DSU in Chapter three above 
indicated the need for further improvement and clarification by WTO 
members on how these rules operate. However, it must also be 
determined whether the S&D provisions benefit a developing country 
third party as far as the dispute settlement understanding is 
concerned. In Banana III, ACP countries raised the question of the 
interrelationship between third parties and S&D during the panel 
process. ACP developing countries acting as third parties argued that 
they did not have sufficient time to prepare and present their 
arguments and submissions, contrary to Articles 12.2 and 12.4 of the 
1099 This concern has been brought forward by the EC: "Another aspect of the Costa 
Rican submission which required further consideration was the proposal to allow third 
parties to present comments during the interim review stage. Since the parties to 
the dispute could negotiate a mutually agreed solution at this stage, it might not be 
prudent to allow third parties a right to comment on the interim review stage. " 
Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/4, (6 November 2002), p. 2. 
! J% 
DSU. 110° More importantly, they also stated that this was in particular 
a violation of Article 12.10 of the DSU, `which specifically provided 
that, when examining a complaint against developing country, a panel 
must accord sufficient time for the developing country Member to 
prepare and present its argumentation". 1101 The panel refused to deal 
with the issue raised regarding Article 12.10, indicating that its 
provisions applied only to developing countries which had participated 
as respondents, not as third parties. 1102 This eventually led to the 
proposal that Article 12.10 of the DSU should be applied to developing 
countries not only as principal parties, but also as third parties. 1103 
Although participating as a third party means that considerably fewer 
resources are needed than if participating as a disputing party, it is not 
totally cost free. It raises a legitimate concern about how to improve 
the resources available for developing countries so that they can 
effectively participate as third parties in the DSM. 1104 In this regard, 
one could also propose that Article 27.2 of the DSU should provide 
legal assistance from the WTO secretariat for developing countries to 
act not only as complainants or respondents, but also as third parties. 
With regard to Article 8.10, this allows a developing country as a 
disputing party to have its own panel member so as to safeguard more 
1100 "'Which require that Panel procedures provide sufficient flexibility so as to ensure 
high quality reports and for the parties to prepare their submissions", EC Bananas 
III, panel report, note 1067, para 5.17. 
1101 Ibid. 
1102 Mary Footer, 'Developing country practice in the Matter of WTO Dispute 
Settlement', (2001), 35(1) Journal of World Trade 55, p-67- 
1103 Asif H. Qureshi, 'Participation of Developing Countries in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement System', (2003), 47(2) Journal of African Law 174, p. 197. 
1104 David Evans and Celso De Tarso Pereira, 'DSU Review: a view from the 
inside', in 
Rufus Yerxa and Bruce Wilson(eds), Key Issues in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement: the 
First Ten Years, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge), 2005, p. 262.; Andrew D. 
Mitchell, 'A legal principle of special and differential treatment for WTO 
disputes', 
(2006), 5(3) World Trade Review 445, p. 461. 
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effectively the concerns and interests of such countries participating in 
a dispute before the DSM. Third party developing countries ought not 
to be deprived of such rights, especially in cases where a country is 
participating as a third party only, which is the most common scenario 
for the majority of developing countries. 
In addition, the more third parties intervene in a dispute the more 
difficult it will be to find a panel, since the panel members must not be 
of the same nationality as any of the parties or third parties. llos 
Adopting this proposal could be seen as a solution to this, reducing the 
difficulties of allocating a panel. 
8.8 Direct Appeal to the AB 
Currently, according to Article 10 of the DSU, any third party that 
wishes to intervene in the appeal process must register its interest 
with the DSB. However, in practice, the AB in the Sardine dispute 
allowed a WTO member (Morocco) to intervene in the appeal process 
without being a third party before the panel, as a form of amicus 
curiae brief. This proved to be very unpopular with WTO members. In 
this regard, a major proposal for the enhancement of third party rights 
is to allow members to intervene directly at the appellate level and to 
participate as third parties in the panel stage subject to Article 10, or 
in the consultation stage subject to Article 4.11.1106 Recently, the 
1105 Ann Weston and Valentina Delich, `Settling disputes', in Diana Tussie(ed), Trade 
Negotiations in Latin America: Problems and Prospects, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 
p. 201. 
1106 Communication from Costa Rica, revision, note 1046, p. 3; Also, in this regard, 
"The EC was supportive of the Costa Rican proposal to allow Members to participate 
as third parties during the Appellate Body stage, regardless of whether 
they 
participated in the panel proceedings. The issues on appeal might 
have a direct 
relevance for Member which wanted to participate as a third party in the 
Appellate 
Body proceedings. " Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/4, (6 November 
2002), p. 2. 
`Jý 
African group proposed that third parties be given the right to 
intervene directly in the appeal process, even if they have not notified 
their interest according to Articles 4.11 or 10 of the DSU. 1107 Costa 
Rica suggested that Article 17.4 be reformed as follows: 
"Only parties to the dispute, not third parties, may appeal a 
panel report. Third parties which have notified the DSB of a 
substantial interest in the matter pursuant to paragraph 2 
of Article 10 may make written submissions to, and be 
given an opportunity to be heard by, the Appellate Body. 
Any Member not having notified its interest pursuant to 
Article 10.2 but having subsequently notified its substantial 
interest to the Appellate Body and the DSB, within 10 days 
immediately following the date of the notice of appeal, may 
make written submissions as a third party to, and be given 
an opportunity to be heard by, the Appellate Body. The 
Appellate Body shall endeavour to address in its findings, 
the arguments and views expressed by third parties, as 
related to the matter of the appeal. i1108 
The oral hearing is an essential part of the appeal process. In this, the 
AB often asks questions in an aggressive and inquisitorial style, 
anticipating responses from the participants during the hearing 
process. The hearing is unlike the practice of the panel, which usually 
allows the participants to respond in writing after the end of the oral 
hearings. The participation of third parties during the oral hearings of 
the appeal process plays a key role in supporting the AB in making a 
ruling. This is particularly true when the AB deals with hazy provisions 
under the agreements covered that would have broader implications 
for all WTO members and for future disputes. In this regard, the 
AB 
can put extra emphasis on third party participants during the oral 
hearings, to deal with issues not included in their written submissions. 
When no third-participant input is available, the AB may 
find itself in a 
1107 Communication from the delegation of Cote d'Ivoire on 
behalf of the African 
Group, note 1090, p. 1. 
1108 Communication from Costa Rica, revision, note 1046, p. 3. 
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difficult position. Such a situation occurred when it confronted the 
standard for the proper burden of proof during the early Wool 
dispute"09 between the US and India. The decision would have 
inevitably affected all future WTO disputes, but the AB heard only the 
arguments of India and the US. This example shows the substantial 
incentive for the AB to increase the level of access for third parties in 
order to obtain valuable information regarding the views of the 
broader WTO membership. 1110 
The current attempt of the AB to broaden third party participation 
during the appeal process includes the establishment of "passive 
observers'. Developing countries with limited financial and legal 
resources do not really benefit from the current procedural rules 
governing the participation of third parties during the appeal process, 
which were established by the DSU and the AB. In fact, even 
developed countries with more sophisticated resources have found it 
difficult to appear as third party participants before the AB. For 
instance, Canada and Australia gave notice of intention to intervene, 
but failed to appear as third parties during the appeal process. "" 
In this regard, Smith argues: 
"A simple frequency count, of course, says nothing directly 
about the impact of different third participants on Appellate 
Body rulings. Nevertheless, it is clear that the US and EU 
have taken advantage of chances to present their views 
during appeals significantly more often than other WTO 
members. In fact, ... the US thus 
far has participated as 
complainant, defendant, or third party in every single 
1109 United States - Measure Affecting Imports of Wool 
Shirts and Blouses from 
India, panel report, WT/DS33/R, adopted on 6 January 1997. [hereinafter 
Panel 
report on US Wool Shirts and Blouses] 
1110 James Smith, note 1045, p. 553. 
1111 Ibid., pp. 553-554. 
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Appellate Body proceeding but one (Turkey - Textiles). Looking ahead, the EU has reportedly taken a similar policy decision to reserve its rights as a third party in every case in which it is not a litigant. Few if any developing countries have the resources to make such a commitment. 
Appearances do not necessarily imply influence, but 
governments that fail to engage as third participants clearly forgo potentially valuable opportunities to pursue their 
interests during Appellate Body hearings with a direct 
impact on the future of the WTO. "1112 
Allowing third parties to intervene directly at the AB stage could be 
advantageous to developing countries, as it would require fewer 
resources to intervene at the AB level than to do so from the beginning 
of a dispute. Furthermore, it could be more difficult for developing 
countries than for developed ones to clarify their interests at a very 
early stage of a dispute, and to identify cases that are of special 
interest to them as they are processed at the appellate level. 1113 This 
would give more incentive for developing countries to participate 
before the AB, and to have their say in the development of WTO 
jurisprudence, which takes shape at the AB stage. 
Argentina made this recent contribution to the debate: 
"The third element related to permitting Members which 
did not participate as third parties in the panel proceedings 
to join the dispute as third parties at the appeals stage. 
Under the current provisions of the DSU, Members were 
obliged to notify their substantial interest in the case at 
the panel stage before they could participate at the 
1112 Ibid., p. 561. 
1113 "This stipulation has created some difficulties for some Members 
in certain 
situations. Sometimes, panel reports come out with some findings or observations, 
which could not have been even remotely anticipated at the time 
the panel was 
being constituted. In the light of this some Members might want 
to become Third 
Parties at the appellate stage. " S. Narayanan, "Dispute 
Settlement Understanding of 
the WTI: need for improvement and clarification/, Indian 
Council for Research on 
International Economic Relations Working Paper no. 117,2003, available online at , 
http: //www icrier org/pdf/wp117. pdf, last seen on 3-6-2008 at 
1 pm, p. 48. 
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appeals stage, where issues of law and interpretation were 
essentially discussed. At the same time, it was possible for 
new third parties to be admitted as third parties to 
participate in compliance with panel proceedings occurring 
after both panel and appellate proceedings. Given the 
systemic interest in issues considered at the appellate 
stage and the interest of Members to make their views known, there was no valid reason for denying them that 
opportunity. Additionally, amending Article 17.4 of the 
DSU to incorporate the right of Members to join as third 
parties at the appeal stage would allow Members with 
limited resources to participate in the process. They would 
not have to participate in the panel proceedings before 
they could be allowed to participate in the appellate 
X1114 proceedings. 
Allowing third parties with a substantial interest to intervene directly at 
the AB level would be a better method of formalizing the practice of 
the AB in the Sardine dispute1115. This allows members who have not 
notified their interest to the DSB and have not participated at the 
panel stage to participate with amicus curiae briefs in the appeal 
process. Such a concession would also guarantee a better position with 
superior procedural rights for developing countries which intervene as 
third parties, rather than sending only a written submission to the 
division, without attending the appeal process or being heard by the 
AB. 1116 
8.8.1 The AB oral hearing and third parties 
Originally, third parties that intervened in the appeal process, unlike 
the panel, would have full access to the appeal proceedings: ""The 
status of third parties during appeals, in other words, is comparable to 
that of the disputants. They enjoy complete access to any written 
1114 Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/23, (26 May 2005), p. 
2. 
1115 More detail in chapter seven, section 7.4.3. 
1116 Minutes of Meeting, WT/DSB/M/134, (29 January 
2003), p. 15. 
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submissions and to all oral hearings. Third parties have a comparable 
opportunity to persuade and rebut, both orally and in writing, 
throughout the appellate processi 7 However, the practices of third 
parties have evolved alongside the practices of the AB, creating a new 
category of third parties, namely that of the 'passive observer'. 1118 
Although these can more easily access the appeal process, they can be 
cut off from participating in the oral hearings of the AB. Considering 
the importance of these hearings, India made a proposal stating that 
third parties needed to be given the opportunity to participate in them 
in all situations. 1119 Hence, developing countries which are third parties 
would not be banned from having their say in the oral proceedings of 
the appeal process. 
8.9 Consideration of Third Party Views in Panel 
and AB Reports 
The introduction of the US submission on transparency states that 
"over 10 years of experience under the WTO dispute 
settlement system has demonstrated that the 
recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement 
Body can affect large sectors of civil society. At the same 
time, increased membership in the WTO has also meant 
that more governments and their citizens have an interest 
in those recommendations and rulings. , 1120. 
The DSU does not require the AB and the panel to decide issues 
related to third parties in their reports. The current practice is that the 
1117 James McCall Smith, 'WTO dispute settlement: the politics of procedure in 
Appellate Body rulings', (2003), 2(1) World Trade Review 65, p. 84. 
1118 Passive observes have been discussed in chapter eight section 7.4.1. 
1119 S. Narayanan, note 113, p. 48. , also, 
Ravindra Pratap, 'India and DSU Reform 
Negotiation: A Critical Appraisal', in Koen Byttebier and Kim Van der Borght(eds), 
WTO Obligations and Opportunities: Challenges of Implementation, (Cameron May, 
London, 2007), pp. 382-383. 
1120 S. Narayanan, note 113, p. 48. 
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arguments of third parties are merely stated in the panel and AB 
reports, or attached as appendixes. Similarly, it has been argued that 
addressing the issues raised by third parties in the same original 
process would reduce the cost, effort and time required for multiple 
panels to establish a ruling on the same matter of dispute as a result 
of third parties requesting the initiation of their own panel. 1121 In this 
regard, two proposals could be considered that would result in 
resolving the issues raised by third parties. The first is to allow third 
parties to become co-complainants during a dispute. 1122 The. second is 
for issues raised by third parties to be directly decided by the panel 
and the AB in their final reports. 1123 
The aforementioned proposals need to be looked at in more detail. The 
main object of the DSU is to resolve disputes between parties; hence, 
the interests of the main disputing parties ought not to be 
undermined. Increasing the number of third parties participating in 
WTO disputes and suddenly turning them into co-complainants during 
the course of a dispute would, however, increase the complexity of the 
dispute. The proposal would also encourage an increase in the number 
of co-complainants with procedural rights equivalent to those of the 
principal parties. Furthermore, this would also raise confusion about 
the terms of reference. They could have their own terms of reference, 
and even raise arguments outside the terms of reference of the 
1121 Discussion paper from the European Communities, Subject: Review of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), Brussels, 21 October 1998, available 
online at http: //www lancs ac uk/fass/law/intlaw/ibuslaw/docs/wt-eu-dsrev. htm, last 
seen on 12-9-2007. 
1122 Allan Rasas, `Joinder of Parties and Third Parties Intervention in WTO Dispute 
Settlement', in Friedl Weiss(ed), improving WTO dispute Settlement system 
Procedures, (Cameron May, London, 2000); Discussion Paper from the European 
Communities, op. cit. 
1123 Communication form Costa Rica, note 1035, and Communication from Kenya, 
note 1040, p. 2. 
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original disputing parties. 1124 They could also have full participatory 
rights in the interim review process, in both the descriptive draft and 
the interim report, which would significantly increase the burden on 
the main disputing parties. In addition, third parties already have the 
option of making their own cases, either by themselves or jointly with 
other members, if they believe that they have a distinct matter to 
raise which differs from the one being discussed by the principal 
parties to the original dispute. Moreover, being a co-complainant is still 
not the best option for developing or developed countries under 
current circumstances, as they are subject to financial, legal, economic 
and political restraints. 1125 Many developing countries would rather 
choose to intervene as third parties, depending on the degree of 
interest they have in a dispute. 1126 
Allowing the AB and the panel to decide all matters in a dispute would 
not intensify the complexity of the dispute as much, since third parties 
are bound by terms of reference and are not allowed to raise issues 
outside such terms. These terms are established by the panel with the 
1124 Article 9.2 clearly states that "'The single panel shall organize its examination and 
present its findings to the DSB in such a manner that the rights which the parties to 
the dispute would have enjoyed had separate panels examined the complaints are in 
no way impaired"; World Trade Organisation, Dispute Settlement Reports, 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Volume 5,1998), p. 2154. 
1125 More detail on the current position of developing countries in the DSM chapters 
one, two and three. 
1126 Elsewhere it has been argued by South Centre that "Third party participation in 
disputes shows that developing countries are aware that the dispute settlement 
system is more than just a mechanism for the main disputing parties to settle their 
differences. It demonstrates that they appreciate the systemic impact of dispute 
settlement reports. This is also reflected in the DSU negotiations where some 
proposals are either based on, or aimed at enhancing, the broad reach of dispute 
settlement. The proposals on external transparency exemplify this. " South Centre, 
'The WTO dispute settlement system: issues to be considered in the DSU 
negotiation', Trade Analysis No. SC/TADP/TA/DS/1, October 2005, p. 16. 
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principal parties and outline the main criteria of each dispute. 1127 
Developing countries also prefer to interact indirectly with the DSM by 
participating as third parties, allowing the panel and the AB to deal 
with issues related to third parties in their report. This would especially 
benefit developing countries acting as third parties. 1128 By doing this, 
developing countries would not waste scarce resources (which could be 
employed elsewhere) in starting a new claim under the DSU. 
Moreover, as discussed earlier, in the oral hearing process the AB 
pushes third parties to raise new issues that are not covered in their 
written submissions, but which are within the terms of reference, in 
order to cover the broader views of the WTO membership. Allowing 
1117 "Chinese Taipei was of the view that the extensive involvement of third parties in 
the dispute settlement process could compromise its basic function of the dispute 
settlement process, which was to secure a positive solution to the dispute between 
the parties. If panels and the Appellate were to reflect the arguments of third parties 
in their reports, it could delay the process and consequently undermine one of the 
basic tenets of the dispute settlement system. " Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/6, (31 
March 2003), p. 6. "Costa Rica welcomed the clarification by Chinese Taipei, in 
relation to its comments with regard to third-party arguments being reflected in 
panel reports and the possibility of their being able to comment on the interim 
report. Costa Rica proposed that these arguments, in addition to being included in 
the report, should also be taken into consideration by the panel, provided that they 
are limited to the terms of reference established by the parties to the dispute. A third 
party, he suggested, might contribute different arguments and points of view in 
relation to some of the points under discussion and the panel should take such 
arguments into consideration. " Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/7, (26 June 2003), p. 4, 
"Chile, however, had strong reservations against the proposal that would require 
panels and the Appellate Body to give due consideration to the arguments and 
opinions of third parties in their rulings. This would not only complicate their main 
task, but could also distract their attention from the main issues and arguments 
raised by the parties to the dispute. Besides, it was not certain that such a proposal 
would benefit small delegations who were already finding it difficult to prepare and 
submit arguments either as complainants or respondents. In all likelihood, this 
proposal would only benefit a few important Members. It would also not be 
appropriate to involve third parties in deciding the panel's timetable and working 
procedures. " Minutes of Meeting, TN/DS/M/4, (6 November 2002), p. 3. 
1128 In this regard it has also been argued that "a complementary approach would 
be 
to press for an enhancement of third party rights in disputes, for example 
by giving 
third party arguments more weight in rulings. This would enhance the 
incentive for 
African countries to take third party statues in disputes, thus allowing 
them to 
benefit from the accompanying capacity building in a non-resource-intensive way". 
Amin Alavi, 'African Countries and WTO's Dispute settlement Mechanism', (2007), 
5(1) Development Policy Review 25, pp. 33-34. 
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the AB and the panel to address directly the concerns of third parties 
in their reports can be seen as a step towards establishing true 
multilateral ism, not only for disputes but also for trading systems. 
In the US - 1916 Act dispute, the AB also declined to give third parties 
the same rights of co-complainant stated in Article 9, asserting that 
the status of a co-complainant is distinct from that of a third party. 
The AB stated: 
"Although the European Communities and Japan invoke 
Article 9 of the DSU, and, in particular, Article 9.3, in 
support of their position, we note that Article 9 of the DSU, 
which concerns procedures for multiple complaints related 
to the same matter, does not address the issue of the 
rights of third parties in such procedures. Under the DSU, 
as it currently stands, third parties are only entitled to the 
participatory rights provided for in Articles 10.2 and 10.3 
and paragraph 6 of Appendix 3.111129 
Allowing the panel and AB to address the concerns of parties is 
preferable to allowing third parties to reassert themselves as co- 
complainants. The former permission is compatible with the original 
functions intended for third parties: to help the panel and AB to 
resolve complicated issues in one dispute but not in another, "which is 
the function of Article 9 of the DSU that deals with co-complainants". 
In this regard it has been argued that 
"... the judicial policy underpinning third party intervention 
stems from the preference for resolving one complex 
dispute at a time, rather than sorting out the conflicting 
claims of multiple parties in a single action. This contrasts 
markedly with the policy underlying the rules and 
procedures for 'Multiple Complaints' contained in Article 9 
of the DSU, which demonstrates a clear preference for the 
1129 United States - Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 (compliant by Japan and 
EC), 
appellate body report, WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R, adopted on 28 august 
2000, para. 144. [hereinafter Appellate body report on US Act of 1916] 
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resolution of multiple complaints concerning the same 
matter by a single panel and if this is not possible that 'to 
the greatest extent possible the same persons shall serve 
as panelists on each of the separate panels and the 
timetable for the panel process in such disputes shall be 
harmonized". 111130 
Enhancing the rights of third parties by guaranteeing better access and 
participation, and allowing the AB and the panel to decide on issues 
related to third parties in their rulings, is a better option for developing 
countries and the DSM than turning them into co-complainants in the 
course of a dispute. Benin and Chad clearly requested the AB to do so 
in the Cotton case, in spite of the fact that the AB has no authority to 
deal with issues related to third parties in a dispute. They argued that: 
"Benin and Chad argue that the Appellate Body should take 
into account the impact of United States upland cotton 
subsidies on the "fragile economies of West and Central 
Africa", as reflected in the Panel's findings and evidence on 
the record. Benin and Chad point out that Article 24.1 of 
the DSU, which requires particular consideration to be 
given to the special situation of least-developed country 
Members, would be given meaning if the Appellate Body 
acknowledged that the increase in the United States' world 
market share caused serious prejudice to Benin and Chad 
by reducing their market share. Furthermore, nothing in 
the text of Article 6.3(d) limits a finding of serious 
prejudice to the complaining party. Therefore, Benin and 
Chad urge the Appellate Body to draw conclusions under 
Article 6.3(d) that would require the United States to 
withdraw the subsidy or remove the adverse effects, not 
only with respect to Brazil, but also with respect to Benin 
and Chad. "1131 
This proposal on allowing the panel and AB to deal with issues related 
to third parties in the same dispute is not alien to international law, as 
1130 John P. Gaffney, note 1084, pp. 1212-1213. 
1131 United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, appellate 
body report, 
WT/DS267/AB/R, adopted on 03 March 2005, para. 214 [hereinafter Appellate 
body 
report on US Cotton] 
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can be seen by considering the International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea (ITLOS). This allows requests to intervene according to Article 
31 of the tribunal Rules within 30 days after the counter-memorial 
becomes available, similarly to Article 10 of the DSU, which is 
governed by Rule 99 paras 1,2 and 3 of the Procedural Rules of the 
tribunal. Once a third party is allowed to intervene according to Article 
31, ITLOS will deal with an issue brought by that party which is related 
to the dispute. 1132 
8.10 Conclusion 
The drafters of the DSU added an important element to it by 
regulating the rules related to third parties. However, it appears that 
the role of third parties has developed to be more important than the 
original drafters had envisaged, particularly for developing countries. 
This has made the current rules for third parties in the DSU important, 
but not sufficient. There is certainly room for improvement. 
The issues which need to be considered in the reform of third party 
rights in the panel and AB process include the following: 
- The condition for the intervention of third parties should remain 
that of 'substantial interest', without modifying Article 10 of the 
DSU to be within 10 days of the establishment of the panel. 
- Third parties should have complete participatory rights 
in the 
first and second meetings of the panel, and full access to the 
submissions made by the parties during the panel and AB 
processes. 
1132 Article 31 of the Statues of the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, available online 
at http: //www. itlos. or-ql, last seen on 06-06-2008, at 10am. Unfortunately this is not 
concrete disputes in this respect. 
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- It should be guaranteed that developing countries which are 
third parties will benefit from the S&D provided for developing 
countries in the DSU. 
- Third parties should have the right to intervene in the appeal 
process without being third parties in the panel process. 
- Third parties, especially developing countries, ought to have 
more guaranteed rights to participate in the oral hearings of the 
AB. 
- Third party concerns need to be addressed in the panel and AB 
reports, instead of their being merely reflected upon. 
ýý1 
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- Concluding Remarks 
The settlement of trade disputes on third party adjudication started 
when GATT was established. Because of its temporary character, the 
GATT dispute mechanism was governed by procedural rules: Articles 
22 and 23 of GATT. Developing countries outnumbered their developed 
counterparts as members, yet no specific provisions considered their 
special requirements. This led the GATT system to be classified as a 
power-based dispute mechanism, rather than a rule-based one. 
Nevertheless, the GATT adjudication system evolved to be more 
legalized, especially when the GATT panel was created in the 1950s. I 
It developed to give special and preferential treatment to developing 
countries, especially following the 1966 improvements to the system. 
Despite all the improvements that took place between 1947 (when the 
GATT was established) and 1994 (when it was replaced by the WTO) 
GATT suffered from severe deficiencies and failed to safeguard the 
interests of its poorer and less developed members. For instance, its 
dispute mechanism lacked clear rules because of its temporary 
character. There was no proper enforcement system. Most 
importantly, the 'birth defect' of easy blockage of the establishment of 
the GATT panel and the adoption of the GATT panel report prohibited 
developing countries from taking their cases to the GATT adjudication 
1133 system . 
1133 Developing countries and the GATT dispute mechanism been dealt with in 
chapter two. 
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During the Uruguay Round, developing countries supported the US 
calls for the establishment of a more law-based dispute settlement 
system that would treat all members equally, irrespective of wealth 
and power. In 1994, the WTO dispute settlement system came into 
existence. It then became clear that the Uruguay Round was not 
meant to serve developing countries and did not consider their 
development needs. It has been argued that the WTO dispute 
settlement system would be the single most important victory for 
developing countries. 
However, it does appear that what has been considered as a victory 
for developing countries is not without faults. In particular, this 
becomes clear if we examine the most fundamental principle of the 
DSM: that which allows fair and equal treatment for all members. 
Indeed, the DSU demolished the negative consensus rules and now all 
members have the right to a panel. It also has more sophisticated 
rules with an improved implementation system. also In addition, it 
considers the special circumstances of developing countries, and 
allows them preferential treatment under the so-called S&D 
arrangements. However, most developing countries do not have 
sufficient financial or legal professional resources to bring their cases 
to the WTO dispute settlement system, while most are either 
economically or politically (and sometimes militarily) dependent on the 
more powerful WTO members. This gives the latter an unfair 
advantage, especially in the consultation and implementation 
processes. The effectiveness of the S&D arrangements have also been 
questioned 1134. In fact, the difficulties facing developing countries are 
not only procedural and structural. It is also difficult for them to shift 
1134 Obstacles facing developing countries in the WTO dispute settlement system has 
been addressed in chapter three. 
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the emphasis of the dispute settlement system and decision-making of 
the WTO to suit their development need s113s 
Indeed, it cannot be said that all members have equal access; nor will 
they, unless they are given the tools to acquire it. Developing 
countries have used every possible occasion to express their 
dissatisfaction with the DSM and, and to propose ideas for reforms. 
Ironically, they have been active in participating in the official reform 
process, and did hesitate to express their concerns about the DSM. 
The reform of the DSM has, however, been conducted separately, and 
not as part of a single undertaking to restructure the WTO 
agreements. The reform of the WTO dispute settlement system started 
in 1999 and the last deadline (in 2004) has long been missed, leaving 
reform as an open-ended process. 1136 
Among the matters discussed during the DSM negotiation process, 
third party rights appear of particular importance in terms of both the 
function of the DSM and of developing countries. Indeed, it can be 
suggested that developing countries ought to seek opportunities to 
identify where they have a special interest in a case, and to participate 
as third parties. This is because developing countries that have never 
participated in the DSM can gain first-hand experience and familiarise 
themselves with the WTO dispute mechanism at lower cost (financial 
and political) by participating as third parties than as principals. Third 
parties have the opportunity to attend the first meeting of the panel 
and to see the parties' submissions to that meeting, as well as 
1135 Developing countries and the jurisprudence of the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism has been dealt with in chapter four. 
1136 More detail on the review process of the DSU in Thomas A. Zimmermann, 'WTO 
Dispute Settlement: General Appreciation and the Role of India', in K Padmaja(ed), 
the WTO and Dispute Resolution, (The Icfai University Press, India, 2007), pp. 165- 
173. 
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participating in the oral hearings before the panel. They also have the 
right to participate in the appeal process, to read the parties' 
submissions and participate in the oral hearing of the AB. With regard 
to the function of the DSM, third party involvement enhances the 
legitimacy of the panel and AB rulings. Finally, it would also appear to 
broaden the view of the panel and AB, allowing them to better 
represent the wider membership of the WTO in the era of international 
13'. 1 trade 
Against these advantages, it has been argued that third parties should 
continue to have restricted access. Indeed, many third parties, 
especially developing countries, have been denied access to the 
consultation stage on discriminatory grounds. Third parties are also 
excluded from the second meeting of the panel and the interim review 
process. They have no right to intervene directly in the AB process. 
Sometimes, especially in the case of developing countries, they are not 
allowed to participate in the oral hearings of the AB either. 
Although the majority of WTO members believe that third party rights 
need to be reformed, there has been a vigorous debate on how much 
they can be extended. To summarise, having examined the reform of 
third party rights with particular reference to the interests of 
developing countries, this thesis makes the following two sets of 
suggestions: 
1137 The importance of third party rights for developing countries examined 
in 
chapter five. 
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First, certain proposals should be adopted when considering the reform 
of third party rights in the consultative process1138: 
- The discretion of the disputing parties to decline third party 
participation at the consultation stage should be removed; the 
arbitrary discrimination against the access of third parties, 
especially developing countries, to the consultation process 
should be eliminated; and equal access should be granted to all 
third parties in consultation. 
- The term 'substantial trade interest' ought to be replaced by the 
term 'substantial interest' to be coherent with the provisions that 
govern third parties' intervention in the panel; the coherence of 
third party provision should be improved by making the 
requirement for access to the consultation the same as the 
requirement for access to the panel and appeal processes; and 
easier access should be granted to developing countries, since 
they have difficulties in anticipating their interest until they have 
actually received the necessary information about the dispute 
during the consultative process. 
- Third parties in the consultation stage ought to be paid sufficient 
attention, kept up-to-date and notified of the progress of the 
consultation and any solution that is agreed; steps should be 
taken to eliminate the practice of the third party, especially in 
developing countries, being excluded from being notified about 
the mutually agreed solution; and such parties should be kept 
informed of all the developments in a dispute, so that they can 
make a decision as to whether to establish their own panel. 
1138 More analyses on third party participation in the consultation stage and 
detailed 
reform proposals in chapter six. 
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Other proposals should be adopted when considering the reform of 
third party rights in the panel and AB processes 1139: 
The intervention of third parties should continue to be 
conditional on 'substantial interest', without modifying Article 10 
of the DSU to require it to be within 10 days of the 
establishment of the panel; this should apply, especially to the 
current practice of the panel, which allows automatic access for 
third parties to the panel process and which increases the 
incentive of developing countries to participate as third parties 
without obstruction. Another current practice of the panel which 
should be preserved is that regarding the time limit on the 
notification of interest, which would give further flexibility to the 
participation of third parties and be particularly beneficial for 
developing countries. Third parties should have complete 
participatory rights in the first and second meetings of the panel, 
and full access to the submissions made by the parties during 
the panel and AB processes. Against the tenor of its rules, the 
WTO dispute settlement system has become multilateral, with 
extensive intervention by third parties. The panel and the AB 
have realized this and extended third party rights on several 
occasions. However, they have added even more ambiguity to 
the existing vagueness of third party rights. The aim of this 
proposal to improve the access and participation third parties is 
in the spirit of the multiplicity of WTO disputes, and guarantees 
that developing countries can enjoy effective participation as 
third parties and gain real experience of the dispute settlement 
mechanism. 
1139 More detail on third party intervention in the course of the 
dispute and detail 
reform proposals in chapters seven & eight. 
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- It should be guaranteed that developing countries which are 
third parties will benefit from S&D provisions for developing 
countries in the DSU. This thesis proposes that the term 'third 
party' be added to Articles 12.10,8.10 and 27.2, so as to 
facilitate the participation of developing country third parties. 
They would then have sufficient time to prepare their arguments, 
to benefit from the technical assistance of the WTO Secretariat 
and be able to have panellists of their own in the Panel Division. 
- Third parties should have the right to intervene in the appeal 
process without being third parties in the panel process; in 
practice, the AB has allowed WTO members to intervene in the 
appeal process without notifying an interest according to Article 
10.3 of the DSU, in the form of amicus curiae. It is true that the 
issue of amicus briefs is highly political, and the practice has 
faced stiff resistance from many WTO members. Nevertheless, 
allowing third parties to intervene directly in the appeal process 
is the most cost effective manner for developing countries to 
participate in the most important stage of the dispute process, a 
stage in which they rarely participate. Therefore, a better 
codification of the AB practice is to regulate the possibility of 
direct intervention by third parties in the appeal process. 
- Third parties, especially developing countries, ought 
to have 
more guaranteed rights to participate in the oral hearings of the 
AB. If the AB is the most important part of the DSM, the oral 
hearing is an important part of the appeal process. Thus, 
developing country third parties ought not to be 'passive' 
participants. They should have a secured right to present 
their 
views at the oral hearings of the AB. 
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- Third party concerns need to be addressed in the panel and AB 
reports, instead of merely reflecting upon them, given the fact 
that considering the view of third parties in the panel and AB 
report will encompass the wider interest of WTO members. This 
is vital for the predictability and security of the multilateral 
trading system and the avoidance of the duplication of the 
dispute process on the same subject matter. This proposal is 
thus in the interests of the membership as a whole. But they are 
primarily intended to address the needs of poorer members. 
Third party participation appears to be the form of involvement 
in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism preferred by 
developing countries. They have the advantage of their concerns 
being dealt with without bearing the cost of the initiation of a 
new panel, unless they have a very distinct concern that is not 
included in the terms of reference. In this case they can still 
initiate a new panel as a last resort. 
Indeed, these proposals are without prejudice to the parties' rights to 
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Appendix One 
Segments of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism 
Consultations 
60 days (Art. 4) 
1 
During all stages 
by 2nd osB 
Panel established good offices, conciliation, 
meeting 
by Dispute Settlement Bod DSB (Art. 6) ) or mediation (Art. 5) 
0-20 days Terms of reference (Art. 7) 
zo days (+io if 
Composition (Art. 8) NO-FE: a panel 
Di rec roo r-General 
can be 
'composed 
asked to pick panel) Panel examination (i. e. panellists 
Normally2 meetings with parties (Art. 12), - Exper t review group chosen) up to 






(i. e. after 
Interim review stage .. ý Review meeting Dss's decision Descriptive pa rt of rep ort with pane I. 
to ha). e a panel 
sent to parties for comment (Art. 15.1) upon request Interim report sent to parties for comment 
(Art 1 5.2) (Art 15.2 } 
6 months from panel's 
composition, 
Panel report issued to parties . .. 30 days for 
3 months if urgent (Art. 12.8 ; Appendix 3 par 12 (j}) appellate report 
4 
up 4r nl's 
fr rom panel's Panel report issued to DSB 
establishment (Art. 12.9; Appendix 3 pa r 12(k)) 
Appellate review max 9o days 
E-o days for panel DSD adopts panelfappettate report(s) 
'oe 
(Art. 16.4 and 17) 
TOT. IFOR 
report unless includirg any changes to panel report made REPORT 
appealed ... by appellate report (A rt. 16.1,16.4 and 17.14) 
ADOPTION: 
usually up to 4 
months (no 
REA4ONýBLE Implementation 
appeal), or 17 
months (with PERIOD of 
T re port by losing party of proposed 
Dispute over appeal) from 
: determined by: im plem entation within reasonable period of 
implementation: establishment 
of panel to 
member time tb rt. 21.3} 
Proceedings possible, adoption of 
proposes, os including referral to report (Art. zo) 
agrees; or parties initial pa ncl on in dispute agree; 
orae r 
In cases of non-implementation implementation 
(app rox15 parties negotiate compensation pending 
full (Art. 21.5) 






If no agreement on compensation, DSB arbitration 
authorizes retaliation pending full on level of suspension 
implementation (Art. 22) procedures and 
Cross- retaliation: pri nciples of 
3oaysa 
reasonabbll ee same sector, othersectors, other agreements retaliation 
period' expires (Art. 22.3) (Art. 22.6 and 22.7) 
Source: Website, www. wto, org. 
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Appendices Two 
Articles mentioning developing country in the DSU 
Article 3: 12 
"Notwithstanding paragraph 11, if a complaint based on any of the 
covered agreements is brought by a developing country Member 
against a developed country Member, the complaining party shall have 
the right to invoke, as an alternative to the provisions contained in 
Articles 4,5,6 and 12 of this Understanding, the corresponding 
provisions of the Decision of 5 April 1966 (BISD 14S/18), except that 
where the Panel considers that the time-frame provided for in 
paragraph 7 of that Decision is insufficient to provide its report and 
with the agreement of the complaining party, that time-frame may be 
extended. To the extent that there is a difference between the rules 
and procedures of Articles 4,5,6 and 12 and the corresponding rules 
and procedures of the Decision, the latter shall prevail. " 
Article 4.10 
"During consultations Members should give special attention to 
developing country Members' particular problems and interests. " 
Article 8.10 
"When a dispute is between a developing country 
Member and a 
developed country Member the panel shall, if the 
developing country 
Member so requests, include at least one panelist 
from a developing 
country Member. " 
4I I 
Article 12.10 
"In the context of consultations involving a measure taken by a 
developing country Member, the parties may agree to extend the 
periods established in Article 4: 7 and 4: 8. If, after the relevant period 
has elapsed, the consulting parties cannot agree that the consultations 
have concluded, the Chairman of the DSB shall decide, after 
consultation with the parties, whether to extend the relevant period 
and, if so, for how long. In addition, in examining a complaint against 
a developing country Member, the panel shall accord sufficient time for 
the developing country Member to prepare and present its 
argumentation. The provisions of Article 20: 1 and of Article 21: 4 are 
not affected by any action pursuant to this paragraph. " 
Article 12.11 
"Where one or more of the parties is a developing country Member, 
the panel's report shall explicitly indicate the form in which account 
has been taken of relevant provisions on differential and more- 
favourable treatment for developing country Members that form part 
of the covered agreements which have been raised by the developing 
country Member in the course of the dispute settlement procedures. " 
Article 21.2 
"Particular attention should be paid to matters affecting the interests 
of developing country Members with respect to measures which have 
been subject to dispute settlement. " 
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Article 21.7 
"If the matter is one which has been raised by a developing country 
Member, the DSB shall consider what further action it might take 
which would be appropriate to the circumstances. " 
Article 21.8 
"If the case is one brought by a developing country Member, in 
considering what appropriate action might be taken, the DSB shall 
take into account not only the trade coverage of measures complained 
of, but also their impact on the economy of developing country 
Members concerned. " 
Article 24: 1 
"At all stages of the determination of the causes of a dispute and of 
dispute settlement procedures involving a least-developed country 
Member, particular consideration shall be given to the special situation 
of least-developed country Members. In this regard, Members shall 
exercise due restraint in raising matters under these procedures 
involving a least-developed country Member. If nullification or 
impairment is found to result from a measure taken by a least- 
developed country Member, complaining parties shall exercise due 
restraint in asking for compensation or seeking authorization to 
suspend the application of concessions or other obligations pursuant to 
these procedures. " 
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Article 24: 2 
"In dispute settlement cases involving a least-developed country 
Member, where a satisfactory solution has not been found in the 
course of consultations the Director-General or the Chairman of the 
DSB shall, upon request by a least-developed country Member offer 
their good offices, conciliation and mediation with a view to assisting 
the parties to settle the dispute, before a request for a panel is made. 
The Director-General or the Chairman of the DSB, in providing the 
above assistance, may consult any source which either deems 
appropriate. " 
Article 27.2 
"While the Secretariat assists Members in respect of dispute 
settlement at their request, there may also be a need to provide 
additional legal advice and assistance in respect of dispute settlement 
to developing country Members. To this end, the Secretariat shall 
make available a qualified legal expert from the WTO technical 
cooperation services to any developing country Member which so 
requests. This expert shall assist the developing country Member in a 




Third party provisions 
Article 4.11: third party participation in Consultations 
Whenever a Member other than the consulting Members considers 
that it has a substantial trade interest in consultations being held 
pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article XXII of GATT 1994, paragraph 1 
of Article XXII of GATS, or the corresponding provisions in other 
covered agreements(4), such Member may notify the consulting 
Members and the DSB, within 10 days after the date of the 
circulation of the request for consultations under said Article, of its 
desire to be joined in the consultations. Such Member shall be 
joined in the consultations, provided that the Member to which the 
request for consultations was addressed agrees that the claim of 
substantial interest is well-founded. In that event they shall so 
inform the DSB. If the request to be joined in the consultations is 
not accepted, the applicant Member shall be free to request 
consultations under paragraph 1 of Article XXII or paragraph 1 of 
Article XXIII of GATT 1994, paragraph 1 of Article XXII or 
paragraph 1 of Article XXIII of GATS, or the corresponding 
provisions in other covered agreements. 
Article 10: Third Parties participation in the panel process 
1. The interests of the parties to a dispute and those of other 
Members under a covered agreement at issue in the dispute shall 
be fully taken into account during the panel process. 
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2. Any Member having a substantial interest in a matter before 
a panel and having notified its interest to the DSB (referred to in 
this Understanding as a "third party") shall have an opportunity to 
be heard by the panel and to make written submissions to the 
panel. These submissions shall also be given to the parties to the 
dispute and shall be reflected in the panel report. 
3. Third parties shall receive the submissions of the parties to 
the dispute to the first meeting of the panel. 
4. If a third party considers that a measure already the subject 
of a panel proceeding nullifies or impairs benefits accruing to it 
under any covered agreement, that Member may have recourse to 
normal dispute settlement procedures under this Understanding. 
Such a dispute shall be referred to the original panel wherever 
possible. 
Article 17.4: Third Parties participation in the appeal process 
Only parties to the dispute, not third parties, may appeal a panel 
report. Third parties which have notified the DSB of a substantial 
interest in the matter pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 10 may 
make written submissions to, and be given an opportunity to be 
heard by, the Appellate Body. 
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